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THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY*S 
WHEAT POLICY 1973-88:
AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
Abstract
This thesis examines the political and economic 
changes in the domestic and international organization 
and operation of the European Community Common Agricul­
tural Policy for wheat during 1973-88. Its purpose is to 
demonstrate the opportunities and constraints in the 
agricultural talks in the Uruguay Round of the GATT begun 
in 1986.
An international political economy approach is adop­
ted to bring into prominence the key security, produc­
tion, finance, and technology power structures and to 
demonstrate how these transformed the interlocking and 
overlapping set of bargains that determined policy.
The thesis shows that throughout the 1970s the EC 
wheat price policy concentrated on supporting farm in­
comes, and this neither required nor permitted an exter­
nal policy beyond measures to dispose of surpluses. In 
the 1980s, however, prices were increasingly directed by 
market conditions. This reorientation was caused by 
shifts in the structures surrounding the wheat system. 
These weakened the pan-European farm lobby, and a patch­
work of new agreements evolved between policy makers, 
commodity groups, and non-farm lobbies to support an 
active rather than defensive export policy.
Consequently, the EC set specific commercial goals 
for the Uruguay Round of the GATT which makes it a for­
midable and active participant in the negotiations. In 
contrast, during the Tokyo Round in the 1970s the Commun­
ity had adopted a strongly defensive and obstructionist 
posture to protect its domestic system.
Examination of the agricultural trade negotiations 
between 1984 and 1988 confirms that the other partici­
pants have not recognized these transformations. The 
thesis concludes that the Uruguay Round could fail, and 
the GATT could be seriously impaired, unless negotiators 
acknowledge the transformed bases of the new EC wheat 
policy.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO POLICY ANALYSIS
The trinity of grain, flour, bread is to be 
found everywhere in the history of Europe. It 
was the major preoccupation of towns, states, 
merchants, and ordinary people for whom life 
meant 'eating one's daily bread.'1
Braudel's observation, which refers to the period 
between the 15th and 18th centuries, is equally apt to­
day. The trinity continues to generate great interest in 
business, government, and the press. Agriculture has 
been at the forefront of debate in the European system 
since 1958 and, in 1982, it was elevated to the top of 
the world trade agenda. The current round of multilater­
al trade negotiations (MTN) in the General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), more than any in the past, will 
be judged a success only if there is agreement on agri­
culture .
Trade policy, however, "is the stuff of domestic 
politics"22 and, as such, any examination of the GATT must 
necessarily begin with a review of the domestic policy 
system. This thesis therefore examines the political and 
economic changes in the domestic and international organ­
ization and operation of the European Community (EC) Com­
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) for wheat during the 1973- 
1988 period to demonstrate the opportunities and const­
raints in the current GATT round. An international poli­
tical economy approach is adopted to bring into promi­
nence the key security, production, finance, and technol­
ogy power structures and to demonstrate how these trans­
formed the interlocking and overlapping set of bargains 
that determines policy.
The CAP wheat price and trading system throughout 
the 1970s focussed on achieving social objectives. Pri-
Braudel (1980), p. 143. 
Spero (1985), p. 91.
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Aentrallu
ces after 1972 were based on the 'objective method cri- 
terion' to provide smaller and less competitive farmers 
with an income comparable to non-farm workers. Market 
concerns were largely ignored. Instead, the Community 
agricultural structures policy was used to rationalize 
the farm sector and to assist farmers to become econom­
ically viable. This domestic orientation neither requir­
ed nor allowed much of an external policy for agricul­
ture. Trade policy was used almost entirely to secure 
domestic supplies of wheat for European consumers; export 
was simply regarded as a cheap and simple means of dis­
posing of surpluses.
This thesis shows that the structures surrounding 
the wheat system began to shift about 1980, causing some 
of the underlying bargains that determine policy outcomes 
to break down and others to form or strengthen. World­
wide political and military tension lessened and produc­
tion of all goods became internationally interdependent, 
so that strict food self-sufficiency became neither ne­
cessary nor feasible. New production techniques and seed 
varieties, meanwhile, expanded output but made farms more 
vulnerable to the increasingly uncertain market, infla­
tion, exchange, and financial risks. Technological 
change drove producers, consumers, and policy-makers to 
adapt quickly to the new opportunities and information. 
Domestically, these changes reshaped the policy commun­
ity, so that the farm lobby no longer dominated. Bale 
and Koester note that beginning in 1980 "a fundamental 
change in the source of criticism occurred"3 and agita­
tion for change moved from outside the system (i.e., con­
sumers, the press, manufacturers, and academics) to 
within the Commission, Council, European Parliament (EP), 
Economic and Social Committee (ESC), and even into some 
of the farm organizations.
3- Bale & Koester (1983), p. 387-88.
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The price system in 1989 was fundamentally different 
from the one prevailing in the 1970s. Debate over prices 
in the late 1980s was largely directed by markets while 
the Community structures policy addressed social con­
cerns. Farmers in 1989 received well below the 'guaran­
tee' implied by the intervention priced two cereals co­
responsibility levies and a fundamentally different in­
tervention system (that operates as a market of last re­
sort and not an alternate market) ensure that market 
prices at least partially reflect market conditions. 
Future price changes also are largely dictated by the 
super levy system (which triggers automatic price cuts 
whenever the maximum guaranteed quantity is exceeded) and 
the 1988 budget agreement that limits growth in EC agri­
cultural outlays to less than overall budgetary growth.
This new system provides a firm basis for the Com­
munity to develop a lasting export presence. The surge 
in EC wheat yields encouraged by the incomes-based price 
policy of the 1970s placed many EC wheat producers among 
the most competitive in the world by the mid 1980s, which 
created inexorable pressure for the Community to move in­
to world wheat markets as a commercial exporter. Begin­
ning in the 1980s, the Community began to develop a vari­
ety of trade instruments and by 1989 the full scope of 
the complete EC wheat trade policy was clear: it would
include targeted marketing with selected refund offers, 
flexible commercial and concessionary credit, credit 
guarantees, multi-annual supply agreements, and an active 
storage system.
The EC push onto the international wheat market 
occurred just as shifting structures were forcing changes 
in world markets. Whereas the Community adopted a highly 
defensive posture in line with its domestic orientation 
in the 1973-79 multilateral trade negotiations, the new 
international focus of the CAP makes the EC a formidable 
participant in the GATT. The EC, as an outward-1ooking,
"Guaranteed price" refers to the effective support, 
provided for farmgate prices by the institutional (inter­
vention and threshold) prices.
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export-competitive participant, is positioned to take an 
active role in developing the rules and procedures in the 
world wheat trade. Provided other parties at the GATT 
recognize and accept this transformation, these changes 
in EC policy should enhance the potential for a political 
resolution to the subsidy dispute which has dominated the 
world wheat trade during the 1980s. The agricultural 
trade negotiations between 1984 and 1988 demonstrate that 
the other participants have not recognized these trans­
formations. The thesis concludes that the Uruguay Round 
could fail, and the GATT be seriously impaired, unless 
negotiators acknowledge and accommodate the new EC wheat 
policy.
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO FARM POLICY ANALYSIS
The single-disciplinary approach commonly used in 
academic and professional work has not disclosed the full 
array of changes in the EC. This thesis uses the theory 
of international political economy and Susan Strange's 
structures-bargains model to examine the EC wheat polricy, 
first, to illustrate the explanatory power of IPE and, 
second, to substantiate the fundamental changes that lhave 
occurred in the wheat system.
The reorientation in EC policy, however, has gone 
unobserved by most academic and government actors. The 
analytical approach chosen frequently forces the analysis 
to focus either on the microeconomic issues (e.g., farm­
ers, consumers) or on the macroeconomic concerns (e.g., 
security, economic growth) in absence of the political 
context. The analyses therefore frequently miss the cri­
tical linkages among the microeconomic, macroeconomic, 
and political levels. Most agriculture research, for ex­
ample, examines ECU prices and averages for the Commun­
ity, thereby ignoring that farmers, who are after all the 
basic unit in the system, work and live in a national 
context: farmers are concerned with national currency
prices and often divergent national market pressures, and
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have their most direct access to policy makers through 
national organizations and national political systems. 
Yet the policy system and many of the key economic pres­
sures facing farmers and policy makers are set in an in­
ternational setting. Analyses that ignore either the 
national or international dimensions err. An examination 
of international agricultural affairs, therefore, re­
quires analytic tools that span national industries, do­
mestic politics, international markets, and high poli­
tics. As shown below, the economics, welfare economics 
and international relations approaches fail to do that.
Economics
The economic approach concludes that the CAP wheat 
policy is inefficient and wasteful and, as Hill says, 
"the basic problem of the CAP is that it attempts to defy 
the underlying forces of economic development." He con­
cluded that: "If the CAP continues as it is at present
the costs of surplus disposal will bankrupt the Commun­
ity."* The US Export Enhancement Program, introduced in 
1985, is an effort to increase the budgetary cost of the 
wheat policy and thereby precipitate bankruptcy.3 In 
summary, economic logic says that the policy must be re­
formed .
Available evidence, however, does not support that 
conclusion. Studies (listed in Table 1.1) show that the 
annual economic costs of defying "the underlying forces 
of economic development" averaged only 27 ECUs per capita 
in Europe during the 1975-83 period. This suggests that 
economists have incorrectly assumed that the critical is­
sue is market efficiency. Petit notes that because econ-
*- Hill (1984), p p . 158-59, concluded that bankruptcy 
would occur in 1984.
=“ Financial Times, 6-9-84, reported that the USDA est­
imated that US outlays for wheat support would rise by 
US$10 for every US$1 cost increase inflicted on the EC. 
Other sources estimated the range was 5-1 to 19-1. Thus, 
the EEP was an imperfect means of achieving this goal.
12 Chapter 1
omists usually ask "how bad are the agricultural policies 
of country X?" the great majority of economic studies of 
farm policy have placed "too much emphasis on the norma­
tive and prescriptive, at the expense of the positive. n,£>
A plethora of macroeconomic studies (Tables 1.1 & 
1.2) concur that protectionist policies in the EC cause 
deadweight losses'7 for the Community because support for 
producer prices above the world market-clearing price 
encourages farmers to produce greater volumes at higher 
marginal cost than the world market clearing price and 
higher consumer prices depress domestic demand for food, 
reducing consumer surplus. Depending on the period, com­
modities, countries, and policies examined, the loss rep­
resents between 0.1% and 2.7% of Community gross domestic 
product (GDP). But agricultural policies are not unique 
in creating deadweight losses. Although national defence 
imposes a loss, few argue that the economic calculus in 
that case is the full story. The numbers really only 
provide an estimate of the cost of providing public poli­
cies. Both agriculture and national defence policies 
have other non-quantifiable benefits, such as protection 
from coercion from other countries or greater social har­
mony through greater equality of incomes.
Sector specific studies— inter-sectoral and multi­
sectoral— show deadweight losses for the Community for 
single years between 1976 and 1985 ranging from 
approximately 0.13% of GDP (Bale & Lutz for 1976) to 1.3% 
(Tyers & Anderson for 1985). The Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics (BAE) estimates the annual dead­
weight loss of all European farm policies averaged about
Petit (1985), p. 9.
7- Deadweight losses include wastage due to inefficient 
production and lost consumer satisfaction because of sub- 
optimal consumption. They do not include income trans­
fers, whether from or to consumers, producers, or govern­
ments .
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0.3% of Community GDP over the 1973-83 period, equal to a 
per capita loss of about 27 ECUs (in 1982 values or US$26 
at 1982 exchange rates).
Table 1.1 Cost of Agricultural Support in the European Coaiunity: Partial Equilibriua
(Intersectoral and Multisectoral) Studies
Ref. Author It Cossodities & policies Deadweight DW Loss
Year Date of Study EEC9 unless stated] Prices (DN) Loss as 2 GDP
1976 Bale & Lutz (1981) CAP It State Policies in France, C 1.2 B ECU 0.132
Geraany It UK; cereals, sugar, beef
1978 Morris: IFS Cereals, dairy, sugar, beef, C 6.2 B ECU 0.532
(1980) pigs, poultry, eggs It olive oil 82 9.3 B ECU —
1978 BAE (1985) Ail policies (CAP It National) 82 11.2 B ECU 0.482
for all CAP cossodities
1980 Buckwell, et al. Ail CAP cossodities It policies
(1982) (a) diff. from self sufficiency C 3.2 B ECU 0.132
(b) diff. from free trade C 11.1 B ECU 0.552
(b) diff. from free trade 82 13.5 B ECU —
1980 BAE (1985) As above 82 8.1 B ECU —
1980 Tyers (1985) Cereals, meats, dairy, sugar 80 22.3 B ECU 1.102
1980 Tyers It Anderson Cereals, seat, dairy, sugar 80 4.9 B ECU 0.272
-82 (1987) EC 10
1983 BAE (1985) As above 82 8.0 B ECU 0.322
C 8.6 B ECU 0.252
1983 Devereau It Morris All CAP cossodities It policies C 14.0 B ECU 0.402
(1983)
1984 Harvey It Thomson Ail CAP cossodities It policies C 13.8 B ECU 0.372
(1985)
1985 Tyers k Anderson All policies (CAP It National) 80 24.1 B US$ 1.302
(1986) for all sajor cossodities
Note: C leans current year; otherwise date is year to which prices are deflated. 
Sources: Walters (1987); BAE (1985); Buckwell, et al. (1982); and IMF (1988).
General equilibrium models show larger losses be­
cause higher food prices reduce household resources 
available to save or to spend on manufactured goods and
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services, while higher farm production attracts resources 
(including entrepreneurs) from other sectors, which re­
duces non-farm growth. EC farm support is estimated to 
depress GDP between 1% (Spencer for 1980) and 2.7% (Burn- 
iaux & Waelbroeck for 1985). Stoeckel's 1985 study esti­
mates EC farm support in 1980 increased exports from the 
agriculture, food, beverage, and tobacco industries by an 
average 37% and caused imports to fall by more than 20%. 
This increase to the trade balance raised the average 
European exchange rate by 4.4%, and thereby caused a 4% 
drop in manufacturing exports and a loss of approximately 
one million jobs (1%). More than 400,000 of the jobs
lost would have been in manufacturing.63 It is important 
to remember that these studies assume total factor mobil­
ity between sectors, which is not necessarily true for 
either labour or capital in the farm sector, and there­
fore could be too high, especially in the short run. 
World-wide, agricultural support is estimated to cost 
industrial market economies US$45 billion, or about 1% of 
their combined GDP.*9











1980 Spencer (1985) All CAP cofiffiodities & policies na approx 0.9X
1980 Stoeckel (1985) All policies (CAP & National) approx 1 
for all CAP coaaodities aillion jobs
n.a
1985 Burniaux & tiael- 
broecfc (1985)
All policies (CAP National) 
for all CAP cosaodities
na 2.11
Source: As for Table 1.1.
Stoecke1 (1985), p p . 40-41. 
World Bank (1986), p. 131.
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The economic paradigm of supply and demand curves is 
a powerful tool for analyzing questions of efficiency and 
wealth creation but operates only by imposing severe lim­
its on the variables that are considered: non-quantifi-
able costs and benefits are assumed to be unimportant or 
constant and therefore are not considered. Economic an­
alysis is perhaps most severely hindered by the explicit 
separation of political and economic processes. Econom­
ics implicitly assumes that a 'black box' political sys­
tem resolves all conflicting demands at one time, leaving 
a new equilibrium. This obviously does not happen in 
real life. Policy compromises are achieved recursively, 
as power and interlocking bargains shift. Economic pol­
icy analysis therefore ignores political factors critical 
to policy development.
Welfare Economics
Many academics around the world have adopted a wel­
fare economics approach to explain the CAP and to examine 
alternative policies. The theory of rent-seeking expands 
the economic approach because it examines how people com­
pete for economic rents created by the incomes-based 
price system in Europe.10 This helps partly to explain 
the efforts of large, efficient producers to push the 
farm ministers to sustain or increase common prices in 
Europe. The Australian government also adopted this 
approach to examine the CAP, concluding that "the best 
prospects for agricultural policy reform lie in groups 
outside agriculture realising their common interests in 
substantially changing the political will of governments 
to reform bad policies."11 The solution therefore is to 
educate European consumers, the unemployed and indust­
rialists to the costs of the CAP. But this approach is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for policy reform be­
1C>- Tollison (1982), p. 575, defines economic rents as a 
return in excess of a resource owner's opportunity cost.
11 - Centre for International Economics (1988), p. 6.
16 Chapter 1
cause it continues to ignore the critical importance of 
non-quantified concerns.















1976 Bale It Lutz 
(1981)
CAP It state policy; Fr., FRG, 
It UK; cereals, sugar, It beef
C 3.9 B 4.7 B 0.2 B
1978 Horris: IFS 
(1980)
Cereals, dairy, sugar, beef 
pigs, eggs, poultry It oils
78 23.3 B 21.5 B 5.1 B
1980 Buckwell, et 
al. (1982)
All CAP products & policies C 24.8 B 22.0 B 8.3 B
1979
-81
OECD (1987) All policies for EC10 (total 
consuser It taxpayer losses)
C 56.5 B — inc.
1983 BAE (1985) All policies (CAP & State) 
for all CAP coscodities
82 30.6 B 47.5 B 24.9 B
1984 Harvey It Thon- 
son (1985)
All CAP products & policies C 42.5 B 46.5 B *7.8 B
1985 Tyers fc Ander­
son (1986)
All policies (CAP & State) 
for sajor products for EC10
80 $49.0 B $27.2 B $2.2 B
Sources: Sane as for Table 1.1.
Josling believes that "preoccupation with efficiency 
of resource allocation and disregard for analysis of in­
come transfers has been a major cause for the frustration 
of many economists who see agricultural policy as a jum­
ble of politically motivated and expensive follies."12 
He, and others, therefore reject the strict classical 
liberal trade theory. The alternative, rent-seeking, 
games theory approach improves on classical economics be­
cause it identifies the transfers that flow among consum­
ers, producers, and taxpayers and thereby provides esti­
t2- T. Josling quoted in Haen, Johnson, & Tangermann 
(1985), p. 32.
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mates of which groups in society bear the economic costs 
and acquire the benefits of the policy (To.bie t.b").
But the welfare approach does not necessarily iden­
tify the potential for change. There are two problems. 
First, the theory incorrectly assumes that the bargaining 
position of each actor in the system is based solely on 
its relative benefits and costs. When opinion surveys 
are compared with the benefits or costs of the CAP, some 
of the results refute such a close economic tie between 
economic self-interest and bargaining positions. German 
farmers, for example, get an average 33% more support per 
capita than other Community farmers13, yet are the least 
satisfied that the CAP is "on balance ... worthwhile."14 
More importantly, however, this theory, like economics, 
still assumes that politics takes place in a black box. 
The distribution of winners and losers is usually pre­
sented as yielding an obvious outcome. But the political 
system does not work that way. The economic calculus of 
income transfers ignores the often more important social, 
political, and cultural concerns that determine police
International Relations
International relations specialists conclude that 
the CAP remains a key part of the political bargain be­
tween Germany and France that sustains the EC and thereby 
bolsters the Western European alliance against Soviet ex­
pansionism. The IR approach fails largely because it fo­
cuses almost exclusively on state-state relations and on 
international security and thereby ignores the increasing
13- Buckwell, et al. (1982), p. 141, table 9.1. Produc­
er benefits in Germany were estimated at 4207 EUA/head 
compared with the EC9 estimate of 2793 EUA/head.
14- Eurobarometre, 27 (June 1987), p. A118, table A40. 
Only 37% of German farmers agreed that: "Although there 
is a lot to criticize and to put right in the EC CAP, on 
balance it is worthwhile." About 44% disagreed. The 
nearest percentage of national farmers which disagreed 
was 31% in France and Luxembourg.
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commercial orientation of international relations. The 
CAP, in particular, cannot be understood completely with­
out examining the great variety of both state and non­
state actors.
It is certainly true that the EC Common Agricultural 
Policy was designed to contribute to economic and politi­
cal integration and security in Europe: "Farmers in par­
ticular were expected to facilitate this process, since 
they were considered to be a 'functional' group whose 
common interest would outweigh their national allegia­
nces."155 The early years of the CAP make sense in the 
context of post-war reconstruction and the impetus to 
develop a stronger and more integrated European economy 
because the CAP provided the means for the original six 
EEC members to strengthen their farm structures and to 
increase European agricultural production. As such, it 
contributed to the western security alliance.
Since then, however, international relations cannot 
properly explain the policy processes and developments in 
the CAP. Under-emphasising all other motives in interna­
tional affairs except security reduces its ability to
explain and contribute to the discussion of largely econ­
omic and trade-related issues. Henry Kissinger, US Sec­
retary of State during the Nixon and Ford administra­
tions, said in 1975 that "a new and unprecedented kind of 
issue has emerged." He explained that: "The problems of
energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of 
space, and the seas now rank with questions of military 
security, ideology, and territorial rivalry which have 
traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda."1** Interna­
tional relations does not provide a means to analyze such 
issues.
Pearce (1983), p. 143. 
Keohane & Nye (1977), p. 26.
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Runge and Witzke argue that "the economists penchant 
for treating the institutional framework as 'given' has 
left little to say about the CAP other than to cite its 
negative economic benefits."17 International relations, 
by ignoring both the economics of the CAP and the connec­
tions between domestic and international politics, has 
similarly reduced its ability to assist analysis.
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Carole Webb, in the opening chapter of the collec­
tion of policy reviews published under the title Pol icy 
Making in the European Community, asserted that the "fun­
damental intellectual problem [of policy analysis is] the 
problem of defining the boundaries."16 A major problem 
of the past has been to reconcile the economic, welfare 
economics, and international relations approaches. Susan 
Strange's States and Markets1*7 presents a schematic app­
roach to social science studies that incorporates and 
illuminates the relationship among the separate discip­
lines. In brief, she argues that society balances four 
conflicting goals: individual, group, or national secur­
ity; wealth creation or maintenance; economic, social or 
legal justice for individuals or groups; and freedom of 
choice or action for either individuals or groups. No 
society can elevate all these goals to an equal status 
because they are often contradictory. The relative power 
of government and private actors determines the balance 
among the various goals, which thereby determines the or­
ganization of markets and states.
Each of the approaches examined in the previous sec­
tion concentrates on a single segment of this balancing 
act. By examining the key focus of each discipline, it 
is easy to determine the linkage among the 'bureaucratic
Runge & Witzke (1987), p. 213. 
Webb (1983), p. 10.
Strange (1988).
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creations' of the social sciences. Economics examines 
wealth creation, welfare economics concentrates on dist­
ribution issues (also sometimes on the trade-off between 
wealth creation and distribution), and international re­
lations focuses on questions of security. Each, in Its - 
own way, works on part of the information necessary to 
understand policy.
International political economy, in contrast, 
attempts to examine the balance among each of these con­
flicting goals. By accepting the inseparability of poli­
tics and economics at both the domestic and international 
levels, IPE provides the means to deal with the second- 
best20 world of agriculture. International political 
economy analyses begin with the basic question of "cui 
bono"21 , or who benefits, but go beyond the economic cal­
culus to look at social, political, and philosophical 
issues and conflicts.
IPE therefore is a focus of inquiry which "denotes 
an area of investigation, a particular range of ques­
tions, and a series of assumptions about the nature of 
the international 'system'."22 Strange's model provides 
a means of putting into practice this rather general pro­
nouncement.23 She argues that ‘power1 decides the mix 
and change in balance of state and market control.2A The 
best approach is to examine changes in the four key 'pow-
20■ The general theory of the second best optimum states 
that "if there is introduced into a general equilibrium 
system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one 
of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian condi­
tions, although still attainable, are, in general, no 
longer desireable." The New Palgrave, V.4 (1987), p. 280.
21- Strange (1985), p. 23.
22- Tooze (1984), p. 2.
23• Gilpin (1987), p. 9 & 25, in contrast, proposed that 
the solution is "an eclectic mixture of analytic methods 
and theoretical perspectives." Eclecticism may be fine 
for well-read analysts but is an inadequate base upon 
which to build a discipline.
2 -^ Strange (1988), p. 23.
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er' structures in the system (i.e., security, production, 
finance, and knowledge) and to determine how they cause 
the essential bargains in the system to change. These 
usually overlapping and interlocking bargains among con­
sumers, producers, governments, and non-state actors pro­
vide the true background and explanation of system 
changes.
The Theory of Bargains
Strange asserts "drawing bargaining maps will ... 
reveal the domestic roots of international agreements, 
and tell us about what is likely to be permanent and what 
will probably prove ephemeral about them."253 All theor­
etical disciplines need a focus for analysis. Economics 
looks to the invisible hand of the market to regulate 
supply and demand while international relations sees the 
world as regulated by military might. Bargains can pro­
vide the same power and depth to IPE as markets and mili­
tary power provide for economics and international rela­
tions .
The concept of bargains, however, is largely unde­
fined or unexplained. The dictionary defines them as: 
"bargain, n. agreement on terms of a transaction; beyond 
the strike terms, moreover; make or strike a — ; come to 
terms. This definition is constrained by its contrac­
tual focus (e.g., union-management bargains or interna­
tional treaties). If bargains are only formal agreements 
or transactions and have explicit strike terms, many im­
portant tacit understandings that often fundamentally 
influence policy would be excluded. Thus, the concept of 
bargains must also include "understandings- n., agree­
ment, harmony, convention, thing agreed upon" as well as 
"conventions, n., agreement between parties; agreement
253- Strange (1983), p. 353.
2<i’• The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 
6th ed. (Oxford, 1976).
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between states, less formal than a treaty; general (often 
implicit) consent."2-7 Therefore, bargains in IPE should 
include all explicit or implicit agreements, understand­
ings, and conventions that underlie the operation of a 
modern economy.
Bargains in political economy provide a means for 
people to acquire power. The quest for power and the 
forging of bargains are therefore closely intertwined. 
Almost everyone would welcome an opportunity to bargain 
to increase their power. To a great extent, however, 'he 
who has, gets.' Bargains only convert potential sources 
of power into actual power, or exchange power over one 
area for power in another. The four power structures 
(i.e., security, production, finance, and knowledge) and 
the existing rules systems (treaties, laws, etc.) appor­
tion power among the various actors in the system. 
Shifts in the power structures therefore causes power to 
ebb and flow between actors. Bargains weaken or new bar­
gains are struck to accommodate the changes.
By implication, there are limits to bargains. Bar­
gains cannot, for instance, create power where it does 
not exist; they just make that power effective. Some 
bargains that provide structural power may create power 
that no other group had been able to use. Nevertheless, 
that power was always available. Bargains by their very 
nature also limit independent action by creating greater 
certainty. Individuals, groups, corporations, and gov­
ernments make either explicit or implicit bargains that 
let all parties know how each will react to specific 
developments. The converse is that each party to a bind­
ing bargain gives up  freedom to react in exchange for 
this greater certainty.
Ibid.
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The variety of bargains is almost as great as the 
number of actors in the system and they often overlap and 
interlock, so that adversaries on some issues may be al­
lies on others. It is not possible, therefore, to iden­
tify an archetypical bargain that encompasses all possi­
bilities. "The bargain struck is apt to consist of a 
highly variable mix of political and economic benefits 
conferred and opportunities opened up. Bargains will 
reflect both the positive goals the parties severally 
wish to achieve and the negative risks and threats from 
which they want to find some security."20
Leadership is the key imponderable variable in anal­
ysis of bargains. Public policy is created by people, 
who can act for either rational or irrational reasons. 
Consequently, the ebb and flow of bargains is not neces­
sarily continuous. By sheer force of personality, strong 
leaders may forge new bargains before the necessary 
structures have fully developed or can sustain failing 
bargains beyond their natural lifespan. Alternatively, 
weak leaders can precipitate the destruction of some bar­
gains that would otherwise survive for a time or fail to 
create new bargains when the structures are supportive.
Regimes and Bargains
Students of international relations might question 
the need for bargains. Regime theory, at least super­
ficially, appears to answer the same questions. Finlay- 
son and Zacher define international regimes as:
composed of sets of explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given 
issue area of international relations and which 
may help to coordinate behaviour. 1. Princip­
les are beliefs of fact, causation, and recti­
tude. 2. Norms are standards of behaviour de­
fined in terms of general rights and obliga­
tions. 3. Rules are specific prescriptions and
Strange (1983), p. 353.
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proscriptions regarding behaviour. 4. Deci­
sion-making procedures are the prevailing prac­
tices for making and implementing collective 
choices .S2S>
But the criteria for regimes miss the critical is­
sues in policy areas. Regime theory is directed primar­
ily at how states and governments conduct their affairs 
in a non-hegemonic power system which excludes non-state 
actors that are increasingly important in the development 
and determination of policy.30 Regime theory is also 
static.31 Each regime has a variety of norms that deter­
mine how states act; if even one norm changes a new re­
gime develops. Consequently, regime analysis is similar 
to comparative statics in economics in that it compares 
relative fixed situations. Bargains, in contrast, high­
light the dynamic nature of systems, and are therefore 
comparable to general dynamics theory in economics.
This can perhaps be best illustrated by examining 
the international regime for the world food system be­
tween 1949 and 1980 elaborated by Puchala and Hopkins.3=2 
Their study categorized the norms of the regime that reg­
ulated the food system as:
1. respect for a free international market;
2. national absorption of adjustments imposed 
by international markets;
3. qualified acceptance of extramarket chan­
nels of food distribution, such as food 
aid;
4. avoidance of starvation;
5. the free flow of scientific and crop infor­
mation, especially after 1970;
6. low priority for national self-reliance;
7. national sovereignty and the illegitimacy 
of external penetration; and
8. low concern about chronic hunger.
Finlayson & Zacher (1983), p. 275. 
Strange (1983), pp. 349-51.
Strange (1983), pp. 346-49.
Puchala & Hopkins (1983), pp. 79-81.
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This characterization of the norms of the world food 
system in the post-war period poses a number of problems. 
First, the order Puchala and Hopkins imposed on the norms 
is confusing. All the norms outlined by the two authors 
cannot be viewed as equal, or even ranked in importance 
as implied by their number (supplied by Puchala and Hop­
kins) . Norm 7 probably had the highest priority, with 
national sovereignty for most of the post-war period 
overriding concerns about free markets (norm 1), avoid­
ance of starvation (norm 4), free flow of scientific and 
crop information (norm 5), and low priority for self- 
sufficiency (norm 6).
Second, regime theory implies that norms— "standards 
of behaviour defined in terms of general rights and obli­
gations"— are accepted by all member states in the sys­
tem. At least three of the above norms fail that criter­
ia. Most developing countries, the EC, Japan, and the US 
have not allowed markets to operate freely (norm 1) in 
the post-war period. Governments frequently use quotas, 
tariffs, taxes, and subsidies to manage their domestic 
markets. Meanwhile, although the rhetoric supported free 
trade, countries worked hard to reach food self-suffici­
ency in contradiction of norm 6. Finally, Norm 2 held as 
the basis of the International Wheat Agreements, where 
exporters and importers were to regulate the market. But 
overt market control failed in 1969 and has not been re­
surrected .
This regime-based analysis of the world food system 
also does not contribute to our understanding of why or 
how things happen. If the above norms held relatively 
constant over the 1949-80 period, it is not obvious why 
the International Wheat Agreement rose and then collapsed 
during the period. Also, because regime theory is basic­
ally comparative statics, it does not show how change has 
been brought about. The "norms" identified above are 
better understood as bargains, which strengthened or
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weakened depending on support from states and non-state 
actors and on the development of the underlying power 
structures.
Simultaneity between bargains and power structures
Bargains and the underlying power structures are 
often interrelated and simultaneous. When parties to a 
bargain acquire structural power— to decide how things 
will be done— they also acquire the ability to build or 
alter their own environment. This creates a complex 
problem of where or how to begin to analyze a simultan­
eous system, where bargains create the structures which 
in turn either support or change the bargains.
Simultaneity is not unique to questions in interna­
tional political economy. All social scientists must 
approach and disentangle interrelated motives, markets, 
and power relationships to understand the world. In 
economics, for example, macroeconomists routinely build 
large, simultaneous econometric models to approximate the 
linkages between sectors. They start by setting the 
exogenous variables and then allow their model to iterate 
towards a stable and unique solution.
The IPE framework provides the means to do likewise. 
Chapter 2 shows that many power structures are influenced 
or determined by events well beyond the scope of any of 
the related bargains. Especially for this sectoral anal­
ysis of the European wheat market, most of the security 
and knowledge structures are not determined by bargains 
within the agricultural policy community. Consequently, 
those power structures can be examined in isolation from 
the related bargains. For the rest, where bargains bes­
tow structural power on actors in the system, an itera­
tive approach is necessary, starting with the baseline 
set of power structures and bargains and then examining 
how, over time, existing bargains are influenced by the 
power structures and how the bargains also change the
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power structures. This study of European wheat policy 
confronts the simultaneity problem directly by working 
iteratively from the power structures to the bargains and 
then to a re-evaluation of the power structures.
The structures-bargains approach differs fundament­
ally from the approaches reviewed above in that non-econ- 
omic factors are elevated to an equal status with econom­
ic ones. Economics, in particular, usually ignores or 
assumes constant all non-quantifiable non-economic fac­
tors. IPE uses the bargain approach to reveal the im­
plicit value attached to these non-economic variables and 
restore them to their rightful position.
IPE AND EUROPEAN WHEAT POLICY
Strange and Tooze posit that "sectoral analysis (by 
which we mean any study of the political economy of a 
specific industry in its world context, or of specific 
markets for goods and services) will illuminate the key 
bargains, whether these are inter-governmental, company- 
government, inter-company or intra-company, or between 
the company and its labour force or its financial back­
ers . 113 3
The European wheat market has been in a period of 
transition since the mid-1970s, shifting more towards a 
market directed approach from the heavily state-managed 
approach of the early years of the CAP. The use of 
Strange’s model reveals that change. Comparison of snap­
shots of the priorities of the system in the early years 
and again in the late 1980s shows that the system has 
shifted significantly away from security-distribution 
concerns towards wealth creation. The priorities of the 
two periods could be ranked as follows:
Strange & Tooze (1981), p. 12.
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1 = most important 4 = least important
The relative ranking of some of the goals is sub­
jective, but even a cursory examination of Community 
action shows that security and food self-sufficiency no 
longer drive the CAP policy. Commission reports now pay 
much more attention to the role and position of agricul­
ture in the entire economy and its contribution towards 
economic growth and development than in the early years. 
This simple substitution of goals has required a concomi­
tant shift towards market control and away from administ­
rative direction.
There are two cases in the past decade that excel­
lently demonstrate the power of the IPE approach: first,
the price system in Europe began to change beginning in 
the late 1970s as support for farm incomes became in­
creasingly expensive and shifting power structures 
changed the distribution of power within the Community; 
second, the Community began to develop a commercial pol­
icy for wheat through unilateral action and multilateral 
processes.
To understand better these changes, this study foc­
uses on common wheat3** and on the relations between con­
sumers, producers, and governments in France, West Ger-
3**- European farm policy distinguishes between hard 
wheats (durum) and soft wheats (frequently called common 
wheat). Within the common wheat class, the policy also 
differentiates between wheat of bread-making quality and 
feed-grade wheat.
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many, the United Kingdom, and at the European level. It 
is necessary to go beyond the general to the specific. 
Most studies of the CAP attempt to encompass all of the 
agricultural producers and products in the Community, 
which usually results in a vague analysis that does not 
truly capture the subtleties of the situation. Wheat was 
chosen because it plays a critical role in the domestic 
food industry: "The price of grain had to be given a key
position, cereals being both a staple food and a raw 
material for animal production, greatly influencing the 
price of pigs, poultry, eggs and, therefore, in an in­
direct way, the price level of all animal products."325 
Cereals were the first set of commodities for which the 
Community was able to negotiate a common market regime 
and still remain the focus of much attention.
Wheat producers also were and continue to be the 
most influential non-government actors in the agricul-
wheat growers' organization often makes them act as the 
spokesmen for all agricultural interests, especially in 
the European domain, even though they represent only a 
small part of French agriculture. In Germany, cereal 
producers predominate among the farm representatives who 
represent Germany in the various Community professional 
groups and consultative bodies."3^
Wheat, as well as dominating CAP diplomacy, is a key 
export commodity that has attracted international atten­
tion. The issue was raised at the G7 Summit in Tokyo in 
1986 and discussions continued at the Vancouver and San 
Francisco meetings of agricultural and trade ministers 
from the big five exporters over the following 12 months. 
Wheat trade issues also were prominently raised in the 
opening meeting of the Uruguay Round of the GATT and then
Priebe (1972), p. 5. 
Averyt (1977), p. 44.
tural system in Europe. 11 In France, the power of the
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paralysed the mid-term review meeting in Montreal in Dec­
ember 1988. Concern for wheat exports also caused Aust­
ralia and 12 other self-styled ’fair traders' in 1986 to 
form the Cairns Group, which may change the direction and 
content of future trade talks if it acts as a 'third 
voice' between the Europe and the US.37
Finally, within the Community, the three predominant 
nations in the fields of wheat production and agriculture 
policy formulation are France, Germany, and the UK. The 
big production increases (Table 1.4) were in the three 
largest producers: common wheat output grew to 52.4 Mt
by the 1984-86 period, up from an average of only about
Table 1.4 Common Wheat Production in the EC
France Germany UK Others EC9
Average Production (Mt) 








Average Area Seeded (M ha) 








Average Yield (100 kg/ha) 








Increase 1984-86 cf 1969-71 
Production 107% 61% 











Contribution to Production Increase








Compound Yield Growth (1969-71 to 1984--86)
Common Wheat 3.4 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.5
Source: Eurostat, Supply Demand Balance Sheets, ASC.
The Western Producer, 29-10-87, p. 15.
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24 Mt in 1969-71. ' v The total land seeded to
wheat in France, Germany, and the UK increased by about 
30% over the 15 years to 1984-86, largely due to a doub­
ling in the UK and a 26% increase in France. As a re­
sult, the three accounted for more than 84% of output in 
1984-86 compared with only 72.5% in 1969-71.
The other six members of the EC9 are either net im­
porters or insignificant exporters of wheat: consumption
of common wheat in those countries rose significantly 
faster than domestic production over the 1969-86 period, 
so that by 1984-86, they imported an average 4.4 Mt
of wheat annually, compared with only about one million 
tonnes in 1969-71 (Tk_ble lsT).
Table 1,.5 Common Wheat Production & Use in 




ooot Product ion Total Use Net Balance
1969-71 average 9,260 10,350 -1,090
1984-86 average 9,884 14,315 -4,431
Source: Eurostat, Supply ;Demand Balance Sheets.
Italy, although a major producer of durum and the 
only remaining large importer of wheat, "had only an 
intermittent and on the whole marginal influence on the 
creation and early development of the CAP,"3e and to a 
large extent continues to have little impact on wheat 
policy. Greece, Spain and Portugal have all joined the 
Community in the 1980s, adding significantly to the wheat 
production base. But their impact on the policy, at 
least until 1988, was minimal and therefore they are 
excluded from this study. Observers of the Community 
assert that the key pressures will continue to come from
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 149.
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the "big, not the small, countries— and from the north 
not the south" which means, in effect France, Germany, or 
the UK .3<5>
The remainder of the thesis examines the fundamental 
changes in the four key power structures (security, pro­
duction, knowledge, and finance) and demonstrates how 
they have affected the vital interlocking and overlapping 
bargains that sustain and support the European wheat sys­
tem. Chapter 2, examines the critical structural changes 
that have influenced the IPE of wheat in Europe since the 
mid-1970s. Chapters 3 to 7 examine domestic reforms cen­
tered on the price-fixing, beginning in 1972 and continu­
ing through to 1988, with a focus on how the shifting 
structures caused the pattern of interlocking bargains to 
change. Chapters 8 and 9 show when, how, and why the CAP 
has developed a comprehensive commercial policy for 
wheat. Finally, Chapter 10 draws some general lessons 
for the major world wheat exporting countries.
Duch£ne, Szczepanik, & Legg (1985), p. 181.
Chapter 2
POWER STRUCTURES: WHEAT. EUROPE. AND THE WORLD
The basic power structures of the Common Agricultur­
al Policy for wheat partly determine the shape and dura­
bility of the interlocking bargains and partly are deter­
mined by those same bargains. The CAP wheat policy has 
been influenced by a myriad of events that on the surface 
appear completely unrelated to wheat production, consump­
tion, or trade. But a gradual transformation in the in­
terconnected security, production, finance, and knowledge 
structures provided the basis for both the creation of 
the CAP in the beginning and for the recent reforms.
Greater complexity stands out as the most striking 
difference between the environment in the 1980s and con­
ditions in the 1950s. In retrospect, the earlier period 
appears relatively simple. In the first two post-war de­
cades the security structure was often characterized as 
'black and white': nations were either friendly or hos­
tile. National security was to be assured by military 
might and food self-sufficiency. Production patterns and 
methods were largely unchanged from times of the agricul­
tural revolution; small, atomistic farm units accounted 
for most of the acreage and production. World-wide, pro­
duction and trade was predominantly in and among the 
developed countries. Farmers and national governments 
also relied on a relatively stable set of financial 
structures (interest, exchange, and inflation rates) and 
the knowledge base was comfortably constant, with few 
developments that required farmers, governments, consum­
ers, or traders to adjust.
But the pace of change accelerated in the 1970s and 
1980s and made life for farmers, consumers, and govern­
ments more uncertain and complex. Each new shift in a 
power structure precipitated changes in the other struc­
tures, so that the stability of the earlier period was 
replaced with perpetual adjustment. The simple security
- 33 -
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structure of the immediate post war period was replaced 
by an interdependent world where superpower (nuclear) war 
seems unthinkable and strict national security is almost 
impossible because of the interdependence of production 
for both food and strategic goods. The agricultural in­
vestment boom of the 1970s and 1980s generated two diff­
erent types of farms. About three-quarters of Community 
wheat is now produced on high-volume and low-margin com­
mercial farms which depend on a stable supply of imported 
inputs, access to financial capital, and a properly func­
tioning distribution and trading system. These farmers 
often produce only a few products and have little opport­
unity to shift production. The rest of the farms in the 
EC are low volume and high margin, and remain small, un­
dercapitalized, and largely removed from commercial and 
financial pressures. This division within the farm sec­
tor complicated policy development at both the farm 
organization and government levels. Meanwhile, the farm 
credit expansion opened the sector to the uncertainties 
of impersonal financial markets: interest rates change
frequently, exchange rates vary greatly, and inflation 
occasionally causes havoc. When the Community became a 
major exporter in the 1980s it found that the export mar­
ket had also changed: price and non-price competition
had increased as developed country markets shrank and new 
opportunities arose in lesser developed countries (LDCs) 
and centrally planned economies (CPEs). Finally, the 
knowledge explosion in the 1970s and 1980s radically 
changed the opportunities and pressures on the CAP. 
Farmers became better educated, which helped them adopt 
new farm technologies. But more knowledgeable farmers 
forced governments to re-examine goals and methods be­
cause quick action by farmers increasingly thwarted gov­
ernment attempts to manage the market.
SECURITY STRUCTURES
The world security system has changed radically 
since the 1950s. Following the Second World War, the
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system was dominated by two large, expanding power blocs, 
led respectively by the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Cold war 
prevailed for more than two decades, interspersed with 
periods of fierce but isolated fighting (Korea in 1950-53 
and Vietnam in 1955-73). It was generally regarded as a 
bad time to be outside one of the alliances. The US Tru­
man Doctrine used a combination of economic aid (Marshall 
Plan) and military support (ANZUS, Baghdad, NATO, and 
SEATO Pacts) to encourage allies and friends to encircle 
the Communist alliance while the USSR expanded its influ­
ence in Europe and the Third World through direct mili­
tary action (Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), 
military and economic support for Communist forces in 
other areas (Vietnam and Cuba), and expansion and consol­
idation of its sphere of influence (Warsaw Pact of 1955 
and building the Berlin Wall in 1962). Rhetoric and an­
xiety both reached a high level. The threat of war seem­
ed rea 1 .
Food self-sufficiency remained a key security inter­
est of most nations. The Second World War had shown that 
food was a strategic resource: Japan annexed Manchuria
in 1936 partly to gain rice fields; Germany sought to 
control the vast wheat lands of the Western steppes when 
it invaded the USSR in 1941; and scarce ships were diver­
ted from military use to transport food from North Amer­
ica to the food deficient UK.1 In the immediate post-war 
period, West European governments set food security as a 
top priority for national reconstruction.
Since then, a series of economic and military fail­
ures have caused the two power blocs to re-evaluate their 
positions and seek less confrontation. Meanwhile, the 
economic structure of the world economy became increas­
ingly interdependent, so that food self-sufficiency now
1 ■ Kennedy (1983), p. 6.
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is less essential and less possible than in earlier 
times. The CAP, built in response to the cold-war cli­
mate of the 1950s and 1960s, appears to many as inconsis­
tent with the interdependence of the 1980s. This new 
world requires guaranteed access to world markets for 
output and to ensure supplies of inputs. In the opinion 
of many, the CAP, by dampening overall industrial output 
and investment in Europe and providing a visible target 
for trade disputes, threatens to destabilize the very 
features that underlie the security structure of the 
western world in the 1980s.
Security in the Cold War
The battered, weakened, and divided West European 
states concentrated on economic and social reconstruction 
in the post-war period. The US helped by providing all 
the national security in those countries immediately af­
ter the war but was determined to strengthen Western Eur­
ope in order to provide a bulwark against Soviet expan­
sion. Thus, the US encouraged West Europeans to join the 
NATO alliance and accept military and economic support 
from the United States. Meanwhile, the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), founded in 1948 to 
administer US Marshall Plan funds for European recon­
struction, successfully assisted rebuilding European in­
dustry .
But the Marshall Plan did not extend to the farm 
sector, where circumstances were difficult. Immediately 
after the war, farming accounted for more than 30% of 
German and almost 40% of French employment; governments 
wished to assure both the survival of these jobs and 
farmer support for the new democratic governments. The 
West German farm economy was in particularly poor shape. 
With partition, the output of the large efficient farms 
in Prussia was lost to the West. The region that now 
forms West Germany contained mostly small and inefficient
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farms.22 Immediately following the war, food was scarce. 
In 1947 the shortages worsened and food was rationed and 
during that winter thousands died of starvation. Al­
though the United States and other allied countries pro­
vided food aid, the German government decided it was un­
wise to depend on food imports. In response, both subsi­
dies and import duties were raised to encourage greater 
production. The other continental governments also con­
centrated on reconstruction. These policies were so 
effective that pre-war levels of food production in the 
EC6 were regained as early as 1951.3 Even so, the six 
remained large net importers of all major foods.
When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
founded in 1950 by the "Six" to manage the continental 
resources of coal and steel, demonstrated the economic 
and political benefits of European cooperation, continen­
tal farmers began to agitate for a similar agricultural 
arrangement. German and French delegations of farmers to 
the 1950 meeting of the International Federation of Agri­
cultural Producers (IFAP) called for a corresponding com­
mon agricultural market. The ministers of agriculture 
from France and the Netherlands subsequently embraced the 
proposition. Although unification proposals were dis­
cussed both by the Council of Europe and the OEEC, the 
effort failed in 1954 because of the collapse of the 
European Defence Community initiative.
But the European movement continued. The Messina 
Conference of the ECSC members in 1955 commissioned Paul- 
Henri Spaak, the Belgian minister of agriculture, to 
examine the possibility of creating a European Economic 
Community along the lines of the ECSC. Spaak thought it 
"inconceivable" for agriculture not to be part of any
Hendriks (1987), p. 35. 
Tracy (1982), p. 232.
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European community.* The Spaak Committee reported in 
1956 to the ECSC Council, negotiations to create the EEC 
began later that year, and, in 1958, the French and Ger­
man governments reached agreement. German industry would 
get access to the French market in exchange for French 
farmers' access to German consumer markets.
The United Kingdom, which had a different approach 
to farm policy than the continental countries, did not 
join in the founding of the EEC or the CAP because suc­
cessive governments judged that it had other priorities 
and opportunities. The UK preferred an open farm trade 
policy (with low consumer food prices and deficiency pay­
ments to farmers), rather than the protectionist system 
sought by continental farmers and governments. Moreover, 
the UK was unwilling to sever its economic and political 
connections with the Commonwealth, which would have been 
the outcome of joining the Community. By the mid 1960s, 
when the Commonwealth had become little more than a fra­
ternal club of ex-colonies and the UK economy had deter­
iorated relative to that in the EEC, the UK had missed 
its chance to help build the Community or its farm pol­
icy. In 1963 the Conservative government formally app­
lied to join the Community but French President Charles 
de Gaulle vetoed the application and the UK had to wait 
to join until after de Gaulle had left the presidency.55
In the absence of UK participation, the CAP was 
thereby created in line with continental concerns. Art. 
39.1 of the Treaty of Rome stated:
The objectives of the common agricultural pol­
icy shall be:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by 
promoting technical progress and by ensur­
*- Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p. 185.
55 - The UK finally joined the Community on 1 January 
1973. The provisions of the CAP were introduced in five 
equal stages until they were fully in force on 1 January 
1978.
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ing the rational development of agricultur­
al production and the optimum utilization 
of the factors of production, in particular 
labour;
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living 
for the agricultural community, in particu­
lar by increasing the individual earnings 
of persons engaged in agriculture;
(c) to stabilize markets;
(d) to assure the availability of supplies;
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at 
reasonable prices.
Nevi1le-Rolfe noted that "the next ten years, punc­
tuated by at least four major crises round the Council 
table, were spent in the search for common means to bring 
about the common ends so enthusiastically assented to at 
Stresa."6 The key provisions of the CAP were eventually 
agreed for the wheat regime in the early days of 1962, 
with the system fully in force on 1 July 1967.
Pearce argues that the main decision of the 1958-62 
negotiations was "that the policy's chief objective would 
be to maintain farm income and that its principal instru­
ment would be price support."'7 The common set of prices 
therefore became the most important feature of the CAP 
wheat regime. Until the 1980s, the Council annually set 
the target price, which represented the maximum price 
that farmers would receive, at a level which provided 
farmers in the consuming regions (i.e., Duisburg in 
Germany) with a desired level of support. The minimum 
(floor) price for wheat, called the intervention price, 
was usually set about 12% to 20% below the target price, 
to reflect transport costs between the producing regions 
(Orleans-Ormes in France) and consuming regions.® Market 
prices in surplus areas during periods of glut were pro­
tected from falling below the intervention price because 
public agencies were required to intervene and purchase
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 204. 
Pearce (1983), p. 147.
Swann (1984), p. 209.
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at an intervention price all quantities of grain offered, 
subject to minimum quality standards(^re 2,1).
Although the Community wanted to give preference to 
domestic production, it also wished to use world grain 
markets to stabilize the domestic market. If the EC sys­
tem had been autarkic, domestic prices would have risen 
sharply because farmers in the original six countries 
were unable to produce enough food to satisfy domestic 
demand at any reasonable cost. The wheat regime was 
therefore designed to allow imports whenever domestic 
production was inadequate. The Community defines a floor 
price for wheat imports (threshold price) such that the 
price of imported wheat in the consuming region is equal 
to the target price after accounting for the transport, 
handling, and other delivery costs from the port of Rot­
terdam to Duisburg. When the world price is below the 
threshold price, the Commission assesses a variable levy 
(tariff) equal to the difference between the threshold 
and third-country offer prices (cif Rotterdam). When 
world prices rise above the threshold price (as occurred 
in 1972), the levy becomes a subsidy to imports and helps 
hold down domestic prices. The wheat regime also allows 
exports of Community surpluses. The Community assesses a 
restitution payment (usually a refund or subsidy) equal 
to the difference between the EC market price (which is 
usually higher) and world export price. If world prices 
rise above the domestic price (as in 1972), the restitu­
tion becomes a tax on exports, ensuring that producers do 
not receive more than the domestic price.
This system of protected internal markets and 
limited access to international markets suited both the 
national security concerns of the original six member 
states in the 1950s and 1960s and the strategic goals of 
the US. The CAP was deemed a "cornerstone" of the secur­
ity policy of Europe because higher prices and farm in­
comes were expected to encourage production and protect
Power Structures; Wheat, Europe, and the World 41
employment in the farm sector. A stronger farm sector 
would support economic growth in Europe and farmers would 
sustain the efforts to integrate the European economy. 
Taylor argues that the cost of the CAP was minimal rela­
tive to the potential cost of war and concluded that "a 
more unified western Europe could provide a stronger 
deterrent against further Soviet expansion, both because 
of its ability to organize a more coordinated military 
effort and because of its diplomatic weight."*9 Keohane 
and Nye point out that the US government accepted the 
autarkic agricultural system in the EC because "concern 
about a communist military threat helped stimulate Ameri­
cans to make short-run economic sacrifices."10 Conse­
quently, the US accepted in the Kennedy Round of the GATT 
in 1963 that the CAP was compatible with the general pro­
visions of the Treaty.
—  Figure 2.1 ----------------------------------------------
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The EC political commitment to food self-sufficiency 
was then bolstered during the early 1970s when the world 
supply of food, energy, and raw materials appeared to be 
running out. Many of the European colonies which gained 
independence between 1945 and 1965 formed regional or 
commodity groups and worked to redistribute both politi­
cal and economic power in the world system. In 1973, the 
impact was first felt when the OPEC nations took the 
opportunity of the Israeli-Arab war to triple oil prices. 
This event provided the impetus for intensive, almost 
panic-driven, Malthusian analysis of the supply and de­
mand situation in commodity markets. Governments consi­
dered rationing and market control, academics examined 
the economics and politics of commodity markets, and in­
ternational agencies such as the Club of Rome produced 
voluminous reports forecasting increasing scarcity and 
conflict over commodities. During that period food also 
was used as a political weapon. The US had frequently 
used food aid to reward friendly countries but during the 
1970s it accepted that food exports could also be selec­
tively withheld to support its foreign policy (e.g., the 
1979 grain embargo against the Soviet Union in response 
to the invasion of Afghanistan).
EC policy makers were comforted in their knowledge 
that Europe was fast approaching self-sufficiency in most 
temperate-zone foods because of the CAP. The Community 
thus entered the 1980s convinced that the CAP was a cor­
nerstone of both European and world security.
Security in the 1980s
During the 1970s, super-power politics began to 
shift towards discussion and mutual coexistence and away 
from confrontation. The Nixon administration finally 
opened trade and diplomatic relations with the Peoples' 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 and, shortly afterward, 
the US negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam. Disengagement 
between the two military blocs in Asia and opening re la-
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tions with China reduced tensions between the communist 
and capitalist blocs. Jointly, the US and USSR used this 
period of reduced tension to implement new agreements to 
lessen the nuclear threat. In addition to the Partial 
Test Ban Treaty and Hot-Line Agreement from the 1960s, 
the two governments negotiated the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (1968), the Helsinki Accord (1975), and the Stra­
tegic Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT I and II) in 1972 
and 1979.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and elec­
tion of President Ronald Reagan in the United States in 
1980 at first appeared to signal a return to cold war 
politics. But changes within the Eastern bloc checked 
this tendency and subsequently accelerated disengagement. 
The economic troubles that plagued Poland beginning in 
1980 also began to appear in other Eastern bloc coun­
tries. Then, the death in 1982 of Leonid Brezhnev, Gen­
eral Secretary of the Communist Party in the USSR since 
1963, opened the way for new leadership. When Mikhail 
Gorbachev gained power in 1985, he introduced sweeping 
reforms of Soviet politics, economics, and international 
affairs. These efforts reached a peak in 1987-89 when 
the Soviet government introduced the economic 'perest­
roika' program of market liberalization and the 'glast- 
nost' political reforms, held contested elections for the 
Supreme Soviet, withdrew military forces from Afghanis­
tan, pressed Cuba and Vietnam to resolve territorial dis­
putes in Angola and Kampuchea, announced unilateral cuts 
in conventional military forces in Europe, and negotiated 
agreement on intermediate range nuclear missiles (SALT 
III). Gorbachev signalled that the international reforms 
were more than just fine tuning when he declared in Cuba 
in 1989 that "we are against the doctrines that endorse 
the export of revolution or counter-revolution" and that 
Russia is "not seeking political or military advantages
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in [the North American] hemisphere."11 In May 1989, Sov­
iet allies began to dismantle the ’iron curtain' security 
fence dividing Eastern and Western Europe, the ultimate 
symbol of the cold war.12
As United States strategic interests shifted, the US 
government re-evaluated its trade policy. Disengagement 
between the two super-power blocs and declining economic 
growth changed the balance between international and 
domestic concerns. Beginning in the 1970s in the Tokyo 
Round of GATT and continuing through the 1980s, the US 
government sought to open foreign markets to expand trade 
and enhance economic growth, which conflicted with the 
long-standing US policy of support for European integra­
tion. As domestic concerns gained the upper hand, the 
official US policy shifted. First, in 1982, President 
Reagan announced the US would never again use food embar­
goes to enforce its other foreign policy objectives; farm 
exports would henceforward be driven exclusively by com­
mercial concerns. Since then, the US has actively criti­
cized European policies that limit trade and investment: 
the CAP wheat policy became the prime target.
At the same time, the world economy has been trans­
formed by the expansion of trade and the operation of 
large transnational corporations. The traded share of 
national GDP continued to rise in almost all national 
economies over the 1960-85 period, leaving the European 
member states more open to international market develop­
ments. Meanwhile, transnational corporations transformed 
the nature of international trade, as much of it became 
intra-industry and intra-firm. Aquino found that in 1972 
intra-industry trade represented more than 70% of Canad­
ian international trade, most of Western Europe's, and
The Economist, 8-4-89. 
The Economist, 6-5-89.
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about 57% of US trade.13 Much of this intra-industry- 
trade was also intra-firm trade, with transnational cor­
porations producing components of single products in dif­
ferent countries and only assembling them in the destina­
tion market (i.e., 'screw driver' plants). Such strat­
egic goods as aircraft, trucks, computers, and weaponry 
have become world products. This production system de­
pends critically on the continuation of trade and finan­
cial flows. European and US strategic interests there­
fore dictate their support for liberal trade and exchange 
regimes.14
EC strategic interests have also changed in other 
ways. When the EC faced the threat of world-wide food 
shortage in the 1970s, policy makers were initially com­
forted by their knowledge that Europe had nearly achieved 
temperate-zone food self-sufficiency. But detailed study 
revealed that it did not necessarily provide greater 
security from international developments. Livestock and 
dairy yields now depend critically on imported high-pro- 
tein feeds from America and the LDCs while the whole farm 
industry is heavily dependent on imported energy (used to 
operate machinery and embodied in the yield-enhancing 
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides). The Community 
had and still has little prospect of reducing dependence 
on these imports. The EC therefore has a strong reason 
to support and strengthen the world trading system. The 
autarkic CAP system, however, undercuts the EC bargaining 
position in world trade forums.
General economic developments both within the Euro­
pean Community and in the world economy during the late 
1970s and in the 1980s further shifted EC security inter­
ests. Overall growth in real economic output in the EC12 
slowed to 1.7% per annum in the 1980s from about 3% in
13- Lipson (1983), p. 261, ci+eci Aq oino doJLa.
1'+- Pearce (1981) , p. 61.
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the 1970s and almost 5% In the 1960s. At the same time, 
employment, which had grown only 0.2% annually over the 
1960-80 period, fell about 2.6% during the 1981-83 reces­
sion and had barely recovered 1980 levels by 1988. When 
the post-war baby-boomers entered the labour market in 
the late 1970s, that growth rate was unable to satisfy 
employment demand. Consequently, the average unemploy­
ment rate in the Community rose from a relatively stable 
range of 2% to 2.5% in the early 1970s to a peak of 11.1% 
in 1985-86 (for EC9).. By 1988, the
average unemployment rate had dropped only marginally to 
10.8% while the French jobless rate continued to rise.
The EC economy, with stagnant economic growth and 
high unemployment, compared poorly with Japan or the US. 
Japanese growth slowed from over 10% per annum in the 
1960s to an average 3.5% in the 1980s, but employment 
continued to grow in the 1% range, holding the unemploy­
ment rate below 4%. In the US, economic growth slowed in 
the 1970s but accelerated sharply after the 1982 world­
wide recession, creating an average 2.4% more jobs per 
year over the next five years. From a high 9.7% in 1982, 
the jobless rate dropped below 6% in 1988 for the first 
time in almost a decade and was judged by many to be near 
the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment 
(i.e., "natural rate"). The growing economic disparity 
between Europe, the US, and Japan threatens EC security 
and autonomy. Unless the EC economy can at least main­
tain its relative place in the world economy, it cannot 
participate fully in either western economic relations or 
the security alliance.
The European Council in Copenhagen recognized these 
trends in 1982 and confirmed that it would seek to comp­
lete the single European market within 10 years in an 
effort to strengthen the economy. The movement for a 
stronger Europe was then taken up by the new Commission 
of the European Communities in 1985 and the Single Act
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was signed and enacted on 1 July 1987, creating the "One 
Europe" policy of intra-community trade liberalization. 
The Single Market is designed to create more efficient 
and dynamic pan-European corporations that can compete on 
world markets, thereby boosting economic and employment 
growth in Europe in the 1990s. The Commission and most 
governments in the member states believe that the maximum 
benefits from the 1992 policy will only be realized when 
strengthened pan-European corporations compete in a more 
open world marketplace. Opening intra-EC markets will 
not be enough because they are mature: in the late 1980s
per capita incomes were rising only slowly, housing and 
consumer markets were reasonably well satisfied, and 
national populations were either stagnant or declining 
(e.g., Germany). Before 1988, debate over CAP reform 
frequently diverted attention from the domestic adjust­
ments emanating from the 1992 policy and the EC position 
on international farm policy reform threatened to derail 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT twice between 1986 and 
1989. The reform of the CAP, therefore, a became a stra­
tegic goal of the Community during the 1980s because it 
represented a major stumbling block in the pursuit of a 
strengthened international trade system.
Although primarily sold as an economic measure, the 
Single Market also has a political dimension. As the 
cold-war thawed in the 1980s, concern increased, especi­
ally in France, that West Germany could be enticed from 
the West European alliance by promises of reunification 
of the two Germanies.1=5 The 1949 Basic Law stated reuni­
fication was a goal of the new Federal Republic. As 
East-West relations improved. West Germans became less 
convinced that they needed either NATO or the US nuclear 
umbrella. France decided that if the internal market was 
completed, West Germany would find it increasingly diffi­
1S* B. Beedham, "East of Eden*. A Survey of Eastern Eur­
ope," The Economist, 12-8-89, p. 18.
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cult, and ultimately impossible, to contemplate turning 
from the EC toward either a neutralist or nationalist 
status, either alone or re-unified with East Germany. 
France therefore accepted that the CAP would need to be 
reformed, so that farm outlays could be cut and resources 
redirected to implement the measures that would be needed 
to complete the Single Market. Consequently, the CAP, 
which in the 1950s and 1960s was regarded as a corner­
stone of the western security alliance, was by the 1980s 
viewed as a stumbling block in the path to a new West 
European security structure.
PRODUCTION STRUCTURES
In the early postwar years and up to the beginning 
of the CAP, the typical continental farm was a "small 
family undertaking employing only a few work units, usu­
ally members of the farmer's family."1'*’ These small 
farms had low productivity (output per hectare or per 
head of cattle) and generally produced a wide range of 
products in much the same way as their ancestors had done 
since the agricultural revolution of the 18th century. 
They produced most of the inputs for crops or livestock 
(horsepower, fertilizers, and feed) and consumed or pro­
cessed a large portion of the output on the farm (feed, 
dairy products, vegetables, and fruit) or sold directly 
to consumers. Meanwhile, world markets were dominated by 
production in the northern, developed countries.
Over the intervening 30 years, European agriculture 
emerged as a highly productive sector capable of compet­
ing in the world markets. Cline has argued that for many 
industrial sectors "comparative advantage is made, not 
given."1'7 The same is true for farming, as it has become 
commercialized and more dependent on inputs and markets. 
Community policies on prices, finance, investment, taxes,
Green Europe 217, p. 55.
W. Cline in Rubin & Graham (1984), p. 26.
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trade, regulations, and research have largely overcome 
the limitations imposed by the endowment of farm land in 
Europe, so that EC farmers now are competitive with the 
best in the rest of the world. Although the majority of 
farm output now is produced on large commercial farms, 
there remain a significant number of small farms in dis­
advantaged regions10 in all countries. At the same time, 
world markets have changed rapidly. Wheat production has 
shifted into the developing world and by the mid-1980s 
India and China were usually able to meet their needs 
from domestic production. But world wheat supply has not 
become more secure because production in new areas is 
more volatile and risky than in the older, more estab­
lished growing areas. Furthermore, although the new pro­
duction techniques increased productivity, they did 
little to relieve the risks or consequences of severe 
drought, as was demonstrated in North America in 1988.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Production Advances
The key change in the past 30 years was the surge in 
capital investment in farm machinery, structures, and 
technologies in Europe. The EC farm sector received an 
above average share of the new gross fixed capital for­
mation (GFCF) following the beginning of the CAP. German 
and British farmers, in particular, consistently invested 
heavily while French farmers were slow to invest in new 
capital equipment or infrastructure until increased gov­
ernment support encouraged expansion in the mid-1970s
The different investment patterns in the three main 
wheat producing countries in Europe result from the 
structure of the industry and the support from the res­
pective national governments. In Germany, small farmers
1<3' The EC has defined approximately half of all the 
farm area in the Community as 'disadvantaged.' Most of 
that land has natural disadvantages (e.g., hills and lack 
of moisture) or has a poor economic structure (e.g., land 
holdings smaller than economically viable).
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Table 2.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a % of Gross 
Value-Added at Factor Cost
1970 1973 1976 1981 1983 1987
Farm France 15 .9 17.9 22.1 23.0 21.8 15.1
Sector FRG 26 .7 24.6 25.9 27.6 25.3 31.0
UK 24.6 28.9 26 .4 20.3 23.7 —
EC10 20.4 20.2 24.2 26.0 22.3 —
Total France 23.4 17.7 23.3 21.1 — 19.4
Economy FRG 25 .5 17.4 20.2 21.9 15.5 19.4
UK 18.6 15 .9 18.9 15.7 13.5 17.3
EC10 24.6 16 .9 22.1 22.3 — — —“
Sources: Stoeckel (1985), p. 25; COM(85)333, table lb;
ASC 1988, p. T .37.
were well supported by government funds to modernize and 
invest in new technologies. In contrast, the relatively 
large farmers in the UK were not assisted to nearly the 
same extent. The UK government wound down its income 
support programs when the CAP support systems were intro­
duced and did not replace them with significant produc­
tion enhancing programs. In the late 1970s, the UK gov­
ernment re-directed efforts toward expanded research 
activities and dissemination of information to the farm 
industry. Farm investment continued strong even without 
government support, however, because the larger, more 
commercially viable UK farms had adequate profit to re­
invest and could easily borrow additional amounts. In 
France, on-farm investment accelerated after 1975 when 
government aids were supplemented by an expanded program 
of research and farmer training in an effort to improve 
the technical skills of existing f armers (lab)ez.2),
Much of the capital invested in farming was used 
for equipment, irrigation, and land drainage, thereby 
helping to improve the productivity of the land. The 
most important change in farm practice brought about by
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Table 2.2 National Expenditure on Agriculture (M ECU)
Outlays For: 1975 1976 1977 1980
Projects to France 57.6 92.1 71.2 185.0
enhance Germany 50.6 44.5 79.6 109.7
production UK 88.6 76.0 53.1 32.2
Land & France 162.1 745.2 260.6 1463.6
cost Germany 647.6 780.3 536.5 681.3
improvement UK 269.0 212.4 146.4 466 .4
I ncome France 963.9 891.2 1317.4 733.5
support & Germany 753.6 624.8 621.6 547.8
other UK 1093.5 286 .8 348.6 254.4
Total France 1183.6 1728.5 1649.2 2382.1
Germany 1451.8 1449.6 1237.7 1338.8
UK 1451.1 575 .2 584.1 753.0
Source: ASC , 1977, :1978, 1980, 1986 .
this investment was the large increase in use of power 
machinery and equipment.1<? By 1985, virtually every 
farmer owned or had use of (through cooperative arrange- 
ments) both tractors and combine harvesters^. As powered 
machinery replaced the horse, more land became available 
for cash crops. In the EC9 member states, farmers plant­
ed 3.7 Mha of oats (the main feed for livery animals) as 
recently as 1968. By 1987 the area planted to oats in 
those states had declined to 1.3 Mha.
1S>- Johnson (1973), p. 73, showed that the earlier move­
ment from animal to tractor power in the US made possible 
the sharply increased level of production. He calculated 
that the maximum horsepower (hp) available if all land 
was used for feed would only be about 125 M hp; in 1970 
the US farm industry required about 200 M hp to produce 
and harvest the crop. Thus, the current level of produc­
tion usable off-farm could not be sustained without trac­
tors and petroleum.
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Table 2.3 Investment in Tractors and Combine Harvesters
France Germany UK
Tractors (000) 19581 623.0 699.2 512.0
1985 1485.0 1479.0 515.2
/100 ha 19581 1.8 4.9 2.4
1985 5.1 12.4 3.1
Combines (000) 19581 42.0 26.0 55.0
19 852 154.5 139.0 54.5
/100 ha 19581 0.5 0.5 1.8
1985= 1.6 2.8 1.4
Notes: (M 1961 for UK; P ) 1984 for Germany.
Source: Eurostat, Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 1988,
I Cl 2.
Following the beginning of the CAP, farmers also 
invested heavily in irrigation. Between 1965 and 1985 
the area of land under irrigation rose by more than 70% 
to almost 6.7 Mha. In 1985 about 7% of French land was 
irrigated, compared with 4.4% in Germany, 2.2% in the UK, 
and 32% of the land in the other member states.=° Irri­
gated land is not often used for wheat due to deleterious 
effects on quality of too much moisture but it is satis­
factorily used for growing other types of feed, such as 
maize and barley. As a result, irrigation investment has 
made the non-wheat feed industry less weather dependent 
and more competitive with feed wheat.
The high assured prices offered to farmers, combined 
with the use of labour saving machinery, also opened the 
way for farmers to adopt modern agronomic practices. 
European farmers rapidly adopted intensive production 
techniques, with a sharp rise in use of fertilizers and 
pesticides to maximize production from each hectare. By
:EO- FAO, Production Yearbook 1986. Table 2; Eurostat, 
Agricultural Statistical Yearbook 1988, Table IC08.
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the mid 1980s farmers used 18% of the potassium, 15% of 
phosphate and 13% of nitrogen fertilizers consumed by 
world agriculture and applied them to only 2% of the 
world’s area (T^ble. 2 .4-).

















Source: Eurostat, Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 1988,
P. 74.
The surge in real capital investment during the past 
30 years and increased use of fertilizers, pesticides, 
and herbicides boosted the average yield of a hectare of 
wheat from about 2.2-3.1 t/ha in the 1954-58 period to 
more than 5.7 t/ha in 1983-87 in each of the three main
Table 2.5 Comparative Wheat Yields
Annual % Change
t/ha France Germany UK USA
1904-08 1.38 1.79 2.24 .88
1934-38 1.58 2.28 2.31 .66
1954-58 2.24 2.90 3.10 1.45
1964-68 3.11 3.63 3.98 1.79
1973-77 4.33 4.38 4.35 2.03
1983-87 5 .72 5 .92 6.72 2.52*
1906-36 0.4% 0.8% 0.1% -1.0%
1936-56 1.8% 1.2% 1.5% 4.1%
1956-66 3.3% 2.3% 2.5% 2.1%
1966-75 3.8% 2.1% 1.0% 1.4%
1975-85 2.8% 3.1% 4.4% 2.2%
* 1983-86
Sources: Malenbaum (1953), pp. 236-39; IWC, World Wheat
Statistics; Data from EC Commission.
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European countries, and to more than 6.7 t/ha in the UK. 
A group of particularly productive UK farmers have found­
ed a 'ten tonne' club, for individual farmers who have 
harvested at least that amount of common wheat from a 
hectare of land 2.s).
Recent studies of the relative economic efficiency 
of European farmers show that cereals producers in both 
the UK and France are highly competitive in world terms. 
Table 2.6 shows that the cost of the relatively greater 
use of inputs in Europe is offset by the significantly 
higher yields, so that Europe is competitive with dry­
land farming in North America, Argentina, and Australia. 
This is particularly true since 1985, because the sharp 
drop in energy costs make the energy-intensive farm sys­
tem in Europe even more competitive. Thus, in both econ­
omic and financial terms, commercially-oriented East Ang—
Table 2.6 Relative Costs of Producing Mheat in Hajor Exporting Countries (US$/t)
Study Year Argentina Australia Canada France UK USA
Total Costs Includino Land
Stanton 1982 — — 132.3 137.8 152.8
Cambridge Land Econony 1983-84 — — 162.0 183.4 188.6
Stanton 1984 — — — 92.2 150.6
University of Suelph 1984 — 108.7 107.2 92.2 150.7
University of Buelph 1986 — 101.3 134.1 94.4 149.7
Fed. Bank of Kansas Cityt 1987 86.7 159.1 179.3 — 146.9 138.8
Total Costs Excluding Land
Stanton 1982 — — — 110.6 119.4
Casbridge Land Econoey 1983-84 — — 130.0 151.9 145.7
Stanton 1984 — — — 72.7 118.3
Fed Bank of Kansas Cityi 1987 70.3 125.1 137.4 — 117.8 119.9
Yield (t/ha) See note 2.3 1.3 1.9 5.7 6.7 2.5
t Central Plains, including Kansas.
Yields: UK 6 France (1983-87); USA (1983-86); Canada, Argentina, Australia (1980-84).
Sources: Murphy (1985), table 3.10. Barkena & Drabenstott (1988), p. 9. A.H. Sarris, “EC-US 
Agricultural Trade Confrontations," in Baldwin, et al. (1988), p. 107. The Globe k Hail. 12-1-87.
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lia farmers in the UK and French farmers in the Paris 
Basin can compete with Kansas wheat producers.
Although the relative competitiveness of European 
farmers depends greatly on the ECU-US dollar exchange 
rate, the data from the studies in Table 2.6 suggest that 
UK and French farmers skould be competitive at even ex­
treme exchange rates. The Stanton and Kansas City stud­
ies, for 1982 and 1987 respectively, show that even when 
the ECU was strong relative to the US dollar, UK and 
French farmers produced wheat at about the same or lower 
cost than US farmers.
A major factor limiting European farmers from com­
peting freely with North American or Australian farmers 
is the relatively high cost of transporting grain to ex­
port position. In the early 1980s, it cost approximately 
US$33/t to move a bushel of wheat from the Paris Basin to 
the export port of Ghent while wheat could be moved from 
Minnesota to New Orleans (a distance twice as far) for 
only about US$12.50/t.221 During the 1980s, however, the 
wholesale and distribution system has been upgraded and 
is beginning to reduce the cost of competing in world 
markets. Southampton, for example, was expanded during 
the decade so that it can now move as much as 10 Mt of 
grains in a single year.22
Consolidation and Specialization in EC Farming
Another major change in Europe has been the marked 
increase in the size of the average farm and the special­
ization of commercial units. In the 1950s, the majority
of continental European farmers produced and lived much
e-
in the same manner as their forbearers in the nineteenth 
century or earlier. They produced cereal and vegetable
=l- Insel (1985), p. 899.
Discussion with Home-Grown Cereals Authority, August
1989 .
56 Chapter 2
crops on small, often widely scattered, plots of land, 
with little use of powered machinery (at least partly be­
cause powered machinery was physically unable to operate 
in many of the small holdings) .s:3 Horses, oxen, and hu­
mans provided much of the energy on the farm so a signi­
ficant share of farm output was consumed rather than mar­
keted .
After 1958, increased availability of financial re­
sources allowed farmers to invest heavily in machinery 
and land. As a result, farmers were able to expand the 
size of their farms, to consolidate plots of land into 
larger areas that could be worked by power machinery, and 
to shift their planting towards crops best produced and 
harvested by machinery. In the case of wheat, this 
allowed farmers to realize the production potential of 
their investment.
Table 2.7 shows that large farms (with over 50 ha of 
utilizable agricultural area (UAA)) represented only 
about 18% of total farmers in France in 1986 but culti­
vated almost half the land; this was up from less than 
30% of the land cultivated by the 5.5% largest farmers in 
1960. In Germany, only about 5.5% of all farms had over 
50 ha in 1986 but they cultivated more than a quarter of 
the land in the country. In 1960, only 1% of German 
farms were large and they cultivated about 10% of farm 
land. The large farms in both France and Germany culti­
vated about 80 ha each in 1986. Changes in UK farm sizes 
are even greater: by 1986 more than one third of farms
cultivated more than 50 ha of UAA and together accounted 
for almost 83% of the farmland in the country. These 
large farms had an average 171 ha under cultivation in 
1986, compared with only 110 ha in 1960.
Furtan, et al. (1988), p. 105.
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Table 2.7 Growth in Cereals 
and the UK
Farms in France, Germany,
France
1960 1986
Total number of holdings 1773.5 1000.0
- % with over 50 ha 5.5% 18.4%
Total ha in agricultural use 30162.0 28240.0
- % on farms over 50 ha 29 .7% 49 .8%
Average ha/holding 17.0 28.2
- on farms over 50 ha 86.0 76 .4
Germany
Total number of holdings 1385.2 707.7
- % with over 50 ha 1.2% 5.5%
Total ha in agricultural use 12935.0 11910.0
- % on farms over 50 ha 10.3% 25 .3%
Average ha/holding 9.3 16.8
- on farms over 50 ha 81.9 78.2
United Kingdom (1960 + 1985) 
Total number of holdings 443.1 241.7
- % with over 50 ha 18.7% 33.6%
Total ha in agricultural use 14191.0 16838.0
- % on farms over 50 ha 64.5% 82.5%
Average ha/holding 32.0 69 .7
- on farms over 50 ha 110.7 171.3
Source: Eurostat, Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 1988,
P. 70.
As they expanded, commercially-directed farms con­
centrated their efforts on production of a smaller number 
of products.*24 In 1970-71, about 46% of European farmers 
(EC9) produced some common wheat: in Germany more than
61% of farmers planted some wheat, compared with 48% in 
France and only 15% in the UK. By 1985, only 36% of Com­
munity farmers (EC9) planted any wheat: the number of
farmers growing wheat dropped to less than 56% in Germany 
and about 46% in France, and remained fairly steady in 
the UK. At the same time, the average area planted to
Bowler (1985), p. 114.
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wheat per farm rose a little in Germany, and more than 
doubled in France and the UK(TaUe-i8’)/
Table 2.8 All Holdings Producing Common Wheat in Europe
1970-71 1975 1980 1985
Total Farms (X1000) 
France 762.2 596.5 564.6 489.4
Germany 659 .8 555.7 503.2 413.9
United Kingdom 48.7 43.1 41.7 46.2
% Total Farms
France 48.1% 45.4% 45 .0% 46 .3%
Germany 61.7% 61.5% 59.2% 55.9%
United Kingdom 15 .1% 15.5% 15.5% 17.9%
Average ha/Farm
France 4.8 6.4 7.3 9.4
Germany 2.3 2.7 3.2 2.9
United Kingdom 20.7 24.2 32.9 41.1
Source: Eurostat, Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 1988.
P . 46 .
Specialization has been a two edged sword. As the 
industry specialized and farmers improved their incomes, 
they also became more exposed to the effects of policy 
changes and market fluctuations. In earlier periods when 
most farms produced a mix of cereals, vegetables, and 
livestock, it was possible for farmers to shift produc­
tion towards profitable areas. In those days the physi­
cal capital on farms was almost perfectly interchange­
able. The average farmer would have horses or oxen for 
power and an array of simple tools and structures (wag­
ons, plows, scythes, shovels, hoes, and basic buildings) 
that could be used alternately to produce and store 
cereals, vegetables, or livestock. If cereal prices dip­
ped, for example, farmers could shift into feed crops 
(oats, barley, or turnips) and expand livestock produc­
tion quickly. The simple buildings served both as stor­
age for field crops or as barns for livestock. The 
application of new technologies and the introduction of
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specialized machinery, equipment and structures make 
shifts more difficult. Wheat farmers often do not have 
the necessary equipment to produce other field crops 
(e.g., lentils, vegetables) or livestock. The new physi­
cal capital is no longer versatile. Specialized seed 
drills, combination harvesters, granaries, and transpor­
tation equipment for wheat are not easily adaptable for 
other products. Farmers are therefore more exposed to 
consequences of shifts in markets than in pre-CAP days.
Table 2.9 Proportion of Working-Time Worked on Farms
1975 1980 1985
France 100% 51.8 55 .0 56.6
50% to 100% 18.2 15 .2 15.0
less than 50% 29.9 29.8 28.4
Germany 100% 46.5 44.0 44.8
50% to 100% 10.1 7.7 8.0
less than 50% 43.3 48.3 47.2
UK 100% 72.0 63.3 63.0
50% to 100% 19 .9 13.0 12.8
less than 50% 8.0 23.6 24.2
Source: ASC 1987, pp. T.104-05.
But farm consolidation also increased off-farm in­
come opportunities, so that farm income statistics no 
longer reflect the true situation of farm families. As 
farmers consolidated their holdings and specialized, they 
required less labour. The introduction of labour saving 
machinery and specialization (cereals production alone 
without livestock rearing, for example) left greater 
periods of the year available for off-farm pursuits. In 
Germany, for example, less than 45% of all farmers work 
full-time on their farms, while 47% of farmers work less 
than half time. In contrast, there is less opportunity 
and need for farmers in France and the UK to seek outside
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employment; between 55% and 65% of farmers work full-time 
on farm in those countries i.t).
Many farmers have taken the opportunity to work off-
Cfob!e_2.io)
farm to supplement the family income. The data showsK.
that in 1985 about 23% of European farmers had other main 
gainful employment while another 7.5% had other secondary 
employment. This varied widely over the Community, with 
about 42% of German farmers, 32% of French farmers and 
21% of British farmers working elsewhere to supplement 
their farm incomes. The German government has encouraged 
this trend, implementing regional economic development 
programs that assist industry to locate in rural areas to 
tap this source of manpower.23 The move to off-farm work 
in the 1980s has been most marked in France, where the 
number of farmers holding other secondary gainful employ­
ment jumped to 19% in 1985 from less than 5% in 1980.
Table 2.10 Employment in Agriculture
France Germany UK EC10
1975
No Other Employment 80.1% 56.9% 76.9% n . a .
1985
No Other Employment 67.7% 57.5% 78.8% 69 .5%
Other Main Job 13.0% 37.6% 12.3% 22.9%
Other Secondary Job 19.3% 4.9% 9.0% 7.5%
Source: ASC 1987, p. T104-5.
As a result, farm income statistics are unreliable 
indicators of farm family incomes. In addition to farm­
ers themselves working off-farm, in many cases other mem­
bers of farm families are also employed off-farm, supple­
menting the family income with their earnings. Farm in­
come statistics rarely report these figures. Gross farm
Ardagh (1987), p. 131-32.
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income data also should not be used to make either cross 
border or farm versus non-farm income comparisons because 
the figures are not adjusted for the often very favorable 
tax treatment for farmers, they ignore imputed and real­
ized capital gains from owning farm land and equipment, 
and they only marginally account for the imputed income 
available in the form of housing, transport, and food 
from the farm operation.26 The data in Table 2.11 indi­
cate some of the benefits accruing to farmers through 
special tax and social insurance relief. At the begin­
ning of the 1980s, farmers were receiving roughly 2,500 
to 5,000 ECU each in such special forms of support.
Table 2.11 National Agriculture Expenditure
Outlays For: 1975 1976 1977 1980
Tax Relief (M ECU):
France —  




















Average per Farm Holding (ECU/farm):
France —  —  
Germany —  1461 






Sources: ASC. 1977, 1978, 1980; EC Commission (1984),
Public Expenditures on Agriculture, Study P.229.
For the majority in the European wheat sector, 
therefore, the shift in production technologies and crop­
ping patterns has narrowed the interests of individual 
farmers and broadened the income base for farm families
Howarth (1985), p. 30-34.
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at the potential cost due to greater exposure to market 
changes.
World Production Changes
The European wheat market does not exist in isolation. 
Developments in world markets have defined the physical 
and economic environment for European decisions and af­
fect the commercial prospects for European wheat import­
ers and exporters. Before and during the early years of 
the CAP, the Community imported significant amounts of 
bread wheat while France exported only modest amounts of 
soft wheat and wheat flour. More recently, the Community 
has moved ahead of the US as a wheat producer and has 
emerged on the world market as one of the three largest 
exporters of wheat and wheat flour.
  Figure 2.2
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The major development in the world market since 1950 
is the shift in production to developing countries. Be­
tween 1950 and 1984 wheat production grew by more than 
230% in developing countries and 170% in centrally plan­
ned economies but rose only 120% in developed countries.
2 2.)
Overall, total production increased by 150%. The largest 
increases were recorded in Asia, where Chinese production
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rose six-fold and Indian output increased more than 700%.
By the mid-1980s, Asia produced about 80% more wheat than
North America; in the early 1950s Asia produced less
wheat than Canada and the US. Consequently, both China 
and India by the mid-1980s were judged to be normally 
self-sufficient. A crop failure in 1987 in India, which 
would in the past have caused widespread starvation, was 
managed without diff icultyJsr?‘
The changing farm policy in the Soviet Union is the 
other major factor in the world market. In 1953 the 
Soviet government ended Stalin's policy of maintaining 
wheat exports, regardless of domestic conditions, and 
allowed shipments to vary in line with domestic supply 
and demand. Although the USSR attempted to expand pro­
duction and exports over the succeeding years, yields 
became more erratic and forced the Soviet government to 
frequently adjust its export and import plans. The gov­
ernment expanded cereals production onto 40 Mha of new 
land in the semi-arid steppe region but quickly found 
that yields there were highly variable because small 
changes in precipitation caused large swings in output. 
Meanwhile, much of Soviet agriculture"*^ ^ c o l  lectivised,
A.
dampening productivity growth over the years that follow­
ed. Farm productivity on collective and state land rose 
only slowly after 1953 while productivity boomed on the 
3% of the land owned by farmers; by 1976, more than 30% 
of the gross agricultural output in the Soviet Union was 
produced on private lands. The increased volatility in 
Soviet production spilled over into the world market and 
caused wide swings in wheat trade prices during the 1950s 
and 1960s.22(3 Then, in 1970, the Brezhnev government de­
cided to expand livestock and milk production in the 
USSR, which necessitated a sharp rise in grain imports 
for animal feed. Since that time the USSR has been the
The Economist, 2-7-88.
Johnson (1977), p p . 10-12, 20; OECD (1983a), p. 55.
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largest single importer of wheat and feed grains. In the 
1980s, agricultural reforms related to "perestroika" re­
versed past policies in order to provide incentives for 
production increases. Some commentators predict the 
Soviet Union will regain self-sufficiency in wheat and 
other grains if the policy succeeds. •
The combination of expanded production in Asia and the 
USSR made world wheat yields in the 1975-84 period more 
volatile than in the immediate post war period. This 
volatility did not fully translate into wider production 
swings, however, because the US government used its farm 
programs to encourage farmers to set-aside large blocks 
of land to offset some of the instability in world mar­
kets. Consequently, instability in world wheat produc­
tion actually diminished in the 1975-84 period compared 
with the 1946-55 period. The US ability to act as swing 
producer is diminishing, however, because each year it 
produces a smaller proportion of total production. Con­
sequently, unless other producing and exporting countries 
join the US as swing producers, world production will 
follow the trend in yields and become increasingly vola­
tile (Takle.
Table 2.12 Instability in World Wheat Yield & Production
WORLD LESS USSR USSR WORLD
YieId: 1946-55 3.1 8.7 3.5
1975-84 3.2 9.4 4.4
Production: 1946-55 n . a n . a 5 .1
1975-84 n . a n . a 3.5
Note: Instability is measured as the mean absolute per­
cent variation from the fitted trend.
Source: IWC, World Wheat Statistics; Author's Calcula­
tions
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FINANCIAL STRUCTURES
The changes in the 1958-88 period in the production 
structures depended critically on the corresponding 
transformation of the financial structures in Europe and 
the world. In the 1950s and 1960s world financial mar­
kets were heavily regulated, with countries such as the 
UK and France still using exchange and credit controls. 
Farmers, however, did not use much credit and so had 
little interest in the operation of the financial system. 
Meanwhile, exchange rates were managed under the terms of 
the Bretton Woods system and capital flows were small 
relative to the flows of trade.
The changes in the financial system began slowly but 
accelerated rapidly in the 1980s. Domestically, govern­
ments gradually deregulated their financial systems, 
allowing farmers greater access to the financial capital 
that would facilitate the reform of the production sys­
tems in Europe. But when the governments attempted to 
use monetary policy more actively for macroeconomic pur­
poses in the 1970s, they discovered that they were less 
able to control financial instruments. Rather than im­
proving economic performance, governments found that they 
often just caused higher inflation. Meanwhile, interna­
tional capital flows multiplied as the financial system 
recycled the massive oil revenues accumulating in OPEC 
countries. In 1985 world capital flows reached US$84 
trillion while trade flows totalled only US$2.7 tril­
lion.-2*9 The combination of varying degrees of deregula­
tion and large pools of mobile international funds 
stressed the world financial system. These factors con­
tributed in the 1970s to abandonment of the gold standard 
and the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates and in the 1980s to increased volatility in both 
interest and exchange rates.
Hiemstra & Shane (1988), p. 7.
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Sources of Capital
The fundamental change In European farming is at 
least partly due to the large increase in the financial 
capital available to the sector. It is often difficult 
to determine the exact causality of the changes, but it 
is certain that without the provision of capital from 
other family members, the commercial financial industry, 
governments, and the farm supply business, the dramatic 
shifts in production techniques and land holdings would 
not have been possible. In France, for example, agricul­
ture was a net provider of funds to other sectors of the 
economy for the century prior to 1970. Since, working 
capital has replaced labour employment, to the point 
where agriculture has been described as "heavy indust­
ry"30 because the average farm had a debt load in 1985 of 
44,369 ECUs or about 2.4 times the annual net value added 
per farm. German and UK farms had even higher debts. 
The average German farm owed 52,767 ECUs or about 2.8 
times the net value added per farm while the average UK 
farm had debt totalling 63,043 ECUs, which represented 
about 1.6 times the average net value added.31
In Germany and France in the 1950s the average farm­
er inherited his land holdings and equipment from his 
father and the trend was for the available land and capi­
tal to be divided rather than augmented. Inheritance 
laws (in the Napoleonic Code which prevailed in the pre­
dominantly Catholic countries of the EEC in 1958) provide 
each legitimate offspring with an equal share of any 
land. Thus, land holdings were perpetually being broken 
apart. Although the laws have not changed, the general 
economic boom in the post-war period provided for much 
greater movement from the farm into industrial employ­
ment. When a farmholder dies now, it is unlikely that 
all the offspring will depend on the income or sale of
Rosenfeld, Girling, & Reid (1980), p. 46. 
ASC 1987. p. 59.
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the asset. If there is a sibling who wishes to farm, the 
off-farm inheritors either continue to own a portion of 
the land, taking only a small share of the operating pro­
fits as their return, or they sell the land to the sib­
ling on a preferential basis. As a result, in France 
probably more than 20% of the population, much of it ur­
ban, has an interest in farm land.32
The majority of the additional capital, however, has 
come from commercial sources^. The revolution in finan­
cial services and the creation of more flexible loan 
terms has provided an opportunity for farmers to consoli­
date and expand marginal farms so they can realize econ­
omies of scale in the use of machinery, labour, and human 
capital. In France and Germany, where farms tend to be 
smaller and less commercial, the government has been 
heavily involved. In France, the government provides 
subsidies to the Credit Agricole co-operative to provide 
low-interest loans to farmers. About 70% of the finan­
cial capital in the French farm sector comes from Credit 
Agricole. In 1978, 5.3 B FF was paid to Credit Agricole 
to subsidise 42% of its loans to farmers; more than 70% 
of the loans were subsidised in 1970.33 The German gov­
ernment also provides subsidies to the commercial banks 
and the loan co-operatives, which have captured almost 
90% of the farm loan market. In contrast, UK farmers are 
larger and more able to meet the loan conditions estab­
lished by the commercial financial system, so the govern­
ment provides only limited support to new and expanding 
farmers through the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. 
By and large, UK farmers use banks, which provide 75% of 
the funds going into the farm sector. As a result, in 
1983 families and commercial suppliers provided only 17% 
of farm finance, compared with 44% in 1970.
Financial Times, 16-6-80.
House of Lords (1981b), pp. 137—44.
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Table 2.13 Farm Debt in France, Germany , and the UK
1970 1978
France: Total Outstanding (FF B) 48 129
Sources: Credit Agricole (subsidized) 70% 70%
Commercial Banks 14% na
Su p p 1iers 8% na
Private Lenders 8% na
1969 1979
Germany: Total Outstanding (DM B) 24.6 37.3
Sources: Banks (subsidized) na 89%
- of which Loan Cooperatives na (27%)
Other na 11%
1970 1983
UK: Total Outstanding (£ M) 1250 6257
Sources: Ag. Mortgage Corp. (subsidized) 14% 7%
Bank & Insurance Credit 43% 75%
Private & Family Credit 26% 9%
Hire Purchase & Leasing 18% 8%
Sources: Rosenfeld, Girling, & Reid (1980), PP. 102,
107-8; Burrell, et al. (1984), p. 60.
The Community has also been active in farm f inance .
Since 1972 it has assisted marginal producers either to
leave the industry or to expand to a scale that is com-
mercially viable. Between 1975 and 1986, for example,
Direct ive 72/160/EEC assisted 215,741 farmers to cease
f arming and release 1.62 Mha for use by about 122,000
other farmers. France was the greatest user of this pro­
gram, with 119,785 holdings and more than 1.1 Mha trans­
ferred over the 11 year p e r i o d . T h e  resulting larger 
farms have tended to be more productive.
Farmers who used outside capital to rationalize and 
consolidate their farming operations now have larger and 
more efficient farms but they must operate at or near 
physical capacity limits in order to service the result­
ASC 1988, p. T.134.
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ing high levels of debt. In 1985, farm debt payments 
represented 22% of German total outgoings, 22% in France, 
and 13% in the UK.33 Consequently, farmers now are sig­
nificantly more exposed to variations in credit condi­
tions than in earlier periods.
Commercialization of Farming
Agricultural policy analysts often ignore the up­
stream and downstream industries that rely on farm pro­
duction. The artificial distinction in the national 
economic accounts between primary, secondary, and ter­
tiary industries masks the true linkages between the 
sectors. The World Bank noted in 1986 that only about 
one-half of all agricultural spending in the world ulti­
mately accrues to farmers. The rest is divided among 
other sectors of the economy. Ignoring the linkages be­
tween the farm and non-farm sectors in Europe may have 
made sense in earlier times when farmers supplied most of 
their inputs on-farm and consumed or sold directly for 
local consumption the large majority of their output. 
But the application of intensive crop techniques and the 
use of capital intensive machinery and equipment has 
fully brought the northern European farm community into 
the economic mainstream.
Table 2.14 Purchases from Non-Agricultural Sectors as % 
of Gross Agricultural Output
France Germany UK EC10
1958-60 21.1 30.4 50.7 n.a
1987 45.4 54.8 53.7 44.0
Sources: Lane (1966), p. 386; ASC 1988, p. T27.
ASC 1987, p. 59.
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As recently as 1958, German farmers purchased only 
about 30% of their inputs from other sectors while French
farmers bought just over one-fifth of their inputs from
(Ikblc
non-agricultural sectors^. The average UK farmer, in con­
trast, purchased more than half of his inputs from non- 
agricultural sectors. With the rapid adoption of capital 
and intensive production technologies, French and German 
farmers are now in line with UK practice.
The 1986 farm accountancy data in Table 2.15 show 
that outlays for capital depreciation, wages, land rent, 
and interest accounted for almost another 30% of gross 
farm output in Germany, 26% in France and almost 36% in 
the UK.
Table 2.15 Gross Value Added 
1986
by Factor of Production,
M ECU France Germany UK EC10
Final Farm Output* 42800 29167 17963 163737
- intermediate inputs 18485 14428 9414 68904
- depreciation 4402 4869 2122 22654
- wages for hired labour 3394 1434 3037 16831
- rent 1389 583 244 3077
- interest 2016 1827 1048 9966
Net Farm Income 13114 6024 2098 42302
% of Adjusted Final Farm Output
- intermediate inputs 43.2% 49.5% 52.4% 42.1%
- depreciation 10.3% 16.7% 11.8% 13.8%
- wages for hired labour 7.9% 4.9% 16.9% 10.3%
- rent 3.2% 2.0% 1.4% 1.9%
- interest 4.7% 6.3% 5.8% 6.1%
Net Farm Income 30.6% 20.7% 11.7% 25.8%
Final Farm Output to Total Outlays
1986 1.44 1.26 1.13 1.35
* Final Farm Output is the gross final output less net 
subsidies.
Source: Eurostat, Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 1988.
PP. 226-27.
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As a result, agriculture now plays a central role in 
the agro-industrial complex. In the early 1980s, the EC 
Commission presented a number of examples of the wide­
spread influence of farming on the economy. The Commis­
sion analysis showed that less than half of the estimated 
impact of agriculture on European GDP is generated on- 
farm. In addition to the approximately 3.5% to 5% of EC 
GDP and 7-10 million jobs contributed by on-farm value- 
added activity, input purchases by farmers supported an 
estimated additional 1.9% of the total European economy 
while off-farm processing, distribution, and marketing of 
the output contributed another 3.4% to 5% of GDP and emp­
loyed as many as 2.7 million workers.34* In the cereals 
sector, where the only output consumed in the raw form is 
as feed and many of the producers use intensive cultiva­
tion practices, the value-added off-farm could be more 
than double the on-farm value-added.
These strong linkages between cereals producers and 
upstream and downstream industries have created many 
opportunities for improved economic performance of the 
sector but have also opened the farm sector to two new 
market influences: credit conditions and inflation.
Since 1958, the ratio of gross incomes to purchased in­
puts and costs such as depreciation, rents, and interest 
charges, has declined from over 3-to-l to only 1.35-to-l 
(and only 1.13-to-l in the UK). Consequently, farmers 
have much less opportunity to manoeuver. In earlier 
times, when farmers earned more than three times what 
they spent on inputs, large swings in prices had only a 
small effect on the prosperity and viability of the farm. 
Now, with small operating margins, farmers are much more 
vulnerable to inflation of their input costs, interest 
rate rises, and small declines in producer prices.
ASC, 1980 & 1982.
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The Changing International Foreign Exchange Markets
The CAP system for wheat had a relatively smooth 
start once the question of price levels had been set. 
The common prices in Units of Account (UAs) were convert­
ed to national currencies at the prevailing fixed ex­
change rates and for 18 months truly common prices pre­
vailed across the Community. Then the financial base for 
the CAP began to crumble. In 1969 France devalued the 
Franc by 11.11% and shortly after Germany revalued the DM 
by 9.29%. In absence of any ameliorating measures, the 
target and intervention prices in France should have 
risen and those in Germany should have dropped. Neither 
government was willing to accept the political consequen­
ces, and those changes were not made.
The Treaty does not require a single price for com­
modities at either the wholesale or retail level: Art.
40.3.3 states that the common price policy only need be 
based on common criteria and uniform methods of calcula­
tion.37 A compromise system developed: common prices in
UAs remained unchanged but the exchange rate used for 
converting the common prices to national prices deviated 
from the market exchange rate. These 'green' rates of 
exchange are overvalued for devaluing countries, thereby 
dampening increases in domestic prices, and undervalued 
in revaluing countries, thereby sustaining prices in 
domestic currencies. The original green rates set in 
1969 were expected to move quickly to the official ex­
change rates, thereby eliminating the discrepancy between 
revaluing, devaluing, and steady currency countries (the 
gap between market and green rates is known as the "mone­
tary gap"). To ensure intra-Community trade was not dis­
rupted by different price levels in different Community 
countries, monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) were 
created to act as border taxes and subsidies to equalize 
offer prices in all countries. They were set equal to
Snyder (1985), p. 100.
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the difference between the market central rate for the 
currency and the green rate, minus a "neutral margin" 
factor to avoid over-compensation. Countries with under­
valued green exchange rates (i.e. strong currency count­
ries such as Germany) received subsidies (positive MCAs) 
to export and tax imports. The reverse occurs in count­
ries with overvalued green exchange rates (i.e., weak 
currency countries such as France).
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Under the system of fixed exchange rates, the Com­
munity had little difficulty sustaining relative prices 
of individual farm products in different member count­
ries. But with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates in 1973, exchange rates became 
highly volatile.. The Commission calculated that the
A.
average annual variation of the UA relative to individual 
member currencies in the 1975-78 period was as high as 
17%; currencies not conforming to EC monetary arrange­
ments often varied more. In 1976, for example, the Ital­
ian lira varied by an estimated 27.5% relative to the UA 
whereas the US dollar varied by about 15% twice between 
1975 and 1978.
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Beginning in 1972 the Community attempted to control 
intra-EC exchange rates with the ’Snake' exchange agree­
ment33 but had difficulty controlling currency swings be­
cause the UK, Irish, Italian, and French governments
would not accept the loss of independent monetary and 
fiscal policy necessary to maintain stable rates. The UK 
and Ireland originally joined the Snake but dropped out 
in June 1972 when speculation drove their currencies out­
side the band. Italy joined but withdrew within a year 
and France joined in 1972, quit in 1974, rejoined in July 
1975, and finally quit for good in March 1976. When the 
inflation gap between France and Germany and the rising 
current account deficit in France put pressure on the
franc, Giscard's government chose to leave the Snake
rather than to deflate the economy or devalue the franc
(.h*) z.h),
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The European Monetary System and the ECU were intro­
duced in 1979 to replace the looser Snake. France became 
a full member but Italy had a wider band (6%) and the UK
3e- The EC9 member states agreed in 1972 to limit the 
fluctuations in their currencies about central rates to a 
maximum 2.25% band; the existing international agreement 
at the time only held fluctuations to a 4.5% band.
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refused to join. Even for those countries belonging to 
the system, green rates continued because diverging un­
derlying economic conditions in the member states caused 
the German and Benelux currencies to rise and the franc, 
punt, and lira to depreciate. European exchange rates 
began to move less wildly after 1983, when monetary and 
fiscal policies were more closely coordinated and infla­
tion rates converged.
Perhaps more importantly in recent years, the wide 
and unstoppable swings in the dollar value of the ECU 
caused major adjustments to the cost of export restitu­
tions. Restitutions vary depending on the ECU price of 
wheat exports, which depends on a combination of the 
world wheat price (in US dollars) and on the US$-ECU ex­
change rate. Between 1980 and February 1985 the US dol­
lar rose sharply relative to the ECU, reducing the net 
export restitutions required to export grain. As the US 
dollar depreciated between February 1985 and 1988, the 
cost of export restitutions rose sharp ly
  Figure 2.5 -------------------------------------------
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Since the end of fixed exchange rates in 1973, the 
European farm system has had to adjust to wide divergen-
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ces between European exchange rates as well as accommo­
date both the surge In the US dollar after 1979 and then 
Its even quicker slide after 1985. This accommodation 
exercise has strained many of the long-term bargains in 
the system.
Shifting Wheat Trade
International trade in wheat also changed signifi­
cantly in the past 30 years. In the 1950s four tradi­
tional exporters— the US, Canada, Australia, and Argen­
tina— controlled about 90% of the export market and dev­
eloped countries still purchased 58% of the wheat sold 
internationally. By the mid-1980s, the four traditional 
exporters share of the market was below 80% and more than 
87% of the wheat was being sold to LDCs and CPEs, espe­
cially the USSR(TaMe 2-ic-Y




Argentina 23% 8% 4% 7%
Australia 20% 11% 14% 12%
Canada 33% 32% 21% 19%
USA 10% 39% 35% 42%
Other 14% 11% 26% 21%
- EC na na 9% 15%
- USSR na na 11% 1%
- Others na na 6% 5%
Importers
Developed Countries 80% 58% 29% 13%
Other 20% 42% 71% 87%
- Developing na na 49% 48%
- CPEs excluding USSR na na 20% 18%
- USSR na na 2% 21%
Source: IWC, World Wheat Statistics, 1985
The two most important shifts on the export side
were the emergence of Europe as one of the three largest
exporters and the end of exports from the USSR. The dev-
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elopment of wheat surpluses In Europe pushed the Commun­
ity into the export market in a big way after the mid- 
1970s (France had been a small exporter since before the 
Second World War). Equally significant, the USSR ceased 
exporting in the late 1970s when Soviet food policy con­
centrated on red meat production. Exports were initially 
curtailed in the 1970s and then virtually eliminated dur­
ing the 1980s: in 1966-71 the Soviet Union exported an
average net 1 Mt per year; by 1980-85, the USSR annually 
imported an average 20 M t .
Apart from the rise of the Soviet Union as the larg­
est single import market for wheat, the other significant 
shift was the rising demand in LDCs and CPEs. Rapid pop­
ulation and income growth and marketing programs to deve­
lop the taste for bread succeeded in creating markets for 
wheat in Africa, Asia, and much of South America. Mean­
while, CPEs apart from the USSR now account for about 18% 
to 20% of the market. But selling to LDCs and CPEs is 
not easy. Following financial deregulation and the sharp 
rise in petro-do11ars in international financial markets 
after 1973, third world countries and CPEs borrowed heav­
ily to fund consumer subsidies and development projects. 
After the US and other OECD countries tightened monetary 
policy in 1980, debt service costs soared, often above 
the total net export revenues of these countries. To 
forestall default, commercial bankers, the US Federal Re­
serve, the International Monetary Fund, and the World 
Bank coordinated efforts to reschedule debt repayments. 
Each package, however, usually required LDCs to cut im­
ports, which contributed to the 15% decline in world 
wheat trade between 1984 and 1987.
The method of marketing wheat changed as the posi­
tion of exporters and importers shifted. In 1972 the 
'great grain robbery' highlighted the risks of dealing in 
this new market situation. Following a Soviet crop fail­
ure in 1972, USSR grain buyers quietly purchased the bulk
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of free world stocks before the news broke. Prices 
soared to record levels when the full dimensions of the 
new market situation were finally revealed. Beginning in 
1975, the major exporters sought assured markets for
their product through long-term framework agreements to
(Table 2. if)
prevent repetition of such disruptions. By the mid- 
1980s, Canada, Australia, and Argentina had commitments 
for more than 60% of their expected minimum annual ex­
ports. The US had less than 20% of its lowest annual 
wheat export volumes committed and the EC (France) had 
negotiated only one binding agreement. The FAO estimates 
that in 1979-82, between 42% and 56% of the total world 
wheat trade was committed under agreements, with about 
89-100% of Chinese trade, 16% of Brazilian trade and 31- 
50% of Soviet trade under agreements.3*9
Table 2.17 Estimated Minimum and Maximum Wheat Commit­
ments under Long-Term Framework Agreements
(Mt) Argent ina Australia Canada EEC USA
1982 1.7-2.0 2.9-3.9 9.0-10.5 0.5-0.7 7.0-12.0
1983 2.8-3.1 3.4-4.6 10.5-12.0 0.5-0.7 7.0-12.0
1984 2.5-2.8 5.2-6.2 10.5-12.0 0 7.0-12.0
1985 2.5-2.6 3.6-3.9 13.3-14.8 0 4.0-8.0
1986 0.8 3.3 12.0 0 4.0-8.0
Annual Wheat Exports (range for 1982-86)
Min. 4.3 8.5 17.5 14.1 38.3
Max. 9.6 15 .5 22.0 17.3 49.3
Source: IWC, World Wheat Statistics (Various), Table 10.
Another key result of the shifts in the wheat market
(T a b le
was the sharp rise in state trading^. About 95% of all 
wheat trades are handled by state traders at either the 
buying or selling ends of the deal. Only about 60% of
3S>- R.A. Goldberg, "Enhancing Competitiveness: Infras­
tructure and Agriculture," in Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City (1985), p. 60.
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trade in the late 1950s had state trading connections.*0 
On the export side, the US, Europe, and Argentina have 
always used private traders but Canada and Australia use 
wheat boards and the USSR uses a state trading house. 
The share of the export market dominated by state traders 
declined to 39% in the late 1970s from 56% in the 1950s 
largely because of the end of Soviet exports and the rise 
of EC exports.*1 But as demand shifted toward developing 
countries and CPEs, all of which use state trading hous­
es, the state-trader share of the import market rose to 
more than 90% from about 60% in the 1950s. Consequently, 
competition became increasingly intense because state 
traders in the importing countries used their market 
power to negotiate better terms from the exporters.
Table 2. 18 State Trading in Wheat (% of Volume of Prin­




1973-77 39 .0% 91.3%
Source : Schmitz et al. (1981), p. 25.
The market shift towards developing countries and 
CPEs also affects the pace of growth in demand for wheat. 
As countries develop, their income elasticity of demand 
approaches the developed country level of 0.2% and popu­
lation growth slows, reducing the growth in demand for 
wheat.*=* The world wheat market is also slowly evolving 
into a mixed bread and feed wheat market. As developing
j!VO" Schmitz, et al. (1981), p. 7.
* 1' Canadian Wheat Board, Grain Matters, Nov-Dee 1988, 
P. 3, claims the role of state traders on the export side 
has in fact risen much higher as the US Commodity Credit 
Corporation has been a key actor in all US wheat sales 
since 1986.
*-?- Gerrard (1985) .
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countries and CPEs develop economically, the demand for 
red meats usually accelerates and livestock production 
increases. Wheat is disadvantaged as a feed grain, how­
ever, because it costs more to produce than maize but 
provides less feed energy. Meanwhile, the price elasti­
city of demand for unprocessed wheat has declined in all 
developed and developing countries. The average price of 
a loaf of bread in North America and Europe now repre­
sents the value not only of the raw wheat (10%), but also 
the costs and profit margins of the related transporta­
tion, milling, baking, packaging, distribution, adver­
tising, wholesale, and retail systems.
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES
The application of additional physical and financial 
capital was necessary for the increases in production 
after 1958, but the gains would not have been possible 
without corresponding changes in the knowledge structure. 
The rapid change in European farming after 1958 was 
assisted by increased investment in education and farmer 
training as well as in the research and development of 
new wheat strains and new methods of cultivation. At the 
same time, farmers and farm policy makers face rising 
consumer demands for greater variety and higher quality 
output and pressure from environmentalists to reduce 
pollution which has accompanied the new, intensive pro­
duction methods.
Education
Farmers in Europe, as in much of the world, have 
usually received little formal education; most of their 
training was on-the-job, either on family farms or in 
larger commercial enterprises. This pattern of education 
was adequate when farming was largely a matter of having 
'a strong back.1 Now, an operator of a commercially- 
motivated wheat farm must understand: economics so he
can decide on the best mix of crops to take advantage of 
market conditions; horticulture and soil sciences so he
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can choose the optimal time to sow and harvest and the 
optimal mix of and time to apply fertilizers, pesticides, 
and herbicides; mechanics so he can repair his increas­
ingly complex machinery and equipment; accounting so he 
can keep track of the cash flow and manage his debt; and, 
ideally, computers, so he can conduct the sophisticated 
analyses needed to keep the farm operating profitably.
Table 2.19 Agricultural, Forestry and Veterinary 
Sciences Students in the UK
1969 1976 1982
Students Studying Agriculture,
Forestry & Veterinary Sciences na 22,700 24 ,700
- Full Time & Sandwich Courses na 6,400 16 ,300
- Part-Time and Evening na 16,300 16 ,700
- At Universities 4 ,291 5,258 6 ,409
National Diplomas in Agriculture na 833 1015
First University Degrees Awarded 736 927 1, 430*
Higher University Degrees Awarded 279 476 589*
* 1981 data
Source: Burrell, et al. (1984), p.44.
At the founding of the CAP, production in the Com­
munity was limited by the low level of formal training 
among farmers and farm families. In France, for example, 
even as recently as the early 1980s only about 5% of 
farmers had received any formal training in agricultural 
or agronomic practices/13 German farmers are generally 
better educated, but not necessarily in farming matters. 
UK farmers are probably better trained because of a comp­
rehensive system of apprenticeship with larger farms and 
the availability of related university training. In the
UK there has been a marked increase in the number of stu-
CTa.Ue2.K0
dents in agriculture-related training programs. In 1982,s
for example, more than 24,700 students were studying ag­
riculture. In addition, the number of farm-related first
Duch§ne, Szczepanik, & Legg (1985), p. 95.
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and graduate university degrees granted in 1981 was about 
double the number awarded in 1969.
Table 2.20 ]National Expenditure on Agriculture (M ECU)
1976 1977 1980
Training: France n . a 257.8 72.5
Germany n . a 2.4 5.4
UK n . a 4.9 17.3
Information France 54.2 59 .4 111.4
& Advice: Germany 5.5 7.3 6.9
UK 58.3 78.8 126 .5
Source: ASC , 1977, 1978, 1980, 1986.
France, in particular. recognized the problems re­
suiting from poorly trained f armers and expanded training
programs for existing farmers during the 1970s. At the
same time, the three north European governments expanded 
their extension programs to inform farmers of new, more
"i
efficient farm practices. The combination of greater 
training for starting farmers, retirement of older farm­
ers, and the greater provision of extension services 
accelerated the adoption of new technologies and methods 
of production.
Biotechnical Advances
The wheat seed, the critical factor in the produc­
tion of wheat, was domesticated as early as 6000 B.C. but 
changed little until this past century. Major seed dev­
elopments in the early 1900s spread wheat production into 
many new areas and radically transformed the world wheat 
industry. Then, in 1973, the breakthrough of recombinant 
DNA (gene splicing) accelerated seed advancement further. 
New strains have been developed that shorten the period 
to maturity, resist fungal and bacteriological diseases
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(e.g., rust), give a desired protein level (either high 
for bread flour or low for feeds), and enhance yields.
The major breakthrough in wheat seed development in 
the post war period was made by the Centro Internacional 
de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT) in Los Banos, 
Mexico, where beginning in 1960 scientists released a 
succession of new wheat breeds suitable for moist growing 
areas, as found in India, Brazil, and Mexico. With the 
application of proper amounts of fertilizers and irriga­
tion, these new varieties provided a high yield of medium 
protein wheat.44 Traditional varieties, characterized by 
tall and thin straw, often fell over when farmers applied 
large quantities of fertilizer; the new varieties had 
short, stiff straw which allowed yields to continue to 
rise even when fertilizer applications were tripled.43 
That seed spread rapidly through the developing world and 
provided the foundation for the 'Green Revolution.'
Since then there has been a proliferation of wheat 
varieties. In the US, for example, in 1977 only 11 vari­
eties represented the vast majority of all wheat planted 
in Kansas; during the 1986 crop year, 43 varieties were 
planted. During the same period, wheat varieties repre­
senting 85% of the acreage planted in Kansas in 1986 did 
not even exist in 1977. Put the other way, the 1977 
wheat varieties only represented 15% of the acreage 
planted in 1986.4<£> The transformation was even greater 
in Europe. In the UK only one winter wheat variety used 
in 1975 (Maris Huntsman) was still used in 1987 and it 
was only planted on about 0.1% of the wheat acreage.4-7
44■ Morgan (1973), P. 315.
43- Brown & Eckholm (1974), p. 134.
4<£‘- Canadian Wheat Board, Grain Matters (Sept-Oct 88) ,
P . 4.
47-- Home-Grown Cereals Authority, Cereals Statistics 
(London, various).
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Hybrids of the 'green revolution' strain of high 
yield and medium protein wheat arrived in Europe in the 
mid-1970s as enterprising farmers took advantage of the 
CAP wheat regime. In 1976-77, the Commission proposed
and the Council accepted that the guaranteed price struc­
ture be modified to allow for a higher reference price to 
be paid for wheat of bread-making quality. The reference 
price for bread wheat, eventually supported by interven­
tion buying, was set about 13.5% above the intervention 
price, halfway between the proposed intervention and tar­
get prices for wheat. Although wheat had to satisfy 
higher quality standards to earn the higher reference 
price, Debatisse noted that "the differentiation tech­
niques between feed wheat and bread wheat has led to al­
most all wheat being considered bread w h e a t . B e c a u s e  
bread-qua1ity premiums were paid to some wheat that was 
not adequate for milling, farmers were encouraged to 
shift into those higher yielding, lower quality varieties 
that just met the minimum standards.
One result of the introduction of new seed varieties 
into Europe was that production techniques changed per­
manently. Because each seed variety has characteristics 
that suit it to specific conditions, farmers now general­
ly purchase their seed annually, much as they buy their 
other inputs. They no longer use seed from previous har­
vests. Furthermore,, the new, high-yielding varieties re­
quire large quantities of inputs— herbicides, pesticides, 
fungicides, and fertilizers— to grow at all.*** Conse­
quently, it would not be easy to revert to extensive pro­
duction methods using the existing seeds. The old, low- 
input, low-yielding varieties, meanwhile, are no longer 
readily available, so farmers cannot easily find other 
seeds to plant.so
Debatisse (1981), p. 30. 
Morgan (1979), p. 314. 
Body (1984), p. 18.
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Research also continues. The national governments 
are funding research into the agronomics of wheat produc­
tion with a view to improving yields or reducing costs of 
production. In particular, scientific researchers are
A .
determining the optimal timing and quantities of fertil­
izers, pesticides, and herbicides to apply. This activ­
ity was stepped up in the later 1970s.
Table 2.21 National Expenditure on Agricultural Research
M ECU 1976 1977 1980
France 98.9 138.8 157.3
Germany 91.7 0.7 164.4
United Kingdom 112.5 72.4 174.7
Source: ASC, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1986
The Bureau Europ^en de Recherches reported in 1989 
that breakthroughs in biotechnology could raise EC crop 
yields by another 10% within 10 years. Furthermore, in­
troduction of DNA-MAB probes into seeds would allow early 
detection of diseases, which alone could increase output 
by 10%. In addition, researchers are seeking ways to 
increase yields and to improve resistance to disease and 
weed killers. The managing director for Monsanto Europe 
SA, a major company in the research field, speculated in 
1989 that innovations from plant biotechnology will rise 
slowly until about 1995, when they will accelerate.251
Computers and the Farmer
The development of computing programs and the dis­
semination of computers both among farmers and in the in­
put and processing industries have significantly tighten­
ed the relationship between market changes and shifts in 
demand. Producers now have the computing power to calcu-
The Western Producer, 18-5-89.
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late rapidly the relative profitability of differing 
price structures and input usage.
Debatisse noted, for example, that "the EEC animal 
feedstuffs industry uses highly sophisticated mathematic­
al techniques of linear programming for optimising animal 
rations." In effect, "the computer directs purchasing in 
this sector."552* Consequently, feed lots and large cattle 
farms are able to calculate the relative merits of using 
forage, EC cereals, and commercially mixed feed based on 
imported cereal substitutes (i.e., manioc, corn glutens).
Other developments in the livestock sector may have 
a major impact on the cereals sector. A group of Dutch 
agricultural engineers have extended computer technology 
to the milking shed.=3 They developed in 1987 a proto­
type computer-controlled milking and feeding dairy called 
'Farm 2000.' When cows enter the milking shed, a comput­
er manipulates a robot arm to do the milking at the same 
time as it delivers individually tailored meals. The 
computer reads a sensor on the cow's neck and prepares 
and presents a balanced meal of forage and concentrated 
foods. Each cow’s measure balances roughage and concen­
trate to optimize milk yields.
In the cereals industry, computers are already being 
used to evaluate in-situ the quality and yields of wheat 
and make automatic adjustments to combining equipment. 
These, and other applications of computer technologies, 
will eventually optimize the use of cereals as feed and 
reduce the amount wasted as seed, feed, and dockage.
Technological Change in Processing
Wheat demand has also been strongly influenced by 
changes in the processing sector. Bakers and millers
Debatisse (1981), p. 26. 
The Economist, 23-4-88.
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have discovered that they can enrich medium strength 
European wheat with low-cost imported corn gluten to pro­
duce a stronger wheat flour suitable for pan breads. The 
corn glutens are a by-product of the production of corn 
syrup for the soda-pop industry.®^ At the same time, 
commercial feed-lots quickly discovered that corn glutens 
could be used to extend and enrich feed for dairy and 
beef cattle. Because the EC agreed to bind the duty rate 
on such products at zero under the Kennedy Round of GATT 
negotiations, those products enter the Community tariff- 
free, which makes them highly competitive with low qual­
ity wheats available for feed.
More recently, the baking industry has discovered 
how to bake 1ighter-weight, air-pocketed pan bread with­
out using high gluten or gluten enriched wheats. Most
wheat produced in Europe does not have enough glutens to
o f
produce this style bread using traditional baking pro-
r \
cesses. In the past, European millers mixed locally- 
produced medium strength wheat with imported high gluten 
wheats (often from North America). In the UK, where 
consumers overwhelmingly prefer these 1ighter-weight pan 
breads, millers and bakers developed the Chorleywood 
baking process. The dough, enriched with extra yeast, 
fat, and water, is continuously mixed with intense mech­
anical action to produce a higher yielding dough that 
bakes into a reasonable pan bread. ^  Consequently, the 
European market for higher quality wheats has declined.
When sugar was rationed in the US during the Second 
World War, corn glucose and fructose were developed as 
substitute sweeteners for confections. With the boom in 
consumption of soda-pop in the 1970s, and the high, regu­
lated price for sugar in the US, the industry produced 
large quantities of corn-glutens, which found a market in 
the E C .
»s. Furtan, et al. (1988), p p . 94-5, note that the new 
method also reduces the normal bread making time by one- 
third to one-half, thereby reducing the labour input 
costs. Therefore, bakers might not be willing to return 
to their old baking methods even if the EC system ended.
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Communications and Information
The wheat trade has also been strongly influenced as 
the world has become a 'global village' because of the 
development of quick and inexpensive telecommunications. 
The development of new technologies to gather and dis­
seminate information has helped make information a true 
public good. In earlier years, the big five grain trad­
ing companies generally had a monopoly on production in­
formation because they were the only market participants 
with informants in each market. They were thereby able 
to virtually control the market and make large profits.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) pioneer­
ed the notion of free flow of scientific and crop infor­
mation in the 1950s and 1960s but the practice only be­
came common in the mid-1970s when new technologies had 
been developed. The LandSat Satellite system, for one, 
can now scan and record crop progress in every part of 
the inhabited world. No longer can any country conceal 
its crop results, such as the USSR did in 1972. Agencies 
such as the US Department of Agriculture (with the help 
of the CIA), the Food and Agriculture Organization, and 
the International Wheat Council now regularly acquire, 
analyze, and report information on the current crop con­
ditions and future prospects for the world market. This 
tends to tighten market relationships and ensures 'grain 
robberies' cannot happen.
The development of modern telecommunications has 
also spread a global conscience. Famines and chronic 
starvation have been common since the beginning of man­
kind, but now that television brings moving pictures of 
their effect into the living-rooms of the developed 
world, food aid has been conscientiously applied to the 
hunger problem.“’5'7 Individuals and groups have responded.
=*- Puchala & Hopkins (1983), p. 80. 
Keohane & Nye (1977), p. 12.
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In 1987, for Instance, the Band-Aid concerts and the many 
national fund-raising efforts of churches and special in­
terest groups helped alleviate the Ethiopian famine and 
dramatically demonstrated the widespread concern in Eur­
ope and North America.
Consumers and Research
At root, the world farming community depends on con­
sumers purchasing their products. In recent years, a 
number of factors have worked to shift the demand for 
cereals. At first, significantly higher personal incomes 
in Europe increased demand for red meats and dampened per 
capita consumption of cereals products, such as flour, 
which reduced growth in demand for bread-quality wheats 
and increased demand for feeds. More recently, medical 
research into human biology and nutrition has shown link­
ages between low fibre diets and intestinal and stomach 
cancer and between red meat consumption and the incidence 
of high cholesterol, heart disease, and strokes. Conse­
quently, there has been a shift in the diets in most 
developed countries towards whole-grain and white-meats 
and away from white bread flours and red meats^lez.n),
On balance, the impact of recent research has been 
to dampen demand for both bread and feed wheats. For 
example, it takes about 1.33 kg of wheat to produce one 
kilogram of white flour and only 1.03 kg to produce a 
kilogram of whole wheat flour.se3 More importantly, it 
takes only about two kilogram of cereals to produce a 
kilogram of chicken meat whereas approximately five 
kilograms of wheat must be fed to a cow to achieve a gain
K53- Canada Grains Council (no date), p. 11, states that 
the extraction rate in North America and Europe ranged 
from 71% to 78% over the 1972-76 period. The endosperm, 
used for white flour, makes up about 83% of the whole 
kernel and the bran, included for whole flour, comprises 
another 14% of the kernel; the germ makes up 3% of the 
kerne 1.
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of one kilogram of meat.55'5' Based on the conversion fac­
tors and the shift in types of meat demanded in Europe 
between 1980 and 1985, the annual demand for feed wheats
in the EC10 has been reduced by about 0.6 Mt (approxi­
mately of the feed wheat use in 1985) compared with
levels that would have been used based on 1980 tastes.
Table 2. 22 Consumption of Basic Foods (kg/capita)
France Germany UK EC10
Total 1909-14 203.9 73.8 150.5 n . a
Wheat 1960-61 96.0 55 .7 n . a n . a
1973-74 69 .9 46.7 67.3 77.2
1984-85 70.4 51.1 61.3 71.2
1986-87 69 .6 51.8 63.5 73.4
Soft 1963-64 82.2 47.6 n . a n . a
Wheat 1973-74 62.3 42.8 66.7 65 .5
1984-85 62.0 48.7 60.4 62.5
1986-87 61.0 49.0 62.3 62.8
Beef 1973 22 21 22 22
1980 26 22 23 23
1984 25 21 22 22
Pou1 try 1973 14 9 12 12
1980 17 10 13 14
1984 18 10 16 15
Note: Wheat is represented by the flour equivalent; tot-
al wheat includes durum and common wheat
Source: ASC, 1987, P. T/164-5 .
In the broader sense, consumers also are the ulti-
mate arbiters of how the environment is used. During the 
1970s and into the 1980s, scientists confirmed that the 
new intensive crop and livestock production techniques 
contributed to the degradation of the European environ­
ment. Nitrogen fertilizers used by wheat producers were 
responsible for the algae bloom and oxygen starvation in 
many Northern European lakes while the large feed-lots
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were causing obvious air, water, and soil pollution. 
Meanwhile, other researchers demonstrated links between 
some human illnesses and consumption of food produced 
using chemicals, herbicides, and hormones. The European 
Council bowed to pressure from the European Parliament, 
some national governments, and consumer groups to ban red 
meat growth hormones effective 1 January 1989, thereby 
creating a major trade dispute at the half-way point of 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Research on pollution and 
food chemicals therefore can create vast new pressures 
for the CAP to adapt.
CONCLUSION
Although the rise in European farm output and the 
development of exportable surpluses certainly has in­
creased the pressure for farm policy reform in the EC, it 
is really merely a symptom of the fundamental changes 
that are pushing the system. The OECD concluded in 1982 
that the diverse changes in the underlying power struc­
tures have radically altered the farm policy environment. 
"The increasing integration of agriculture within the 
economy has taken agricultural policy out of its purely 
sectoral context and policy formulation has been put 
within a wider context of general economic, social, and 
environmental perspectives."*50 The Community has spent 
the better part of the 1980s coming to grips with the new 
realities. The following chapters discuss the implica­
tions of these changes in the context of both domestic 
policy reform and international trade negotiation.
OECD (1982), p. 103.
Chapter 3
PRICE POLICY: DIRECTION OF CHANGE
This chapter, and the four following, examine the 
fixing of wheat prices from 1973 to 1988 to illustrate 
the role of shifting power structures and changing bar­
gains in directing the proposals, discussion, and deci­
sions respecting wheat. In particular, the analysis 
shows that the price fixing is no longer primarily dir­
ected toward supporting farm incomes. In the first years 
the target price was based on perceived income require­
ments for producers in the food deficit region of the EC. 
The lower intervention prices reflected the transport 
costs between there and the producing areas. In 1976-77 
the target and intervention prices were separated1 and by 
1980 target prices were "derived from the intervention 
price."2 Throughout the 1980s the Commission argued that 
"a realistic policy with regard to pricing must be pur­
sued, with the emphasis on the economic function of 
prices."3 Consequently, the debate has concentrated on 
market rather than social concerns.
In this analysis, the focus is on the three stages 
of policy development: initiation, consultation, and
decision-making. Within the price-fixing, the three 
stages can be distinguished by focusing on the centres of 
debate, where in general: the Commission initiates;
various pressure groups at the community and national 
levels as well as the official consultative organs of the 
Community (advisory groups, Economic and Social Commit­
tee, and the European Parliament) debate the Commission's 
proposals; and the Council decides. Consequently, the 
analysis follows the reforms beginning with the Commis­
sion and working through the European and national policy 
structures.
1 - COM(75)600, p. 55. Note: all Commission price pro­
posals (COMS) are listed chronologically along with the 
relevant opinions and decisions in the table on p. 415. 
All other COMS are listed chronologically in pp. 411-14.
^- Green Europe Newsflash #44, p . 5.
3- ASC 1985, p.74.
92
Price Policy: Direction of Change 93
REFORM OF THE CAP WHEAT PRICE POLICY
Reform has not come easily. The price fixing became 
increasingly complex and contentious during the 1970s and 
in the 1980s the basic farm lobby-Commission-Agricultural 
Council bargains began to unravel; in earlier periods the 
policy system could be characterized as a cozy, administ­
rative arrangement between farm groups, the Commission, 
and Council. The combination of a new world-security 
structure, increasing economic volatility, and rising 
domestic production of most products, but especially 
wheat, caused strains in the system and a corresponding 
shift in the key bargains. Meanwhile, the Commission 
developed a number of alternative allies to counterbal­
ance the farm lobby and to support reform.
The shifting power structures and bargains created 
the conditions for reform of the CAP wheat pricing policy 
over the 1973-88 period. Since 1973 the guaranteed Com­
munity price has been sharply revised. The biggest 
change was in the role of the target and intervention 
prices. In the early years of the CAP, the target price 
was "the linchpin of the market organization" and was set 
at the beginning of each marketing year to reflect "the 
farmgate price farmers should receive in consumption 
areas. 11/4 As a result, it became the focus for much of 
the haggling in the Commission and Council. The inter­
vention price, in contrast, was set about 12% to 20% be­
low the target price to reflect the transportation costs 
between the producing regions in France and the consuming 
region in Germany. By 1988, the system had been turned 
upside down, with the intervention price being set both 
conceptually and practically first; the target price was 
set largely to reflect Commission and Council concerns 
with the external market. As a result, in 1988, the Com­
mission proposed and the Council accepted that the target 
price for common wheat for 1988-89 should fall 2.3% be­
Burtin (1987), p. 19.
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cause the cost of transport from Ormes to Duisburg fell 
to 26.90 ECU/t from 32.70 ECU/t in 1987-88. If the orig­
inal intent for the CAP had remained, the intervention 
price should have been raised rather than the target 
price cut.
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Sources; CQRs, News reports, official publications, H-SCA.
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This change in the system evolved so slowly that it 
has been little remarked upon. In the early to mid- 
1970s, the price debate revolved around the price in­
crease needed to sustain farm incomes, with the objective 
method providing a yardstick for all participants. Be­
ginning in the mid-1970s the Commission worked to bring 
the annual adjustments below the general rate of infla­
tion and after 1983 it attempted to cut both nominal and 
real prices. At that point, the Commission met strong 
resistance from both farmers and agricultural ministers 
in the Council. Council completely refused to approve 
direct price cuts. It proved, however, willing to accept 
'camouflaged1 and even automatic price cuts, as long as 
the ministers could return to their domestic constituen­
cies and proclaim that they had not directly caused the 
price cut.
As a result, the power to direct prices shifted 
largely to the Commission from the Council. The Commis­
sion first tried to establish automatic mechanisms which 
would direct price cuts based on the underlying economic 
conditions in the sector. The guarantee threshold system 
which operated from 1983-84 to 1985-86 forced a 1% cut in 
the price increase in 1983-84. When the formula indicat­
ed a 5% price cut in 1985-86 (because of the record har­
vest in 1984), the Council rejected the mechanism. 
(Council discovered that by using a three-year moving 
average production figure, they had designed a system 
that would also have triggered 5% price cuts in each of 
the next two years.5 ) After that failure, the automatic 
approach to price setting lapsed until 1988, when the 
Commission proposed and the European Council accepted the 
stabilizers system. In 1989-90, the first year of full 
operation of the new system, the intervention price was 
reduced by 3% because cereals production exceeded the 160 
Mt threshold. Between 1983 and 1989, automatic mechan-
■¥r See. p p  K 5 " ' I 2 X .
Vasey (1985), p. 657.
96 Chapter 3
isms forced a total 5.7% cut in the official intervention 
price. If the stabilizers system is sustained, the nom­
inal intervention price could drop by a further 8.7% by 
the end of the 1992-93 crop year.
Although prices were reduced in both nominal and 
real terms after 1983, that is only part of the story. 
The Commission, largely with Council approval, changed 
its approach and used its own powers to effect 'disguis­
ed' price cuts. The first real attempt to reduce farm 
support through the disguised approach came at the begin­
ning of the 1983-84 crop year, when the Commission an­
nounced that it would purchase only 3 Mt of bread wheat 
in the August-October period and would charge a 5 ECU/t 
security deposit on all intervention offers. Then in 
December 1983, the Commission announced it would delay 
intervention payments by four months for cereals produ­
cers, effectively cutting producer support by about 4%.
The bulk of the camouflaged changes came in 1986 and 
beyond. The bread wheat support system (i.e., reference 
price and corresponding intervention purchases) was rep­
laced that year with a flat 2% premium for wheat that had 
more than 14% protein content. As a result, the effec­
tive support for bread wheat dropped by about 13%. Mean­
while, the quality standards for basic intervention were 
raised, payments for lower quality common wheat were dis­
counted up to 5%, and the value and number of monthly in­
crements were reduced. In addition, the Council approved 
a flat 3% co-responsibility levy on all cereals sold off- 
farm. In 1987 the Commission introduced a new buying-in 
system and opened intervention buying between November 
and May only when the average market price dropped below 
the intervention price. Even then, the Commission only 
paid farmers 94% of the basic intervention price, delayed 
by 110 days. In 1988 the Commission and Council adopted 
a 3% super levy for cereals (refundable if production did 
not exceed 164.8 Mt) and further reduced the value of
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monthly increments. In 1989, the Commission proposed a 
phased reduction of the period of open intervention over 
the following years and Council accepted for 1989-90 that 
the buying period be shortened by one month to November 
through May.
Table 3.2 The impact of market changes on the effective support for producer prices 
for feed wheat (ECU/t)
Inter­ Buying Monthly Incre­ Feed January Impact Co- Co- January
vention in Incre­ ments Cuts Buying of pay Resp Resp Producer
Price Rate ment, Begin I Price delays Levy! Levv2 Prices I Ch
S3 184.58 1 . 0 0 2.57 Sept - 197.43 1.92 - - 195.51 2 . 1
84 182.73 1 . 0 0 2.57 Sept - 195.58 1.71 - - 193.87 -0 . 8
85 179.44 1 . 0 0 2.57 Sept - 192.29 1 . 6 8 - - 190.61 -1.7
8 6 179.44 1 . 0 0 2.45 Aug 5 185.17 4.06 5.38 - 175.73 -7.8
87 179.44 0.94 2 . 0 0 Nov 5 165.70 3.57 5.38 - 156.75 - 1 0 . 8
8 8 179.44 0.94 1.50 Nov 5 164.20 3.61 5.38 2.87 152.34 - 2 . 6
89 174.06 0.94 1.31 Nov 5 150.85 3.53 5.22 5.22 144.88 -4.9
Xch -5.7/1 _ - - -19.5X _ - _ -25.9% -
Notes: January buying price equals the basic intervention price, adjusted for the feed wheat
quality and buying-in rate, supp1 evented by the cumulative monthly increment applicable for Jan­
uary 1 of the marketing year (i.e., monthly increment x the number of months of increments). The 
adjustment for the impact of payments delays was produced by COPA. The second co-responsibility 
levy for I9B8-89 is the actual net payment after the refund and for 1989-90 is the initial rate 
(subject to refunds if production for 1989 is less than 164.5 Ht).
Sources: Commission of the ECs (1988), Produits Aqricoles: Prix et hontants Fixes; COPA.
The Intervention system consequently now operates as 
a safety net rather than an alternate market. By 1989, 
the higher quality standards, delayed payments, and a 
shorter buying period (limited to November to April) had 
reduced support during the critical harvest period. Fur­
thermore, the Commission suggested in 1989 that it was 
considering changing the operation of intervention so 
that it becomes even less popular. In particular, the 
Commission reported it was considering cutting the number 
of intervention stores and reducing the subsidies to 
transport grain to the delivery points. Already by 1989, 
the UK intervention agency had raised the minimum quanti­
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ties it would purchase to 500t from lOOt, making it more 
difficult for small farmers to offer their grain to in­
tervention rather than the market.
The adjustments in national currencies meanwhile had 
became less troublesome. In 1984 the Commission and 
Council implemented a new agri-monetary system that elim­
inated the pressure for higher ECU prices resulting from 
the strong DM. As a result, EMS parity changes became 
less difficult because they were automatically accommo­
dated in the green ECU system. (EMS parity changes, how­
ever, still present a major challenge to the Community as 
it attempts to remove the artificial differences in 
prices caused by the green rates.)
The changes in the intervention system between 1983 
and 1989 allowed market prices to drop below the inter­
vention price. Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 indicate that 
wheat producers in France, Germany, and the UK no longer 
count on the market price lying somewhere between the 
intervention and target prices. Since 1982-83 average 
market prices in all three countries have dropped consis­
tently below intervention prices.
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A concomitant of this shift in price policy was a 
reformulation of the CAP policy for improving the econ­
omic organization of the farm sector (that set of pro­
grams is commonly called ’structural policy’). Marsh and 
Swanney observed in the early 1980s that EC agricultural 
structural policy underwent a radical shift in orienta­
tion during the late 1970s, coinciding with the period of 
significant reform in price policy. Structural policy.
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which was economically directed in the 1960s and into the 
1970s, instead became a social safety net for small farm­
ers and disadvantaged regions. This continued throughout 
the 1980s. In 1983, the Commission announced its "inten­
tion that in future greater emphasis be put on long-term 
structural action, as opposed to market intervention and 
price support, to alleviate social and income problems in 
agriculture. ,<fa In line with this new approach to struc­
tural issues, the Commission in 1986 permitted the less- 
favoured areas (LFA) designation, and the corresponding 
support programs, to extend to cover 48% of the Commun­
ity's agricultural land base, up from the 31% allowed 
under the 1975 program. As a result, 51% of German, 38% 
of French, and 52.5% of UK agricultural land is covered 
by the LFA designation. Then, in 1988, the Council 
approved a program of extensification and direct EC and 
national income payments to support small farmers suffer­
ing declining revenues as a result of the reforms in the 
price system.
This change in the structures policy fits the evi­
dence presented in this thesis. As price policy became 
market-oriented, it was quite natural that the "justifi­
cation of structural policy switched from economic to 
social criteria."'7 Anything less would have been im­
possible given the political and economic bargains that 
support small farmers and disadvantaged regions.
PAST STUDIES OF THE PRICE SYSTEM
Past analyses of the Common Agricultural Policy have 
not recorded this reversal of the roles of price and 
structural policy nor the changes in the structures and 
bargains which precipitated the change. Three recent 
analyses have concentrated primarily on the price debate. 
Pearce examined the chronology and issues surrounding the
Bui I. EC 9/83. p. 27.
Marsh & Swanney (1983), p. 58.
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1981 price review and concluded that the CAP "has pro­
vided an opportunity for some groups to pursue their 
claims with even greater effect than might have been 
possible at the national level."® Hence the title of her 
article: "The Common Agricultural Policy: The Accum­
ulation of Special Interests." Harris and Swinbank's 
analysis of the 1978-79 price fixing focused on the give 
and take between the Commission and Council to the ex­
clusion of other actors and influences in the system. 
They concluded that the "annual review, within which the 
divergent national interests can find expression, helps 
ensure the survival of the CAP.’"9 Finally, Vasey examin­
ed the Commission-Counci1 negotiations in the relatively 
recent 1985 farm price review and provided insights into 
the complications involved in such high level debate. At 
the root of each analysis, however, each researcher sees 
price fixing as an administrative exercise to establish a 
set of guaranteed agricultural product prices that meet 
producer wishes. This view looks increasingly elemen­
tary. Other political and economic forces have intruded 
in the process in recent years, to the point where the 
earlier bi-polar debate between the Commission and farm­
ers (represented by either their organizations or their 
national governments) has fragmented.
Each study failed for the same reason to give a full 
picture of the issues and debate. By attempting to draw 
conclusions about the process from single price reviews, 
they missed the important influence of the power struc­
tures. In short-term, partial analyses, power structures 
appear to establish an unchanging array of opportunities 
and constraints. But, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the 
power structures shifted greatly over the past 20 years 
and changed the way farm policy is set.
Pearce (1983), p. 172.
Harris & Swinbank (1978), p. 267.
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Nevi1le-Rolfe, in contrast, examined the CAP price 
reviews over an extended period, but his work is more a 
discussion of the history and politics of the CAP than an 
analysis of the political economy of the system. By 
attempting to cover all product regimes10, the role of 
power structures and bargains became lost in the profu­
sion of detail. In the 1987-88 marketing year, the CAP 
included separate support measures and marketing systems 
for: durum, common wheat, barley, rye, maize, and rice;
sugar and isoglucose; olive oil and oilseeds; dried fod­
der; cotton, flax, hemp, and their related seeds; wine; 
hops; leaf tobacco; fruit, vegetables, and related pro­
cessed products; milk products; beef, veal, and pigmeat; 
eggs and poultrymeat; silkworms; peas and beans; and 
sheep and goatmeat. It requires hundreds of pages just 
to codify the various types of support offered to these 
producers. Nevi1le-RoIfe's study demonstrates that look­
ing at all commodities blurs the focus.
THE KEY BARGAINS
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 examine how the changing
power structures discussed in Chapter 2 transformed the 
fundamental bargains in the system. Although the annual 
spring pricing fixing is often cluttered with a myriad of 
unresolved issues that ultimately form part of an omnibus 
package of measures, the single most important issue is 
always the level of the guaranteed prices for the coming 
production year.
The founding bargain between the German and French 
government set the tone for the early price reviews. The 
respective national farm organizations coordinated their 
actions in COPA, so that it was able to present to the 
Commission a strong and united position on the direction
10- The term "regimes' refers here to the technical 
measures used to support a product market and should not 
be confused with the regimes studied by Krasner (1983).
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for price proposals. Consensus at the national and in­
ternational levels had a powerful impact on Commission 
and Council actions and dominated the debate.
In the early years of the CAP, and up to around 
1979, the key bargains outlined in Figure 3.4 largely 
determined the scope and direction of policy.
Figure 3.4 ----------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING THE WHEAT PRICE POLICY*
1970-79











As the rate of structural change accelerated during 
the 1970s, the critical bargains underlying the annual 
price review were strained. Some fundamental bargains 
strengthened: for example, the German Ministry of Agri-
*  A H  a b b r e v  icctcons a.re. c.r> pp. 5 ‘-£>.
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culture and the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV) farm organ­
ization tightened their alliance. Other bargains (out­
lined in Figure 3.5) weakened: farm organizations had
greater difficulty building a common position, to the 
extent that the price recommendations of COPA became in­
creasingly general and lacking in focus. Completely new 
bargains were also developed. The Commission, for exam­
ple, developed new consumer and environmental lobbies to 
counter the farmers.
Figure 3.5
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING THE WHEAT PRICE POLICY
1979-88
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In 1988, a new factor entered the price review. 
The European Council in February 1988 reformed the farm 
budget so that it now incorporates all farm outlays, in­
cluding depreciation allowances for intervention stores. 
As a result, farm ministers can no longer hide the true 
cost of farm support in off-budget areas. The flip-side 
of these changes is that the Commission now has the auth­
ority to transfer Agricultural Council price decisions 
which appear likely to exceed budgetary guidelines to a 
special joint Council of Finance and Agricultural Minis­
ters. The committee will then review and revise the 
prices to limit budget costs. If the system works, it 
would significantly open the decision process to non-farm 
influence at the highest level.
Chapter 4
PRICE POLICY: PROPOSALS
The process for preparing wheat price proposals 
changed significantly during 1973-88. When the system 
began in 1967, Sicco Mansholt, the first Agricultural 
Commissioner, wanted prices to regulate production and 
structural policies to support small farmers. But the 
Farm Council never accepted his proposals. After pan- 
European farm riots in spring 1972, the new Commission 
found it had lost influence both with the farmers and the 
Farm Council. DG-VI quickly recognized the benefits of 
strengthening its central role in the policy process and 
repaired its relationship with the farm policy community. 
In order to do so, it developed the price system to sup­
port farm incomes.
The Agricultural Directorate had great leeway to 
manage farm issues during the next 15 years because the 
president of the Commission was relatively weak, as he 
was replaced frequently and his power proscribed by the 
Council. The Luxembourg Accord, meanwhile, forced con­
sensual decision-making in the Council and encouraged DG- 
VI to develop the expertise and contacts necessary to 
finesse proposals through the system. DG-VI, in collu­
sion with COPA, thereby enjoyed unmatched power during 
the 1970s. This period of administrative legerdemain 
reached its peak in the mid-1970s with the operation of 
the 'objective method.’ Farmers never got everything 
they requested but they did get healthy price increases 
and were viewed jealously by other European lobbies as 
the most influential special interest group at the Com­
munity leve1.
Shifts in the power structures in the 1970s, how­
ever, undermined the basis for the Commission's power. 
As early as 1968, changed production patterns began to 
make the price system less satisfactory, as output rose 
much faster than domestic demand. New technologies
- 106 -
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threatened to exacerbate the problems facing both the 
intervention system and the Community budget. Meanwhile, 
international competition intensified and financial mar­
kets became more unstable, which created additional impe­
tus for reform, as both farmers and the Community faced 
budgetary dilemmas.
Table 4.1 Objectives and goals of the wheat price review— rank order of priority 
(1 = tost important; 5 = least iiportant; X = rejected as valid issue; 
- = not lentioned)
F a n  Food EC EC
Date COM # Title Income Prices Budqet HCAs Siippiy
21-03-73 na Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1973-74 1 - - - -
05-11-73 (73) 1850 Memorandum: Agriculture 1973-78 1 - 7 - L
16-01-74 (74! 30 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1974-75 (A) nL - - - 1
29-09-74 (74) 1446 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1974-75 (B) 1 - - - -
27-11-74 (74) 2 0 0 1 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1975-76 1 - - - Vf.
04-03-75 (75) 1 0 0 Stocktaking of the CAP 1 X - - X
10-12-75 (75) 600 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1976-77 AI - - - X
28-02-77 (77) 1 0 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1977-78 1 1 - - X
08-12-77 (775 c n cJ i  J Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1978-79 4 7 - 2 1
05-02-79 (79) 1 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1979-80 2 - - - 1i
07-02-80 (80) 1 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1980-81 n - 4 1 7
05-12-80 (80) 800 Reflections on the CAP - - 3 1 i'
20-02-81 (81) 50 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1981-82 1 - 7 - 1
24-06-81 (31) 300 Report on the Mandate of 30 May 1980 1 - - - 1
23-10-81 (815 608 Mandate of 30 May 1980: Guidelines 2 - - - 1
27-01-82 (82) 1 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1982-83 1 - 4 3 2
21-12-82 (82) 650 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1983-84 ni. VA - 3 1
20-06-83 (83) 380 Guidelines for Development of the CAP - - 3 2 1
28-07-33 (83) 500 CAP Proposals of the Commission 4 - 3 2 1
20-01-84 (84) 2 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1984-85 - - - 2 1
30-01-85 (85) 50 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1985-86 - - 2 3 AL
15-07-85 (855 333 Perspectives for the CAP (Green Paper) X - 2 - 1
14-11-85 (85) 700 Memo on Adjustment of the Cereal Market - - 2 - 1
18-12-85 (855 750 Future for Community Agriculture - - 2 - 1
13-02-86 (8 6 ) 2 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1986-87 - - 2 - 1
16-03-87 (87) 1 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1987-88 - - 2 3 1
01-10-87 (87) 452 Implementation of Ag Stabilizers (Cereals) - - 1 - 1
23-03-88 (8 8 ) 1 2 0 Proposals on Fixing Prices for 1988-89 - - 1 3 1
Source: COHS from the Commission of the EC (as indicated) and Bulletins of the ECs (various).
Table 4.1 illustrates the gradual shift in Commis­
sion objectives. By 1980, the Commission accepted the
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challenge to reform the domestic price system. First, it 
ended the objective method and then pushed for the dom­
estic wheat price to respond to market imperatives rather 
than non-market concerns.
THE PRICE FIXING PROCESS
The Treaty of Rome gives the Commission primacy in 
the area of policy formulation by granting it two levers. 
First, 'no proposal means no policy' because Article 155 
states that "in order to ensure the proper functioning 
and development of the common market, the Commission 
shall ... formulate recommendations or deliver opinions 
on matters dealt with in this treaty, if it expressly so 
provides or if the Commission considers it necessary." 
Second, Article 149 requires that the Council act unani­
mously to change any proposal without Commission appro­
val .
Although the Commission has significant power to 
initiate, the decision process in Council ensures that it 
does not develop proposals in a vacuum. Between 1966 
(the Luxembourg Accords) and the early 1980s the Agricul­
tural Council set policy on the basis of consensus, tak­
ing "full account of the interests of all member states 
in drawing up its proposals from the very beginning, and 
negotiate[d] first with them (in addition to consulting 
the technical bodies concerned), and later with the Com­
mittee of Permanent Representatives, so as to give its 
proposals some chance of being adopted by the Council."1 
The Commission also co-operated with COPA, the EP, and 
the ESC to ensure maximum support for Commission propo­
sals before they reached the Council. After the Agricul­
tural Council re-introduced majority voting in 1982, how­
ever, the Commission found that it had more leeway to set 
the agenda and less need to finesse its proposals.
Bieber & Palmer (1975), p. 311
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The price review2 is always preceded by extensive 
consultations beginning in early autumn, led by the Agri­
cultural Directorate (DG-VI) of the Commission. DG-VI 
first reviews market conditions in the CAP sectors— based 
partly on a review of the general economic outlook for 
the Community and world markets provided by DG-II (Econ­
omic and Financial Affairs). It presents this analysis 
in November to the advisory committees and to the perman­
ent representatives of the member states on the Special 
Committee on Agriculture (SCA).
Meanwhile, a working group of experts from the Com­
mittee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) 
reviews the market situation and prepares its request for 
price increases. This report is usually submitted to the 
Commission in November during one of the regular meetings 
between the Commission President, the Agriculture Commis­
sioner, senior officials from DG-VI, and the Presidium of 
COPA (composed of representatives of each of the member 
national farm organizations). COPA, the Committee of 
Agricultural Co-operation in the EEC (COGECA), the food- 
processing industry, consumers, and farm workers also 
have input through the 16 product advisory committees.3
Near year-end, the Agricultural Commissioner submits 
DG-VI's price proposals to the full Commission. Until 
the early 1980s, COPA also was given a preview of the 
proposals before they were transmitted to the Council.* 
Most years the Commission formally transmits the propos­
als (in a communication (COM)) to the Council of Agricul­
32 • See Nevi 1 le-Ro If e (1984), Appendix 5, esp. pp. 517-21 
for anecdotal view of process.
3- Each committee has 50% of its members from COPA or 
COGECA, 25% from selected trade and processing firms, and 
25% representing consumers and farm workers.
*- International Herald Tribune, 22-4-84, quotes Brian 
Gardner of Agra Europe as saying "until very recently" 
COPA was shown the price proposals before they were sub­
mitted to member countries.
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tural Ministers between early December and the end of 
February. The price package should be accepted by the 
Council before April 1, the beginning of the marketing 
year for most products.
In spite of frequent high-level consultations be­
tween DG-VI and farmers, consumers, and national govern­
ments, the official price proposals transmitted to the 
Council unquestionably reflect Commission concerns and 
goaIs.
THE KEY BARGAINS AT THE POLICY INITIATION STAGE
The 'tenet of faith' in European unification created 
a bond among the original members of the Commission that 
lasted into the 1970s. In earlier years, leaders such as 
Sicco Mansholt, the first Agricultural Commissioner, and 
Walter Hallstein, the first President of the Commission, 
commanded great respect, which enabled them to override 
much opposition on the specifics of policy. In practical 
terms, the cadre of committed idealists® ensured that the 
proposals from DG-VI were universally acceptable within 
the Commission. Furthermore, French civil servants were 
always appointed to the key bureaucratic jobs within DG- 
VI that controlled cereals policy (i.e., the Director 
General and the head of the cereals division of DG-VI). 
As France generally set the standards for good Community 
relations, the cereals policy was generally regarded as a 
touchstone of Community spirit. In practice, this allow­
ed DG-VI to prepare proposals and manage the agricultural 
system without input from the rest of the Commission.
Non-agricultura1 directorates have never had much 
influence on farm policy. In the 1975 Stocktaking an 
"inter-service group" of officials from a variety of 
directorates, chaired by the secretary-general of the 
Commission, recommended expansion of the "horizontal di­
Poullet & Deprez (1977), pp. 138-39
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mension" of agricultural policy formulation. In partic­
ular, they suggested that DGs I (External Relations), II 
(Economic Affairs), and XIX (Budget) should provide opin­
ions on DG-VI price proposals and that the final price 
package should be approved both by the Economic Policy 
Committee of senior treasury civil servants and the Fin­
ance Council.A Neither proposal surfaced in the report 
on the Stocktaking (which was prepared by DG-VI). Farm 
policy therefore remained largely a monopoly preserve of 
DG-VI and the Agricultural Council until 1988, when the 
European Council agreed that the Commission could refer 
Agricultural Council price decisions that exceed budget­
ary guidelines to a special Council of Finance and Agri­
culture Ministers for review and revision.
  Figure 4.1 --------------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING THE FORMULATION 
OF WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS 1970-79
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During the 1960s and 1970s DG-VI worked to bolster 
its position in the policy system by carefully cultivat­
ing relationships with farmers, the national farm organi-
Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p. 247 & 346.
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zations, and COPA. Farmers had long been convinced of 
the value of a common market in agriculture: French and
German farm delegations to the 1950 annual meeting of the 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers had 
called for a common agricultural market. So, shortly 
after the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1958, the new 
European Commission involved farmers in the development 
of the new market system. National delegations of farm­
ers, food industry representatives, and government lead­
ers from Germany, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands 
attended the Stresa Conference in July 1958 (convened un­
der Article 43 of the Treaty) and established the basic 
objectives of what was to become the CAP. Mansholt then 
assisted farmers to establish pan-European lobby organi­
zations (COPA and COGECA).
The set of actors increased sharply during the late 
1970s. Most important, perhaps, were the changes inside 
the Commission. As the Community expanded and policy 
became more complex, the Commission civil service grew 
quickly, so that by 1976 there were seven times more bur­
eaucrats than in 1958. The Commission also employed more 
specialists in a greater number of horizontal units. The 
European Commission inevitably became "bureaucratized"-7 
as the number of staff increased and the influence of the 
original, ideologically-committed Eurocrats waned (espec­
ially when many of them retired in the 1970s). As a re­
sult, informal cross-directorate contacts declined and 
the technocrats who came to run farm policy often saw the 
Community as simply another job.
As the Community grew, the number of Commissioners 
also expanded, from nine in 1970-73 to 13 in 1973-79, to 
14 in 1980, and finally to 17 in 1986. New competing 
directorates (such as DG-XIX responsible for the Commun­
ity budget) also were created. Table 4.2 shows that as
Poullet & Deprez (1977), pp. 138-39.
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the Commission expanded and the issues became more tech­
nical, consensus in the Commission began to break down. 
Although the sample is small (deliberations within DG-VI 
and among the Commissioners are supposed to be confident­
ial) , the fact that disagreements have become public sug­
gests the bureaucratization of the Commission has not 
contributed to agreement.
Table 4.2 Disagreements in the e m i s s i o n  and DG-VI at the Initiation Stage, 1973-68
Date Issues/Deoree of Split Source
Lardinois
28-03-73 2 UK & 1 It. Cossissioners opposed the DG-VI price proposals Aora Europe, 513
6undelach
25-01-79 Ruiours of split in Cossission; France and FRG Cossissioners 
sought to replace the proposed price freeze with a 27 rise
Guardian
Dalsager
15-01-81 DG-VI proposed 5-6%; criticized; Cossission proposed 87 Financial Tises
13-02-81 UK Coiiaissioner (Budgets) unhappy with price increases Aora Europe, 915
16-12-82 DG-VI proposed 5.57.; Cosaission changed to 4.37 Guardian
03-03-83 UK Coisissioner (Budgets) criticized price rises Financial Tises
30-07-83 2 UK, 1 FRG & Irish Coaaissioners voted against CQIM83)500 The Tises
Andriessen
26-01-85 DG-VI proposed 3.17 cut in cereals prices; flndriessen changed 
to -3.67
Financial Tises
16-06-85 FRG Cossissioner voted against the Green Paper Financial Tises
05-07-85 DG-VI split; traders wanted price cut; aajority wanted quotas 
and other options; Italian Cossissioner publicly criticized 
the Green Paper
Aara Europe, 1140
11-02-87 Cossissioners failed twice to agree on green rates and oils tax Financial Tises
08-01-88 Cossissioners split on set-asides Financial Tises
COPA also came under increased pressure to accom­
modate an increasing number of views and interests. 
Changes in the production and finance structures caused 
the interests of farmers to diverge, so that economic 
events had widely varying impacts on different farmers. 
Meanwhile, the expanded Community added groups of farmers 
with new interests. As a result, COPA increasingly fail­
ed to develop specific policy proposals in time to have
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any chance of influencing the Commission proposals and 
thus forfeited any substantive role in the policy initi­
ation stage.
The changing power structures and widening gaps 
among farmers and between COPA and DG-VI led the Commis­
sion to look to new areas for support. Some of the
changes, such as a greater role for the SCA, were imposed
by the Council, while others, such as expanded contacts 
with farm organizations at the national level and with 
consumers and environmentalists, were deliberate attempts 
to strengthen the position of both DG-VI and the Commis­
sion in the policy community.
  Figure 4.2 -------------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING THE FORMULATION 
OF WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS 1979-89










In the 1980s, those in DG-VI who wished to continue 
using prices to support incomes lost the ability to com­
pletely control the debate. Disagreements developed 
within the Directorate. The traders in DG-VI, who recog­
nized the potential for wheat exports, sided with other 
Directorates (especially DG-I) and with the French gov­
Price Policy: Proposals 115
ernment in an effort to optimize the commercial potential 
of wheat exports. This created significant friction, as 
commercial concerns conflicted with social interests.
The remainder of this chapter examines the Commis­
sion price proposals for 1973-88— and their focus on in­
come support, agri-monetary issues, the budget, and sur­
plus production— to demonstrate how and why these bar­
gains have changed, and ultimately to show the impact on 
the operation of the policy and price system.
THE OBJECTIVE METHOD AND PRICES AS INCOME SUPPORT
Wheat price proposals since the early 1970s high­
light the growing importance of market variables in oper­
ation of the CAP. Although Sicco Mansholt wanted to use 
prices to regulate production, the Commission was even­
tually forced to use them to support farm incomes when 
the Council failed to adopt the 1968 structural adjust­
ment plan.® It transpired, however, that using prices to 
support incomes was generally consistent with the under­
lying security, production, finance, and knowledge struc­
tures of the 1970s. As discussed in chapter 2, high dom­
estic wheat prices encouraged farmers to adopt new tech­
nologies, consolidate their operations, and, thereby, to 
increase both output and farm incomes.
Mansholt nevertheless was unwilling to preside over 
that change. During his tenure as Agricultural Commis­
sioner, the Commission proposed to freeze or marginally 
reduce guaranteed wheat prices in each price review. 
Consequently, prices in 1971, his last price review, were 
virtually unchanged from the levels set in 1965. But 
inflation, which accelerated after 1970 because of shifts 
in the financial structures, cut sharply into the real 
(inflation-adjusted) purchasing power of wheat. This 
change in the real wheat price galvanised the EC farm
Pearce (1981), pp. 10-11.
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lobby into action. Farmers agitated for higher prices in 
spring 1971 but were too late to influence the Commission 
proposals. Council responded, however, with a modest 2% 
increase for wheat and thereby set the stage for rapid 
price gains over the next decade.
Table 4.3 Early Commission 
sions for Common
Proposals & Council Deci- 
Wheat Prices (ua/t)
Proposal Decision Target Prices
1967-68 — — 106.25
1968-69 .0% .0% 106.25
1969-70 -1.0% .0% 106.25
1970-71 -1.0% .0% 106.25
1971-72 .0% 2.0% 109.44
Sources: 
CAP, Feb.
Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p. 250; 
1975, p .3.
Newsletter on the
The Commission could no longer ignore the pressure 
from farmers and the member state governments. Petrus 
Lardinois, the new Agricultural Commissioner, responded 
and introduced the objective method to establish the 
Commission’s annual price proposals. The Commission's 
Memorandum: Agriculture 1973-78 stated that:
The Commission intends to formulate its future 
proposals more and more in the light of trends 
in the general level of prices on modern farms: 
these are the farms which, under the general 
farm price policy, should be ensured*5’ an income 
comparable to that received from non-agricul- 
tural work, account being taken, on the one 
hand, of a satisfactory return on invested 
capital, and, on the other hand, of trends in 
prices of the means of production and in pro­
ductivity. However, as regards the prices of 
individual products, the Commission will, in 
its proposals, take account of the supply and
<5>- C0M(74) 2001, p. 2, stated that stated that prices
should "guarantee" modern holdings with an income com­
parable to non-agricu1tura1 earned income.
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demand situation on each of the markets con­
cerned .10
This parity-pricing formula had substantial intellectual 
support from past work done by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO).'11 Although the Council never res­
ponded to either the Memorandum or to a draft regulation, 
the Commission began to use the method with the 1972-73 
price review.
In short, the method entailed calculating the per­
centage increase in guaranteed prices necessary to keep 
incomes of 'modern' farms in line with non-farm incomes. 
On the cost side, national currency increases in the cost 
of farm inputs were calculated for each of the member 
states over the preceding few years and aggregated to 
provide a Community average. The reference or target 
income for the farm sector was then calculated based on 
the rise in the average compensation for non-farm wage 
labour. From the calculated cost base and target income, 
the Commission derived the theoretical price increase 
required to offset the cost increases of the past two or 
three years and to maintain the ratio between farm and 
non-farm incomes. The Commission deducted first 1.5% to 
compensate for the average annual productivity increase 
attributed to state investment and support for research 
and development'12 and then the value of past price in­
creases granted through both official price reviews and 
via changes in the representative exchange rates. The 
remainder was the indicated Community average price in­
crease .13
The objective method quickly became the focal point 
in the price fixing system, as both farm organizations
1C,‘ Newsletter on the CAP. Special Issue, Nov. 1973, p.
11 .
1X- Veer (1979), pp. 280-81 & 283.
12- Veer (1979), p. 291.
X3- See COM(77)100, 28-2-87, for further detail.
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and DG-VI saw its potential. The formula initially 
brought the Commission and COPA closer together as they 
worked to make the system operate effectively. Before 
1974, relatively low rates of inflation in wage and input 
costs (averaged over three years) ensured that the 
relationship between farm and non-farm incomes did not 
diverge. Then in 1974 inflation and interest rates rose 
precipitously (at least partly due to changes in the 
underlying financial power structure), economic growth 
slowed, and unemployment climbed. Farmers believed that 
they were bearing too large a share of the burden because 
European farm prices rose more slowly than either input 
costs or world prices (which soared due to the "great 
grain robbery" by the USSR).
In spite of the price increases approved by the 
Council for 1974-75, COPA and its member organizations 
pressed the Commission and national governments for more. 
COPA used the objective method to demonstrate that the 
accelerating wage and cost inflation warranted an addi­
tional price increase of at least 4%. This was perhaps 
the high point of the influence of COPA. Although there 
was no provision in the rules for interim price increas­
es, COPA successfully organized a series of protests—  
starting in France in early July and escalating through­
out France, Germany, and the Netherlands— that forced the 
Commission to accept the results of the objective method 
and present an interim price increase for 1974.
The interim price rise was approved in September 
1974 only after the Commission and Council agreed to Ger­
many's demand for a Stocktaking of the CAP. The result­
ing Commission memorandum proposed that the objective 
method should be changed to better reflect market reali­
ties. The Commission wrote that the purpose of the pol­
icy should be "to provide a decent income— taking the 
average of a number of years— for those persons (farmers 
and farm labourers) who work on agricultural holdings
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which are run on a rational basis and which are econom­
ically viable."** As a result, the Commission decided to 
use target farms (as defined in Dir 159/72/EEC) rather 
than 'modern' farms (which included a wide range of small 
and uncompetitive farms in the calculation), to disaggre­
gate costs further to increase precision of estimates, to 
set new weights for the member states, and henceforward 
to use a movable 36-month period for calculations.1= The 
Commission then warned that the method only "yields a 
general indicator, which the Commission uses in combina­
tion with other indicators (e.g., market situation, econ­
omic trend) to arrive at its proposals for increases in 
the general level of agricultural prices consistent with 
the efforts being made to ensure market equilibrium."16 
Over the following years, it increasingly manipulated the 
method to support its priorities.
Swinbank noted that the experience over the 1973-78 
period "shows the ease with which the calculations can be 
manipulated behind a wall of secrecy" and added "it also 
demonstrates that the final calculated figure is critic­
ally dependent upon a series of arbitrary decisions taken 
with respect to the method of calculation."i7 The best 
example of this was the 1977-78 price review. The NFU 
learned that the Commission proposed to use single-week 
exchange rate averages from the beginning and end of the 
three-year review period (i.e., first week of 1973 and 
last week of 1976), which indicated prices should decline 
in 1977-78. After lobbying, the Commission decided to 
use two-month averages at the beginning and end of the 
period, which indicated a 0.1% price increase. If the 
average exchange rates for 1973 and 1976 were used, as 
requested by the NFU, the objective method would have 
indicated the need for a 6% increase.
**■ Veer (1979), p. 284.
Veer {1979), p. 292.
16- COM(75)100. p . 43.
Swinbank (1979), p. 308.
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Table 4.4 The History of the Objective Criterion Method
for Setting Prices
Mod­ Changes COM Proposals
Obj ective ified to All Common Bread
Year Method Va lue Criteri a Prods Wheat Wheat
1972A 2-3.0% _ — 2-3.0% 2.3% —
1972B 5.0% — - 6.5% 4.6% -
1973 3.0% - - 2.8% 2.8% -
1974A 7.2% — — 7.2% .0% —
1974B 4.0% - - 4.0% 4.0% —
1975 12.4% 6 .5% Excl Italy 9.2% 9.0% -
1976 4.6% 9 .1% Excl Italy 7.5% -5.8% 6.9%
1977 0.1% 5 .1% Snake Only 3.0% 3.0% 3.1%
1978 4.2% — - 2.0% 1.3% 3.1%
1979 n . p  . - - .0% .0% .0%
1980 n . a . - - 2.5% 1.8% 1.7%
1981 n . a . - - 7.8% 6.0% 4.0%
1982 9.0% — cf Table 4.5 8.4% 6.6% 6.6%
Notes: Marketing years beginning with date given; n.p . -
f igure calculated but not pub1i shed; n .a . = either not
calculated or kept confidential; 1972A was withdrawn; the
f igure for the reference price for wheat of bread--making
qua 1ity (bread wheat above) for :1976 is the percent in-
crease between the reference price in 1976 and the inter-
vent ion price for common wheat for 1975 .
Sources : Swinbank (1979), p. 305. COMS of the EC.
The Commission also made ad hoc modifications so 
that the method indicated price increases that fit with 
their other concerns. In 1975 and 1976 Italy was exclud­
ed from the calculations (on the grounds that the lira 
was fluctuating widely in both years), which lowered the 
indicated increase for 1975-76 and raised it for 1976-77. 
In both years, the Commission proposed a compromise be­
tween the formal results and their modified results, so 
that they appeared to be providing generous income sup­
port relative to the required support. Then in 1977-78, 
the Commission recalculated the formula excluding all but 
those member states involved in the exchange 'Snake,' 
which yielded a higher rate and justified a higher in­
crease. In 1978-79, the Commission proposed that prices
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rise only 2% rather than the indicated 4.2%, on the basis 
that as a moving average the formula overestimated need. 
Finally, in 1979-80 the Commission calculated but did not 
publish the indicated value. It simply stated that the 
general farm income situation would allow a price freeze, 
and that "the results of the objective method corroborate 
this conclusion."1*3 In short, history demonstrates that 
the objective method was seldom objective.
DG-VI then ceased using the objective method until 
1982, when it presented a complete set of calculations, 
with indicated price increases ranging from 4% to 15%. 
Even then, the proposed 8.4% price rise was lower than 
the declared average. The level was chosen largely to 
facilitate green rate changes and to buy acceptance of 
the new co-responsibility measure that would set future 
prices based on market conditions. When Council approved 
the Commission's proposed guarantee threshold system, the 
income-supporting role for prices effectively ended.
Table 4.5 The Objective Criterion Method calculations 
for 1982-83 (using different periods and
methods of calculating the exchange rates)
1980 1980-81 1979-81 1973-81















Source: COM(82)10/1, p . 21.
Changes in the security, production, finance, and 
knowledge structures had combined to shorten the period 
of fixing prices using the objective method. As early as 
1969 volatile international exchange rates forced their 
way onto the price fixing agenda. Then in the late 1970s
.to. COM(79)10, p. 18.
122 Chapter 4
the farm budget swelled as surplus production developed. 
Finally, in the early 1980s the Community discovered that 
surplus production was not simply a budget problem. The 
Community had become a major exporter and would need to 
adjust its domestic policies to ensure it made the most 
of its new opportunities. Volatile exchange rates, tight 
budgets, and rising surpluses, which increasingly influ­
enced the Commission's price fixing proposals, did not 
fit within the objective method.
EXCHANGE RATES AND THE PRICE REVIEW
The agri-monetary system, developed in 1969 provided 
for fixed 'representative' exchange rates to be set dur­
ing the annual price review and then to be left unchanged 
during the marketing year, regardless of international 
exchange rate movements. The Commission initially ex­
tracted agreement that the gaps between the green rates 
and market exchange rates would be reduced at the time of 
the annual price fix (or, in exceptional cases, during 
the year at the request of a national government). Al­
though green rates were initially expected to be short­
term aberrations, the end of the Bretton Woods system
  Figure 4.3 -------------------------------------------
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caused wide fluctuations in exchange rates, 
countries ever closed their gaps for long.




in order to maintain the common price
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The Commission, however, was unwilling to accept the 
massive derogations from common prices that developed: 
at times ECU prices received in Germany and the UK dif­
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fered by as much as 50%. The Commission therefore worked 
during the 1973-88 period to eliminate the monetary gaps. 
Occasionally agri-monetary reform overshadowed other is­
sues at the price fixing and, at times, virtually deter­
mined the magnitude of the proposed price increases.
COPA did not benefit from this new orientation be­
cause it had extreme difficulty reconciling national con­
cerns. Agri-monetary changes did not fit easily into the 
formula-based approach embodied in the objective method 
favoured by COPA. With an expanding membership and maj­
ority voting rules, any position accepted by COPA had to 
be very general. National farm organizations frequently 
found that they were in direct opposition to other member 
organizations. For example, French farmers throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s pressed for the end to German posi­
tive MCAs (which provided German farmers with higher real 
prices and export subsidies to compete in Europe) because 
they believed that these subsidies hurt French commercial 
interests.
The only successful farm lobbies were bilateral. In 
1979, for example, the F6d6ration Nationale des Syndicats 
d 'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA) and the Deutscher Bauern- 
verband (DBV) provided a resolution to the impasse over 
the introduction of the EMS when they agreed jointly that 
MCAs could be eliminated, provided guaranteed prices in­
crease sufficiently to ensure German farmers steady oper­
ating revenues. Mostly, however, national farm organiza­
tions lobbied their national governments. In weak cur­
rency countries, farmers lobbied for rapid devaluation of 
their green rates while in strong currency countries 
(i.e, Germany), farmers protested against changes that 
would cut farm-gate prices.
COPA was generally unable to build a common European 
position upon these arrangements. At best it mustered 
only support in principle for the elimination of monetary
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gaps (1978) and agreement that changes in positive MCAs 
should not cause prices to fall in any country (1979). 
As a consequence, DG-VI tended to consult directly with 
the national farm ministry and farm organizations (espe­
cially in Germany) to develop specific green rate pro­
posals .
Table 4. 6 Impact of 
Prices (%
Green Rate Proposals on 
change in prices)
Bread Wheat
ECU National Currency Price Proposals:
Pr i ce France Germany UK
1975-76 9.0% 12.6% 3.1% n. a .
1976-77 6.9% 6.9% 2.8% 6.9%
1977-78 3.1% 5.8% .0% 9.6%
1978-79 3.1% 5.7% 1.9% 6.5%
1979-80 .0% 5.3% .0% 5.3%
1980-81 1.7% 5.4% 0.6% 1.7%
1981-82 4.0% 1.4% -1.5% -2.1%
1982-83 6.6% 4.7% 1.6% 2.1%
1983-84 3.0% 5.9% -0.1% 0.5%
1984-85 .0% 2.9% -6.3% -4.0%
1985-86 -3.6% -1.5% -4.1% -3.6%
1986-87 -12.6% -11.2% -12.6% -12.6%
1987-88A -2.0% 2.6% -2.0% 1.1%
1987-88B .0% 4.7% -2.4% 3.1%
1988-89 .0% .0% -1.0% .0%
Note : Price is for common wheat for 1975-76 for bread
wheat reference price for 1976-77 to 1985-86, and for
premium wheat price for 1986-87 to 1988-89. Co--responsi-
bility levies are deducted for 1983-84 and 1985-86 but
not for 1986-87 to 1988-89; 1987-88A was withdrawn and
rep laced with 1987-88B.
Source: Appendix A.
As monetary gaps developed during the 1970s due to 
appreciation of the DM and depreciation of other curren­
cies, the Commission adopted two broad approaches to 
management of the system. First, the Commission worked 
to develop a more stable set of exchange rates in the 
Community. In 1972, the Community created the 'Snake' 
but was still unable to offset wide swings in exchange 
rates (see Chapter 2). Meanwhile, the Commission sought
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adjustments to representative rates to close the monetary 
gaps at each price review. In the Stocktaking in 1975, 
the Commission stated its strong opposition to the con­
tinued use of green rates to circumvent the common price 
system. It argued that green rates, and the resulting 
MCAs, distorted production and worked against the goals 
of the Treaty of Rome: "Production must be allocated
according to the principle of the optimum allocation of 
resources and the need for specialization foreseen in 
Article 43 of the Treaty. "1S> The Commission suggested 
that the Commission and Council should adopt formal rules 
and procedures to help set and dismantle green rates.2° 
Lardinois in 1976 proposed that green rates be regularly 
revised every six months to reduce the positive and nega­
tive monetary gaps.1-1
-t-ke
InKabsence of Council action, the Commission propos­
ed price increases for 1976-77 and 1977-78 that would 
allow the maximum dismantling of positive MCAs. In 1976- 
77, the Commission proposals exceeded the amount indicat­
ed by the objective method by an average of almost 3% for 
all products and about 2.3% for wheat in order to provide 
room to revalue the green DM. Again in 1977-78 the Com-
• H v a t :
mission proposed^wheat prices rise 3.1%, more than indi­
cated by the objective method (0.1%), so that the DM 
could be revalued by a full 3%. Then in 1978, the Com­
mission proposed a seven-year schedule for elimination of 
MCAs and alignment of green rates with market rates.222 
Each year one-seventh of the gap would be eliminated; the 
current year's share would be a 1.1% revaluation for the 
green DM and devaluations of 1.9% and 3.2% for the franc 
and pound respectively. With the proposed 3.1% increase 
for wheat, even German wheat farmers would receive a 
price rise. Shortly thereafter, the Commission warned
Newsletter on the CAP, 3 (March 1975), p. 11. 
Ibid, p. 53.
Nevi1le-Rolf e (1984), p. 275.
COM(77)482.
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that the agri-monetary system's "link with the 'snake' 
draws common prices upwards and strengthens guarantees to 
producers . 11:23
Beginning in 1977, the new Commission, with Roy Jen­
kins as President, began preparations to replace the in­
effective 'Snake' with a European Monetary System (EMS). 
The EMS was supposed to produce stable exchange rates and 
to reduce development of future monetary gaps but it 
almost failed to be implemented because of concern over 
existing MCAs. France insisted that the Council adopt an 
automatic timetable to eliminate Germany’s positive MCAs 
before it would accept the EMS. When Germany refused, 
the EMS was not introduced as scheduled on 1 January 
1979. The impasse was finally resolved in March 1979 
when the Council agreed that new MCAs could be eliminated 
over two years provided changes in green rates did not 
cause nominal prices to fall in any member state (known 
as the 'gentlemen's agreement'). Even though intra-EC 
exchange rates began to move less in the EMS, green rates 
persisted because the UK remained outside the system, 
Italy benefited from a wider band within the EMS (6% cf . 
2.25% for the rest of the members of the EMS), and 
national rates of inflation continued to diverge.
The 'gentlemen's agreement' limited Commission pro­
posals over the next several years. The 1979 price pro­
posals did not include any revaluation of strong currency 
green rates because the Commission did not plan to raise 
ECU prices. In 1980, with the EMS in operation for over 
a year, the maximum disparity in monetary gaps had been 
reduced to as low as 15% from more than 43% in February 
1979. The Commission therefore decided to reduce the re­
maining positive monetary gaps. It offered to increase 
wheat prices 1.7%, in spite of market and budget pres­
COM(78)20. p. 198.
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sures for lower prices, in order for the green DM to be 
devalued by 1.1%.224
In December 1980, the Commission warned that the 
agri-monetary system was a "sickness" which threatened 
the common agricultural market because green rate revalu­
ation created a very real pressure for higher ECU pri­
ces.223 Fresh from recent consultations with farmers and 
the member states, the Commission in February 1981 pro­
posed common wheat intervention prices rise 6% in ECU 
terms (4% for bread-wheat) to allow for a 5.3% revalua­
tion of the DM and a 5.8% rise in the green pound. But
Germany calculated that the revaluation would cause farm-
gate prices to drop, which violated the 'gentlemen's
agreement.' As shown in Chapter 7, Council rejected the 
Commission package.
In January 1982, the Commission hoped for greater
success when it resubmitted most of its proposals from 
1981 because the economic situation was better: prod­
ucers had received large nominal price increases in 1981- 
82 and the world wheat price in ECUs was rising, thereby 
cutting the budgetary cost for cereals support. The Com­
mission therefore proposed a 6.6% rise in the ECU wheat 
reference price (in line with the obviously-manipulated 
objective method) to provide room to revalue the green DM 
by 4.7% and the green pound by 4.2%. Even though farm- 
gate prices would have risen with this package, the Coun­
cil rejected the proposed green rate changes.
After the serious disputes in Council during the 
1982-83 price review, the Commission proposed for 1983-84 
a package of price increases and revaluations of green 
rates that represented "a minimum dismantling" of the 
agri-monetary system: a 3% increase in the ECU reference
COM(80)10, p . 3. 
COM(80)800. p . 2.
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price for wheat was matched by revaluations of 3% for the 
DM and 2.3% for the pound. But again the Council revised 
the proposal. Shortly after (in response to the Stutt­
gart Summit), the Commission declared that "the 'gentle­
men's agreement' which attempted to define conditions for 
the gradual phasing out of monetary compensatory amounts 
has proved unsatisfactory."22^  The Commission first con­
sidered creation of a green ECU with negative monetary 
gaps for all countries except the strongest currency 
(i.e., the DM) but in the end proposed an alternative 
system for dismantling the monetary gaps. New gaps would 
be closed automatically 1/3 at the time of the exchange 
rate change and 1/3 at the beginning of the next two mar­
keting years; existing MCAs would be reduced as condi­
tions permitted. Germany, and other countries revaluing 
green rates, would be permitted to compensate their farm­
ers.27 The Commission warned, however, that "common 
prices expressed in ECU may be frozen or even reduced; 
and consequently that the Community support prices ex­
pressed in national currency may be reduced in nominal 
terms . ":v-‘3
DG-VI then proposed for 1984-85 a freeze in the ECU 
wheat reference price and revaluations of 6.3% in the 
green DM and 4% in the green pound. Council, swayed by 
German and UK protests, instead approved a package that 
cut the ECU prices for wheat by 1% and held the green DM
steady. DG-VI then lost control as the debate moved to
the Fontainebleau Summit, where the French President of 
the Council negotiated a resolution to the UK budget 
issue and an agreement to introduce a green ECU system. 
The new system holds German farm-gate prices steady when 
the DM appreciates by setting the agricultural unit of
account (AUA) equal to the real ECU multiplied by a "cor-
COM(83)380, pp. 4-5. 
COM(83)500, p. 38. 
COM(83)500, p. 10.
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recting factor." All other countries receive increases 
equal to the appreciation of the green ECU over the real 
ECU. The Commission proposed and Council agreed that 
existing positive monetary gaps for Germany and the Neth­
erlands would be eliminated by the beginning of the 1987- 
88 marketing year.29 At the beginning of 1984-85, the 
new green ECU was set 3.4% above the real ECU to reduce 
the positive monetary gap for the DM. In practice, this 
system eliminated future positive monetary gaps and 
thereby reduced the pressure for higher ECU guaranteed 
prices.
Although the green ECU was not the Commission's pre­
ferred solution, it accepted the system proposed by the 
German and French ministers as a reasonable compromise. 
The Commission acknowledged that "it is politically im­
possible" to expect national governments to allow cur­
rency changes to cut domestic prices, as normally happens 
with other traded goods in the EC.30 They decided to
support.creation of the new system because:/\
The conventional system does not involve any
automatic mechanism such as the alteration of 
the correcting factor. The increase in the
common price is, under the conventional system, 
the result of a Council decision adopted on the 
basis, and in the context of, a set of politic­
al guidelines given annually through the price 
review. Under the green ECU system, this dis­
cretionary component of a political decision 
has disappeared.31
After prices were fixed for the 1984-85 marketing year 
and the new green ECU system was introduced, the Com­
mission moved quickly to reduce the existing DM positive 
monetary gap. In July 1984 it proposed a further five 
point reduction in the German monetary gap effective 1 
January 1985, with German farmers compensated with VAT
Reg.(EEC) 855/84. 
COM(87)64, p. 3. 
COM(87)64, p. 10.
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refunds for resulting losses
In 1985-86 the Commission proposed a 0.5% revalua­
tion of the green DM on top of the proposed 3.6% drop in 
wheat ECU prices. When Germany vetoed the cereals pro- 
posals, the Commission decided to forgo further agri- 
monetary changes until 1987-88. In the 1987-88 package 
of price measures, DG-VI initially published proposals to 
cut ECU wheat prices 2% and to hold the green DM steady, 
but the Commission responded to German protests and re­
vised the proposal to include a freeze in ECU prices and 
a complete revaluation of the remaining 2.4% positive DM 
monetary gap. Council refused to immediately revalu^e 
the DM, but it did agree to eliminate effective 1 July
1988 the remaining positive monetary gap (less the neut­
ral margin). Although there were further delays, the 
remaining gap (except the neutral margin) was finally 
eliminated 1 January 1989.
Once the Commission and Council agreed on this sys­
tem of managing positive monetary gaps, the price pro­
posals focused less on setting prices to accommodate ex­
change rate changes. DG-VI found the green ECU system 
reduced the upward pressure on ECU prices resulting from 
the positive DM monetary gap. (Between 1984 and June
1989 four realignments of the EMS boosted the correcting 
factor to 1.137282; without the green ECU, these realign­
ments would have created significant pressures to raise 
ECU prices.) Consequently, the Commission was able to 
focus on the two other problems looming on the horizon; 
budgetary costs of the CAP and surplus disposal.
BUDGET PRESSURES
Large price increases, application of financial cap­
ital, and a proliferation of new, high-yielding crop and 




tion beginning in the 1970s. Increasing surpluses of 
wheat, at a time when world markets were becoming more 
competitive, compounded the costs of the CAP, thereby- 
forcing budget concerns into the farm debates. Further­
more, the budget became the focus of UK efforts to reform 
the CAP, so that many subsequent reforms of the wheat 
system were couched in budgetary terms to satisfy the UK. 
The budget, however, seldom directed Commission propos­
als. The non-farm directorates certainly attempted to 
force the CAP to live within budgetary limits, but DG-VI 
was generally unwilling to prepare its price proposals 
solely in the context of real or notional budget limits. 
Instead, DG-VI attempted to use the budget as a bargain­
ing lever to get the Farm Council to adopt its desired 
policy orientation.
The link between the budget and CAP reform has been 
weak for a number of reasons. First, the budget ceiling 
is artificial because maximum revenues are set at an 
arbitrary percent of the tax base. The Community demon­
strated that the ceiling is flexible when it adjusted it 
in both 1984 and 1988. Second, the budget is out of step 
with the agricultural marketing year. The annual budget 
is drafted and usually adopted before the start of the 
calendar year while prices for the marketing year are 
seldom set before March. Consequently, each budget 
covers six months (January-June) when wheat prices are 
known and six months (July-December) for which wheat 
prices have yet to be set. Third, budgetary rules re­
quire all outlays related to provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome— "compulsory" spending, which includes EAGGF Guaran­
tee Fund expenditures— be accommodated. Finally, the 
budget procedure which evolved during the 1970s allows 
Parliament final approval for the budget and all non- 
compulsory spending but does not provide it with the 
power to change compulsory spending. The unrelated tim­
ing of the price fixing and budget and limited Parliamen­
tary control of compulsory spending consequently reduces
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budgetary control over CAP. Generally, the budget had an 
impact only when Parliament rejected the entire budget 
and forced the Community to operate under the 'provision­
al twelfths' rule.3'-2 When that happened, the Commission 
made ad hoc adjustments to prices and intervention rules 
to balance the accounts in the short-run.
Table 4.7 EC Budget Expenditures (H Ufl 1972-78; H EUfl 1978-80; H ECU 1981-89)
Cereals Guarantee EAGGF Total EC cereals (a) as 7 ia) as 7 (c) as 7
year Total Total (a) Total ib ) Budget (c) 7 of (a) of (b) of (c) of VAT*
1972 908 2 258 — 3 075 40.2% — 73.47 n.a.
1973 1 030 3 815 — 4 641 2 7 . 0  a — 82.27 n.a.
1974 400 3 098 — 5 038 1 2 . 9 a — 61.57 n.a.
1975 621 4 727 - - 6  214 13. n — 76.17 n.a.
1976 610 5 570 — 7 953 1 0 . 9 a — 70.07 n.a.
1977 630 6  830 — 8  483 9.2/1 — 80.57. n.a.
1978 1 113 8  673 9 CC"■j j Z 11 884 12.8a 90.87 73.07 n.a.
1979 1 564 30 441 10 765 14 603 1 5 . 0 a 97.07 71.57 n ■ a >
1980 1 669 11 315 11 895 16 290 14.87. 95.17 69.57 < 1 . 0 0 0
1931 i Q01 11 141 11 443 18 546 1 7 . 2 a 97.47 60.17 <3.000
1982 1 825 12 406- 12 792 21 427 14.77 97.07 57.97 < 1 . 0 0 0
1903 2 441 15 812 16 540 24 807 1 5 , 2 a 97.57 64.37 < 1 . 0 0 0
1984 1 650 18 347 19 023 27 209 9.07. 96.87. 70.37 1.000
1985 2 310 19 744 20 464 28 085 11.77. 96.57 70,37 1.000
19ts6 3 391 22 137 22 911 35 174 15.37. 96.67 62.97 1.150
1987 4 224 22 968 n? 876 37 783 1 8 . 4 a 96,27. 60.87 1.237
19S8F 4 506 28 795 29 998 43 820 15.67 96.07. 65.77 1.196
39B9F 4 133 n r i 7H7 29 758 45 030 14.67 95.27. 62.97 1.278
Notes: F leans budget forecast t as a percentage of 6 DP in 1939F.
Source : Aqricu ltural Situation in the Coaswnity (various); EC Budgets in 0J.
Nevertheless, budget concerns certainly encouraged 
DG-VI and the Commission to look to other ways to support 
farmers. Shifts in the production, technology, and fin­
ance structures during the 1970s caused a sharp decline 
in the efficiency of using prices to support farm income.
If the budget is not passed before the beginning of 
the financial year, Art. 204 of the Treaty of Rome pro­
vides for outlays equal to "provisional twelfths" of the 
previous year's budget.
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Table 4.8 shows that the average effectiveness of the 
price system— transferring funds to producers from con­
sumers via both higher food prices and general tax levies 
— declined to about 50% in 1985 from more than 70% in 
1976 because disposal of surpluses increased the dead­
weight losses of the policy.33 This was particularly 
true for wheat, as the Community moved from approximate 
self-sufficiency in the 1960s and 1970s to a position as 
one of the largest exporters in the 1980s. Marginal in­
creases in prices were even less efficient. Harvey esti­
mated that price increases in 1980 raised farm incomes 
only by 56 ECUs for every 100 ECUs expended ( 67%
efficiency for the whole price system).
Table 4.8 The Budgetary Efficiency of the CAP (EC9)
Average for Policy: Year




Bale & Lutz 1976 1.39 71.8%
Morris 1978 1.32 75.8%
Harvey et al 1980 1 .50 66 .6%
Thomson & Harvey 1980 1 .77 56 .0%
BAE 1983 1 .16 85 .6%
Tyers & Anderson 1985 1.88 53.1%
10% price rise (Harvey): 1980 1 .79 55 .9%
The cost-benefit ratio shows the number of ECUs taxpayers 
and consumers surrender to increase farm incomes by an 
additional ECU; conversely % reaching farmers shows the 
proportion of money foregone which increases farm income. 
Sources: Table 1.4; Harvey (1982), p p . 177-78.
33- Earlier estimates would show that efficiency of the 
income-support role of prices was higher than in 1976 
while more recent studies would likely show efficiency 
dropped below 50% in 1986-88 as the costs of exporting
surpluses rose sharply due to both the price war between
the US and the EC and the appreciating ECU. The BAE
estimate shows the CAP policy was more efficient in 1983
because that year world prices in ECU terms were strong 
and EC cereals output was down.
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The Commission first became concerned about the cost 
of the CAP in the late 1970s. Before 1979, the budget 
was not a serious problem because costs of the cereals 
regime ranged from less than 400 M UA to 1.1 B UA and 
total outlays for all EC programs remained well below the 
available resources. By then, however, the underlying 
structures had changed. Capital investments, new tech­
nologies, and farm consolidation throughout the 1970s 
boosted farm productivity and caused rapid production 
gains. The Commission recognized that these shifts would 
soon increase the cost of the CAP, thereby using resour­
ces that could be directed both to non-farm rural and 
urban concerns. The CAP, which used an average 75% of 
the Community budget, severely limited opportunities to 
develop new programs. As a first step to control CAP 
budgetary outlays, the Commission in 1977 appointed a 
Budget Commissioner, who quickly became a powerful focus 
for discontent with the CAP.
In 1979, three factors caused the Commission to 
focus seriously on the budgetary aspects of the CAP. 
First, the 'own resources' system was finally put into 
effect. Before then, the Community depended on a combi­
nation of own resources and national contributions, which 
seriously limited the Commission's ability to develop new 
programs. With the new resources available after 1979, 
the Commission wanted to redirect its spending, but CAP 
outlays expanded sharply, leaving little for the other 
directorates. Second, in 1979-80 the UK, Denmark, and 
Ireland bore for the first time the full costs and bene­
fits of the CAP. The new Conservative government in the 
UK also began in 1979 a five-year campaign to reduce its 
net expenditures; for tactical reasons it chose to link 
its EC budget demands with CAP reform. Third, the Euro­
pean Parliament was elected in 1979 for the first time 
and immediately sought to change the budget to suit its 
priorities. While the farm lobby remained important in 
the first Parliament, the expanded group of MEPs with
136 Chapter 4
non-farm interests wanted the Community to develop new 
programs in areas which were under its control (farm 
spending, because it was compulsory, was not truly con­
trolled by the EP).
In December 1979, the Council overturned the EP's 
revisions to the 1980 budget and the EP rejected the en­
tire budget, forcing the Commission to propose prices 
that would not increase EAGGF outlays beyond the resour­
ces available within the provisional twelfths rule. The 
budget limits, however, did not effectively bind that 
year. Rising world prices following the US grain embargo 
of the USSR in 1979 combined with the rapidly appreciat­
ing US dollar to reduce EC export restitutions, so that 
the absolute budget limits were inconsequential. DG-VI 
had enough fiscal room to propose price rises and still 
keep EAGGF within the budget limit.
Even though the budget pressure did not seriously 
bind again until 1984, the Commission sought to limit the 
cost of agricultural programs. It believed that "the 
community budget must also serve the development of new 
policies, the lack of which is often harmful to European 
agriculture."3^ The Agricultural Council, however, did 
not enthusiastically support efforts to limit the cost of 
CAP programs. Nor was it pressed to do so, because be­
tween 1980 and 1983 the appreciating US dollar caused 
world wheat price in ECUs to rise, so that the Community 
budget was not strained by the increased volume of 
cereals exported.
Nevertheless, DG-VI framed its next several price 
proposals in an effort to gradually change the incentives 
to over-production, which would go a long way to reducing 
growth in EAGGF outlays. To that end, the Commission 
promoted producer co-responsibility as a solution to both
ASC 1980, p. 21
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the budgetary and production problems. In 1981 it form­
ally proposed producers assume greater financial respon­
sibility for disposal of production in excess of agreed 
quantities, which would thus "set a limit on EAGGF finan­
cial commitments."33 By 1983, the Commission realized 
that the guarantee threshold system was not really rest­
rictive. Table 4.10 shows that in 1983, the new mechan­
ism barely affected the price proposals, because, first, 
the formula used three-year average production figures 
and, second, the Council could simply offset the trigger­
ed price cut at that or following price reviews. After 
the 1983 price review, the Commission therefore tried to 
get the farm ministers to agree to limit growth in CAP 
outlays to less than the growth in 'own resources. 13:6 
DG-VI surely saw that this would give them significant 
power to control future Council decisions, because the 
Commission would be responsible for calculating the 
growth of own resources.37 Through that means it hoped 
to get the farm ministers to accept the prudent price 
policy, to strengthen co-responsibility, to gradually 
eliminate MCAs, and to review the external protection 
system.3® DG-VI by then had decided that realigning 
prices to market conditions was in its best interests, so 
the budget lever suited its goals. The Agricultural 
Council, however, accepted neither budgetary restraint 
nor fundamental reform of the CAP.
33- COM(81)50, p. 24.
Own resources were defined by a 1971 agreement bet­
ween the Commission, Council, and the EP to include EC
tariff revenues, agricultural import levies and miscel­
laneous charges.
37- H. Wallace, "The Best is the Enemy of the 'Could1 : 
Bargaining in the EC," in Tarditi, et al. (1989), p. 197, 
argues that the Commission would benefit because "the 
Commission's propositions set the parameters, condition 
the climate, and define the timing of crucial phases of 
budgetary negotiations."
3®~ COM(83)380, p. 2.
138 Chapter 4
At the end of 1983, the budget situation became
serious. To conserve resources and to prod the Council 
into further reform, the Commission unilaterally announc­
ed in December that intervention payments to cereals 
farmers would be delayed by four months. The Commission 
then proposed to freeze common wheat prices and severely 
limit other price increases for 1984-85 because the bud­
get for 1984 already equalled 0.997% of the adjusted VAT 
base (the limit was 1%) . The Commission went to the
European Council in March and got agreement that the Fin­
ance Council should intercede in Farm Council price deci­
sions if they were likely to exceed expenditures under 
Commission proposals. The price package for that year, 
however, was resolved without resort to such measures.
The Fontainebleau Summit in June 1984 then appeared 
to take the pressure off farm policy and to allow farm 
ministers to delay reform. The Heads of State reached a 
compromise on the UK budgetary problem and cleared the 
way to raise the EC spending limit to 1.4% of VAT begin­
ning in 1986, with supplementary support from member
states in 1984 and 1985.
Then, in December 1984, the EP rejected the 1985 
budget by an overwhelming vote, forcing the Commission 
and Council to limit price rises. The Commission took 
the opportunity to propose a 3.6% cut in the wheat price 
(+1.5% less 5% co-responsibility triggered by the guaran­
tee threshold system). The Council failed to reach 
agreement because Germany invoked the Luxembourg Compro­
mise and vetoed the price proposal. The Commission imp­
lemented a “precautionary" 1.8% price cut but realized 
that it would need to develop a new approach to reform 
the CAP wheat price.
Later in 1985, the Commission's Green Paper firmly 
shifted the debate away from budgetary concerns toward a 
complete re-evaluation of the price system. Budget pres­
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sure continued, however, because accession of Spain and 
Portugal quickly filled the fiscal room provided by the 
1984 Fontainebleau Summit. The Commission therefore 
became more determined to reduce the support for farm 
prices. It withheld budgetary fixes to the CAP in an 
effort to coerce the farm ministers to implement its re­
forms to the intervention system. Without reform of the 
CAP, there was little potential for the budget being 
fixed, or for new programs to capitalize on the Single 
Market.
After the CAP mechanisms were changed, the Commis- 
sion returned to theK budget. It decided that the time 
was right to press for permanent limits on the EAGGF out­
lays. It thus proposed an additional stabilizer levy to 
limit growth in net CAP expenditures. When the European 
Council failed to reach agreement in December 1987, all 
the outstanding issues, including new limits on own re­
sources, were referred to a special Summit in Brussels in 
February 1988. The Commission pressed the Heads of State 
to adopt stabilizer levies and automatic (but non-cumula- 
tive) price cuts for cereals as well as to limit EAGGF 
Guarantee expenditures (including provisions for depreci­
ation of both old and new stocks) to grow no faster than 
the annual growth rate of the Community GDP. The Summit 
ministers went even further than requested and approved 
both cumulative price cuts and a lower growth limit on 
outlays (80% of GDP growth, excluding depreciation of old 
stocks, which effectively equalled 74% after accounting 
for depreciation of new stocks and for the set-aside pro­
gram) . Perhaps most important, the Summit agreed that 
"if the Commission considers that the outcome of the 
Council's discussions on these price proposals is likely 
to exceed the costs put forward in its original proposal, 
the final decision shall be referred to a special meeting 
of the Council attended by the Ministers for Finance and 
the Ministers for Agriculture which shall have the sole
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power to adopt a decision. "3S> This provision provided 
the Commission with a powerful negotiating lever for 
future price reviews as it could threaten to take the 
decision out of the hands of the farm ministers. (The 
Commission certainly will prefer to threaten rather than 
act, because there is significant doubt that the special 
Council could resolve the debate.)
In summary, the Commission used the budget as a bar­
gaining lever during the 1980s. Cottrell argues that the 
Commission seldom accepted that CAP spending was a bur­
den; rather it usually talked in terms of a "shortfall in 
resources."4° DG-VI, in particular, believed that the 
agricultural budget was small relative to both national 
budgets and the gross output of the sector.**1 During the 
1980s, DG-VI and the Commission therefore employed the 
budget to support its other policy priorities. In a 
sense, that action was analogous to use in the 1970s of 
the objective method to justify price increases. After 
1985, however, the Commission as a whole genuinely 
attempted to set limits on agricultural spending. The 
other DGs saw budget limits as the only way they could 
develop programs to complete the Single Market; DG-VI 
accepted this because it supported its own reform goals.
THE RISE OF SURPLUS PRODUCTION AND PRICES
The most important change at the Commission level in 
the 1980s is the enhanced market role for prices. The 
Commission was forced to examine alternatives to using
3C?“ Bull . EC 2-1988, p. 9.
**°- Cottrell (1987), p p . 172-73.
* lm Burtin (1987), pp. 52-53, stated that "the common 
agricultural policy cost each European citizen about 5 
ECU per month." That amount should be seen as an "in­
surance premium guaranteeing secure supplies" As such, 
"it does not appear excessive." In a wider economic 
context, net EAGGF expenditure "may be regarded as very 
modest ... [because] it represents half of 1% of the 
Community's gross 'national' product ... and less than 3% 
of consumer expenditure on food."
Price Policy: Proposals 141
prices to support incomes because of the surge in farm 
output after 1970. Productivity increased, in response 
to greater capital investment, farm consolidation, new 
agronomic practices, and new high yielding wheat strains, 
to such a level that it was virtually impossible for the 
Commission to slow the growth of production simply 
through minor price adjustments. DG-VI had three alter­
natives. In order of administrative difficulty, it could 
implement production quotas and maintain price and inter­
vention guarantees, cut purchase prices but maintain ex­
plicit intervention guarantees, or reform the guarantee 
system. After a clash with Council in 1985, the prefer­
red middle option was rejected. Internally, DG-VI split 
into two opposing camps: the traders wanted a market
approach while others wished to maintain administrative 
control over the farm sector. The market approach pre­
vailed as the commercial components of the farm policy 
community (in DG-VI, France, and the farm organizations) 
finessed the necessary changes.
  Figure 4.6 -------------------------------------------
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Between 1972 and 1979, the Commission disregarded 
Sicco Mansholt's warnings that high prices would encour­
age surplus production. The Commission also apparently
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Ignored the early Indications that EC wheat production 
would soon rise significantly higher than demand. The 
Community had recorded modest wheat surpluses since the 
start of the cereals regime and by 1973 EC6 production 
exceeded total domestic use by 4.7 Mt and surpluses were 
rising by more than 1 Mt each year. About that time, 
academic researchers showed that the EC9 would soon be­
come one of the world's largest wheat exporters, a drama­
tic change from the prevailing position as a large market 
for wheat imports.^2
During the 1970s, the threat of world shortages and 
the need for a stable system to allow farmers to adapt to 
new pressures forced the Commission to continue to use 
prices solely to support farm incomes. Although the Com­
mission in 1973 publicly acknowledged that it would ad­
just the prices indicated by the objective method if mar­
ket conditions warranted, it only once tried to do so. 
World wheat prices soared following the "great grain rob­
bery" of 1972 and world opinion on the prospects for 
wheat radically changed. A flood of reports and confer­
ences in 1974 and 1975 forecast world food shortages 
would continue for the foreseeable future. With world 
wheat prices above the EC target price in 1973, shortages 
rather than surpluses seemed much more likely. Mean­
while, both the Commission and wheat producers in the 
original six member states looked forward to a larger 
domestic market for wheat after admission in 1973 of the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. The UK was at that 
time one of the single largest wheat importers in the 
world.
During the 1975-76 price fixing, DG-VI accepted the 
prevailing view that "the tight situation on the world 
[cereals] market will probably not disappear in the near
Schmitz & Bawden (1973), p. 63 & Appendix E.
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future."43 In this context, the Commission believed that 
"further incentives should be given to producers of cer­
tain products for which there are acute supply difficul-
tei
ties [i.e., cereals]."44 This fit^nicely with the desire 
of the Commission to grant large price increases to fore­
stall a repeat of the farm protests of 1974.
The Stocktaking did not even raise the issue of pos­
sible. wheat surpluses, except to suggest that the Commun­
ity should examine options for developing a "rational 
trade policy." But, at the same time, the uncertain sec­
urity structure encouraged the Commission to recommend 
greater domestic production of feed cereals to reduce the 
Community's dependence on imports. (The Community had 
been hurt by a US embargo on soya exports in 1973 and 
feared other supply disruptions.) With production short­
falls in both the domestic and world wheat markets, con­
cerns over surpluses were generally regarded as academic.
That view prevailed through 1976-77 and 1977-78. 
The Commission proposed in 1976-77 that the Council re­
align incentives in the cereals market to encourage pro­
duction of higher quality wheat suitable for milling and 
baking and to make lower quality wheats more competitive 
with both domestic and imported feeds. DG-VI was largely 
concerned with the distribution of production between 
grades of wheat, and not at all about the absolute quan­
tities produced. Then drought in 1976 cut EC wheat pro­
duction, so in 1977-78 the Commission did not have to 
worry about wheat surpluses. The 'prudent' price policy 
introduced that year was explicitly targeted on sectors 
with structural surpluses, which did not include wheat.
During the next two years, the Commission accepted 
that the situation was changing. In 1978, it noted that
43- COM(74)2001. p. 39.
44- COM(74)2001. p . 4.
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cereals might be moving into surplus and consequently 
proposed that wheat prices rise less than indicated by 
the objective method. By 1979 the Commission accepted 
that the Community was self-sufficient in cereals and 
forecast that by 1985 the Community would produce 9 Mt 
more cereals than needed for domestic use (including 5-7 
Mt of wheat). For the first time, the price proposals 
were directed toward limiting structural surpluses: the
Commission proposed ECU guaranteed prices be held steady 
at the previous year's levels.
Table 4. 9 Commission Forecasts of Cereals 
and Surpluses (excluding Durum)
Production
Forecast Domestic Domestic Exports/
Year Year Su p p ly Demand Surplus
1975-76 (EC9) na "acute supply difficulties"
1976-77 (EC9) na food aid/crisis conferences
1977-78 (EC9) na drought in 1976/no surpluses
1978-79 (EC9) na cereals moving to surplus
1979-80 (EC9) 1985 — — 9
1980-81 (EC9) na US embargo of USSR cereal imports
1981-82 (EC9) na cost of surpluses rising
1982-83 (EC10) 1988 135 122 13
1983-84 (EC10) 1988 137 112-17 20-25
1984-85 (EC10) 1989 137 114 23
1985-86 (EC10) 1991 148 115 33
1986-87 (EC10) 1991 159 119 40
1986-87 (EC12) 1991 180 — —
1987-88 (EC12) 1992 187 137-42 45-50
1989-90 (EC12) 1993 192 142 50
Source: COMS of the Commission of the ECs.
The Commission did not follow through with that
policy in the following two years largely because the US
export embargo of the Soviet Union in 1979 re-kindled
fears of world-wide shortages. Proponents of self-
sufficiency were pleased to note that the Community was 
not hurt by the surge in world wheat prices to near­
record levels in 1980. Meanwhile, higher world market 
prices lowered the EC budget for cereals exports while
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the US embargo opened the Soviet market for expanded ex­
ports of European surpluses. In March 1980, the Commis­
sion therefore decided that "other sectors may exhibit 
some of the features of surplus production from time to 
time but none present a need for changes in policy in the 
same way that the milk, sugar and wine sectors do.'"*= In 
this context, the Commission proposed to raise wheat 
prices for 1980-81 by 1.7% in ECU terms which, adjusted 
for green rate changes, would provide increases above 5% 
for both France and the UK and about 1% for Germany. But 
the Commission cautioned that in future "the prices pol­
icy cannot on its own overcome the problems arising from 
the market situation and the need to maintain agricultur­
al incomes, particularly those of the poorest farmers.'"** 
The Council on May 30 approved a compromise price package 
for 1980-81 and requested the Commission prepare propos­
als to adapt the CAP (the 'Mandate').
The Commission's Reflections on the CAP in December 
1980 presented two sides of the production argument. DG- 
VI noted that the FAO had forecast food shortages would 
continue in the foreseeable future so that the Community 
should have assured outlets for excess production. Nev­
ertheless, it accepted that something would have to be 
done to control the expansion of both production and bud­
get costs; if the farm policy community proved unable to 
resolve the problems, finance ministers and the non-farm 
directorates were ready to do the job for them. Further­
more, DG-VI and the Commission were frustrated with the 
political imperatives of elections and pressure group 
politics that usually drove Council decisions.^-7 By est­
ablishing rules and parameters for prices, the Commission 
sought to wrestle power from the Council. The market-
Green Europe #170, March 1980, p. 22. 
COM(80)10, p. 4.
Club de Bruxelles (1988), p. 1.23.
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based approach appeared to offer the greatest freedom 
from Council interference.
DG-VI concluded that open-ended price guarantees 
were unworkable in the long term because "at the present 
state of agricultural technology it is neither economic­
ally sound nor financially feasible to guarantee price or 
aid levels for unlimited quantities."*® The Commission 
preferred "producer co-responsibility above a certain 
level of production" as a permanent feature of the cer­
eals market. Optimally this would be implemented via 
price cuts rather than levies because lower guaranteed 
prices would help common wheat and other feed grains com­
pete with imported cereal substitutes.*19 The Commission 
hinted that if cuts in guaranteed prices proved impossi­
ble, similar reductions in farm-gate prices could be 
managed by the Commission unilaterally raising the qual­
ity criteria for intervention, limiting intervention 
buying to certain months, or reducing the intervention 
price for lower quality wheats.
The first full-scale assault on guaranteed prices 
came in the 1981-82 price review. Although the Commis­
sion did not publish a wheat forecast, it stressed that 
the sector faced both rising surpluses and costs. The 
Commission proposed as a new "fourth principle" for the 
CAP-— in addition to common prices, common financing, and 
Community preference— that producers should be respon­
sible for the cost of disposing of production in excess 
of agreed quantities."150 It argued that "farmers should 
not be separated too far from market realities by guaran­
tees that do not adequately reflect market realities."”51 
DG-VI wished to set separate basic quantities for durum, 
common wheat, and all other cereals based on a three-year
®- COM(80)800, p. 17.
*9- COM(80) 800, p. 20.
°- COM(81)50, p. 2.
x“ COM(81)50, p. 11.
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moving average of past production. Farmers would receive 
an initial payment when grain was sold into the market 
and any final payment would be adjusted to reflect the 
actual production for the year.552 If production exceeded 
the basic quantities (proposed at a total of 121.2 Mt) by 
more than 0.5% in any year, guaranteed prices would be 
cut 0.1% for each 0.1% of excess production, up to a 
maximum of 5%. The Agricultural Council was willing to 
consider co-responsibility but disagreement about the 
proposed cuts in cereal prices in Germany and the UK (and 
the link with the UK budget debate) delayed the new sys­
tem .
The Commission issued in June 1981 a final report on 
the Mandate of 30 May 1980 which argued that farm income 
considerations, though important, could no longer be the 
sole reference point for fixing prices. The Community 
could not afford unlimited guarantees for surplus commo­
dities. The Commission concluded that "prices must ref­
lect market realities more than they have in the past."5,53 
Later in 1981 the Commission's Guidelines for European 
Agricu 1 ture marked the beginning of market-based planning 
for the cereals market. The Commission declared that 
"decisions based on a horizon of one or two years are of­
ten inadequate."”5^  Thus, for the first time the Commis­
sion produced and published a detailed five-year outlook 
for cereals production, consumption and market opportuni­
ties, which showed the EC would have about 13 Mt of ex­
portable cereals by 1988. It concluded that the Commun­
ity needed a "programme of progressive reduction of 
cereals prices in real terms" to reduce EC cereals prices 
to about the support level under the 1980 US Farm Bill 
(Food Security Act, 1980) .S5= With strengthening world
ss:v>. This would work similar to the Canadian Wheat Board
pooling price system.
553■ COM(81) 300, p . 13.
COM(81) 608. p . 6.
=S5‘ COM(81)608, p . 24.
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cereals prices, the gap between EC and US support prices 
was only about 20% and price equality appeared attainable 
(see Figure 9.1). The Commission, however, categorically 
rejected using world market prices as a reference and 
cautioned that "to avoid unacceptable consequences for 
production and incomes, such a programme must be gradual: 
one could not envisage a reduction in nominal terms. 
Furthermore, DG-VI was also not willing for the Community 
to reduce its share of the world export market: the 1988
production target (130 Mt) was based on maintaining the 
export volume of 1981.
The 1982-83 price review marked the end of the ob­
jective method system of setting prices and the beginning 
of market-based rules. The revised economic forecast 
showed exportable quantities would rise to between 20 and 
25 Mt in 1988 (compared with an earlier forecast of only 
13 Mt). The Commission prepared a detailed set of 
objective method calculations to justify an average 9% 
price increase. Combined with modest green rate revalu­
ations for Germany and the UK, the package provided price 
increases of at least 2% for wheat producers. In ex­
change for the price increases, the Commission wanted 
Council to accept a 'guarantee threshold' system for 
cereals that would cut price proposals in future years if 
the cereals crop (excluding durum) exceeded 119.5 M t . 
For every full 1 Mt of production over 119.5 Mt, the 
price proposal for 1983-84 would be cut by 1%, up to a 
maximum of 5%. The Commission had bowed to pressure and 
revised its original proposal: prices under the new sys­
tem would only be cut in a year following excess produc­
tion, and then only from a notional increase rather than 
in absolute terms.
When the Commission considered the 1983-84 marketing 
year, it was faced with a guaranteed threshold system
COM(81)608, p. 24.
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even weaker than It had proposed. The system accepted by 
the Council compared the average production over the 
previous three years (rather than latest annual crop) 
with the threshold. The guarantee threshold also was 
raised by any amount of imported cereals substitutes over 
15 M t . Table 4.10 shows the impact of these change in 
1983-84. If the Commission's threshold system had been 
accepted by Council, the 1983-84 wheat price proposals 
would, have been reduced by 5% rather than the 1% they 
were cut. Combined with the recommended 4% increase in 
the reference price for wheat, this left a 3% ECU price 
rise, which the Commission proposed to fully offset with 
revaluation of the green DM and mostly offset by revalua­
tion of the pound. Taken together, the changes did 
little to realign EC prices to US levels. Nevertheless, 
the Commission still hoped to reduce the 20% gap between 
the US target price and EC support prices. The target 
still appeared attainable as the depreciating ECU was 
narrowing the US dollar-ECU price gap.
Table 4.10 The Guarantee Threshold System in 1983-84
(Mt) Proposed System Actual System
Guarantee Threshold Leve 1 119 .5 119 .5
Actual Production - 1982 124.9 —
— 1980-82 — 120.9
Over Production 5.4 1.4
Indicated Price Cut (max 5%) 5.0% 1.0%
Later in 1983 the Commission announced that it could 
no longer honour its 1981 commitment to not cut nominal 
prices. It cautioned that "the common prices expressed 
in ECU may be frozen or even reduced; and consequently 
that the community support prices expressed in national 
currency may be reduced in nominal terms. "B_/ The Commis­
sion proposed "that the speeding-up of the narrowing of
COM(83)500, p. 10.
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the gap between its prices and those applied by its main 
competitors should be an objective in its future propos­
als for common prices for cereaIs. "“r'G3 The Commission 
also hinted that "if this objective is not attained by 
the prices policy, the Community will then have to con­
sider, in spite of the administrative difficulties which 
such a solution would create, imposing a levy on cereals 
to cover all or part of the cost of exports.
When the Commission came to prepare the price pro­
posals for 1984-85, it had little room to manoeuver. 
Real farm incomes had fallen in 1983 in all member states 
except Belgium and budget costs were forecast to jump 
sharply because both volumes and the per-tonne refund 
cost of exports were rising (US-dollar export prices were 
falling faster than the ECU was depreciating). The Com­
mission proposed to freeze wheat ECU prices and to re­
value the green DM and pound, which would effectively cut 
wheat prices by 4% in the UK and 6.3% in Germany. At the 
same time it proposed higher quality standards to reduce 
intervention buying of low-quality wheat. Although Coun­
cil rejected much of the Commission's package, it did 
agree to cut guaranteed ECU prices for the first time 
ever.
The Commission reciprocated in .1985 with its first 
proposal to cut ECU prices since 1970. The 1984 record 
cereals crop triggered a 5% cut under the guarantee 
threshold system. With exportable production of cereals 
(excluding durum wheat) forecast to reach 33 Mt by 1991, 
the new Commission decided to try to get as large a cut 
as possible in 1985. Frans Andriessen therefore reduced 
DG-VI's proposed 2% notional price rise to 1.5%, which, 
combined with the 5% co-responsibility cut, would cause 
prices to fall 3.6%. Germany, which also faced a propos-
COM(83)500, p. 24.
COM(83)500, p . 24.
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ed 0.5% revaluation of the green DM, invoked the Luxem­
bourg Compromise in Council and killed the proposal. 
With stalemate in the Council, the Commission implemented 
an interim set of intervention and reference prices cuts.
Table 4.11 Comparison of Wheat Prices (adjusted for 
green rates & yields) and Inflation
ECUs^ France Germany UK
ECU Prices/t*
- 1975-76 152.24 152.24 152.24 152.24
- 1985-86 209.30 209.30 209.30 209.30
- % Change +37.5% +37.5% +37.5% +37.5%
Green Rates (NC/ECU)
- 1975-76 n . a . 4.66 2.96 0.42
- 1985-86 n . a . 7.00 2 .40 0.62
- % Change n . a . +50.2% -19.0% +46.7%
Green ECU Correcting Factor
- 1975-76 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
- 1985-86 1.0 1 .08 1.0 1.08
- % Change .0% 8.4% .0% 8.4%
National Currency Price/t
- 1975-76 n . a . 790.38 450.67 64.19
- 1985-86 n . a . 1587.91 501.88 140.32
- % Change n . a . +100.9% +11.4% +118.6%
Yield (t/ha)
- avg 1973-75 4.22 4.63 4.44 4.52
- avg 1983-85 5 .63 5 .66 5 .72 6 .76
Gross Value/ha (NC1 Price x Yield)
- 1975-76 642.5 3282.3 2001.0 290.3
- 1985-86 1178.4 8987.6 2870.8 948.6
- % Change +83.4% +173.8% +43.4% +226.8%
Change in GDP Price Deflator
- 1985-1975 n . a . +154.3% +42.8% +177.5%
^ lnte.rve.nticn pricey* ^ rv»L»n it^ j C\.\Je^'Tc^ a^Q, ufelols*
Source: Author's Calculations. Data from ASC, Eurostat.
The impasse in Council during the 1985-86 price fix-
ing highlighted the political problems associated with
the middle approach of cutting prices to slow growth in
wheat production. The calculations in Table 4.11 show
the economic reasons for the failure of this approach.
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Although the Commission cut real ECU prices for wheat 
between 1975-76 and 1985-86, the production incentive
continued. The ECU reference price for wheat of bread-
making quality rose only 37.5% between 1975-76 and 1985- 
86, resulting in a real decline in ECU prices. Even 
after adjusting for exchange rate changes over the 
period, price increases per tonne in national currencies 
were much less than inflation. But wheat yields rose 
about 3% per annum, so that the gross value of wheat out­
put per hectare rose at about the rate of inflation in
Germany and exceeded inflation by about 8% in France and
18% in the UK. Both German and French cereals producers 
also received significant direct income support during a 
number of those years, compensating them for the smaller 
price increases. Thus, for all the attempted restraint 
on the part of the Commission, the real returns from 
wheat were higher than in 1975-76.
In the summer and autumn of 1985, the Commission 
concentrated on two priorities: the white paper on
completing the internal market and farm policy reform. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the two were inseparably link­
ed in the eyes of the new Commission.^0 Although there 
was general agreement on the Single Market, different 
groups within DG-VI and the Commission disagreed over how 
to proceed with farm policy reform. The traders wanted 
to force the Council to cut prices while other divisions 
in DG-VI wanted to offer a selection of soft options to 
supplement price cuts. An early draft of DG-VI's Green 
Paper was regarded as brutal by at least four Commission­
ers and was significantly rewritten.*^1 The final draft, 
which offered a wide variety of soft options was still 
unacceptable to a German Commissioner because he rejected 
the central premise that Community prices must be brought 
into line with world prices.
A5C 1985, p. 26.
Financial Times, 11-6-85 & 16-6-85.
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The Commission argued in the Green Paper that unless 
the Community gives "market prices a greater role in 
guiding supply and demand within the agricultural policy, 
it will be drawn more and more into a labyrinth of admin­
istrative measures for the quantitative regulation of 
production."^2 After consultations, the Commission con­
cluded that it would not be feasible to rely simply on 
price cuts. It therefore proposed to continue the rest­
rictive price policy, to reduce the intervention price 
for feed wheats, and to assess a co-responsibility levy. 
The levy would be adjusted annually so that it
paid a specified share of the cost of surplus exports. 
The Commission cautioned that "if the levy is to be 
effective as a guide to farmers, it must not be offset by 
artificial increases in institutional prices, as has 
sometimes happened in the past for milk products."^3 Al­
though the changes were widely accepted, the Commission 
was not united: the Italian Commissioner publicly re­
jected the new levy because it would hurt Italy as a 
deficit producer.
The 1986-87 price fixing proposals attempted to 
implement the conclusions of the Green Paper. The new 
forecast for production and consumption for 1991-92 
showed net exportable cereals from the EC10 would be 
about 40 M t . DG-VI proposed to freeze ECU prices for 
wheat, to replace the special reference price for wheat 
of bread-making quality with a flat 2% premium for wheat 
exceeding 14% protein, to cut by 5% the intervention 
price for common wheat failing the old bread-wheat qual­
ity standards, to reduce the maximum moisture content for 
wheat, and to end intervention buying until after the 
harvest. This package was expected to cut the effective 
market price sharply because the reference price for 
bread wheat had generally acted as the floor price for
COM (85) 333 , p . X\j . 
COM(85)700, p. 6.
154 Chapter 4
the Community wheat market. The Commission also proposed 
a co-responsibility levy that would be triggered whenever 
total cereals production in the expanded Community of 12 
exceeded 149 Mt; production was forecast to reach 161 Mt 
in 1986-87. The Commission proposed a levy of 3% for 
1986-87, which represented about one half the cost of 
disposing of the expected 12 Mt surplus. The first 25 
tonnes each farmer delivered to the market or to inter­
vention would be levy-free. The Commission announced the 
levy would need to be raised to 6% in 1987-88 to cover 
the full cost of exports. As compensation, the Commis­
sion changed the marketing year to July 1-June 30 from 
August 1-July 31, which brought forward the first monthly 
increment to August 1 (worth 2.45 ECU/t), and offered to 
raise the target price for wheat (thereby tightening Com­
munity preference) and to devalue the franc to provide 
French wheat farmers with a small price increase. It 
also decided not to request the green DM be revalued.
In 1987, the Commission attempted to complete the 
reforms it started in 1986. The forecast for exportable 
production for 1992-93 for the EC12 was raised to a range 
of 45 to 50 Mt, which increased the sense of urgency in 
the Commission. DG-VI first proposed to cut the inter­
vention price by 2% in ECU terms, but, in a quick rever­
sal, the Commission withdrew that proposal and recommend­
ed holding ECU prices constant while revaluing the green 
DM by 2.4%. The new approach would lower German prices 
slightly more, but would allow Germany to compensate its 
producers for the lower prices. Instead of doubling the 
co-responsibility levy to 6% as suggested in 1986, the 
Commission proposed to limit intervention buying to the 
February to May period and to restrict the monthly incre­
ments to the period of intervention. The changes to in­
tervention, the most significant reforms for the wheat 
price system ever proposed, were designed to appeal to 
Germany. German farmers, who usually sell most of their 
crop during the harvest (July-September) because they do
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not have adequate on-farm storage, were not seriously 
concerned about reduced monthly increments after the 
harvest. The Council rejected that reform, however, and 
preferred the Commission's alternate proposal (offered 
during the Council negotiations) to reduce the buying-in 
price by 6%.
The Commission, however, was not yet satisfied. DG- 
VI reviewed progress in the late summer of 1987 and de­
cided that although budget savings had been made and real 
prices cut, both the EAGGF budget and cereals production 
were continuing to rise. The Commission judged that the 
situation was ripe to complete its reforms because in 
spite of price restraint, real farm incomes were 6.5% 
higher in 1986 than in 1980. DG-VI therefore proposed to 
further tighten the cereals system. The Commission for­
mally transmitted to the Council in October 1987 its so- 
called stabilizers package. Specifically, DG-VI proposed 
a new co-responsibility levy to cut the intervention 
price by up to 5% in 1988-89 and 7.5% in 1989-90: if
production exceeded a proposed 155 Mt threshold by more 
than 1.55 Mt (1%), then a proportionate levy would be 
assessed when intervention opened on November 1. It also 
warned that if the reforms failed to stem the rise of 
production, it would have to impose either land set- 
asides or quotas, which were not universally popular in 
the farm community.
After hard bargaining at the Brussels European 
Council meeting in February 1988, most of the important 
measures proposed by the Commission were adopted (see 
Chapters 3 and 7). At least until 1992-93, prices would 
be set automatically, based on market conditions. Short­
ly after, the Commission proposed and the Council approv­
ed a new Community program of direct income support pay­
ments, which would be payments by member states. The
<£> ■<'+ . COM(87)410, p . 19
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Community also implemented a related set of programs to 
encourage land set-asides and extensification of produc­
tion. The structures policy was therefore redirected to 
support small and disadvantaged farms. With those chan­
ges, the price and structures policies had come full 
circle, back to where Sicco Mansholt had wanted them in 
the first place.
CONCLUSIONS
In February 1988, the new market regime for cereals 
was virtually complete. Over the preceding 15 years, the 
Commission had cajoled, prodded, threatened, and bribed 
the Council into converting the price review from anad- 
ministrative exercise into a market-based, semi-automatic 
process. When the language and logic supporting the 
price proposals in the 1970s is compared with that of the 
late 1980s, the difference is startling. Pearce noted 
that the founders of the CAP decided that "the policy's 
chief object would be to maintain farm income, and ... 
its principal instrument would be price support."^3 That 
no longer holds. The Commission's latest price reviews 
have barely mentioned farm incomes.
This transformation could not have occurred without 
the fundamental changes in the security, production, fin­
ance, and knowledge structures. DG-VI and the Commission 
recognized that these fundamental shifts required changes 
in the basic operation of the CAP system for wheat and, 
furthermore, that these changes could enhance its posi­
tion and authority within the Community Consequently,
it used its initiative power to focus the debate on 
issues and solutions that bolstered its position and in­
terests. If it had ignored the inexorable change in the 
power structures, DG-VI, and probably the whole Commis­
sion, would have remained masters of the CAP, but would
Pearce (1983), p. 147.
Petit, et al. (1987), p. 115.
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thereby have become increasingly irrelevant for the 
majority of the Community.
The reforms in the price system also changed the map 
of interlocking bargains the Commission requires to oper­
ate effectively. Perhaps most importantly, DG-VI lost 
significant power to influence farm policy and farmers' 
livelihoods as it substituted automatic formulae (green 
ECUs, quantitative guarantees, stabilizer levies, and 
stabilizer price cuts) for purely administrative adjust­
ments (objective method, green rates, basic co-responsi­
bility) . In exchange, DG-VI developed two new and poten­
tially more important relationships. First, throughout 
the 1980s DG-VI reoriented the cereals price system so 
that the EC could develop commercially based export mar­
kets. As a result, by the late 1980s, it had positioned 
itself at the centre of the most vibrant part of the farm 
policy community. Then, after the price system was re­
formed, DG-VI recognized that it would need to expand its 
offerings to the less advantaged parts of the rural sec­
tor. Therefore, in 1989, it began to re-deploy resources 
to develop the rural economy, in an effort to attract the 




The official consultative bodies and miscellaneous 
pressure groups interested in European wheat policy were 
forced to adjust both their approach to the price review 
and their positions on farm policy in the 1980s as many 
of the traditional bargains in the Community changed. 
Before 1979, farmers dominated farm and food policy by 
controlling the debate and proscribing possible outcomes. 
Individual farmers supported the farmer-based policy 
'cartel' because the financial and power gains were sig­
nificantly greater than the lost freedom of action.
Even as COPA reached its zenith of influence, funda­
mental shifts in the underlying power structures were un­
dercutting the farm power base, thereby weakening the 
policy cartel. The diminished role of food in assuring 
national security, combined with the rising diversity of 
farm interests, made it increasingly difficult for COPA, 
the EP, and ESC to develop compromises for the farm lob­
by. The Commission and the official consultative agen­
cies took the opportunity to develop new relationships 
with non-farm interests. Meanwhile, the Commission dev­
eloped new strategies for bargaining with the Council 
which effectively excluded the consultative bodies from 
the actual decision-making process. As a result, farmers 
increasingly were forced to turn to their national capi­
tals to influence price decisions.
THE DISCUSSION PROCESS
Formal consultation begins when the Commission 
transmits its proposals to the Council. The Economic and 
Social Committee, the European Parliament, and a collec­
tion of Community interest groups— including the official 
lobbies for farmers, industry, consumers, and the envir­
onment— then prepare and present critical opinions in an 
effort to influence the direction and scope of the deci­
sions .
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The period for discussion varies depending on when 
the initial proposals were submitted. Community legis­
lation provides that Council should approve CAP prices 
before the start of the marketing year, which begins 
April 1 for products such as milk and beef and July 1 for 
wheat and other field crops (August 1 before 1986). In 
practice, the Commission usually presents its proposals 
by the end of February, which leaves about one and a half 
to two months for debate and deliberation.
Table 5.1 Length of Price Fixing Debates
Proposal Decision Before Days of
Date Date Apr 1 Debate
1967-68 4-3-66 26-7-66 Y 144
1968-69 16-6-67 27-10-67 Y 133
1969-70 18-12-68 22-4-69 N 125
1970-71 10-6-69 8-6-70 N 363
1971-72 15-2-71 25-3-71 Y 38
1972-73 A 16-6-71 withdrawn - —
1972-73 B 2-2-72 25-3-72 Y 52
1973-74 21-3-73 1-5-73 N 41
1974-75 A 16-1-74 23-3-74 Y 66
1974-75 B 29-8-74 2-10-74 Y 34
1975-76 27-11-74 13-2-75 Y 78
1976-77 10-12-75 6-3-76 Y 87
1977-78 11-2-77 25-4-77 N 73
1978-79 8-12-77 12-5-78 N 155
1979-80 31-1-79 21-6-79 N 141
1980-81 6-2-80 30-5-80 N 114
1981-82 20-2-81 2-4-81 N 41
1982-83 23-1-82 18-5-82 N 115
1983-84 22-12-82 17-5-83 N 146
1984-85 17-1-84 31-3-84 Y 74
1985-86 30-1-85 * N —
1986-87 5-2-86 25-4-86 N 79
1987-88 A 24-2-87 withdrawn — —
1987-88 B 16-3-87 30-6-87 N 106
1988-89 Stabs. 29-9-87 13-2-88 - 137
1988-89 Prices 23-3-88 14-7-88 N 113
* Council failed to agree on cereal prices in 1985-86 and 
the Commission implemented an interim set.
Sources: Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 248; Swinbank (1979),
P .  312; Commission and Council reports.
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Table 5.1 shows that the length of debate varies 
considerably. In the early years, when the market struc­
tures were being set, the debate averaged about 134 days 
(four and a half months). After 1970-71, the debates 
shortened. While the objective method was used by the 
Commission to set the price proposals, only about two 
months were allowed, except for 1978-79, when the Commis­
sion outlined the new market-directed price policy it 
wished to adopt. Since then the issues have been more 
complex and the scope of the proposals has been greater 
but the consultative bodies have had an average 100 days 
(more than three months) to deliberate.
The length of time between proposal and decision is 
important. As the debate shortens it becomes difficult 
for the consultative bodies to reach genuine compromises. 
Opinions tend to be strongly influenced by those with 
most to gain or lose while those indirectly affected have 
seldom completed their preparatory work, so their opin­
ions are often unheeded. In contrast, as the timespan 
lengthens, interest groups have more opportunity to or­
ganize protests to halt undesired proposals or to reform 
the existing proposal.
KEY BARGAINS IN THE SYSTEM
Before 1979, the farm lobby dominated the system. 
Farmers through COPA largely defined the scope and timing 
of the debate and created the greatest pressures for 
change. The national farmer organizations supported the 
system because they gained from a strong pan-European 
pressure in Brussels. Consequently, the Commission, EP, 
and ESC all focused their consultative efforts on COPA.
Non-farm interest groups had virtually no part in 
the policy process. Consumers were not regularly repre­
sented at the European level until the Bureau Europden 
des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) established a per­
manent office in Brussels in 1973; environmentalists only
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got representation in 1974 when the European Environmen­
tal Bureau (EEB) was established; and the industrial lob­
bies remained on the sidelines through much of the early 
period of the CAP.
  Figure 5.1 --------------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING DEBATE OF THE WHEAT 
PRICE PROPOSALS 1970-79









Beginning in the mid-1970s, COPA lost cohesion and 
by the 1980s was no longer at the centre of the policy 
process. When the Commission dropped the objective
method and began to address more divisive issues, COPA 
faced dissension within its ranks as individual commodity 
groups and national organizations clashed over their de­
mands from the Community. The needs of individual mem­
bers of COPA diverged and in some instances conflicted. 
The national farm organizations moved into the vacuum 
with greater consultation with their national governments 
in an effort to maintain control of the farm policy. 
Consequently COPA was pushed to the margins of the Euro­
pean debate. Taylor noted that by 1983 COPA simply pro-
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vided "a forum for exchanging information and help[ing] 
national groups define positions to follow in relations 
with national governments or national representatives in 
Brusse Is. 1,1
  Figure 5.2 --------------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING DEBATE OF THE WHEAT 
PRICE PROPOSALS 1979-88






The non-agricultural directorates in the Commission 
expanded contacts with the industry, consumer, and envir­
onmental lobbies to increase their power and in effect to 
break the farm lobby's exclusive control of the price re­
view. The EP and ESC followed suit, opening their pro­
cesses to the concerns and interests of these other 
groups. The EP, especially after the 1979 election, 
sought to gain public favour and votes by courting con­
sumer and environmental interests.
The Commission successfully managed the reform of 
the domestic price system in the 1980s only because it
Taylor (1983), pp. 40-41.
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had broken the farmer-based policy cartel. The following 
sections demonstrate how the shifting economic and poli­
tical environment and Commission efforts affected the 
official consultative agencies and the special interest 
lobbies.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (ESC)
The ESC was established in 1958 as a forum for elite 
accommodation among the leaders of labour, industry, 
farming, and other interest groups. During the 1960s and 
early 1970s farmers used the ESC to bolster their case 
for farm price increases. But the elite-dominated view 
of Community development rapidly lost favour. Conse­
quently, by the mid-1970s, COPA devoted only about 10% of 
its lobbying efforts to the ESC.2 In 1979, the election 
of the EP changed relationships significantly. COPA 
shifted most of its focus to Strasbourg and left the 
lobbying of the ESC to its members on the Committee while 
the Commission redirected the bulk of its consultations 
to the EP. The ESC therefore was forced to find a new 
role in farm debates or lose relevance. Gradually after 
1982, the ESC developed as a forum for discussing the 
soft options for reform; accommodations over prices were 
largely left to others. A concomitant of this shift was 
that the ESC found itself more closely allied to the 
Commission in discussions concerning the reform of the 
price system.
The ESC began in 1958 with what looked to be a 
strong position in farm policy debates. Article 43 of 
the Treaty of Rome requires that the Commission "consult" 
with the ESC on all proposals implementing the CAP. Art­
icle 47 specifies that the ESC create an agriculture sec­
tion which is to "hold itself at the disposal of the Com­
mission to prepare ... the deliberations of the Commit­
tee. " Its internal procedure in the early years allowed
2- Kirchner (1980), p. Ill
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the farm lobby to dominate policy debates, which ensured 
that COPA targeted it for lobbying. In particular, the 
agriculture section prepares the draft opinion, which is 
then presented to a quarterly plenary session of the ESC. 
Between 1975 and 1988, the agriculture section had at 
least one month to deliberate and prepare the draft 
opinion (except in 1977) while the whole Committee had to 
debate, amend, and approve the opinion during a two or 
three day plenary session which always had a full agenda. 
Because there was generally little time for discussion, 
the agriculture section draft was often accepted unamend­
ed by the Committee. As a result, from the early years 
and well into the 1970s, the ESC strongly supported farm­
er demands for higher prices to sustain and increase farm 
incomes.
A number of factors conspired to reduce farm lobby­
ing in the ESC. After the farm lobby scuttled Mansholt's 
structural policy proposals in 1971, the Commission in­
creased its direct links with COPA to improve its rela­
tions with the farm movement. Then, the objective method 
reduced the need for discussion and compromise: price
packages were developed by technicians based on the ob­
jective criteria. As a result, COPA found that there was 
less to be gained by working through the ESC.3 During 
the 1980s, when the Commission began to consult more 
frequently with the national farm ministries, COPA with­
drew from directly lobbying the ESC and left the job to 
its members who were appointed to the Committee.2 In­
stead, COPA concentrated its lobbying efforts on the 
elected members in the EP.
3- Lodge & Herman (1980), p. 282.
Art. 194 of the Treaty of Rome specifies that ESC 
members must serve in a personal capacity in the ESC and 
"may not be bound by any mandatory instructions." But 
farm organizations have always relied upon their members 
(who, after all, were appointed because they represent 
the farm sector) to work within the Committee to get an 
opinion which supports the COPA position.
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The evolving membership of the ESC also weakened the 
farm voice inside the Committee. The number of farm rep­
resentatives in the Committee held relatively steady over 
1970-88, but, as the total ESC membership increased with 
the admission of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973, 
Greece in 1980, and Spain and Portugal in 1986, the per­
centage of farm representatives in the total membership 
declined, to 10.6% in 1986 from 17.6% in 1970.
Furthermore, recent ESC appointees who joined the 
farm lobby (both from the original member states and from 
the new members) have been generally concerned with the 
interests of smaller farms and the problems surrounding 
Mediterranean products. Consequently, the farm group in 
the ESC was no longer dominated by Northern European 
members concerned with the problems of large, commercial 
enterprises.
Table 5.2 Membership in the ESC
Also members of : 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
COPA/COGECA 18 17 18 18 20
BEUC 3 5 6 7 10
EEB 0 0 0 1 0
Total ESC 102 144 144 156 189
% total ESC:
COPA/COGECA 17.6% 11.8% 12.5% 11.5% 10.6%
BEUC 2.9% 3.5% 4.2% 4.5% 5.3%
EEB .0% .0% .0% 0.6% .0%
Source: ESC Bulletins, Various.
Meanwhile, the environmental and consumer lobbies
strengthened their position in the Committee, providing a 
counterweight to the farm lobby. Ten members (or 5% of 
the ESC) in 1986 represented consumer interests, up from 
only three in 1970. Although there were no official 
representatives of the environmental lobby in the ESC
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after 1986, their voice was certainly heard because many 
of the consumer representatives were also interested in 
environmental issues.
ric.oitura.1
Table 5.3 CoMission^Proposals and ESC Opinions
Coaaission Agriculture ESC ESC
Average For All Coaaittee Plenary Session Vote Minority
CAP Products Opinion Opinion (F/A/N) Opinion
1968-69 .07 n.a. n.a. —
1969-70 .07 n.a. agreed; but no cuts —
1970-71 .07 n.a. agreed; only wheat cuts —
1971-72 >.07 n.a. agreed —
1972-73 A 2.37 n.a. 9.57-10.57 spread over 2 yrs —
1972-73 B 6.57. n.a. 9.57-10.57 spread over 2 yrs —
1973-74 2.87 n.a. no opinion; too little tiie —
1974-75 A 7.27. n.a. 7.27 not enough —
1974-75 B 4.07 no opinion no opinion —
1975-76 9.27 n.a. 9.27 inadequate (41/22/5) --
1976-77 7.57 9.17 accepts coetproiise (30/23/20) —
1977-78 3.07 need "upward 
adjustient"
0.17 (objective aethod) (66/17/16)
1978-79 2.07 +4.77 4.27 (objective aethod) (48/42/6) —
1979-80 .07 37 increase standstill for surplus products 
but reasonable rises for rest
(47/23/13)
1980-81 2.57 n.a. need higher prices; should use 
objective aethod
(55/14/13)
1981-82 7.87 n.a. 7.87 quite inadequate (47/27/11) —
1982-83 8.47 closer to 97 8.47 (60/50/9) 16.37 (20 aeabers)
1983-84 4.27 n.a. 4.27 (53/25/39) ain. 77; reject 
cereals co-resp.
1984-85 .87 accept liaited rise (70/21/19) —
1985-86 0.37 reject cereal 
price cut
rejected ag. section opinion; 
unable to reach an opinion
(42/52/9)






for oils tax 
ok for 19B9
accepted prices and green rate 
changes; no to oils tax 
only for 1989; want set-asides
(94/53/12) supported oils tax
Sources: Neville-Rolfe (1984), pp . 248-51; EP Opinions in the 0J_.
ESC opinions have evolved in line with the changing 
position of farmers in the Committee. Even when the ESC 
agreed with COPA that prices should be used to support 
farm incomes, the formal opinions never fully mirrored
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farm demands. Although the agriculture section was dom­
inated by COPA members, it never asked for prices to rise 
as high as demanded by COPA. Only when the Committee 
allowed minority opinions in the 1980s was there a direct 
one-to-one relationship between COPA demands and the 
views of the "agriculturalists" on the Committee.
The Committee strongly backed the income-supporting 
role for prices adopted by the Commission in 1972. In 
1974, the ESC noted that it:
has repeatedly stressed the dangers of the 
method used by the Council to fix agricultural 
prices, a method based essentially on a search 
for a political compromise. Reference to ob­
jective criteria is provided for in the Treaty 
of Rome, but a political compromise cannot, by 
definition, take account of such criteria. The 
Committee must therefore endorse the Commis­
sion's assessment that 'the Council's annual 
decisions ought to be based more fully on 
objective criteria.' Moreover, it should be 
possible for all the social and occupational 
groups concerned to make a joint examination of 
these criteria, in an appropriate body.3
In both 1974-75 and 1975-76 the agriculture section 
was unhappy with the Commission proposals; both opinions, 
which were accepted by the plenary session, recommended 
that prices should be higher, with the objective method 
figure as the minimum. The Section also examined the 
objective method calculations and in 1975-76 outlined a 
number of changes— expanding the sample of farms, extend­
ing the production cost data to two years, and eliminat­
ing the 1.5% productivity deduction4— which would work to 
increase the indicated price rise.
The 1976-77 price debate for the first time revealed 
"deep divisions amongst members of the Committee."55 
After three years when agriculture section drafts were
OJ No. C 115, 28-9-74, p. 26.
OJ No. C 47, 27-2-75, p. 29.
ESC Bulletin, 1 (Feb. 1976), p. 2.
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accepted (at least partly because of the short time 
available for debate), the Committee had more than a 
month and a half to frame an opinion. The agriculture 
section asked for prices to rise 9.1% (what the method 
yielded if Italy was excluded) but the plenary session 
narrowly overturned the agriculture section draft and 
proposed prices rise 7.5% to 8% (approximately what the 
Commission proposed). The opinion further recommended 
that the Commission set production targets, provide 
greater support for Mediterranean products, and begin 
direct income payments for small farmers. A minority of 
members attempted to amend the opinion to call for a 
price freeze but failed by a vote of 25 to 42 (27 ab­
stained) .
The ESC plenary session then rejected the agricul­
ture section draft opinions in each of the next three 
years. In 1977-78 the session voted by a large margin
for the Commission to stick to the objective method,
which indicated a 0.1% price rise for the year. The 
agriculture section wanted a price rise exceeding the 3% 
offered by the Commission. In 1978-79, when the Commis­
sion proposed an average 2% price increase, the agricul­
ture section asked for more than 4.7% (as indicated by 
the old objective method formula) but the plenary session 
settled by a narrow margin for 4.2% (as indicated by a 
revised form of the objective method). The farm lobby 
narrowly defeated an attempted to amend the opinion to 
support the Commission's restrained price proposal (2%). 
Then in 1979-80, the Commission proposed a price freeze 
to slow the rise in surplus production. The agriculture 
section drafted an opinion that called for price increas­
es exceeding 3% but the plenary session rejected that by
a large majority and instead, after a presentation by
Agriculture Commissioner Finn Gundelach and a "delicate 
but orderly debate," accepted that prices of products in 
surplus should be frozen while other products should 
receive "reasonable price increases." The Committee also
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accepted the Commission's agri-monetary proposals but 
suggested that drops in farm income resulting from re­
duced positive monetary gaps should be supplemented with 
other measures "to cancel out the adverse effects."A 
Once again a group of consumers, trade unionists, and in­
dustrialists attempted but failed to get a price freeze.
Following three years of defeat, the farm lobby 
triumphed in 1980 and the ESC opinion rejected many of 
the Commission's suggested reforms; it instead requested 
a large price increase. The resulting opinion also cri­
ticized the Commission for no longer using the objective 
method:
The Committee notes that this year, the Commis­
sion did not adopt the direct use of the fig­
ures obtained by the objective method. The 
Committee considers this a serious matter which 
could be construed as calling into question the 
common agricultural policy as it has been con­
ceived to date if it turns out that the Commis­
sion has permanently abandoned the objective 
method— which the ESC has always supported— for 
its calculation in connection with the propos­
als for farm prices in the Community.-7
The Committee further rejected the budget argument 
because it was "not in itself sufficient reason for not 
implementing economically and socially justified farm 
price increases."®
The agriculture section prevailed in the 1981-82 for 
the last time. A month after the Commission proposed a 
7.8% increase in prices and co-responsibility to dampen 
surplus cereals production, the Committee adopted an 
opinion calling for higher prices but agreed "that pro­
ducers should share in the cost of reducing surpluses so 
as to establish a balance between supply and demand.
OJ No. C 171, 9-7-79, p. 4-5.
OJ No. C 182, 21-7-80, p. 35 
OJ No. C 182, 21-7-80, p. 35. 
OJ No. C 159, 29-6-81, p. 29.
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Before the next price review and while the Commis­
sion was examining the Mandate of May 30, the ESC pre­
pared and released an own-initiative opinion on CAP re­
form that concluded that "a general policy principle [for 
prices] must be that of structural balance in the mar­
ket."10 The Committee expressed support for the Commis­
sion's attempt to develop a long-term strategy for pro­
duction, prices, and trade in an effort to control surp­
luses. As well, the opinion suggested that the Community 
should expand support for Mediterranean products and 
develop forestry policies.
In 1982 the ESC was expanded and new members nomin­
ated. About the same time it also instituted monthly 
consultations with the Commission (giving it advance 
warning of proposals), which allowed it to produce more 
timely opinions.11 This change worked to dilute the 
power and influence of the agriculture section, however, 
because the non-farm interests had more opportunity to 
respond to the farm price proposals. In 1982-83, the 
agriculture section called for a 9% price increase, but 
the plenary session instead approved the Commission's 
proposed 6.6% price rise and the related package of 
measures, which included strengthened co-responsibility 
(provided the guarantee threshold system incorporated 
limits on imported cereal substitutes). The opinion also 
called for "a comprehensive policy for regulating the 
volume of production and consumption" to restore market 
equilibrium.12 A group of 20 'agriculturalists' in the 
ESC rejected this decision and issued a minority opinion, 
calling for an average 16.3% price increase ("in accord­
ance with the 'objective method'" and equal to COPA's de­
mands) to offset the drop in farm incomes over the past 
few years. The minority said they "categorically reject
10- OJ No. C 348, 31-12-81, p. 30. 
1X- ESC Annual Report 1983, p. 9. 
1=- OJ No. C 114, 6-5-82, p. 4.
Price Policy: Debate 171
the Commission proposals" for prices and co-responsibil­
ity. They instead called for strict Community prefer­
ence, strengthened producer guarantees, and "immediate 
implementation of a genuine, dynamic and on-going export 
policy for food and other agricultural products."13
The 1983-84 debate was a carbon copy of 1982-83, ex­
cept that the farm lobby lost further support. The ESC 
plenary session accepted the Commission's price proposal 
but cautioned that the co-responsibility levy for cereals 
should be based on production and therefore should not be 
permanently factored into the price. Once again, 19 
'agriculturalists' issued a minority opinion calling for 
a minimum 7% price increase (again the COPA position), 
rejected the introduction of cereals co-responsibility, 
and demanded limits on imports of cereal substitutes.
In 1984, Dalsager attended the plenary session to 
present the Commission's case for a low price increase 
and the ESC plenary session responded with an opinion 
that essentially supported the Commission proposals (and 
for the first time in several years, the agriculturalists 
did not present a minority opinion). The ESC, however, 
deviated from past practice and spent some time examining 
a number of 'soft' options for the Commission to consid­
er, including expansion of bio-energy and forestry to 
reduce surplus production and direct income payments to 
help small producers hurt by measures designed to bring 
structural surpluses under control. The ESC Annual Re­
port that year noted that the agriculture section "has 
unquestionably enhanced the ESC's prestige in the eyes of 
the Commission."1* This approach proved to be a means 
for it to build a new role in farm affairs.
Ibid., p . 7.
ESC Annual Report 1984, p. 11.
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In 1985 the ESC demonstrated that It no longer had 
any ability to resolve differences surrounding price 
negotiations. In March the Committee reached a stalemate 
when it attempted to resolve differences over the pro­
posed 3.6% cereals price cut. The draft opinion from the 
agriculture section rejected the price cut but the plen­
ary session voted against it and the Chairman declared 
that "this year, the Committee has been unable to take up 
a position on farm prices."155 After 1985 it was impera­
tive that the Committee find a niche where it could do 
some useful work, or it would become totally irrelevant.
Later that year the ESC found that role when it 
examined the Commission's Green Paper. Their opinion 
showed great insight into the divergence of views in the 
Community:
At the heart of the problem the CAP now faces, 
is the failure of the attempt to use prices at 
one and the same time economically, in order to 
balance supply and demand, and socially, in 
order to provide a fair standard of living for 
the entire agricultural community. This fail­
ure is evidenced by the existence side by side 
of increasing surpluses and of farm incomes 
which have not increased in real terms in most 
Member States in the last decade, and have 
actually fallen in some, and also by an in­
creasing inequality of incomes within agricul­
ture. A choice now has to be made. If prices 
are used economically, some other means must be 
found of giving those in agriculture an income 
society accepts as fair, of which direct income 
payments to the poorest farmers and part-time 
employment outside agriculture would be most 
effective.1A
The Committee concluded that a cautious price policy for 
cereals was necessary but that it could not, "in isola­
tion, improve the market balance without entailing un­
acceptable social and political risks."1'7 The ESC,
l=- ESC Bulletin, 1985(3).
1<fa- OJ No. C 330, 20-2-85, p. 14.
17r- OJ No. C 330, 20-2-85, p. 17.
Price Policy: Debate 173
prompted by the environmental and consumer lobbies, 
called for the Commission to tighten the intervention 
system, expand domestic uses (e.g., starch and bio­
ethanol), develop new international markets (e.g., food 
aid), diversify farm holdings into forestry and tourism, 
encourage organic farming, and use land set-asides for 
conservation purposes. The Committee also agreed that
farm incomes should be supplemented to compensate for
losses due to reforms of the CAP (taking into account 
total family income) provided they do not offset the
efforts to reduce production.
The ESC in 1986, 1987, and 1988 generally accepted
the Commission's proposals to freeze guaranteed prices 
and reduce intervention support. Although the farm lobby 
attempted a number of times to get the ESC to withdraw 
support for cereals co-responsibility, it was defeated 
each time. The new members in the ESC (nominated in
1986) generally showed more interest in supporting small 
and Mediterranean farmers than in helping Northern Euro­
pean farmers. Over that period the ESC, and the agricul­
ture section in particular, worked to develop a new role 
as champion for the soft-options. The opinions only 
obliquely referred to the price proposals (usually to 
accept the scope and direction of the recommendations). 
Instead, the Committee examined a variety of options and 
developed a set of non-price measures to reform the sys­
tem, including expanded food exports, direct income aid 
to farmers hurt by reform, new uses for surplus stocks, 
and land set-asides.10
So m  •c') )
ctfter 1975, the ESC opinions on prices increasingly 
supported the Commission, often at the expense of farm 
interests. The farm lobby became isolated within the 
Committee as new members with new concerns entered; even­
tually farmers had to resort to minority statements to
ESC Annual Report 1988, p. 14.
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communicate their opinions. But the agriculture section 
built itself a fresh role as a forum for new ideas and as 
a proponent for alternative soft-options for agriculture. 
Farmers, consumers, and environmentalists discovered they 
could collaborate both in the section and in plenary ses­
sions to develop proposals to provide new opportunities 
for farmers.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CEP)
The decision to elect the members of the European 
Parliament, beginning in 1979, caused a fundamental 
change in how the EP dealt with farm issues. Before 
1979, the EP, run by elites appointed by the member 
states, had an outlook similar to the ESC. Its views 
also evolved in the same direction as ESC opinions as it 
sought to be the Commission's "ally and partner. "1,5> As a 
result, farmers were slowly losing support to non-agri- 
cultural members. Then in 1979 the Assembly was expanded 
and elected. Tugendhat argues that "in modern Europe, 
only the ballot box can confer political legitimacy and 
all that goes with it; nothing else can."20 Farmers 
recognized that, and in the succeeding years increased 
their efforts to influence the EP. But, like most other 
legislatures, the EP balances farm sector demands with 
the concerns and needs of other groups in society. As a 
result, the EP has a relatively fluid opinion on farm 
matters, at times siding with farmers while at other 
periods rejecting farm demands and looking at the larger 
picture.
The EP is part of the policy process because Article 
43 of the Treaty of Rome stipulates that the Council can 
act only "on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the Assembly." Although the EP does not have 
a block over Community price policy, its opinion has
Fitzmaurice (1985), p. 17. 
Tugendhat (1986), p. 146.
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gradually become important. Commissioners frequently 
state that their negotiating position with Council can be 
undercut if the EP votes for higher prices than propos­
ed.121 Furthermore, the EP has important budgetary powers 
which provide it with additional leverage. Article 203 
authorizes the EP to amend the draft budget and, acting 
by a majority of its members and two-thirds of the votes 
cast, ultimately to reject the entire budget. If that 
happens. Article 204 provides the Community with interim 
resources equal to 'provisional twelfths' of the previous 
years budget, which potentially disrupts all Community 
programs. Consequently most years the president-in- 
office of the Council attends EP plenary sessions on the 
budget while the president of the Farm Council usually 
attends both the agriculture committee meeting and plen­
ary session debate on the price proposals.
Before the election in 1979, the farm lobby control­
led both the agriculture section meetings (where farm and 
rural members formed the majority) and the subsequent 
plenary session debates because participation was usually 
uneven. The agriculture section during the 1970s had 
fewer than 20 members, which made it relatively easy for 
the well organized farm lobby to dominate. After the 
1979 election, farmers represented a smaller percentage 
of the total MEPs but they maintained significant influ­
ence for quite a few years because only about 100 MEPs 
actively participated in the work of the EP and as few as 
200 voted on average. The UK National Consumer Council 
believes low participation and the need to develop a new 
majority for each vote tended to benefit farmers because 
"those who have a clear 'brief,' such as agriculture, can 
be well informed and concentrate on single issues, where­
221 ■ The Daily Telegraph. 16-2-76; Financial Times, 1-4-
81.
176 Chapter 5
as someone who attempts to deal with broader areas could 
have difficulty."522
Table 5.4 Membership in the European Parliament
Members who are:
1979 1982 1984
Farmers 32 35 33
Consumer Activists 1 1 5
Environmentalists 4 4 10*
Total EP 410 434 434
Percentage of total EP membership:
Farmers 7.8% 8.1% 7.6%
Consumer Activists 0.2% 0.2% 1.2%
Environmentalists 1.0% 0.9% 2.3%
* A Rainbow Coalition of Ecologists, Danish Anti-Marke­
teers and others includes 20 MEPs in the post-1984 E P . 
Source: Official Handbook of the EP (1979, 1984).
Farmers began to lose control of farm policy especi­
ally during the 1984-89 session of the EP. As the number 
of MEPs increased, the membership of the agriculture sec­
tion expanded, rising to more than 50 members by 1988.
Consequently, farmers found that the committee which they 
'tohad come . view as their monopoly preserve included manyN
members with divergent viewpoints. Furthermore, all 
elected MEPs, including farmers, faced a greater variety 
of pressures which forced them to consider a wider array 
of interests and concerns during the plenary sessions in 
Strasbourg.23 Then in 1987, the Single Market project 
revived interest in the Assembly because the EP was 
granted final say on all 1992 decisions. As a result, 
beginning in mid-1987 attendance at EP sessions rose 
sharply, so that more than 300 of the 518 MEPs regularly
22- National Consumers Council (1988), p p . 92-93.
=3. por example. Lord Plumb, who was the President of 
both the NFU and COPA in the 1970s, became a strong ad­
vocate in the EP for reform of the CAP in the 1980s.
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attended in 1987, which bolstered the non-farm contingent 
and further diluted the influence of farmer members.
The EP agriculture working group, which prepares the 
draft opinions for the plenary session, largely deter­
mined the EP position on prices in the early years of the 
CAP. During the 1970s, it consistently proposed, and the 
EP approved, price demands greater than recommended by 
the Commission. The farm MEPs accepted the objective 
method as a way of setting prices because it provided a 
mechanistic means to establish a specific price demand 
that impressed non-farm MEPs. This method also was par­
ticularly useful in arbitration between different farm 
demands in the committee stage.
The pre-eminence of the agriculture committee was 
first challenged in the mid-1970s, when the EP restruc­
tured its committee system and created two additional 
committees to review and comment on the price packages. 
Although the agriculture committee continued to be res­
ponsible for drafting the opinion for the plenary ses­
sion, the budget committee and the committee on the en­
vironment, public health, and consumer protection (con­
sumer committee hereafter) were given an opportunity to 
comment on the proposals.
Beginning in 1977, the agriculture committee was 
held in check by the new budget committee for two years. 
The agriculture committee drafted an opinion that label­
led as "manifestly insufficient" the proposed 3% price 
increase for 1977-78 and called for prices to rise at 
least 5% and for greater green rate adjustments to aid 
farmers in high inflation countries. Although the EP 
plenary session agreed with the sentiments of the agri­
culture committee, the budget committee prevailed and the 
final opinion only stated that the 3% proposal was too
The Economist, 11-2-89.
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low. In 1978, the agriculture committee again called for 
an average 5% price increase but accepted the "cautious 
price policy" for cereals. The budget committee rejected 
that view and supported the Commission proposals, pro­
vided prices for surplus products are frozen, while the 
consumer committee thought surplus products should re­
ceive a price increase in conjunction with more effective 
co-responsibility and limits to the market guarantees. 
The budget committee prevailed and the final opinion 
called for guaranteed prices to rise 2% except for those 
products in surplus. But the farm lobby got the EP to 
agree that farmers in revaluing countries should be com­
pensated if their green rates were revalued.
In 1979, the EP reviewed and commented on the 1979- 
80 price proposals before going to the polls in June. 
The agriculture committee called for prices to rise fast­
er than proposed so that the agri-monetary gaps could be 
significantly reduced. The Commission had not proposed 
any change in the positive monetary gaps. Although both 
the budget and consumer committees supported the Commis­
sion proposals, the MEPs compromised (at least partly be­
cause the election was just months away) and requested a 
3% increase except for those products in structural sur­
plus.25
Relations in the EP changed significantly after the 
election. During the first elected European Parliament 
(1979-84), the expanded group of electorally-minded MEPs 
were anxious not to alienate potential farm voters. Con­
sequently, they generally accepted the agriculture sec­
tion opinions and concentrated on non-farm issues.
Financial Times, 16-3-79, noted that the EP was con­
fused about the price proposals given uncertainty over 
the introduction of the EMS. As well as accepting a 
general price rise and freeze for surplus products, the 
EP also voted to use "European Units of Accounts" (which 
do not exist); if prices were denominated in ECUs, the 
average price level would have dropped 17%.
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Table 5.5 emission^ Proposals and European Parliament Opinions
Commission EP Agriculture EP Budget Environment, EP
Average for All Coiiittee Coieittee Public Health Plenary Session
CAP Products Opinion Opinion & Consumers Opinion
1968-69 .OX n.a. — — agreed; except butter
1969-70 .07. n.a. -- — some increases; no cuts
1970-71 .02 n.a. — — increases for beef & cereals
1971-72 >.02 n.a. — — 5.02
1972-73 A 2.32 "insuffisante* — — withdrawn before opinion set
1972-73 B 6.52 — — — 8.02
1973-74 2.82 4.02 — — 2.762
1974-75 A 7.22 “increase" — — "substantial increase"
1974-75 B 4.07. 6.02 — — 6.02
1975-76 9.22 inadequate — — "patently inadequate"
1976-77 7.52 9.57. satisfactory 
but inefficient
9.57.
1977-78 3.02 at least 52 32; none for 
surplus prods
n.a. 32 is too low
1978-79 2.02 5.02 22; none for 
surplus prods
27. 22; no increase for surplus 
products
1979-80 .02 at least 37. 02 02
products
3.02 except for surplus
1980-81 2.52 at least 7.92 2.42 2.47. "stringent" ok but 2.42 not 
unacceptable
1981-82 7.82 12.02 7.82 too high 12.02
1982-83 8.47. 147. 8.42 n.a. 14.02, no production liRits
1983-84 4 . 2 2 at least 72 acceptable 02 no less than 7.02
1984-85 0.87. unacceptable accept 0.82 "noted" proposal; no figure
1985-86 0.37. 4.52 accept "noted" 3.52 in real terms




unsatisfactory no price figure set
1987-88 -0.52 no cereals 
price cuts
endorses cuts emphasis on 
quality
accepts price cuts and 
HCA changes
1988-89 Stabs - reject accept n.a. accept stabilizers
Sources: Neville-Rolfe (1984), pp. 248-51; Opinions of the EP in the OJ.
Cottrell dubbed the EP the "obedient servant to the farm 
lobby" for its strong support of farmers during this 
period.2^ The agriculture section regularly requested 
price increases well above what the Commission proposed
Cottrell (1987), p. 28.
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and the EP accepted without amendment almost all of those 
draft opinions.
In 1980, the agriculture committee calculated that 
the objective method indicated a price rise of 7% was 
justified; the Commission's 2.4% proposal was "unaccept­
able." The committee called for prices to be raised at 
least 7.9% (COPA's position), recommended that monetary 
gaps should be further reduced (but not if domestic 
prices would fall), and suggested the Commission should 
manage the wheat market to avoid creating surpluses. 
Although the budget committee was preoccupied that year 
with the battle over the 1980 budget (which the new MEPs 
had rejected as one of their first acts), it issued an 
opinion supporting the Commission; the consumer committee 
agreed. The plenary session eventually supported a 
"stringent agricultural prices policy" but agreed that 
the Commission proposal was "unacceptable." Although the 
opinion did not state a preference, the implication was 
that prices should rise by significantly more than 2.4%.
IV
Part of the reason for the lack of an alternate proposalA.
was that the new MEPs could not reach a consensus. MEPs 
proposed a variety of unsuccessful amendments to set 
prices equal to: an average 1% cut (0% for non-surplus
commodities; cuts greater than 1% for surplus products); 
0% for all surplus products (not cereals); the Commission 
proposals; at least 5%; the objective method; 7.9% except 
surplus products; and a rate of +13% for France. The 
easiest option was to leave the actual figure open to 
interpretat ion.
In 1981 the agriculture committee requested a 12% 
increase, called for the end of monetary gaps within two 
years and rejected outright the Commission's proposal to 
make co-responsibility a principle of CAP because it was 
"simply a system for containing agricultural expendi­
ture." A significant minority of the agriculture section 
tried unsuccessfully to get the committee to adopt COPA's
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position (a 15.3% price increase and no co-responsibil­
ity) . The budget committee accepted the Commission pro­
posals completely while the consumer committee rejected 
the price increases because they would add 2.5% to the 
cost of food in the Community. Nevertheless, the plenary 
session agreed with the agriculture section and strongly 
supported the use of the objective method to set prices.
The EP then missed a golden opportunity in the Man­
date of 30 May 1980 to resolve some of its internal con­
flicts. MEPs worked on and debated the issues raised by 
the Commission but failed to reach an opinion before the 
November 1981 Council meeting where the Mandate was re­
solved. The EP thereby forfeited any real influence over 
the outcome.27
In 1982, the agriculture committee again called for 
a price rise based on the objective method. They reason­
ed that "the objective method of determining agricultural 
prices is absolutely defendable. Consequently, they 
rejected "totally the idea that the community can commit 
itself definitively in regard to its agricultural price 
level by proposing a once and for all alignment of Euro­
pean prices on production prices in other major producer 
countries (USA), deliberately ignoring their production 
conditions and taking no account of any possible changes 
in parity between the dollar and European currencies."22** 
The farm committee therefore requested prices rise 14% 
but did not reach any view on the agri-monetary propos­
als. The committee also rejected extending co-responsi­
bility to cereals; instead, they proposed the relative 
prices for different cereals be adjusted and imports of 
cereals substitutes be limited to reduce the cost of sur­
plus production. Although the budget and consumer com­
2:7 - Cottrell (1987), p. 151
2S- EP Doc 1-30/82/A. p. 7. 
EP Doc 1-30/82/A, p. 9.
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mittees again sided with the Commission, the plenary ses­
sion generally accepted the committee's draft.
Later that year the Presidents of the EP, the Com­
mission, and the Council clarified the budgetary practice 
related to compulsory and non-compulsory spending and 
largely removed the budget weapon from the European 
Parliament in future farm price debates. They agreed 
that EAGGF Guarantee outlays are "compulsory;" as such, 
the EP can amend them only on first reading. If the 
Council rejects the amendments, the EP cannot amend them 
on second or subsequent readings. In exchange, the 
Presidents agreed that the EP can sustain amendments to 
all "non-compulsory" outlays. The EP therefore lost some 
of its limited budgetary power over the prices but gained 
ultimate control over non-compulsory outlays. After 
1982, however, EAGGF Guarantee outlays rose rapidly so 
that there was little fiscal room to expand programs in 
areas the EP could influence. As a result, the non-farm 
lobbies made greater efforts to reduce agricultural 
outlays, which created increased friction between the 
farm and non-farm lobbies in the Assembly during the 
price debates.
In November 1982 the agriculture committee restated 
its earlier views on prices, co-responsibility, and 
imports of cereals substitutes. When the 1983-84 price 
proposals were released, the committee announced that 
they were "totally inadequate" and said prices should 
increase "no less than 7%" (COPA's position), called for 
positive monetary gaps to be largely dismantled, and 
rejected co-responsibility on cereals. The budget com­
mittee, as usual, supported the Commission proposals 
while the consumer committee called for a price freeze. 
The plenary session went ahead, however, and accepted 
unamended the agriculture section's (and COPA's) request.
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In 1984, well after the Commission had decided that 
prices should not be used solely to support farm incomes, 
the agriculture section of the EP stated that "the price 
policy must continue to be the principal means of en­
suring a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community."30 But, the section acknowledged that "in 
view of the limited financial reserves, there is at the 
moment no possibility of an overall price adjustment."31 
The committee argued, however, that there was room within 
the budget for the Community to eliminate MCAs, to 
develop long-term export contracts for cereals, and to 
negotiate export restraint agreements with foreign supp­
liers of cereal substitutes. Both the budget and con­
sumer committees accepted the Commission's proposals.
Given that the budget was at the legal limit of 1% VAT,
the plenary session decided to note the Commission pro­
posal without stating an alternative price figure. Thus, 
the budget committee prevailed, but only because the bud­
get was already totally allocated.
The MEPs then went to the polls. The new EP in­
cluded two fewer farmers and a much stronger contingent 
of consumer advocates and environmentalists. As a con­
sequence, there was more interest in non-farm affairs. 
Kirchner demonstrated in his 1984 study of the EP that, 
even during the 1979-84 session, only about 10% of MEPs' 
time was devoted to agricultural and fisheries matters. 
In contrast, the EP spent 23% of its time on political 
affairs, 21% on economic and monetary affairs, 21% on
environmental, social, regional and cultural affairs, and 
17% on budgetary, institutional and legal affairs.32 
Farm programs, nevertheless, continued to consume the 
vast majority of the Community budget. Because MEPs 
could only expand non-farm programs (over which it has
■ EP Doc 1-1508/83, p. 6.
’ EP Doc 1-1508/83, p. 8.
Kirchner (1984), p. 119
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influence and control) if farm spending could be slowed, 
the new MEPs were less disposed to accept agriculture 
section draft opinions that requested strong price gains.
Meanwhile, the relationship between MEPs and the 
national governments and parties in their home countries 
changed. Increasingly after 1979, national governments 
supplied their MEPs— both government and opposition party 
members— with information explaining their national 
policy positions.33 tAoreover, the new MEPs belonged to 
political parties which had to reconcile support for 
farming with the need to appeal to a largely urban elec­
torate. This competition for MEPs' support helped to 
balance the needs and concerns of farmers and the demands 
of other parts of the Community. Although the farm lobby 
remained strong after 1984, it no longer could dominate 
proceedings.
In 1985, after the EP general election, the new 
agriculture committee again got most of what it request­
ed. It reiterated the importance of guaranteeing the 
level of farm incomes "in the interests of the smooth 
course of political life and social peace."34 The com­
mittee disagreed with the European Council decisions in 
1984 and stated that "the price decision for the 1985-86 
year should contribute to rectifying this imbalance."33 
Consequently, the committee rejected "the whole of the 
Commission's price proposals package," including the pro­
posed 3.6% cut in cereals prices, and instead recommended 
that prices rise by 4.5%, aid to small producers be 
doubled, and intervention payment delays cease.36 The 
budget committee supported the Commission's proposed 
cereal price cuts (triggered by the guarantee threshold 
system). The plenary session took the middle road and
Jowett (1984), p. 7.
3*. EP Doc 2-1770/84. P . 10
3S- EP Doc 2-1770/84, P • 12
3A. EP Doc 2-1770/84, P • 16
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proposed a 3.5% price rise (in real terms) to allow posi­
tive monetary gaps to be dismantled without compensation.
But the EP did not avoid the repercussions of the 
stalemate in the Council over the 1985 price package. 
When it attempted to develop a new position on CAP reform 
in response to the Commission's Green Paper, it reached 
an impasse of its own. The Tolman report produced by the 
agriculture committee recommended the Community end un­
limited price guarantees rather than implement "drastic 
price cuts." The report also proposed an active export 
policy and limits on duty free imports of cereal substi­
tutes. The budget committee disagreed, calling for sup­
port prices to be fixed "at a level close to interna­
tional prices." Three other committees made comments on 
the proposals. The committee on economic and monetary 
affairs and industrial policy called for a series of 
measures to reduce the cost of the CAP, including the end 
of the agri-monetary system, greater promotion of deficit 
products (i.e. oilseeds), and new efforts to negotiate to 
end the GATT zero-bound duty on cereal substitutes. The 
committee on external economic relations concluded that 
maximum guarantee levels should be set and co-responsi­
bility applied to production in excess of those levels; 
on no account should Community Preference be increased. 
Finally, the consumer committee endorsed the Commission 
proposal to use market prices to guide supply and demand, 
but questioned co-responsibility. In January 1986, the 
plenary session was faced with a vast array of conflic­
ting views to reconcile and by the end of the debate the 
Tolman report had been amended almost 200 times. Even 
then, the plenary session rejected the opinion (114/168/ 
56) because it was "over influenced" by the farm lobby.37
Soon after that failure, the EP was presented with 
the 1986-87 price proposals, which included greater co-
37- The Times. 17-1-86.
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responsibility and a price freeze. The agriculture sec­
tion maintained that "the market and price policy must 
remain the cornerstone for guaranteeing agricultural in­
comes in the future" and therefore rejected the cereals 
price freeze and the "feeble, emaciated, one-legged 
creature" of co-responsibility. Meanwhile, the budget 
committee requested multi-year planning for CAP prices, 
the committee on economic and external relations ques­
tioned whether the co-responsibility levy would dampen 
growth of cereal surpluses, and the consumer committee 
rejected the price proposals as unsatisfactory unless 
accompanied by direct income payments. The plenary ses­
sion had difficulty reaching a compromise opinion: once
again, no single lobby dominated. The session finally 
called for a pluri-annual price review but did not dec­
lare any preferred price figure. The new members from 
Spain and Portugal helped swing the vote because they 
were concerned that higher prices might exhaust the bud­
get and thereby reduce resources for regional and social 
programs.3e
In 1987, the Commission's price package and later 
the proposed stabilizers dissatisfied the farm lobby in 
the EP. The agriculture committee for the first time 
since the early 1970s did not use the objective method to 
set its opinion (although COPA did); the section decided 
that the method had nothing to contribute to the new con­
cerns over the market situation, food quality, or the 
budget. The committee instead examined the specifics of 
the Commission package— payment delays, tightened quality 
standards, limits to buying-in, and co-responsibility 
levies— and rejected them because they might cut prices 
by as much as 15%. The committee preferred a price 
freeze, combined with higher direct income support, set- 
asides, co-responsibility and the dismantling of the 
green ECU system. The other committees endorsed the
3  63  . International Herald Tribune, 21-4-86.
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Commission price proposals. The plenary session once 
again declined to set a definite price and instead 
accepted the Commission prices. Later in the year, the 
EP allowed that stabilizers would be necessary to slow 
growth in production and to limit budgetary outlays, but 
said that they should be part of a larger package, which 
would include land set-asides, extensification, diversi­
fication, and assistance for feed incorporation.3*9
By 1988, the changed composition and rules in the 
EP, combined with the renewed interest which flowed from 
the Single Market exercise, had forced a radical adjust­
ment in farm debates in the Assembly. The agricultural 
committee, in particular, accepted that the CAP was only 
one of many Community policies and therefore had to 
change: prices could no longer be the sole means of farm
support. The committee after 1985 developed two new 
strategies to resolve its internal disagreements. Urged 
by the MEPs from the Northern European countries, it be­
came a strong supporter of the commercial farm sector and 
a major proponent of an active export policy for wheat 
and other products in surplus supply. Meanwhile, the 
Southern MEPs forced the committee to review support for 
small and disadvantaged farmers, with the result that it 
came to promote the social dimension for the CAP, includ­
ing a new structures policy, land set-asides, and direct 
income payments. As a result, the EP was able to resolve 
the conflict between farm and non-farm interests and 
develop a united approach in the late 1980s.
THE PRESSURE GROUPS
More than 500 European interest groups attempt to 
influence the development or operation of Community
i n
policy. Fenne11 identified 152 different European organi-
N in m 3
zations . that had an interest in the farm policy,
\
including:
OJ No. C 156, 15-6-87, p p . 127-28.
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- 15 producer organizations (e.g., COPA);
- 66 processing lobbies (e.g., UNICE and CIAA);
- 42 groups of agriculture and food traders;
- 9 co-operatives associations (e.g., COGECA);
- 2 groups of farm and food industry workers;
- 3 consumer associations (e.g., BEUC); and
- 15 others (e.g., EEB).
COPA certainly is the senior and most influential organ­
ization operating in the agricultural field at the Com­
munity level. The industrial lobbies have great poten­
tial influence but have remained largely neutral because 
they do not have either united policy positions or any 
relevant access to the farm policy system. Meanwhile, 
consumers and environmentalists developed bargains with 
the EP, the ESC, the non-farm Commission directorates, 
and some of the Councils, thereby creating a nascent role 
in the debate over the structure of farm policy in the 
1980s and 1990s.
Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations
Sicco Mansholt, the first Farm Commissioner and the 
'architect of the CAP,' encouraged the national farm 
organizations to establish COPA in October 1958. He 
believed that if farmers had a focus for European action, 
they would support further integration of agriculture and 
become a strong ally of the Commission. COPA did just 
that during the following decade. Farmers developed 
strong European ties through their Brussels office and 
found they could largely control the scope of farm 
debate. But as the power structures shifted and farm
°~rv4.
interests diverged^ 192Q& the Commission decided to
negotiate directly with the national governments, which 
forced much of the farm lobbying effort back to the 
national level. As a result of both the economic and 
political changes, the farm lobby became less united and 
many farmers began to look more for support to special 
commodity groups and their national governments. Conse­
quently, the underlying bargain between COPA and its 
member organizations weakened and COPA lost power in
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Europe. The Council, Commission, ESC, and EP no longer 
wait expectantly for COPA decisions.
In 1989, COPA was composed of 30 national farmer 
organizations from the 12 EC countries, including the 
Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV) from Germany, four large 
farm movements from France (including FNSEA), and the 
three National Farmers' Unions (NFU) from the UK. Al­
though all farm interests are theoretically represented 
in COPA, the members of the Presidium have almost always 
been large (often cereals) producers because those in­
dividuals have been more able to find the time and money 
to be away from their farms. In 1976, most members of 
the Presidium operated farms that had more than 100 ha of 
land under cultivation and little had changed by the late 
1 9 8 0 s . T h i s  ensured that the interests of the commer­
cial farmers were well-represented at the expense of the 
small, less-advantaged producer.
The Commission provides the key to both the develop­
ment and to the survival of COPA. From the beginning it 
decided to meet and to work only with pan-European, 
multi-product farm lobbies. Consequently, farmers had to 
work through COPA to have any influence on the develop­
ment of farm policy at the European level. During the 
1960s COPA built upon this and developed three key ser­
vices for its members. It established itself as a cent­
ral meeting place to prepare detailed European positions 
that reflected the common needs of all farmers in the 
Community, as a central agency to organize lobbies or 
protests in support of common positions, and as a set of 
eyes and ears in Brussels to inform national farm groups 
of developments and issues.
During the price review COPA works on a variety of 
levels. During the 1970s, COPA had good working rela-
Averyt (1977), p. 75.
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tions with the bureaucrats in DG-VI (both through the 
advisory groups and via direct contacts), which ensured 
that COPA views were well understood and that the anal­
ysis that preceded the price review recognized farmer 
concerns. COPA used these contacts to gather information 
to review market conditions and to recommend an average 
price increase (and individual product increases before 
1976) for the Commission to include in the price pro­
posals. COPA was also given a preview of the Commission 
proposals before they were sent to the Council, which 
allowed it to mobilize its support or opposition to the
proposals. During the consultation phase, COPA completed
its request for price increases in light of the Commis­
sion package and lobbied the Commission, ESC, EP, and 
Council to explain, defend, and promote its position. 
Kirchner estimated that COPA in 1973-78 devoted 35% of 
its effort in the price review to lobby the Commission, 
10% on the ESC, 27% on the EP, and 28% on the Counci I."’"1
COPA's role in the price review changed in the 
1980s. The critical negotiations were often conduc­
ted between bureaucrats from DG-VI and the SCA, and
between the Farm Commissioner and the Council pf Farm
r\dt eitker- forUr^
Ministers; COPA couId.easily influence.I\ \
COPA therefore decided to act as the eyes and ears of the 
national organizations. It now monitors both the Council 
and the SCA and meets regularly with Commission officials 
in order to provide member organizations with information 
to be used in the national capitals.42 When it learns of 
an important meeting, it briefs representatives of the 
national farm organizations, who then make direct rep­
resentations to their national farm ministries. During 
the 1980s, COPA also reduced its contacts with the civil 
servants in DG-VI and concentrated its lobbying efforts 
on the political level in the Commission (especially the
Kirchner (1980), p. 111. 
Philip (1985), p . 56.
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Farm Commissioner and members of his cabinet). The civil 
servants in DG-VI therefore became less certain of the 
farm lobby's specific concerns, which reinforced their 
need to consult with the national representatives in the 
SCA. Also during the early 1980s, the Commission stopped 
giving COPA a preview of its price packages. The combi­
nation of events forced COPA to become more reactive and 
less influential in the price review.
COPA had its two greatest successes before 1973. 
Their biggest achievement, by far, was their defeat of 
Mansholt's proposed structural policy, which was designed 
to rationalize and modernize the European farm industry. 
As a result of their efforts, "the structural aspect of 
the proposals was de-emphasized in favour of attaching 
greater importance to price measures."43 Then, when 
inflation accelerated in 1971 and began to reduce the 
real value of guaranteed prices, the farmers were again 
successful in lobbying the Council to raise prices and 
ultimately convinced the Commission to recognize that 
prices should be used to support farm incomes.
Two important events in 1973 changed the direction 
of farm politics. First, the UK, Denmark, and Ireland 
formally entered the European Community and their res­
pective farmer organizations joined COPA, which widened 
the interests and views of the organization. This, in 
turn, caused COPA in 1973 to provide for qualified major­
ity voting on all decisions by the Presidium; up to that 
point, all decisions had been unanimous. COPA had little 
alternative to this change, but as a result it no longer 
spoke for all farmers when it dealt with the Commission 
or Council; majority positions could be and frequently 
were contested by dissenting COPA members.
• < * 3  . Rosenthal (1975), p. 129.
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When Lardinois introduced the objective method for 
setting the Commission's price proposals in 1973, COPA 
rapidly adopted it. At first it looked to be an ideal 
approach for setting farm prices. The method would allow 
technocrats in DG-VI and COPA jointly to develop the 
price proposals based on objective criteria, which had 
the potential of reducing the role for politicians. The 
Council, in COPA's view, had not been a strong ally of 
the farmers in the early years.
During the 1970s, the objective method dovetailed 
with both the general inflationary psychology and the 
internal politics of COPA. As Averyt noted, when "infla­
tion hit farm markets in the 1970s, agreement seemed to 
become easier: even if a national group desired only 5
percent increase, why not agree with other groups in COPA 
that are pressing for a 10 percent increase." As he 
said, it "was a painless form of agreement."4* The ob­
jective method provided COPA with a convenient mechanism 
to justify its demands for higher prices to support farm 
incomes. At the same time, it created a European focus 
for the farm lobby, which was viewed as necessary to 
solidify the influence of COPA. COPA realized that it 
would become increasingly difficult to retain the old 
consensus style used to set its price requests because 
the concerns of its increased membership had diverged. 
Before the objective method was adopted, COPA relied en­
tirely on reports and comments from its member organiza­
tions to arrive at a set of price proposals. This pro­
cess provided the Commission with a differentiated set of 
price demands: some sectors expressed willingness to
accept be low-average price increases while others demand­
ed above-average rises. The Presidium continued to pre­
pare detailed price requests for the major commodities 
until 1976, but the focus rapidly shifted toward the 
average price rise. COPA feared that without a formula-
Averyt (1977), p p . 93-94.
Price Policy: Debate 193
based price system (i.e., the objective method), farmers 
would fight among themselves. Renationalization was 
judged to be the main threat to the farm movement in the 
Community.“*= The formula therefore appeared to be a 
powerful tool for COPA.
Table 5.6 COPA Price Proposals
Commission COPA Price Position on: Obj ective
Proposals All Products Wheat Method
1968-69 . 0% 5.0% n.a. n.a.
1969-70 . 0% 4-5.0% n.a. n.a.
1970-71 .0% general + n.a. n.a.
1971-72 n.a. 5-10.0% n.a. n.a.
1972-73 A 2-3.0% 11-12.0% n.a. n.a.
1972-73 B 6.5% 11-12.0% n.a. 5.0%
1973-74 2.8% 7.5% n.a. 3.0%
1974-75 A 7.2% 16-17.0% +8.0% 7.2%
1974-75 B 4.0% 8.0% n.a. 4.0%
1975-76 9.2% 17.5% 15 .0% 12.4%
1976-77 7.5% 10.6% n.a. 4.6%
1977-78 3.0% 7.4% — 0.1%
1978-79 2.0% 5.0% — 4.2%
1979-80 .0% 4.0% — n.p.
1980-81 2.5% 7.9% — 7.0%
1981-82 7.8% 15 .3% — n.a.
1982-83 8.4% 16.3% — 9.0%
1983-84 4.2% 7.0% — 7.0%
1984-85 0.8% 3.9% — 3.9%
1985-86 0.3% 4-5.0% — 7.8%
1986-87 .0% 4.7% — 4.7%
1987-88 -0.5% n.a. — n.a.
Notes: —  = not calculated; n.a. = not available; after
1982-83, the objective method numbers were from COPA, not 
the Commission.
Sources: Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 248; Financial Times,
various.
Throughout the 1970s, COPA cooperated with the Com­
mission to develop the objective method system. It work­
ed well for a while, but problems soon developed. Begin­
ning in 1975, the Commission began to manipulate the for­
Averyt (1977), p. 95.
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mula to provide a result that conformed to its precon­
ceived views (see chapter 4). Then, in 1979, the Commis­
sion ceased using the objective method because the form­
ula could not adequately accommodate its new concerns 
about green rate, budgets, and market conditions.
COPA and its member organizations, however, con­
tinued to use the objective method to frame their de­
mands. COPA's membership had become increasingly diverse 
during the 1970s, as the changed financial structures and 
increased incentive of high prices induced farmers to 
specialize and commercialize their operations. Northern 
cereals farmers became highly competitive while southern 
producers of Mediterranean products remained uncompeti­
tive. Then in 1981 Greek farmers joined COPA and in 1986 
Spanish and Portuguese farmers entered. Consequently, 
COPA found it difficult to wean itself from the objective 
method. In 1985, COPA was persuaded by the Northern 
European farm organizations to reject for the first time 
since 1972 the objective method result when setting its 
price demands. The method indicated that prices should 
rise 7.8% but COPA only requested 4-5%. That decision 
was not universally accepted— farm union members in 
Italy, Greece, and Ireland regarded it as a mistakeA<fa—  
and COPA returned to the objective method in 1 9 8 6 . It 
ceased publishing the results in 1987, however, because 
the method indicated that intervention prices should 
fall. The formula could not reflect the significant 
changes being made to the intervention system (via 
changed quality standards, lower monthly increments, re­
duced buying-in rates, and tighter quality standards). 
Henceforward, COPA focused on farmers' revenue situation 
to make case for higher prices.
Financial Times, 8-2-85. 
Financial Times, 11-2-86.
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But problems had been brewing for a number of years. 
The objective method had simply masked the growing dis­
agreement and animosity between and inside the national 
farm organizations. The Commission's frequent consulta­
tions with the SCA increased the opportunity for national 
farm organizations to become directly involved in the 
negotiations, which contributed to the distinctiveness of 
national groups.4S As a result, national differences 
were highlighted and COPA found it increasingly difficult 
to find a common position among farmers.*'* Thus, when 
economic pressures increased in the late 1970s, COPA 
found it was less able to finesse the necessary trade­
offs to be influential. As the Commission and Council 
used the price review to limit growth in production, to 
hold the line on budgetary outlays, and to reduce the 
distortions caused by exchange rates, national farm 
groups began to have sharply different concerns.
The most common argument centred around the opera­
tion of the agri-monetary system. French wheat produc­
ers, in particular, disliked the agri-monetary system 
because it allowed real wheat prices in Germany to remain 
above French prices; French producers wanted Germany to 
be a large, protected market for French produce, not to 
compete with them.250 When inflation was high during the 
mid-1970s, COPA was able to finesse agreement on incre­
mental changes in the green rates proposed by the Commis­
sion because nominal prices did not have to fall in
*13* Averyt (1977), p. 90, reported in 1977 that the Com­
mission consulted directly with national farm organiza­
tions. There is no evidence that the Commission during 
1970-88 ever negotiated directly with any of the national 
farm organizations, except through the advisory commit­
tees. Rather, the Commission consulted with the SCA, 
whose members in turn often talked to their national farm 
organizations. The impact was the same, however, because 
COPA was still cut out of the process.
***- Taylor (1983), p. 46.
=5°* Agra Europe, 606, 24-1-75, noted that Italy and
France openly disagreed with Germany over MCAs at a COPA 
meeting.
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strong currency countries. But in the low inflation 
years beginning in 1980, German farmers faced price cuts 
at the farm-gate whenever the Commission proposed to 
revalue the green DM. COPA was unable to resolve the 
differences. Instead it requested the end of the green 
rate system, temporarily through payment of higher ECU 
prices (or supplemented with direct compensation for 
German farmers) and permanently through Economic and 
Monetary Union.
The issue of price cuts also divided the European 
farm community. With the largest 25% of farmers re­
ceiving about 75% of CAP support, the impact of price 
cuts would be distributed unevenly.®1 Buckwell estimated 
that a 5% real price reduction in 1980 would cut absolute 
incomes on large farms by as much as eight times the 
amount for small farms (table 5.7). Thus owners and 
operators of large farms, who are disproportionately rep­
resented in the cereals sector and in the national member 
organizations of COPA, have a strong incentive to fight 
against such a move. But when the cuts per worker are 
compared to income per worker, the losses for smaller 
farms in Germany represent a larger share (about 30%) 
than for the larger farms (about 20%). In France and the 
UK, both the smaller and larger farms would suffer in 
equal proportions. In all three countries, however, the 
absolute income per farm worker is significantly lower 
for small rather than large farms, so that even propor­
tionate cuts would tend to hurt small producers more 
(i.e., it is easier for a high income farmer to cut his 
cost of living than it is for a low income farmer). Con­
sequently, farm unions with more small farmers (e.g., the 
DBV in Germany), tend to be the most set against direct 
price cuts.
Stoecke1 (1985), p.15.
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Table 5.7 Effect of a 5% fall in real farm prices on 
farm worker incomes by country and farm size 
category (EUA/annual work unit)
Farm Size small





















ESU (European Size Unit) is a measure of farm size. 
Source: Buckwell, et al. (1982), p. 158.
Although COPA continued to want prices to support 
incomes, it accepted that something had to be done to 
align production with demand. It rejected in 1981 the 
Commission's proposal to align EC prices with world or US 
prices but grudgingly accepted the guarantee threshold 
system in 1982. When price cuts proved impossible in 
1985, COPA sided with its German members and accepted co­
responsibility as the "least worst" alternative, provided 
it was matched with tighter Community Preference, limits 
on cereal substitutes, and an active export policy (want­
ed by French farmers). Income aids would be accepted 
only if directed to farmers in marginal areas, elderly 
smallholders, or for young beginning farmers.552
The co-responsibility system, because it affects the 
national farm industries differently, also led to con­
flicts. In particular, it exacerbated the already diffi—
=2- Caspari (1983), p p . 47-48.
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cult relations with the National Farmers' Union of Eng­
land and Wales, which had probably always been the least 
'communautaire' of the member farm associations. As 
early as 1978 the NFU had differed with COPA and accepted 
that prices should be used to regulate the market and 
that surplus products should receive lower prices. In 
1980, the NFU also considered but rejected a motion at 
its annual meeting calling for the UK to withdraw from 
the CAP and to implement national measures.5=3 Then in 
1984, the NFU issued a position paper (The Way Forward) 
that explicitly accepted that surplus production must be 
cut. With the introduction of co-responsibility, the NFU 
found itself strongly at odds with the other COPA mem­
bers, because UK farmers paid significantly more than 
their continental colleagues (see table 6.3).
One consequence of the renationalization of COPA is 
that it has had great difficulty mobilizing farmers to 
support their lobbying efforts. Its ability to organize 
and plan mass protests across the Community peaked in 
1974, when it successfully pressed the Commission and 
Council for an increase in addition to the price rise 
already approved by the Council. There was no provision 
in the Community process to provide interim price in­
creases but COPA used the objective method to demonstrate 
that farmers should receive at least an additional 4% 
price rise. It then organized a series of protests. 
They started in France in early July, spread throughout 
France, Germany, and rtke.  ^. in August, and culminated 
when more than one million farmers protested across the 
Community on September 17. Their efforts secured a new 
proposal from the Commission and ultimately higher prices 
from the Council.
Since then, farm protests in Europe have either been 
small or limited to specific commodity groups or regions.
The Times, 13-2-80.
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Table 5. 8 Farmer Protests in Europe (1971—88)
Date Number Regional/Sectoral Interests
Mar. 71 100,000 All regions & sectors
Feb. 74 80,000 Fr. 4-day rally at EP focus on price 
review
July 74 30,000 German price protest in Munich
July 74 na French riots in Provence
Aug. 74 na French & German farmers block roads
Sep. 74 1,000,000 COPA protests in all countries
Mar. 75 na Wine war between France & Italy
Feb. 76 100,000 FNSEA rally for higher prices
Mar. 76 na Wine fight; French vs. Italian
1977--78 — No significant protests
Apr. 79 6-8,000 French protest in Midi region
1979--80 na Lamb war between UK & France; French 
producers destroy UK lamb shipments
Mar . 80 na Farmers protest at EP in Strasbourg
Apr. 80 100 London rally of Non-UK dairy farmers
Apr. 80 1,000 French farmers burn Mrs. Thatcher in 
effigy in Boulogne & Strasbourg
Mar. 81 2,000 B. & Fr. 3-day protest in Brussels
Dec. 81 3,000 French protest in Strasbourg
Mar. 82 na French wine producers demolish wine 
storage centre in S. France
Mar. 82 100,000 FNSEA peaceful farm rally in Paris
Apr. 83 2,000 Italian farmers protest
Apr. 83 na French pig farmers riot
Nov. 83 10,000 Italian farmers protest CAP reform; 
want focus on Med. products
Mar. 84 16,000 Protests in Bavaria and Dortmund, W. 
Germany over price cuts
Mar. 84 na French anti-UK nation-wide protest
May 84 35,000 French milk producers protest at 
Loire Council meeting
Mar. 85 na Widespread protests in EC
May 85 3-10,000 Protest outside Council meeting
Apr. 86 50,000+ FRG protest for state aid & against 
CAP
Mar. 87 10,000 Small FRG farmers protest against 
large producers
Apr. 87 20,000 FRG protest at Bonn Commission 
meeting
May 87 15,000 Protest in Brussels vs. price cuts
Sources: Financial Times, The Daily Telegraph, The
Times. and Le Monde.
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Table 5.8 shows that in many cases the protests in one 
country have been targeted against the interests of farm­
ers in another part of the Community. Open battles raged 
at times between competing producers in different count­
ries (e.g., Italian and French wine producers in 1975-82 
and French and UK sheepmeat producers in 1979-80), be­
tween producers of cereals and livestock (e.g., at the 
1983 NFU meeting5**), and between large and small pro­
ducers (e.g., in Germany in 1987). COPA has not been 
able to solve the problem of diverging and conflicting 
demands from its member farmers.
In summary, COPA has been effectively neutralized in 
much of the farm debate. As issues became more complex 
after 1975, the Commission consulted and negotiated more 
with the SCA, which forced more of the lobbying effort 
back onto the national farm organizations. COPA was un­
able to hold together the European coalition of farm 
interests because the changed production and financial 
structures caused the interests of its members to di­
verge. It also lost the ability to mobilize farmers to 
protest for a Community position. As it tried to com­
pensate for its lost power, it developed more as an 
intelligence gatherer and educator, which was valuable
a rLt. \ro le.
but significantly d i f f e r e n t e n v i s a g e d  in 1958. COPA 
therefore was pushed to the periphery of the policy de­
bate in the 1980s.
Industry
The original bargain struck between Germany and its 
industrialists and France and its farmers has for the 
most part held firm. The industrial lobbies in Europe 
have not commented widely on any of the price-fixing 
packages produced by the Commission. The Union of In­
dustries in the EC (UNICE) has generally been vocal only 
when the Commission or Council examines reform of the
Financial Times, 9-2-83.
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CAP. Then in 1981, the agro-food committee of UNICE be­
came independent as the Confederation des Industries 
Agro-Elementaires de la CEE (CIAA) and henceforward rep­
resented 13,000 firms which employ about 2.2 M workers in 
the food and drink industries in Europe. By then the 
changed security and production structures had increased 
the pressure for reform and the new industry lobby began 
working with the Commission to reform the CAP and, more 
recently, to implement the Single Market policy by 1992. 
But by 1988 this had not had any major impact on the CAP. 
For the most part, the industry lobby has been "compara­
tively ineffective" because it represented too many 
diverse and conflicting members to be able to develop 
effective bargains with the key agricultural policy­
making bodies.55®
Industry is formally connected in the farm policy 
area with only with the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Commission. In the ESC, where one-third of the mem­
bers are nominated to represent industry, the lobby works 
through the agriculture and budget sections and in the 
Plenary session to counterbalance the farm lobby. The 
result, outlined above, is that the ESC has accepted that 
reform is inevitable. Industry also has contacts with 
DG-III and the Commissioner for Industry, neither of 
which has good access to the agricultural forum. Conse­
quently, when industrialists present their views on farm 
issues, they are almost always ignored.
ha5
The industrial sector, been unable to develop any 
effective bargains in the farm policy community primarily 
because it does not have any well defined interest in 
farm matters. The CIAA suffers because its membership 
ranges from producers of animal feeds to confectionery 
firms. Its membership therefore is significantly more 
fragmented than any individual farm group or even COPA.
==- Caspari (1983), p. 48-49.
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The rest of industry is even less united in its 
views on the CAP. There is often a symbiotic relation­
ship between farmers and rural industry. For example, 
more than half of Germany's wheat farmers have other 
gainful employment and therefore have significant public 
sympathy in their quest for supportive public policies. 
Rural industries depend on these people to work in their 
enterprises. Especially in industries where variable em­
ployment is the norm, employers have come to depend on 
their workers having the farm to fall back on.
Industries which process farm produce or provide in­
puts to the farm sector also do not have a clearly de­
fined interest in the debate. Generally, the economics 
of farming ensures that most if not all sales to and
purchases from the farm sector would continue under any
of the options proposed by the European Commission. 
Price cuts and set-asides would tend to hurt larger pro­
ducers more and are therefore least popular. But most 
analysts in the industrial sector acknowledge that the 
highly indebted, commercially-oriented farms which pur­
chase most of the inputs and sell proportionately more 
into commercial channels would likely react to all other 
policy changes by increasing production and by farming 
more intensively. Just after the Commission's stabilizer 
package was accepted by Council in February 1988, one 
Suffolk farmer cautioned that: "The only way most people
will respond to a 3 per cent price-cut is to produce 
more."S6 He reasoned that producers plant cereals as a 
break-crop between potatoes and sugar beet, both of which 
are on quota, and they do not have the machinery to shift 
into rapeseed production. As a result, the industrial 
sector is in a win-win situation.
At the same time, farm co-operatives control a sig­
nificant portion of the agri-food industry. In France,
Financial Times, 26-2-88.
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for example, farmer-owned co-ops controlled 77% of the
cereals storage capacity in 1977, owned and operated 30%
of the combine harvesters in 1979 and provided 70% of the
agricultural credit. With much of the up-stream and 
down-stream activity related to farming largely owned by 
farmers, the industrial lobby’s opinions on farm policy 
are often muted.
Large and influential parts of the wholesale and 
distribution system also have strong reasons to want to 
maintain parts of the system. The agri-monetary system, 
for example, introduces arbitrary and speculative ele­
ments into intra-Community trade which the larger com­
panies frequently exploit profitably. MCAs are often too 
high or too low relative to underlying currencies and 
"the complexity and seeming arbitrariness of the system 
impose[s] such significant costs on manufacturers and 
traders attempting to operate the system that they act as 
a barrier to smaller or traditionally-minded concerns, 
preventing them from engaging in intra- or extra-Com- 
munity trade."”7 Jos ling and Harris observed that "in 
1973 the MCA system was so complex that UK importers 
ceased buying French grain for several months as the
risks involved were felt to be too great."”® Conse­
quently, small actors are pushed out and the market is 
controlled by large multinational corporations which can 
afford the risks.”*9 Some entrepreneurs also benefit 
handsomely from over-production and its concomitant pro­
blems. Cottrell points out that some of the new agri­
millionaires in Europe are those who handle the surplus
production. He noted that one Scottish company in the
mid-1980s made £0.5 M in one year by storing barley.
That was only one of many, as between 1981 and 1986 about 
240 intervention stores operated by private owners were
”7- Josling & Harris (1976), p. 67.
”e- Josling & Harris (1976), p. 70.
”*9- Debatisse (1981), p. 2.
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created in the UK.4*0 Disposal of the mountains of grain 
and butter and lakes of wine and milk also creates 
profitable opportunities for private traders as the surp­
luses are sold and transported to other markets.
Consequently, although the industrial lobby in the 
EC generally agrees that the CAP should be re-oriented to 
the market, it seldom speaks with an authoritative voice 
during the critical stages of the wheat price review.61 
In 1979 the Food and Drink Industries Council encouraged 
the Community to implement a five-year freeze on cereals 
prices, but was ignored by the entire farm policy commun­
ity. After that the lobby refined its position, but 
still had little success.
During the 1980s, the European industrial lobbies 
recommended that the Commission should use production 
forecasts to set prices, that price guarantees and inter­
vention buying should be limited, and that trade policy 
should be adjusted to the needs of processors. In 
particular, they sought assistance for value-added ex­
ports and more opportunity to import commodities needed 
by processors but not adequately produced in the Commun­
ity (e.g., hard bread wheat, durum, and long-grain rice). 
In short, the CIAA wanted the demand side of the market 
to drive Community policy.6*2 But this package masked 
major disagreements about the means of achieving the 
changes. There was no widespread agreement about how 
price discipline should be implemented or about how the 
difficult problem of cereal substitute imports can be 
resolved.
At times, the industrial lobby has certainly helped 
focus the farm debate on some of the costs of the exist-
6*°- Cottrell (1987), p. 66.
6>1- National Consumers Council (1988), p. 100.
6>2* Caspari (1983), p. 49.
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ing system and towards some savings. But most years it 
has failed to have any impact because it has neither a 
well defined objective nor has it developed any signifi­
cant bargains with any of the policy actors in the Euro­
pean farm system.
Consumers and the CAP
Analysis of food politics cannot be limited to the 
producer side. Consumers have a major interest in price, 
volume, and quality of produce. Since 1973 consumers 
have earned a minor place in the price review by develop­
ing contacts across the Community and using them to push 
for the CAP to be transformed into a comprehensive food 
policy. Although the consumer lobby has developed a 
coherent and articulate program of reform, it has been 
largely ineffective because it does not have access to 
the critical policy forums.
Although consumers are mentioned in the Article 
39.1(e) of the Treaty of Rome, they have never fully par­
ticipated in the price review. Before 1973 they were 
shut out completely as proposals were prepared by func- 
tionaires in DG-VI assisted by COPA members, vetted by 
agriculture committees dominated by farmers in the ESC 
and EP, debated by farmers through COPA, and set by farm 
ministers in the Agricultural Council. Since then the 
consumer lobby has expanded considerably its level of 
contact and access. In 1973 the Commission helped the 
Community consumer associations open the Bureau Europ^en 
des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) office in Brussels 
(it had existed since 1962 without a formal office) and 
assisted the BEUC to work with other consumer and co-op­
erative organizations through the Consumers' Consultative 
Committee. The consumer lobby really got launched in 
1975 when the Commission developed a consumer program.<£,:3 
Since then the BEUC has created close links with DG XI
BEUC (1985), p. 4.
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(environment, consumer protection, and nuclear safety), 
gained a seat on various agricultural advisory commit­
tees, developed contacts with the consumer representa­
tives in the ESC (10 in 1986, up from 3 in 1970) and with 
the consumer committee in the EP, and gained limited 
access to the Agricultural Council both directly and 
through the national consumer organizations. The con­
sumer associations in the EC remain relatively powerless, 
however, because they are excluded from the decision­
making process: farm policy decisions are still made
almost exclusively by functionaires and ministers of 
agriculture. The UK is the only member state where the 
minister for agriculture also has responsibility for food 
policy.
In addition to poor level of contact, consumer 
associations suffer from a lack of public support within 
the Community. The strongest consumer groups in 1979 
were located in the UK (750,000 members), the Netherlands 
(460,000 members), Belgium (395,000 members) and Germany 
(where the consumer association (AGV) has about eight 
million indirect members). In contrast, the two French 
consumer associations combined had only 48,000 members 
and countries such as Ireland and Denmark had less than 
2,000 members each in their organizations.
The weakness of the consumer lobby is often a mirror 
reflection of public opinion on the CAP. Only about 22% 
of the general public surveyed in 1987 thought the CAP 
was too expensive. In the three largest countries, about 
half of the general population thought that either too 
little or about the right amount of money was spent on 
farming.**4 When asked if the CAP was worthwhile, about 
half of all respondents in France, Germany, and the UK 
agreed. The general acquiescence among consumers is at 
least partly the result of steady increases in labour
Eurobarometre, 27, Table A.40.
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incomes throughout the 1970s and 1980s and the declining 
portion of disposable incomes needed to purchase food. 
By 1986, the average European consumer spent only about 
17.5% of his income on foodstuffs and another 4.6% on 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Ger­
man consumers spent only 12.7% of their incomes on food 
while the French spent 16.8% and those in the UK spent 
1 3 . 6 % . In addition, the commercialization of the farm 
sector dampened the price elasticity of supply, so that 
increases in the guaranteed prices have only a marginal 
impact on consumer outlays. The Commission estimated 
that in 1977 a 10% guaranteed price increase should only 
cause retail prices to rise by about 1%.AA
Table 5.9 Public Opinion on the CAP (1988)
Q: All things considered, does the EC spend too much
money on agriculture, not enough or about right?
Too Muchi About Right Not Enough No Opinion
France 26% 30% 19% 25%
Germany 36% 32% 16% 16%
UK 26% 33% 18% 23%
EC 12 22% 26% 27% 25%
Q: Although there is a lot to criticize and to put right
in the EC CAP, on balance it is worthwhile.
Agree Disagree No opinion
France 50% 17% 33%
Germany 48% 22% 30%
UK 48% 22% 30%
EC 12 46% 18% 36%
Source: Eurobarometre Special 




The consumer lobby has partly compensated for its 
lack of contact and support by developing a coherent 
critique of the CAP and repeating it in every possible
ASC 1988. p. T/161. 
ASC 1977. p. 102.
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forum. The BEUC priority since 1977 has been to reform 
the CAP so that consumer interests are considered equally 
with producer interests. Although the consumer lobby 
agrees food security is essential, it believes that it 
has already been obtained. Now it wants to prevent 
permanent surpluses by separating income support from 
price policy. Since 1973 the BEUC has presented annual 
opinions expounding price restraint for all commodities 
and price freezes or cuts for surplus products. Only in 
1982, when farm incomes were down sharply, did the organ­
ization allow that a price increase would be acceptable.
BEUC has not been overly concerned with the cereals 
sector, however, because the relationship between the 
producer support for cereals and the retail price for 
processed cereal products (e.g., flour and bread) is 
relatively small. Instead, it has attacked the market 
regimes for milk and sugar, particularly in 1983 and 
1984, because the producer price is a large proportion of 
the retail price.
During the 1980s, the BEUC recognized the consumers' 
diminishing concern for prices and consequently shifted 
its strategy. Medical research into the links between 
nutrition and disease (esp. cancer and heart ailments) 
has shown that poor diets and the way many foods are pro­
duced contribute to illness. Wealthier consumers, in 
particular, have become health and quality conscious and 
increasingly demand organically-grown produce and exotic 
vegetables and fruit. The BEUC consequently changed its 
primary focus from prices toward the examination of CAP 
structures and regimes to ensure that they provide the
necessary incentives for farmers to adopt alternative
crops or production methods.
After 1986, BEUC also concentrated more on the glo­
bal issues of farm policy. In October 1986, the Council
of Ministers resolved that consumer policy should be
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integrated with other EC policies and agreed that con­
sumer impact statements should be attached to Commission 
proposals which affect price, choice, or quality.*7 
Although the resolution did not directly include farm 
policies, BEUC took the opportunity to expand its anal­
ysis and criticism of the CAP price system. After the 
Council resolution, it produced a series of detailed 
critiques of the CAP and proposed radical changes to the 
policy. In 1987, it examined food surpluses in the Com­
munity in the run-up to the debate over the Commission's 
stabilizers package. Its "consumers and taxpayers 8- 
point plan for reform of the CAP" recommended the Commun­
ity realign EC prices with world prices by 1992 and dras­
tically reduce intervention support, abolish export 
refunds, and cease destruction of food surpluses. BEUC 
proposed that co-responsibility levies and quotas (in­
cluding on imports of cereal substitutes) should be 
phased out as prices approach world levels. It also 
suggested that the Community should develop a comprehen­
sive system of direct income payments to producers, with 
at least 20% of the CAP budget used for that purpose.*®
The BEUC sought in the late 1980s a more certain 
role in the farm policy reviews, both through greater 
representation on the advisory committees (and consumer 
representation on the product management committees) and 
through formal acceptance of consumer impact statements 
into the process. By 1989, however, they had not suc­
ceeded with either goal. To compensate, BEUC attempted 
to build coalitions with other directorates and lobby 
groups in an effort to direct farm policy from the out­
side. Domestically, BEUC occasionally worked with the 
EEB in an effort to build a common position on the en­
vironment while at other times it attempted to attract 
support from the non-farm rural sector with proposals for
BEUC (1987), p. 3.
BEUC (1987), p p . 39-40.
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the Community to develop a comprehensive rural policy. 
Meanwhile, BEUC made detailed comments on farm policy and 
the GATT, in an effort to influence the EC negotiating 
position, and thereby set limits to the future develop­
ment of the CAP. In particular, BEUC recommended that 
the Community should work through the GATT to get inter­
national agreement to reduce farm support by 5% in both 
1990 and 1991. Furthermore, BEUC supported the US 
tariffication p r o p o s a l , k n o w i n g  that if the EC binds 
its variable levy and agrees to reduce export subsidies, 
the Community would be forced to completely revise the 
farm support system in the EC.
Nevertheless, in 1989 consumer influence remained 
limited by lack of access to the farm policy community, 
uneven membership, and general public acceptance of the 
CAP. With its shift in emphasis from prices to CAP pro­
grams, however, it had defied the odds and remained rele­
vant in farm policy debates.
The Environment and the EEB
As the farm sector has become more commercially 
oriented, Europeans have come to resent the sometimes 
unpleasant environmental impact of intensive farm prac­
tices. The increasing wealth and prosperity in Europe 
has provided the conditions for the environmental move­
ment to grow and prosper while the new information trans­
mitted from research and environmental establishments has 
created pressures for change. The European Environmental 
Bureau was founded at the end of 1974 to press for sound 
environmental policies and since has worked to develop 
and expand its access to the policy process. But, like 
the BEUC, the EEB lacks effective and direct access to 
farm policy forums and has had to expend much of its 
energies to adapt to the constantly changing public mood 
to remain a viable, if peripheral, actor.
^  BEUC (19891}.
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Since 1974, the EEB has developed a working rela­
tionship with the Commission through DG-XI and its Com­
missioner and built links with the environmentally con­
cerned members in the ESC and the EP. Unlike the BEUC, 
however, the EEB does not have direct access to the 
Council or to a large body of supporters that can apply 
pressure to the national ministers. The environmental 
movement in Europe tends to be highly fragmented, with 
many single interest or umbrella organizations in each 
member state. For example, the EEB had 39 member 
organizations spread across nine countries in 1980, up 
from only 24 in 1974. In contrast, there were then only 
22 (now 30) main farm organizations and 11 (now 17) 
national consumer lobbies.
Since its inception, the EEB has targeted agricul­
ture.'70 It has consistently argued that the CAP must 
encourage environmentally-sound extensified farm prac­
tices, which would include preservation of hedgerows and 
wild terrain, reduced use of fertilizers and pesticides, 
scaled-down livestock operations, regulation of laying 
batteries, and conservation of energy. The environmental 
brief gained ground after 1980 as the EEB worked with the 
ESC and through the Rainbow Group of 20 MEPs in the E P . 
Together they worked to develop specific proposals that 
were both environmentally sound and helped to reduce pro­
duction. By 1988, however, the agricultural community 
had only agreed to examine some of those options. As 
with the CIAA and BEUC, the EEB has been unable to sus­
tain its positions because it has failed to crack the 
agricultural policy ‘cartel.’
CONCLUSIONS
Shifting power structures have radically altered the 
policy debate in European agriculture since 1973. As the 
production, finance, and knowledge structures created
ESC (1980), p. 437.
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greater diversity in the farm and non-farm economies, the 
policy agenda expanded to include issues that pitted 
farmers against farmers and overlapped with non-farming 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the Committee of Profes­
sional Agricultural Organizations lost internal cohesion, 
which contributed to the erosion of its privileged posi­
tion in the policy system. The process accelerated when 
the Commission opened the process to new actors— includ­
ing consumers, environmentalists, and budget experts— and 
the ESC and EP debates shifted their focus away from the 
absolute price level, on which farmers generally spoke 
with a common voice, toward issues where farmers dis­
agreed among themselves (e.g., green rates and quotas).
Other eurogroups, however, have not filled the gap 
left by the weakened COPA. They have been unable to 
develop bargains with the key centres of power in the 
agricultural policy system— DG-VI and the Agricultural 
Council. Instead, the profusion of opinions at the Euro­
pean level has left DG-VI and the Agricultural Council 
with a greater opportunity to listen to national farm 
organizations and to act on their own concerns. Conse­
quently, eurogroups have increasingly become simply 
forums for exchange of information and agencies to help 
national groups to define common positions to follow in 
relations with national governments or national repre­
sentatives in Brussels.
Chapter 6
PRICE POLICY: NATIONAL INTERESTS
Margaret Thatcher asserted in 1981 that in the 
Council "there is no such thing as a separate Community 
interest; the Community interest is compounded of the 
national interests of the ten member states."1 These 
national interests are determined almost wholly within 
the national policy frameworks as competing public and 
private interests use the system to get their preferred 
outcome. The national interest is not synonymous with 
the public interest. In the wheat case, the national 
interest reflects those sets of private and public in­
terests that are promoted by the explicit and implicit 
bargains that underlie the system. The public interest, 
in contrast, is the Pareto potential35 that economists 
long for.3
After 1958, the national interests in Council re­
flected the private interests of farmers, as they had a 
virtual monopoly of the policy system. But after 1973, 
the shifting power structures altered the fundamental 
bargains that determined the national interests of 
France, Germany, and the UK in the Council, so that by 
the 1980s national interests seldom fully mirrored farm 
interests. These new national interests in many ways.
1- The Times. 3-2-81.
The New Palgrave, V.3 says a Pareto optimal outcome 
is "if there exist[s] no other productively feasible 
allocation which ma[kes] all individuals in the economy 
at least as well-off, and at least one strictly better 
off, than they were initially."
3- Frankel (1970), p. 39, argues that "foreign policy is 
generally conceived as being based upon the concept of 
'national interest' which is deemed to represent the 
whole society and not to be a mere compromise between 
partial interests." But his concept of foreign policy 
revolves around national security and defence, which are 
both pure public goods. Commodity trade is not a public 
good and therefore the national interest in this area 




however, present stronger pressures for reform of the CAP 
than the public Interest of the Community.
KEY BARGAINS IN THE SYSTEM
The effective bargains which influence the national 
interest in each country depend initially on the balance 
of five institutional and economic factors: the strength
of the national farm and consumer organizations; the 
relative benefits and costs of farm policy options; the 
public interest; the electoral system; and the style of 
government.
Strength of National Farm and Consumer Organizations
Mancur Olson argues that, unless a group is small or 
there is coercion, "rational, self-interested individuals 
will not act to achieve their common or group inter­
ests."4 Individuals quickly determine that their action 
alone has virtually no effect on the provision of public 
goods and they therefore act as free-riders in the sys­
tem. In the case of wheat, all farmers would like higher 
prices, but the action of any single farmer would have no 
measurable impact on the policy outcome; so rational
farmers would withhold active support from any lobby 
effort. Olson hypothesized that "large organizations 
that are not able to make membership compulsory must also 
provide some noncollective goods in order to give poten­
tial members an incentive to join."5* The large farm 
organizations in France, Germany, and the UK have to
varying degrees done just that, offering technical ad­
vice, financial, market, and production services, and 
opportunity for personal political advancement. Farm 
organizations need an active membership as well as large
numbers of members. The German farm lobby is probably
the strongest because the DBV membership, which repre­
sents 90% of all farmers, is active. In contrast, al-
4- Olson (1965), p. 2.
H- Olson (1965), p. 16.
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though the NFU of England and Wales represents more than 
three quarters of the farm population, its membership is 
both numerically small and relatively inactive. France 
represents a middle case: the FNSEA membership is highly
active, which makes up for the fact that it represents 
only about 44%-65% of French farmers.*
Relative Benefits and Costs
The impact of policy options on individual pro­
ducers, consumers, and taxpayers determines the passions 
that arise when change is mooted. Table 6.1 shows that 
at the economy-wide level, consumers and taxpayers in 
France, Germany, and the UK are paying an increasingly 
large cost to support farms in those countries. In per- 
capita terms, consumers pay about 200 ECU in France and 
the UK and 280 ECU in Germany. But, because UK families 
have significantly lower disposable incomes, they pay 
relatively more than in France and about the same as 
Germany. In contrast, payments per farm holding in 1984 
averaged 10,300 ECU in France, 15,400 ECU in Germany and 
23,200 ECU in the UK. Farm operators therefore can be 
expected to fight harder to defend the CAP than the 
average consumer can be expected to fight for reform. 
Zietz and Valdds say that "rational complacency" dictates 
that consumers are less likely to prevail than producers 
because changing the system is significantly more diffi­
cult than it is worth.-7
The studies in Table 6.1 estimated the impact of all 
the measures covered by the CAP. But the individual 
mechanisms also have differential impacts, as illustrated 
in Table 6.2. Veer demonstrated for 1983 that farmers in 
Germany would suffer a larger cut in farm income due to a 
20% price cut than would farmers in France or the UK. An 
earlier study by Buckwell, et al. (Table 5.7) also showed
**- Keeler (1987) , p. 265.
Zietz & Valdes (1988), p. 20.
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Table 6.1 Estimates of the Inter-Sectoral Transfers Caused by the CAP (B ECU)
Ref. Author & Study coverage as in Base Consuner Producer Taxpayer
Year Date of Study Table 1.1 Prices* Loss Gain Loss
1976 Bale & Lutz France C 2 . 0 2 . 2 -0 . 6
(1981) Geraany C 3.1 2 . 0 0.4
United Kingdom C 0.9 0.4 0.4
1978 Norris: IFS France C 4.8 5.5 1 . 1
(1980) Geraany C 6.9 6 . 1 1 . 8
United Kingdoa C 2.7 1.7 1 . 1
1980 Bucknell, et al. France C 5.4 5.2 2 . 0
(1982) Geraany C 9.0 6.5 2.7
United Kingdoa C 3.7 2.5 1.4
1984 Harvey fc Thompson France C 8 . 2 10.9 3.0
(1985) Geraany C 1 1 . 8 11.4 5.5
United Kingdom C 7.8 6 . 0 3.8
*  e  - c,vj r ^ r erst ^e.o.r'
Sources: Halters (1987), p. 23; Buckwell, et al. (1982), pp. 49, 121, 124 It 130;; National
Consumer Council (1988), p. 255.
that price cuts caused larger farm income losses in Ger­
many than in France or the UK. His study demonstrated 
that a 5% cut in real prices would have reduced German 
farm incomes by an average 540 EUA or about 10% of their 
1980 net income. In contrast, the same price cut would 
have reduced average incomes in France by about 450 EUA 
(6.5% of net income) and in the UK by 510 EUA (only about 
6% of net income). Meanwhile, the agri-monetary system 
affected farmers even more widely. Veer estimates that 
French farmers would have increased their incomes by 5% 
if the agri-monetary system had ended in 1983, while 
German farmers would have suffered a 15% cut in income. 
As the pound was stronger at that time, UK farmers would 
have faced an 11% fall in their incomes; if the pound had 
been weak, UK farmers would have gained.
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Table 6.2 Impact on Farm Incomes of a 20% Price Cut and 
Termination of the Agri-monetary System 
(Based on MCAs existing in 1983)











Source: J. de Veer "National Effects of CAP Trade Lib­
eralization," in Tarditi, et al. (1989), p. 107.
Because price cuts would hurt German farmers rela­
tively more than French or UK farmers, Germany has 
generally tried to avoid direct price cuts and instead 
preferred to make changes to the related mechanisms. 
When Germany was forced to veto the 1985 price package, 
it decided it would have to seek some way to protect its 
farmers from the inevitable realignment of prices. The 
co-responsibility system was the answer. It distributes 
the cost of price cuts differently because the levy is 
applied solely on cereals marketed or sold into interven­
tion (i.e. not on cereals consumed on farm) while small 
farmers receive cash grants equivalent to the levy on the 
first 25t of cereals marketed. Consequently, farmers 
planting less than approximately 5 hectares (5ha x 5t/ha 
= 25t) or feeding a large portion of their cereals to 
their own animals would be virtually exempt from the 
levy. Table 6.3 shows that because of those specific 
rules, only about 23% of German farm holdings (mostly 
large) had to pay the cereals levy (more than 30% of 
farmers cultivate less than 5 ha and almost one-third of
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wheat produced Is fed on farms). In contrast, more than 
50% of French holdings and about three-quarters of UK 
holdings had to pay. Germany therefore preferred co­
responsibility and stabilizer levies.
Table 6.3 Application of 
(1985)
the Co-Responsibility Levy
France Germany UK EC8
Production (Mt) 54.3 25 .3 22.3 113.9
Subject to levy (Mt) 29.7 4.6 16.8 55 .8
Production subject
to levy (%) 55% 18% 76% 48%
Holdings subject
to levy (%) 51% 23% 73% 41%
Note Items (EC10) :
Avg. cereals ha/farm 13.9 8.6 42.3 8.3
% wheat fed on farm 12% 31% 5% 13%
Source: House of Lords (1986) , P . 31 .
The Public Interest
The public interest can be viewed as the Pareto
optimal set of measures for each country. In the farm
case, this usually entails evaluating the costs and bene-
fits of the CAP and summing up the gains and losses for
each nation. It is assumed to be in the public interest
of a nation to maximize its total economic we If are. This
approach, adopted by empirical economists, assumes that a
dollar (pound, DM, or franc) lost is worth a do 11ar gain-
ed, regardless of who wins or loses. The studies cited
in Table 6.4 demonstrate that it is in the public inter­
est for France, Germany, and the UK to end the CAP price
system. On a national basis the costs of the CAP are
levied more heavily on the UK and Germany than on France. 
The UK gets a small share of the producer benefits be­
cause it has a small farm sector so, after the consumer 
and taxpayer losses are deducted, its net deadweight
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losses are large. Germany also has a large deadweight 
loss because its taxpayers pay a large share of the EC 
budget. France, in contrast, suffers a smaller dead­
weight loss because its producers get a large portion of 
the producer benefits. The four studies also suggest 
that the deadweight losses have risen for each of the 
countries in the 1980s compared with the 1970s.
Table 6.4 Estimated Cost of Agricultural Support in France, Gernany, and the IK (B ECU)
Ref. Study Author fc Study coverage as Base for Deadweight Loss as I
Year Date of Study in Table 1.1 Prices Loss of GDP
1976 Bale & Lutz France C 0.5 0.16X
(1981) Germany C 0.7 0.191
United Kingdom C 0 . 1 0.04X
1978 Morris: IFS France C 0.4 0 .1 2 X
(1980) Germany C 2 . 6 0.35X
United Kingdom 0 2 . 1 0.81%
1980 Bucknell et al France C 2 . 2 0.46%
(1982) Germany C 5.2 0.89%
United Kingdom C 2.7 0.69%
1984 Haryey & Thompson France C 0.3 0.05%
(1985) Germany C 5.9 0.75X
United Kingdom C 5.6 0.95%
Sources: fts for Table 6.1.
In 1980, Harvey estimated (Table 6.5) that the econ­
omic efficiency of the CAP was less in Germany and the UK 
than either in the Community as a whole or in France. On 
average, less than half the money given up by consumers 
and taxpayers in the UK was actually going to the farm 
sector. The rest was being dissipated through ineffi­
cient production and consumption. The policy was little 
better in Germany. In contrast, France found that more 
than 70% of its effort reached its target. More distur­
bing to policy makers, however, was that incremental
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price increases were an increasingly poor means of sup­
porting farm incomes. Harvey estimated that the UK would 
have to give up more than £2.25 for each £1 that would be 
added to farm incomes. Germany and France also showed 
poor efficiency ratings for incremental price rises. 
Consequently, as prices continued to rise during the 
early 1980s, the absolute deadweight losses rose (see 
Tables 1.1 and 6.4).
Table 6.5 The Economic Efficiency of the CAP (1980)
Eff iciency Percent
Ratio Eff icient




Efficiency of 10% France 1.61 62.1%
Price Increase: Germany 2.20 45.5%
UK 2.25 44.4%
EC 9 1.79 55.9%
The cost-benefit ratio shows the ECUs taxpayers and con­
sumers surrender to increase farm incomes by an addition­
al ECU; conversely % reaching farmers shows the propor­
tion of money foregone which increases farm incomes. 
Source: Harvey (1982), p p . 177-78.
Of course, the operation of the CAP results in 
financial flows between the member states. Although the 
flows net to zero for the Community as a whole, flows 
into or out of individual countries represent significant 
gains or losses for member states. Koester estimated 
that France, in particular, gained about 9.2 M UA for 
each one percentage point increase in common wheat prices 
in 1975, which certainly provided justification for 
France pushing for higher common prices during the 1970s. 
In contrast, the UK was against price rises because every 
percentage point increase worsened the already critical 
balance of payments deficit by about 4.7 M UA. The
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German economy lost only about 1.2 M UA from each price 
increase.® Higher prices after 1975 enlarged the inter­
state transfers, eventually forcing a change in the 
budgetary rules. By 1985 the UK and Germany endured 
annual outflows that averaged about £1.8 B while France 
gained about £300 M annually. After Council agreed to 
give the UK a rebate, the annual net UK financial loss 
from the CAP fell to about £500 while France began to 
experience financial outflows.
Table 6.6 Sui«ary of Estieates of the Inter-State Transfers Resulting fro* the EC Coteon 












"(1977) 1(1978) $(1979) (1979) A (1982) (1982) (1985) (1985) ’(1987)
Ref. Year 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1985 1985 1987
France +170 +272 +521 +734 - 2 2 +597 +294 0 -195
6 er*any + 1 2 - 1 2 2 -404 -671 -1041 -1750 -1B26 -2061 -2018
UK -79 -593 -818 -1123 -1150 -1422 -1767 -589 -536
Italy -85 -736 -786 “646 -558 +778 +707 +471 +341
Netherlands -50 +91 +628 +631 +1166 +191 +295 +236 +146
Beigiufi/Lux. na -129 -h i +156 +89 +568 +530 +471 +355
Ireland na na +506 +475 +962 +586 +707 +648 +487
Dennark na -14 +621 +618 +824 +285 +236 +177 +195
Greece - - - - - - +825 +766 +766
Portugal - - - - - - - - +146
Spain - - - - - - - - +195
Note: 11 EC Auditors is without the UK rebate and 12 EC Auditors is with the UK rebate. % With
net effect on trade account leasured using export restitutions." Converted froi units of account 
at 1 ua = £0.41667. t Converted fros US$ at US$1 = £0.55595. A Converted fros EUA at 1 EUA = 
£0.598488. ' Converted fro® ECU at 1 ECU = £0.696027. + Converted fros ECU at 1 ECU = £0.588977 
Sources: BAE (1985); Buckwell, et al. (1982); Franklin (1988), p. 16; The Econoflist, 20-6-87.
Even when there was consensus that the CAP cereals 
price policy needed to change, there was little agreement 
about which mechanisms to alter. Veer's study of the 
1983 systems (Table 6.7) showed that Germany and the UK 
would benefit most from price cuts while France and the
U. Koester in Buckwell, et al. (1982), p. 63.
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UK would gain from the end of the MCA system. In con­
trast, Germany would not benefit from the end of the MCA 
system. An earlier study, based on 1979-80 MCAs, esti­
mated that Germany would lose about 51 M ECU if the agri- 
monetary system ended while France would gain about 1.2 B 
ECU.*5' The UK was estimated to lose more than 1 B ECU for 
two reasons. First, it had a large positive monetary gap 
at that time, which meant its farmers would have suffered 
relatively large price cuts. Second, the end of MCAs 
would raise the cost of operating the CAP because prices 
and production would rise in the many member states with 
large negative monetary gaps and the UK, as paymaster for 
the CAP, would bear a disproportionate share of those 
costs without getting the benefits. With UK budget re­
bates in the 1980s, the net impact on the UK would be 
less.
Table 6.7 Impact on National Economies of a 20% Price 
Cut and Termination of the Agri-monetary 
System (existing in 1983)
Cut Prices 20% End MCAs
France +0.26% +0.04%





Ire land -1.55% —
I taly +0.65% —
Netherlands +0.08% -0.13%
EC10 +0.37% +0.01%
Source: J. de Veer, "National Effects of CAP Trade Lib-
eralization," in Tarditi, et al. (1989), P. 108.
L. Mah<§ & C. Moreddu, "Analysis of CAP Trade Policy
Changes," in S. Tarditi, et al. (1989), p . 91.
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Kinds of Electoral Systems
Politicians are often willing to support specific 
sectors even if that harms the nation's public interest, 
provided the political benefits outweigh the economic 
costs. In the farm case, farmers gain or lose power to 
influence the government depending on the type of elec­
toral system in the country. In first-past-the-post, 
single-member constituency systems (e.g., the UK), groups 
usually need a significant block of votes to have any 
serious chance of influencing policy through the elector­
al system. They must command at least as many votes as 
the victor's normal plurality during an election. In
contrast, proportional representation often dilutes
single interest voters' influence unless the group rep­
resents a large portion of the vote (e.g., farmers in
\f\ ^Sc>^ eu-,eJ. Wtos
France) or unless it concentrates its vote on small or
Aw
regional parties that can be dominated by interest groups 
(e.g., farmers in Germany).
The Style of Government
The style and form of government also critically 
determines whether special interests can influence
policy. Coalitions are generally easier to influence 
because their survival usually depends on a few legis­
lative votes which can be swayed by interest groups. 
Coalition governments often compartmentalize policy to 
limit overlaps between policy areas, with the result that 
sectoral debates often are not open to counterbalancing 
lobbies. Presidential systems potentially are quite 
closed if elections are infrequent and the President does 
not need support from the elected assembly, but can be 
susceptible to pressure during or near elections if the 
vote is likely to be close. Finally, Cabinet government, 
as practised in the UK, can either be controlled by 
determined single-interest groups or open to wider con­
cerns, depending on the concerns of the Prime Minister 
and the Cabinet.
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In summary, the national interest reflects these 
different strains and opportunities as special interests 
use the various electoral and government systems to press 
for their preferred outcome. The following sections 
examine France, Germany, and the UK to demonstrate the 
evolution of their national interests.
FRANCE AND THE CAP
Farm interests in France are considered by most 
people to be generally compatible with the French public 
interest.10 French farmers, politicians, consumers, and 
industrialists generally view farming as a viable and 
expanding sector that should be assisted. France has 
been a wheat exporter since before the Second World War 
and by 1980 regularly exported more than half its annual 
production. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing summed it 
up best in 1977 when he called agriculture the "petrole 
vert de la France."11 As a result, farmers and the gov­
ernment have focused on the best way to keep the French 
farm sector competitive in European and world markets.12 
During the 1970s, farmers and the government were satis­
fied that they could improve efficiency and maintain 
their commercial interests within the existing price 
regime in Europe. The higher prices that were set to
support farm incomes provided an ideal environment for 
farmers to expand production and exports. The Federation 
Nationale des Syndicats d 'E x p loitants Agricoles (FNSEA), 
the major farm organization, had bargained its way into 
the public policy process in France, so that it commanded 
great power over the content of policy and was able to 
match farmers’ commercial interests with their
social concerns.13
Agra Europe (1983), p. 73.
DuchSne, Szczepanik, & Legg (1985), p. 95. 
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 104.
Keeler (1987), p p . 9, 12-13.
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The "corporatist" relationship between the govern­
ment and the farm lobby held until the Socialists won the 
1981 election. By then the changed production and finan­
cial structures had strained the historically strong 
bonds between farmers and the government. The administ­
ration decided it was time to weaken its formal links 
with FNSEA. The new government no longer believed that 
the CAP price regime was consistent with France's public 
interest. The French farm lobby recognized that it could 
not expect to keep both high prices and the unrestricted 
right to produce and sell for commercial markets. As a 
result, the larger farmers led the French farm lobby to 
champion the realignment of prices towards world levels 
and the development of a commercial policy for wheat.1A
FNSEA positioned itself at the centre of a powerful 
information and lobbying network after 1958. In contrast 
to Germany and the UK, French law (the 1945 Tanguy-Pri- 
gent Liberation Ordinance) prohibits FNSEA from providing 
insurance or cooperation services, which reduces its 
ability to attract members through provision of non­
collective services. At the start of the Fifth Republic 
in 1958, FNSEA therefore entered a corporatist relation­
ship with the newly strong executive government in order 
to solidify its position.155 In exchange for support for 
the government, FNSEA got exclusive access to the
policy system and was given responsibility for the opera­
tion of many important administrative agencies and boards 
that managed the farm modernization program. FNSEA con­
trolled, for example, the Soci6t6s d 'Am6nagement Foncier 
et d 'Etablissement Rural (SAFERs), which buy land from 
retiring farmers and reallocate it to expanding farm­
ers.16 Because local FNSEA members effectively deter­
mined the viability of new and expanding farmers through
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 132.
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p p . 51 & 55. 
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 112.
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these agencies, farmers had great incentive to join the
organization. Furthermore, FNSEA got large subsidies
from the government that allowed it to offer services to 
members; Keeler argues that without the subsidies FNSEA 
would not have survived.1-7 Finally, FNSEA was the sole
recognized voice for farmers in France. Although there
are three or four other farm organizations, they general­
ly had smaller memberships and, until 1982, were totally 
excluded from the policy system.
As in Germany, there are no effective non-farm lob­
bies to offset the power of the farm movement. Consum­
ers, environmentalists, and industrialists have had 
neither the inclination nor means to influence policy. 
In 1987, for example, half of all consumers agreed that 
the CAP was "worthwhile" while only 17% disagreed.10 
This is a least partly because the average consumer and 
taxpayer pays less in absolute terms than in Germany and 
the cost of the CAP relative to average household incomes 
is lower in France than in Germany or the UK. The pre­
disposition toward the CAP is also at least partly be­
cause the benefits and costs are spread more evenly in 
France than in either Germany or the UK. Producer losses 
or gains are felt more widely than in either of the other 
two countries both because of the larger number of farm­
ers in France (1.5 M or 7.1% of total civilian employment 
in 1986) and because about 20% of the French population 
has an interest in agriculture through land inherit­
ance .ie>>
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the high price 
policy also was almost fully consistent with the French 
public interest. Producer benefits were estimated to be 
greater than consumer costs and almost equal to the total
Ke-eler - (1981?), p. 167.
Eurobarometre #27, Table A40. 
Financial Times, 16-6-80.
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of consumer and taxpayer costs (Table 6.1); the country 
was a net recipient of inter-state transfers caused by 
the CAP (Table 6.6); and every percentage point increase 
in guaranteed wheat prices raised inter-state flows to 
France by more than 9 M UA. As France had a sustained 
large current account deficit, even with the large net 
in-flows from the CAP, the nation benefited from any
(Fi«v to.i)
increases in institutional prices*. Finally agriculture
was judged to be a key sector that would press for 
greater European integration, which suited France’s 
security interests.
  Figure 6.1 -------------------------------------------
FR AN C E'S  BALANCE O F PAYMENTS





By the 1980s, however, France’s public interest had 
altered, which created the conditions for change in the 
policy orientation in France. Using prices to support 
farm incomes became increasingly inefficient, so that the 
producer benefits of the CAP were less than the consum­
ers' cost. Furthermore, expansion of the CAP to new 
Mediterranean products, the 1984 budget deal, and the 
accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 turned France 
into a net payer from its long-term position as a net 
beneficiary of the CAP. Meanwhile, less than 8% of the 
French population depended on agriculture in the 1980s,
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compared with 13.5% in 1970 and 22.5% in 1960. About 
that time France also re-evaluated its security inter­
ests, and decided that the CAP impeded development of 
non-farm policies, which potentially threatened the West­
ern alliance (see chapter 2). But agriculture remained 
important because it contributed a major share of nation­
al export revenues (12.6% in 1986). The French govern­
ment, and eventually the farm lobby, decided France had 
more to gain if the CAP was reformed so that commercial 
farmers could maximize their production and export poten­
tial.
The key opportunity for farmers to influence policy 
through the electoral system comes at the septennial 
presidential election, when farm votes are carefully 
courted by right-of-centre presidential candidates. In 
1966, the 'empty chair' confrontation in the European 
Council so angered farmers that they nearly defeated 
Charles de Gaulle in the primary election that year. 
Future right-wing candidates ensured they did not anger 
the farm sector near elections. In 1974, Giscard won the 
Presidency at least partly because Jacques Chirac swung 
the farm vote in his favour; the net one million farm 
votes (69%) he gained offset his deficit in the non-farm 
vote. In 1981, even though 67% of farmers again voted 
for Giscard, he lost. The significantly smaller farm 
population was unable to muster enough votes to offset 
Giscard's non-farm vote shortfall. Then Frangois Mit- 
terand was re-elected in 1988, even though he had antag­
onized farmers throughout his first term. Below the 
Presidential level, however, farmers remained powerful. 
Farmers have strong connections at the local level, both 
through the Chambres d 'Agriculture (dominated by FNSEA 
members) and through their "notables" (local elected 
officials). A survey in the late 1970s showed that 94% 
of farmers were acquainted with their 'notables' and 84%
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had recourse to them if needed, which was the highest of 
all socio-economic groups.250
Table 6.8 Electoral Influence of Farmers in France
Voting System: Proportional Representation
Farm Population as Share of Total Working Population:
I960: 22.5% 1986: 7.3%
Impact of Farm Vote:
1966: farmers, unhappy with the empty chair in Brus­
sels, nearly defeated de Gaulle in the President­
ial election
1974: net one million farm vote (69%) went to Giscard
(winner) ef. net win of only 400,000
1981: 67% of farmers voted for Giscard; Mitterand won
1989: Mitterand again defeated Giscard
Sources: Keeler (1987), p. 103; Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p.
129.
The 1981 election marked a turning point for farm­
ers. Before Mitterand was elected he prepared plans to 
break the compact between the FNSEA and the government. 
Immediately after the election, Edith Cresson, the new 
Socialist agriculture minister, granted official status 
to three competing farm organizations, in addition to 
FNSEA. Then in June 1981 Cresson announced new aid to 
the farm sector. Unlike in the past, however, FNSEA did 
not have any role in administering the program.251 Cres­
son also announced plans to review regulations on elec­
tions to the Chambres, to replace SAFERs with councils 
not controlled by FNSEA, and to create new professional 
associations to replace those controlled by FNSEA. The 
government thereby hoped to undercut FNSEA's power base 
and to supplant it with sympathetic left-leaning farm
250■ J. Hayward, "Mobilizing Private Interests in the 
Service of Public Ambitions," in Richardson (1982), p. 
126 .
251 - Keeler (1987), pp. 219-22.
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organizations. These actions set off a "hot winter" for 
the French government. Although SAFERs were not changed 
and FNSEA continued to have privileged access to the 
President, in the end FNSEA was faced with the reality 
that it no longer controlled the policy agenda. Finally, 
in 1984 Mitterand announced that farmers would no longer 
be allowed to disrupt the peace in an effort to influence 
the government. He threatened "tough action" against 
farmers who damage public buildings during farm protests; 
in the past farmers had gone largely unprosecuted.
Agriculture nevertheless remained a key portfolio 
for ambitious politicians. A number of political leaders 
have used the post of minister for agriculture in the 
French government or president of the FNSEA as a "spring­
board" to French or European politics.23 From the minis­
ter ior agriculture job, both Chirac (1973-74) and Michel 
Rocard (1983-86) ultimately became Prime Minister. Two 
presidents of the FNSEA also moved to greater prominence: 
Michel Debatisse first became a leading member of the 
European Parliament for the Gaul list party and then 
Secretary of State for the Food and Agricultural Indust­
ries in 1979; and Frangois Guillaume was recruited as 
French minister for agriculture for 1986-88.
Good relations with the farm lobby were necessary to 
run the highly interventionist national farm policy 
during the 1970s. The potential for farm influence was 
strongest when the French government was most active in 
the sector, because "the more difficult an intervention­
ist scheme is to administer within a sector, the more the 
state must seek the collaboration of interest groups."23 
As the new Socialist government withdrew from interven­
tionist policies after 1982, however, there was less need 
for those links with the farm lobby. As the benefits of
Petit, et al. (1987), p. 46. 
Keeler (1987), p. 258.
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FNSEA membership became less certain, the natural divi­
sions between large and small farmers, which had been 
building throughout the 1970s, began to cause strains 
within the lobby. The French government therefore found 
greater freedom to examine and develop farm policies that 
were not necessarily accepted by the FNSEA leadership.
Table 6 . 9 France's 
Cereals
Opening Bargaining Positions on
Year Prices MCAs Other
1973 <2.8% + na
19 74A ok barley price too high; franc 
floated Jan. 22, giving farmers 
interim price rise
1974B 8.0% na aid for non-wheat producers 
given by France; Giscard 
promised to ask for new rise
1975 10.0% 3.5% Chirac promised farmers min. 
13.5%; "solemn undertaking"
1976 ok ok na
1977 3.0% 4.2% na
1978 ok ok got 2.5% devaluation of franc 
effective Feb. 1, 1979; held 
MCAs constant in election
1979 2.0% ok agreed with Germany to phase out 
MCAs & press for +2% prices
1980 5.0% 2.0% promised farmers aid
1981 10.0% none aid announced before prices set
1982 15.0% 1.5% aid announced before prices set; 
threatened majority vote against 
UK; guarantee threshold ok
1983 ok 4.8% wanted large cut in German MCAs
1984 -1.0% 5.8% na
1985 ok ok accept price cuts
1986 n . a ok accept co-responsibility
1987 n . a ok accept changes in intervention; 
not keen on direct income aid
1988 n . a ok accept stabilizers; not keen on 
set asides
ok = accept Commission, proposal
Sources : Financial Times, The Times, and Agra Europe.
Until 1983, the French government generally listened 
to and supported the farm lobby at least during the price 
review. The government was determined to forestall dis­
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ruptive farm protests with promises, which usually en­
tailed prices higher than proposed by the Commission 
(table 6.9). But with the strong links between France 
and DG—VI, there was seldom much difference between their 
positions. They both accepted in the early 1970s that 
prices should be used to support farm incomes and, in the 
mid-1970s worked to introduce an automatic agri-monetary 
system that would not allow Germany to maintain an under­
valued green rate. Farmers meanwhile used their strong 
links with the government to extract maximum price in­
creases through a combination of negotiation and protest. 
They were able to extract solemn undertakings from the 
French government (often from the Prime Minister or 
President) to support their demands in Brussels or, if 
that failed, to supplement inadequate price rises with 
national aids. Only for a short period during the tenure 
of Prime Minister Raymond Barre were farm interests part­
ly subordinated to the national anti-inflation program.214 
Generally, however, the government supported demands for 
higher ECU prices and the end to the agri-monetary system 
because both would help the French balance of payments 
and national income. As recently as 1982, the French 
government fully supported farm demands, and even threat­
ened to force a majority vote for the price package to 
overcome a block in the Council.
Beginning in 1981, the government's opening position 
on the price talks shifted in line with the new public 
interest. France was increasingly concerned to sustain 
and improve the international competitiveness of French 
farmers.25=5 Consequently, after 1982 France supported 
Commission efforts to realign EC wheat prices with US 
target prices and to introduce an active export policy. 
When price cuts proved impossible in 1985, France worked 
with the Commission to develop the co-responsibility sys-
Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p. 131. 
Franklin (1988), p. 30.
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tem that replaced the price and income policy of the 
1970s and early 1980s. Farmers also accepted that the 
system would need to change; they could no longer hope to 
keep both high prices and unrestricted market privileges. 
Commercially competitive farmers, in particular, disliked 
any scheme that would limit their production or output, 
such as compulsory land set-asides or tied income aid. 
Although smaller farmers were less certain about the 
direction of reforms, FNSEA was dominated by the larger 
farmers. Votes in the lobby were based on dues paying 
members, which tended to be disproportionately wealthy 
Northern cereals producers rather than poor Southern 
farmers.^ As a result, FNSEA accepted that the CAP must 
change. The quantum approach of co-responsibility and 
thresholds became popular in the 1980s at least partly 
because it was similar to the system already administered 
by the Office National Interprofessione1 des Cereales 
(ONIC), where cereals producers paid a levy to develop 
domestic uses and export markets for French cereals. 
Provided the co-responsibility funds were used to expand 
market opportunities, that option would be acceptable.-'-7
In summary, during the 1980s farmers faced the pros­
pect of losing control of the farm policy network in 
France as the changes in the power structures forced 
apart the interests of farmers and the public. The new 
Socialist government, which did not depend on farm sup­
port, weakened the farm lobby after 1981 and seemed 
poised to bargain in Brussels for changes in the CAP. In 
response, the farm lobby adjusted its policy to support 
re-orientation of the price system and expansion of pro­
grams to improve competitiveness and exports. Conse­
quently, by the mid-1980s the French farm policy commun­
ity was re-united, only now in support of reform rather
Keeler (1987), p. 105.
227 - Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p p . 17 & 132.
234 Chapter 6
than in defence of the old price system. France had 
become the driving force behind CAP reform.
GERMANY AND THE CAP
German history and the republican political system 
have provided German farmers with a unique opportunity to 
control the national position in European farm debates. 
Following the war, Germany actively supported farmers to 
promote food self-sufficiency and to sustain the popula­
tion base in many war-ravaged areas. This policy fitted 
trvto- the economy-wide security and production structures.
In the unsettled period immediately after 1945 and up to 
the mid 1960s, West German politicians were particularly 
worried about Communist invasion from East Germany. The 
government regarded farmers-— which represented more than 
one quarter of the total West German population in 1950 
and virtually all of the rural population— as a bastion 
against Communist agitation within the rural areas along 
the border.23 At the same time, the government was 
pressed to develop non-farm jobs for the 12.5 M refugees 
from the East between 1945 and 1961 and took the oppor­
tunity to slow farm rationalization.2*9 In return, farm­
ers expanded output, integrated themselves into the rural 
economies, and actively supported conservative govern­
ments. In 1955, the political bargain between farmers 
and the government was enshrined in the Green Law, re­
quiring the government "to enable agriculture ... to 
offset the existing natural and economic disadvantages" 
in order to "equalize the social situation of people 
working in agriculture with that of comparable profes­
sions."30 The government also encouraged industry to 
locate in rural areas to provide both full-time and part- 
time off-farm employment.31 So by the time the CAP was 
created, farmers were well entrenched in German politics.
2ej* J. Ertl quoted in Financial Times. 8-11-78. 
2<9- George (1985), p. 59.
3°* Tangermann (1979), p. 243.
31 - Ardagh (1987), p. 131.
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with privileged access and significant influence over 
policy.
The German farmers' union, Deutscher Bauernverband 
(DBV), maintained its role at the centre of farm policy 
in Germany after 1958 because of its strong and loyal 
membership. The DBV is in practice the only key to the 
powerful lobby and farm service system. Through the 
Deutsche Raiffeisenverband (DRV), the cooperative move­
ment markets more than half of the nation's cereals and 
78% of the dairy products, supplies 62% of the fertil­
izers and 36% of the machinery, and provides 27% of farm 
finance.32 Although the DRV is legally separate, it mar­
kets DBV memberships, which are "assumed by farmers to be 
a prerequisite for their [DRV services] obtainment. "33 
At the same time, the DBV provides virtually the only 
access to government for farmers. Consequently, more 
than 90% of all German farmers are members of the associ­
ation. The DBV also remains active all year round— a 
survey of DBV members in North Rhine-Westphalia around 
1980 showed 94% of the members attended at least one 
meeting a year and more than 50% attended regularly— so 
that it can mobilize the lobby during elections and key 
policy negotiations.3"*
The unity of the German farm lobby was severely 
tested but only partly damaged over the 1973-88 period. 
While the Napoleonic inheritance laws in Baden-Wurttem- 
burg, Hessen, and the Rhineland-Palatinate led to farms 
being broken into smaller holdings, primogeniture in the 
North and much of Bavaria encouraged farm consolida­
tion.33 Combined with the shifting production and finan­
cial structures throughout the 1970s and 1980s, divergen­
ces in the German farm sector increased. The absolute
Foxall (1982), p. 54. 
Keeler (1987), p. 262. 
Andrlik (1981), p. 106
Ardagh (1987), p. 129.
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number of farmers in Germany dropped from more than five 
million in 1950 to about 1.3 M in 1985 while almost half 
the remaining farmers also work off-farm. The regional 
dimension compounded the economic divergences and caused 
strains to show within the farm lobby. These conflicts 
came to a head in 1972 when the DBV, dominated by large- 
scale, full-time farmers, pushed the German government to 
prepare a 'Green Plan' that would provide support only 
for larger farmers. Small and part-time farmers, com­
prising the majority of the German farm population, re­
belled and formed a new association to lobby for their 
interests,3& The new organization remained weak, how­
ever, because it did not get official recognition from 
the government; most farmers remained members of the 
Db v .3  ^ Nevertheless, relations in the farm lobby re­
mained strained. As recently as March, 1987, 10,000 
small farmers protested against the domination of the DBV 
by large agri-business and called for the president of 
the DBV to resign.3®
Despite internal disputes, however, the farm lobby 
successfully defended its power-base in the German farm 
policy community because there is "no effective counter­
vailing interest group" to the DBV.3<5> Although the con­
sumer associations in Germany have more than eight mil­
lion members, they are not influential both because the 
membership is spread across 36 various organizations and 
because the national consumer federation has no direct 
access to the farm policy process. The distribution of 
winners and losers under the CAP both strengthens the 
farm lobby and weakens the consumer lobby. German farm­
ers, because they are predominantly small, are heavily 
dependent on the CAP to sustain their incomes (Table 
6.2). On the other side, although German consumers pay a
Andrlik (1981), p. 107.
Keeler (1987), p. 270.
Wall Street Journal (Europe), 5-3-87. 
Bulmer & Paterson (1987), p. 92.
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higher total cost for the CAP than their counterparts in 
France and the UK, they have significantly higher per 
capita incomes, so that in Germany outlays on food, alco­
hol, and tobacco comprise the smallest proportion of 
household expenditure of any member state."*° Germans 
also recognize related benefits of the CAP. In a 1984 
survey, 18% of the respondents liked the assurance of 
food supplies provided by the CAP while 11% thought the 
country benefited from the trade advantages in the 
policy; only 5% saw agricultural surpluses as a prob­
lem."*1 Much of the German population also views the CAP 
as the cost of belonging to the EC and not simply the 
cost of farm policy."*2 Furthermore, a majority of the 
population still lives in rural areas, so they see and 
accept the need to support farmers."*3 Consequently 
almost half of the German public surveyed in 1987 thought 
the CAP was on the whole worthwhile; only 22% thought the 
it was too costly."** Meanwhile, German town-dwe 1 lers 
have a romantic vision of farming:
Witness so much of classical German literature. 
German poetry, even more than English, is full 
of the love and longing for nature: trees,
rivers and meadows are personified, almost 
mystically. But this is rarely accompanied by 
any sense of a tough daily local life; poets 
visit nature to explore their own souls and to 
discuss philosophy. The German novel, equally, 
has seldom treated themes of rural life."*55
German farmers have carefully cultivated that "ideology 
that closely associated the role of agriculture with 
social values (i.e., stability, continuity, solidar-
*°- ASC 1988. p. T/161, shows that in 1986 17.0% of 
German household expenditure went for foodT compared with 
20.5% in France, 18.9% in the UK, and 21.9% in the EC as 
a who le (jmhcL tab<xccoV
*1* Bulmer & Paterson (1987), p. 149.
"*2 - Tangermann (1979), p. 249.
"*3- Phi lip (1989) , p. 4.
"*"*“ Eurobarometre #27. Table A40.
"*=- Ardagh (1987), p. 141.
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ity). As a result, there is little pressure to change 
the CAP.
  Figure 6.2
GERMANY'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
AS A « R C S N T  OF DDF AT MARKET PRICES
-2
IW!
Economic interest (as measured by deadweight losses 
or financial flows) should dictate that Germans would 
want to change the basic CAP system. Bale and Lutz
(Table 6.4) estimated that in 1976 the costs to consumers
and taxpayers exceeded producer gains by about 0.7 B ECU 
and more recent studies show that the costs rose to al­
most 6 B ECU in the 1980s. As well, Koester determined
that every increase in guaranteed prices raised the net 
payments from Germany to the rest of the Community (Table 
6.6). But Germany had relatively steady economic growth 
and a sustained balance of payments surplus over most of
(FYcj fc>. z)
the period, so it could afford to ignore the negative 
effects of the price system and instead concentrate on 
the defence of those CAP features from which it bene­
fited. The agri-monetary system, in particular, was
popular with all the federal ministries'*7 because "by 
effectively keeping control over the level of its green
Hendriks (1987), p. 39.
Petit, et al. (1987), p. 56.
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exchange rate, the German government, like the British, 
sought to retain within the framework of the CAP an 
important element of traditional national policy. 
MCAs provide higher domestic prices and stronger German 
farm incomes while dampening prices in other countries, 
thereby lowering potential EC production, surpluses, and 
budgetary costs
The proportional representation system (with both 
single member constituencies and list voting) consoli­
dates the power of the farm vote because the resultant 
coalitions need to court either the farm vote directly or 
the smaller parties that win with farm support. Indivi­
dual farmers and the DBV generally support the Christian 
Social Union (CSU) in the large farming state of Bavaria 
and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) elsewhere. In 
1969, however, the Socialist Democratic Party (SPD), 
which was not as pro-farmer as the CDU/CSU, governed in 
coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Farmers 
fortuitously got support from Josef Ertl, a Bavarian FDP 
member appointed as minister for agriculture. The SPD had 
little sympathy with the CAP but Ertl successfully ex­
ploited the coalition to support farm interests.550 The 
FDP gradually became more receptive to farm interests and 
after 1980 it actively courted farm votes to ensure the 
party could get the 5% minimum vote to ensure its parlia­
mentary representation.551 Ertl remained agricultural 
minister for 14 years, strongly supported when policy 
disputes arose by the other three FDP ministers in Cabi­
net. After the 1981 election, the FDP shifted into a 
coalition with the CDU/CSU and Ertl resigned. The new 
agricultural minister, Ignaz Kiechle, was a CSU member 
and became another strong farm supporter. Throughout the 
period the national governing coalition faced almost con-
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 72. 
Tangermann (1979), p. 250-51. 
Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), pp. 90-93. 
Philip (1989), p. 11.
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stant pressure from farmers because the federal system 
ensured that there was seldom a period without either 
Lander or national elections. Governments in France and 
the UK, in contrast, generally have the comfort of three 
or four years between elections, which allows them great­
er freedom from special interest lobbies.
Table 6.10 Electoral Influence of Fanners in Germany
Voting System: Proportional Representation; 5% tour­
niquet
Farm Population as Share of Total Working Population: 
1960: 13.8% 1986: 7.3%









about 10% of the lower house (52 out of 518 
members) were farmers or associated with 
farming; the CDU/CSU would have needed 2/3rds 
of the farm vote to get a majority while the 
SPD could only get a majority if all farmers 
abstained
24 out of 29 farmers elected were CDU/CSU 
33 of 40 closest results had a farm vote
greater than the total plurality; 16 went to 
SPD; 17 to CDU/CSU
22 out of 28 farmers elected were CDU/CSU 
135 of 248 districts have more than 5% farm
vote; 44 districts had greater than 15% and 91 
have 5-15%; 31 of 40 closest results had a
farm vote greater than the total plurality; 20 
went to SPD; 11 to CDU/CSU
22 out of 33 farmers elected were CDU/CSU
16 farmers were members of the CDU/CSU; 3 in
the FDP; and 2 in the SPD.
23 out of 33 farmers elected were CDU/CSU
Sources: Andrlik (1981), p. 115-16; Nevi1le-RoIfe
(1984), pp. 85-6 ; Schweitzer, et al. (1984), table 5.
The federal system of government in Germany further 
strengthens the farm lobby. Federalism has forced decen­
tralization and diffusion of power because the Lander 
(through the upper house) have a say on farm policy. The 
federal Cabinet often has little opportunity to influence 
farm policy because the compromises and options have been
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finessed in negotiations among the department and minis­
ter for agriculture, the DBV, the Bundestag, and the Lan­
der. This "sectorized nature of policy-making in the 
Federal Government places the existing [CAP) policy— and 
its protagonists in the ministry— in a strong posi­
tion."55^  While German agricultural officials are legally 
bound to consult with the DBV, consumers, environmental­
ists, and industrialists only have access to farm debates 
through other ministers in full Cabinet.553 But because 
the Cabinet has little say on farm issues, these other 
views are largely unheeded in the farm policy debate. 
The DBV maximizes its impact in the system by working 
closely with the ministry of agriculture: key members of
the ministry "usually come from" the DBV, so that there 
is a common view on the issues and prescriptions and 
close personal ties between the two.55'*
The resulting set of interlocking bargains inside 
Germany ensures that farm interests dominate and deter­
mine the German national position in European farm 
debates. The German minister for agriculture almost 
always begins the price review demanding a set of prices 
that favour farmers, either through relatively low ECU 
price increases and no change in the undervalued green 
DM, or higher ECU prices to compensate for any green DM 
change. The bottom line has always been that DM prices 
and farm incomes must not fall.
In the 1973-76 period, the farm lobby faced two 
serious challenges to its high price policy: anti-in­
flation policy topped the SPD economic agenda while Ost- 
politik was Chancellor Willy Brandt's key foreign policy 
venture. While the inflation policy was a greater im­
mediate threat, any thaw in East-West relations would
55=5■ Bulmer & Paterson (1987), p. 72.
533 ■ Bulmer & Paterson (1987), p. 105. 
=*■ Edinger (1986), p. 192.
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undercut the long-term security reason for Germany to 
support the CAP. Both policies therefore threatened farm 
prices and incomes. Nevertheless, Ertl used the coali­
tion system to ensure his government supported price 
increases for German farmers.
Table 6,. 11 Germany' s 
Cereals
Opening Bargaining Positions on
Year Prices MCAs Other Demands
1973 4.0% -1.2% na
1974A <12.0% na Ertl favours price rise but 
less than DBV demand of 12%
1974B 0% na 4% is "irresponsible"
1975 <6.0% none na
1976 0% none na
1977 +3.0% none na
1978 +3.5% none na
1979 +0% none agreed with France to phase out 
MCAs & press for 2% price rise
1980 ok none na
1981 ok ok na
1982 lower none na
1983 ok none na
1984 0% none threatens to veto 5% DM cut; 
wants green ECU
1985 0% none rejected price cut
1986 0% none rejected changes in mechanisms 
which reduced prices
1987 higher none price freeze and related 
measures were "declaration of 
war"
1988 0% ok not keen on stabilizers but 
would consider provided the 
maximum cut is 2.5% per annum; 
want set asides
Sources: Financial Times, The Times, and Agra Europe.
The Stocktaking, which Ertl forced as part of the 
compromise to the supplementary price review in September 
1974, revealed some of the pressures he had to overcome 
to sustain his pro-farmer policy. The battle over the 
German position on the Stocktaking started in November 
1974 when the German Institute for Economic Research, a
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quasi-autonomous research unit, reported that German 
farmers had higher average incomes than non-farmers. 
This obvious attempt to undercut the income argument for 
the CAP created problems for Ertl. When he proposed 
Germany renationalize the price system to ensure farm 
incomes, the Cabinet rejected that position and instead 
officially pushed for the CAP to be changed to support 
consumer interests and hold down the cost of food. The 
German Cabinet also asked for the European Council rather 
than the Farm Council to debate and to decide on CAP re­
form to ensure non-farm interests had a role. But before 
the European Summit, inflation in Germany decelerated and 
Schmidt's government did not push for reform. The Stock­
taking was dropped quietly and German farmers continued 
to extract full support from its national system.
Then in 1979, world commodity prices soared, Ger­
many's terms of trade deteriorated sharply, and the 
German current account moved into a significant deficit 
position, which triggered a major attempt to reduce farm 
support through the CAP. Ertl attempted to forestall the 
domestic reform movement during the second half of 1978 
when as President in the Agricultural Council he declined 
to schedule time for debate of possible reforms. But in 
1979 both Schmidt and his economics minister pushed for 
reform and in 1980 the SPD issued a study that proposed 
to end unlimited guarantees for surplus products and to 
introduce national income support i n s t e a d . E r t l  held 
out, however, until the next election. When the SPD lost 
support in the 1981 election, the diminished FDP parlia­
mentary wing shifted into a governing coalition with the 
CDU/CSU who were more sympathetic to farm interests.
Since 1981, the farm lobby has been more solidly 
supported by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Cabinet. In 
1983 Kohl pondered publicly whether the EC should cont­
The Guardian. 20-10-80.
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ract to the original six c o u n t r i e s E a r l i e r  in the 
year, Ertl had also won a "famous victory" over the 
economic and finance ministers when the German Cabinet 
agreed to press the Community to develop a green ECU.53"' 
His successor, Kiechle, was just as successful. During 
the next three price reviews, he was given Cabinet ap­
proval to take an unusually hard line in Council and re­
ject any price cuts for cereals; he even was permitted to 
use the veto in the Farm Council in 1985. But the German 
veto proved ineffective (the Commission implemented the 
price cut anyway), as did Kiechle's rearguard action in 
the Farm Council in 1986 and his threat in 1987 to cut 
German payments to the EC if cereals prices were cut.=a
The German farm policy community found it had to 
iv
develop an alternate policy approach following the 1985
\
veto. The German government, prodded by the DBV, comp­
letely rejected direct price cuts but was willing to work 
with the Commission to reduce CAP outlays by implementing 
cuts in aids, ceilings on intervention, and lower Commun­
ity participation in structural programs. Germany also 
had been willing as early as 1968 to introduce quantita­
tive limits on intervention buying and stocks.'6’0 It was 
therefore only a small concession to accept the concepts 
of co-responsibility and stabilizer levies. As a result 
of strong German pressure, however, the new system 
affected less than one quarter of holdings in Germany 
(Table 6.3).
Germany, because it had few commercially competitive 
farms, was also more willing than France to consider 
quantitative controls on production that would tie sup­
=s<£,“ The Times. 14-12-83. Kohl subsequently claimed that 
he was misquoted.
Petit, et al. (1987), p. 30. 
se}* Wall Street Journal (Europe). 5-3-87.
=**- Nevi 1 le-Rolfe (1984), p. 282.
6’°- Rosenthal (1975), p. 82.
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port to individuals. As early as 1986, Germany got the 
Community to provide funding for an experimental set- 
aside program in one German state. When a Community set- 
aside program was finally approved by the Farm Council in 
1988, German farmers had the highest take-up rate in the 
EC. By June 1989, more than 2.4% of German land was en­
rolled in the plan, compared with only 1.2% in the UK and 
less than 0.1% in France.'6’1
The German farm lobby is perhaps the strongest and 
most resilient in Europe. In spite of government efforts 
to undercut it during the 1970s, it maintained a dominant 
role in the national debates that formed the policy posi­
tions taken to the Agricultural Council meetings. There 
seems little prospect of farmers losing that position to 
other lobbies, given the overwhelming sympathy and sup­
port from the population at large, the continuing absence 
of any effective countervailing lobby, and the distinc­
tive electoral and governance systems in Germany. Be­
cause the farm minister represents both his government 
and the special interests of the farm sector in the EC 
Farm Council, Germany has been a formidable player in the 
reform negotiations.
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE CAP
The partnership forged during the Second World War 
between the NFU and the agriculture ministry did not sur­
vive the UK's accession to the Community. Before 1973 UK 
agriculture policy was invisible to most people. The 
ministry and the NFU had a monopoly on farm affairs; each 
supported the other in the policy process to exclude all 
offsetting lobbies.6*2 In those years, the compact bet­
ween farmers and the ministry was largely innocuous be­
cause the UK supported farmers through relatively small 
direct payments, rather than at the expense of consumers
Conversation with MAFF Official, July 1989. 
Howarth (1985), p. 104.
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or industry. The UK public interest coincided with pri­
vate farm interest— at least as far as they were imple­
mented within the particular UK political system. After 
1973, however, the CAP strongly favoured farmers at the 
expense of both consumers and taxpayers, which was neith­
er in the interest of the government nor the economy.
The UK Cabinet therefore actively undercut the farm lob­
by, which ultimately provided the government with greater 
freedom of action to reform those parts of the CAP which 
harm the public interest.
The farm lobby in the UK faces difficult conditions. 
It is divided along regional lines, so that there are 
separate officially recognized farm organizations for 
England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. These 
divisions reduce the movement's lobbying impact. More 
importantly, however, the NFU in England and Wales (the
largest union) has neither a strong package of non­
collective services to encourage farmers to join nor 
monopoly access to the policy system. Consumers, indust­
rialists, and environmentalists have direct access to 
farm debates in Cabinet through the relevant ministers. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food (MAFF) 
is also responsible, as its name says, for food and 
forestry and consults regularly with their lobbies.
The farm lobby provides little in the way of non­
collective benefits to attract and retain members. Co­
operatives market only about 17% of the nation's cereals 
and have little to do with provision of the means 
of production, except insurance (through the NFU Mutual). 
Until recently, the key benefit of joining the NFU was 
the advice it gave on how to get government assistance. 
When farmers were less educated and the government less 
active in extension work, this role ensured that farmers
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could not "afford not to be a member of the NFU.',<£,:3 Tab­
les 2.19 and 2.20 show that farmers are now better educa­
ted and the government has a much more active extension 
system to inform farmers of technical and program oppoi—  
tunities. UK financial deregulation also has increased 
competition in the insurance and finance sectors, reduc­
ing even those benefits. Consequently, the major non­
collective benefit of NFU membership has diminished, 
which weakens the farm lobby.
The farm movement also weakened as structural 
changes increased the diversity of interests. NFU annual 
meetings after the mid-1970s produced frequent disagree­
ment over policy, with large farmers pitted against small 
farmers and grain farmers confronting livestock produc­
ers.^4 After 1980, the divisions increased further as 
the measures taken to control cereals and milk production 
were assessed disproportionately on larger producers. 
This also led the NFU at times to disagree strongly with 
its European counterparts. In 1980 the conflicts became 
so great that the NFU debated and passed a motion at the
annual meeting calling for the UK to withdraw from the
CAP and implement national support measures.6®
In general, the public interest set the anti-CAP
tone in the UK. The nation as a whole had the worst
ratio of costs to benefits (Tables 6.4 & 6.5), the econ­
omy faced a large and increasing outflow of funds due to 
the CAP (Table 6.6), and each incremental addition to 
wheat prices raised the net outflow, which exacerbated 
the already large current account def icit(F;^ .3). The UK 
government judged that those costs were excessive, given 
that the UK standard of living was below the EC average.
Howarth (1985), p. 108. 
Howarth (1985), pp. 109-10. 
The Times. 13-2-80.
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Majority-party rule and Cabinet and party solidar­
ity generally limited farm influence on the system to 
voting times. The Cabinet keeps tight control on all 
European affairs through the European Section of the 
Cabinet Office, reducing the opportunity for farmers to 
sway the agricultural minister. Meanwhile, the first- 
past-the-post, single-member constituency system (with 
frequent boundary reviews to eliminate inconsistencies in 
ridings) and declines in the farm population, combined to 
reduce the electoral power of farmers. By 1981, there 
were only 10 constituencies where the farm vote exceeded 
15%; in 1955 there were 110. Furthermore, dependance on 
hired labour "reduce[d] the strength of farmer's lobbies 
from that indicated by the total labour force propor­
tions. Howarth concluded in 1985 that there was "no
danger whatever to the Labour Party from losing whatever 
agricultural vote it has" and although in the past. Con­
servatives probably "had some reason to fear offending 
the farmers' vote," now "there no longer appears to be 
any electoral obstacle to the Tories adopting a radical
Harvey (1982), p. 183.
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stance on farm policy. The changes since the 1950s 
are significant. One Tory MP in 1988 commented that "you 
only have to go to Committee Room 14 every Tuesday where 
the Tory backbench agricultural committee holds its meet­
ings. They used to have a hundred turn up. Now it's 
down to 10 or 20. "<be Most of the 'Tory Knights of the 
Shires' have been replaced by town-dwe1lers, who have a 
strong anti-farming bias.
Table 6.12 Electoral Influence of Farmers in the UK
Voting System: Single constituency, plurality voting
Farm Population as Share of Total Working Population: 
1960: 4.8% 1986: 2.6%
Impact of Farm Vote:
1955: 110 ridings with more than 15% of vote from agri­
cultural sector 
1961: 74 ridings with more than 15% of vote from agri­
cultural sector 
1970: 60 agricultural seats were politically signifi­
cant (the farm vote exceeded the half the plural­
ity) : Conservative (40); Labour (11); Liberal (9) 
1981: 10 seats had more 15% of vote from agricultural
sector
1983: 12 agricultural ridings were politically signifi­
cant
Sources: Financial Times, 29-10-87; Howarth (1985), p.
113-6.
The NFU offset some of the decline in farm electoral 
significance during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s as 
it maintained political neutrality and developed a strong 
working relationship with officials in MAFF. The Agri­
cultural Act of 1947 provided the statutory right for 
farmers' representatives to be consulted by the govern­
ment at the annual review of the agricultural industry
Howarth (1985), pp. 116-17. 
The Independent. 16-12-88.
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and the NFU was accepted as the sole voice of farmers.<£,‘7 
The NFU used these close contacts to develop rapport-70 
with MAFF officials, many of whom were recruited from the 
NFU. As a result, the farm sector was recognized as "the 
one unequivocal example of an economic sector where an 
interest group has been officially recognized by the 
state and incorporated into the process of decision 
making, not merely to represent its members but to play a 
joint role in the political management of the sector."7-1
When the UK joined the Community in 1973 the situa­
tion changed rapidly. In 1974, the Conservative govern­
ment was defeated and the new Labour government opened 
farm policy to other interests. In line with its entente 
with trade unions, the Labour government favoured con­
sumers: in particular, it maintained an overvalued green
pound and fought to limit guaranteed price increases. 
MAFF at first "staunchly resisted any move to open up the 
agricultural policy community,"72- but eventually accepted 
that as inevitable. The ministers {or agriculture after 
1974, who were usually both relatively junior members and 
non-farmers, were not much help because they were given a 
strong consumer-directed brief by Cabinet. As the farm 
sector adjusted in the 1980s to shifts in the underlying 
power structures, the ministry of agriculture— which is 
the only remaining sectoral ministry in the UK— sought 
new ways to justify its existence. The solution chosen, 
enshrined in section 17 of the Agricultural Act 1986, was 
to develop MAFF as the ministry for the countryside, in 
order to promote conservation, rural economic develop­
ment, and rural tourism, in addition to traditional farm
*‘5>- Howarth (1985), p. 107.
7°- Cox, Lowe, & Winter (1986), p p . 188-89, says the
relationship has been called "c1iente1 ism," "symbiotic," 
and "proprietorial."
71- Cox, Lowe, & Winter (1986), p. 185.
7:2- Cox, Lowe, & Winter (1986), p. 196.
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interests.-73 This changed mandate challenges the minis­
try to balance farm and non-farm interests and should 
further diminish farm influence.
Table 6. 13 The UK's Opening Bargaining Positions on 
Cereals
Year Prices MCAs Other Demands
1973 0% none na
1974A 0% na na
1974B <4% none na
1975 <9% +7.5% devalue green pound before 
prices set
1976 0% none opposed wheat reference price
1977 0% ok max 18-20% from transition, ECU 
prices & green £
1978 0% 5.0% UK government forced to ask for 
7.5% devaluation of pound
1979 0% 5.0% will veto price increases
1980 0% 5.0% bargaining for budget rebate; 
veto if necessary
1981 8% none na
1982 0% none bargaining for budget rebate; 
veto if necessary
1983 <4% none na
1984 0% none unhappy with green ECU system
1985 -5% none want prices cut directly
1986 ok ok would prefer price cuts; 
accepts co-responsibility but 
want it paid on acreage rather 
than sales; proposes voluntary 
set asides
1987 ok 8% proposes set asides
1988 ok ok proposes limiting intervention 
buying; prefer price cuts 
rather than stabilizer levy
Sources: Financial Times , The Times, and Agra Europe.
The UK government during the 1973-79 period was 
strongly against both increases in guaranteed prices for 
cereals and automatic agri-monetary changes. Higher 
prices, either from devaluations of the green pound or 
from higher guaranteed prices, would have exacerbated the
The Economist, 10-9-88.
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wage-price inflation spiral the UK was attempting to 
combat through the social compact with unions. Higher 
prices also contributed to the balance of payments defi­
cit, which eventually precipitated a payment crisis and 
opened UK policy to IMF influence. Meanwhile, UK wheat 
farmers were reaping windfall price rises as the CAP 
system was introduced in the UK. Consequently, the UK 
farm lobby did not get the government to support higher 
prices. The UK government also staunchly defended the 
agri-monetary system because it held down domestic price 
increases caused by the depreciated pound. Jos ling and 
Harris argued that:
The versatile green money system ... ke[pt] 
farm prices down in the UK, with the twin ad­
vantage of avoiding the political repercussions 
of unpopular price rises in the country where 
these would face the greatest opposition while 
at the same time reducing the potential for 
adding to surplus production as a result of the 
expansion of UK agriculture. The MCA has be­
come an instrument for the regional differenti­
ation of prices within the Community."7'*
After 1978 the UK approach to the CAP changed. 
Beginning with the 1979 election of the Conservative 
government, the UK shifted emphasis in the price debate. 
The Foreign Office and Treasury advised the new Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, that there was no practical 
or negotiable way to reform the CAP to benefit the UK. 
North Sea oil, which also began to flow in 1979, quickly 
pushed the UK current account into surplus. From April 
1980 to 1985 the green pound was overvalued, so the UK 
government could not use it as a bargaining chip in price 
negotiations. Furthermore, the rebates authorized under 
Article 131 of the Treaty of Accession ended in 1980, 
causing a sharp jump in the net UK cost of the CAP. The 
only solution was to squeeze the price system through the 
budget lever.7”® The UK government therefore adopted a
Josling & Harris (1976), p. 66. 
The Guardian, 29-11-79.
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combination of budget demands and threats of vetoes to 
attempt to force change in the CAP. This approach, how­
ever, provided the UK with little influence over the con­
tent of the reforms. The UK minister for agriculture 
neither had the support of the UK farm lobby nor of his 
fellow ministers. A number of times the UK agriculture 
minister appeared to be on the verge of agreement in the 
Farm Council, only to be undercut by the Prime Minister, 
Foreign Secretary, or Chancellor of the Exchequer. In 
1982, 1984, and 1985, for example, those ministers struck 
budget agreements that did not link directly to reform of 
the CAP. Therefore, the UK Agriculture Minister found 
the budget lever next to useless.
Because the minister ior agriculture and the farm 
lobby were unable to cooperate, few of the post-1985 re­
forms in the CAP were proposed by the UK. The UK govern­
ment instead stuck to its demands for direct price cuts 
long after the rest of Council had begun to look at other 
options. Partly because the government and farmers could 
not agree on a common approach to EC debates, the resul­
tant changes (including co-responsibility and stabilizer 
levies) generally were less favourable for UK farmers 
than almost all other alternatives. Even when the MAFF 
and the NFU agreed on basic direction, they failed to 
present a united front in European debates. In 1987, for 
example, both MAFF and the NFU supported the introduction 
of set-asides but they failed to agree about whether they 
should be voluntary and compulsory.
In summary, although the UK became one of the 
strongest proponents of CAP reform during the 1980s, it 
failed to influence the direction of reform because its 
weak farm lobby and peculiar budgetary approach often 
neutralized its position in the Council. As a result, 
the emerging cereals policy has been perceived as not 
compatible with UK farm interests.
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CONCLUSIONS
Farm organizations are able to dominate the national 
interests in Council as long as they maintain large and 
active memberships, strong bargains with the ministries 
of agriculture, and electoral influence. When the rela­
tionships are strong, they can even overcome pressures 
for change that result from shifts in public interests. 
The German DBV has done just that. The French farm lobby 
nearly lost its position in EC policy debates in the 
1980s when the French government rejected its historical 
support for high prices and instead opted to support the 
commercial aspirations of farmers. But the farm lobby 
quickly re-aligned itself behind the French government 
and thereby increased its influence over EC policy re­
form. In contrast, farmers in the UK lost their influ­
ence during the 1970s and the UK farm policy community 
entered EC debates divided.
France and Germany naturally came to dominate the 
farm reform debate because their positions in Council 
reflected bedrock support within both their governments 
and farm sectors. In contrast, the UK has not shown 
staying power in Council debates. The other governments 
recognize that the UK does not risk serious political 
backlash if it backs down in the negotiations because the 
UK position is usually not supported by the farm sector 
in the first place. Consequently, although the UK 
acquired greater freedom to set its policy position after 
1973, it lost some of its influence in Council.
Chapter 7
PRICE POLICY: DECISIONS
Community farm policy decisions are heavily influ­
enced by discussions leading up to the price debate among 
the Farm Ministers, but the key negotiations are always 
conducted within the Council itself. The main pressures 
on policy decisions arise either through the formal pol­
icy development process discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 or 
from the national sources discussed in Chapter 6. This 
chapter examines how the often-conflicting private, 
national, and Community interests are accommodated in the 
Counci 1.
In the early years, the Commission advised, peti­
tioned, cajoled, and threatened the Council to adopt its 
proposals but had little success. The peculiar price, 
exchange rate, and structural assistance systems in place 
in the 1970s enabled the Council, with or without Commis­
sion assistance, to fashion price packages to satisfy 
virtually everyone. But by 1980 farm specialization had 
reduced opportunities to trade-off price rises for some 
products for restraint on others, which impeded Council 
efforts to strike bargains that satisfied all national 
interests. As shifting power structures threatened to 
lead to re-nationalization of the CAP (see Chapter 6 on 
Germany and the UK in the 1970s), the Commission was 
forced either to relinquish control over the CAP or to 
reassert its authority and vision.
By 1984 the farm ministers had demonstrated that 
they were unable to manage the system either to their or 
the Commission's satisfaction, so the Agricultural Com­
missioner stepped in and used his own powers to manage 
the wheat market, to bargain with the Council, and, in 
some cases, to override or offset Council decisions. As 
early as 1977 the Commission tried to use its obvious ex­
pertise to fashion a new role as a conciliator and bridge 
builder in the Council. When that failed, it used its
- 255 -
256 Chapter 7
power to propose (Treaty of Rome, Article 149) as a bar­
gaining lever. Then, in 1983, the Commission decided to 
use its management powers to offset some of the impact of 
Council decisions.
As a result, the Commission dragged the Agricultural 
Council "with much kicking and screaming" to reform the 
policy.1 After 1984 real, and often nominal, guaranteed 
ECU prices for average quality wheat dropped each year, 
while the Commission changed the intervention system 
(e.g., delayed payments, shortened buying-in periods, and 
reduced monthly price increments) to reduce market 
prices. By 1988, the unlimited price guarantee for wheat 
was gone, official intervention prices merely represented 
notional prices that were often unattainable in the mar­
ket, intervention operated as a buyer of last resort, and 
prices were automatically adjusted based on market condi­
tions. In summary, the system was significantly more mar­
ket-directed and automatic than in earlier times. This 
chapter explains how the Commission managed this reform.
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The focal point for all farm-related decisions is 
the Council of Agricultural Ministers: Article 145 of
the Treaty of Rome provides that the Council has the 
"power to take decisions." That process begins when the 
Commission transmits its proposals to Council and discus­
sions begin in the Special Committee -for Agriculture 
(SCA), composed of representatives of the member state 
agricultural ministries. The President-in-Counci1 mean­
while attends EP debates to determine the general reac­
tion to the proposals. The SCA then reviews the EP opin­
ion and the advice from the specialist working groups and 
organizes the Council debate. All non-contentious issues 
are resolved in the SCA and submitted to the full Agri­
cultural Council as "A" items not requiring debate. The
Franklin (1988), p. 65
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price proposals are always treated as "B" items with full 
debate.
Pressure groups attempt to influence the Council 
before the debate. COPA and the BEUC (after 1977s2) 
occasionally meet with the president of the Agricultural 
Council. But William Averyt noted that generally:
Eurogroups have had little success in gaining 
access to the Council.... Here, the older pat­
terns prevail. The national groups have dis­
cussed proposals with their minister at length 
before he boards the train in Paris or Bonn for 
Brussels. Hence, a dual pattern of access 
characterizes EC politics. Community influen­
ced strategies are most noticeable during the 
discussion stage when proposals are being drawn 
up by the Commission; at the moment of formal 
decision, national strategies still dominate.3
Nevertheless, interest groups frequently stage demons­
trations outside the Council venue to reinforce their 
lobby efforts in the national capitals.
Once the Council has gathered all opinions, it is 
convened by the President-in-Counci1 as many times and 
for as long as necessary to arrive at an acceptable com­
promise. With only infrequent meetings over a span of 
weeks or months, the process is often open to influence 
by the national governments and domestic pressure groups.
The Commission participates in Council debates under 
Article 149 which provides that "where, in pursuance of 
this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal from the Com­
mission, unanimity shall be required for an act constitu­
ting an amendment to that proposal." The Commission fac­
ilitates decisions by revising its proposals in line with 
the evolving Council debate; alternatively, the Commis-
S2- The Times, 16-2-77, reported that the BEUC met John 
Silkin, the President of the Agricultural Council, for 
the first time ever.
3- Averyt (1977), p. 3.
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sioner can withhold approval for amendments in an effort 
to force the Council to accept Commission proposals. The 
Council, however, can override the Commission and enact 
any package it likes, provided it acts unanimously.
The Commission also has significant power to adjust 
the market system, thereby affecting market prices. Reg. 
(EEC) 2727/75 apportions specific management responsibi­
lities?^ The Council is responsible for setting official 
prices and monthly increases, and for establishing the 
"general rules" for intervention while the Commission is 
authorized to set the "detailed rules" for regular and 
special intervention. If the Commission changes the in­
tervention system against the wishes of the national gov­
ernments, the management committee for cereals can reject 
the proposal by a qualified majority within a time limit 
set by the Commission. Disputed items, along with the 
management committee opinion, must then be decided within 
one month by a qualified majority in Council. Unless 
Council overturns the proposal, it becomes law. In prac­
tice, it is difficult to muster a qualified majority in 
the Council to overrule the Commission. The Commission 
also has the power, through general clauses in the Treaty 
of Rome and Reg.(EEC) 2727/75, to set guaranteed prices 
in the absence of a Council decision (e.g., 1985 cereals
prices). The Commission accordingly has significant 
power to control or to offset the potential outcome of 
any price debate.
The other decision centres in Brussels, including 
the Councils of Foreign and Finance Ministers, have had 
little impact on the price policy.4 Price decisions by 
the Council of Agricultural Ministers are final and need 
not be ratified by any other Council or by the European 
Parliament. The resulting expenditure must also be paid. 
Although farm issues can be passed to other Councils or
4- Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p. 90.
^ek” Reg. (EEC) 2727/7 5 is the main re.gulation governing 
the operation of the EC cereals market.
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to the European Council (heads of government), the farm 
ministers maintain a virtual monopoly on the information 
and bargains needed to finesse decisions in this complex 
policy area. The other Councils therefore usually fail 
to resolve farm issues. The exception was at the 1988
<\c>vern m e X t
European Summit where the heads of, ' * successfully 
concluded a historic package of reforms (with the support 
of their farm ministers).
KEY BARGAINS IN THE SYSTEM
The decision making process revolves around the 
Council of Agricultural Ministers and the surrounding web 
of interlocking bargains. Council debate is usually pro­
scribed and directed by the strong bargains between the 
French government and French farmers, and among the Ger­
man Ministry of Agriculture, the political parties, and 
the DBV. In addition, the German and French governments 
have a loose bi-lateral relationship that at times trans­
cends the Council chamber and forms the basis for resol­
ving policy impasses (e.g., the Stocktaking in 1975 and 
introduction of the EMS in 1979 and cereals co-responsi­
bility in 1986).
The Commission in the early years thought it could 
control the system. When Community interests began to 
shift in the late 1970s, however, it discovered how 
little influence and support it really had in Council or 
from the lobby groups. The pan-European organizations,
including COPA, BEUC, CIAA, EP, and ESC, were usually
either unable or unwilling to support Commission pro­
posals for reforms.
Eurogroups have never had a major role at the deci­
sion-making level. Although COPA has access through the 
President-in-Counci1, it is generally unable to influence
policy. Consequently, "farmers act at the Community
level to supplement, not to supplant, action at the
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national level."55 In the 1970s COPA was sufficiently 
united and active to offset and mask this limitation. 
Meanwhile, other pressure groups, which gained access to 
the Council only in the late 1970s, found that their 
generally weak and divided membership was no match for 
their adversaries or the issues.
  Figure 7.1 -------------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING DECISION MAKING IN THE 
WHEAT PRICE POLICY 1970-79






















Relations at the decision-making level in Europe 
began to change about 1979. The inter-state bargains in 
the Commission, COPA, ESC, and EP began to break down and 
the critical intra-state agreements— between the national 
farm organizations and the member state ministries of 
agriculture— became more important. The shifting produc­
tion and finance structures weakened COPA and caused the
Pearce (1983), p. 171
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farm interests in France, Germany, and the UK to diverge. 
French farmers, looking to expansion and export, discov­
ered they had less in common with smaller, less-competi­
tive German farmers. This strained the critical bargain 
between Germany and France in the SCA and Council. By 
1979, the UK government had downgraded its bargain with 
the NFUs and became the key swing agent in the price re­
view. Instead of developing any continuing bargains, the 
UK switched partners almost annually, alternately sup­
porting its farmers, the Commission, or just going it 
alone. Although this kept the UK in the middle of the 
debate, it did not contribute to its influence.
After 1979 the EP gained some influence through the 
budget and its agricultural section, but in the end found 
it could do little more than constrain Council options. 
Because the interests in the Assembly widened after the 
election, it seldom spoke with enough authority to impose 
its opinion. Furthermore, as the Commission's negotiat­
ing strategy evolved from 1977 to 1988, both the EP and 
ESC lost power to influence decisions because they were 
seldom consulted about the specific proposals.^
Pressure groups were also pushed to the margins 
during the 1980s. COPA, in particular, found that it had 
less impact on Council because it could neither produce 
influential opinions on issues critical to the debate nor 
organize lobbies that represented more than a single 
interest. Other eurogroups, meanwhile, were forced to 
shift their focus toward non-price issues (e.g., food 
quality, structural programs) and therefore found that 
they had little influence on the price review when they 
had their annual courtesy visit with the president-in- 
counci1.
EP Doc 579/77, p. 83.
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Figure 7.2 -------------------------------------
KEY BARGAINS AFFECTING DECISION MAKING IN THE 
WHEAT PRICE POLICY 1979-88

























The Agricultural Council also lost some power re­
cently. Increasingly during the 1980s the Commission or 
individual farm ministers placed farm issues on the 
agendas of the Budget, Economic, Foreign, and European 
Councils. For most of the period this strategy did not 
harm the power of the Agricultural Council because the 
other ministers failed completely to solve the problems. 
But the 1988 European Council succeeded where the others 
failed. Now the farm ministers risk the Commission re­
ferring the price package to a joint Budget-Farm Council 
meeting if they exceed budget guidelines.
Last, and perhaps most importantly, the makeup of 
the Council affected policy decisions. In the 1970s the 
membership and voting rules that applied to other policy
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areas did not truly matter for agricultural affairs be­
cause all decisions were unanimous (after the Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966). In 1982 the Council began to decide 
by qualified majority votes and the distribution of votes 
began to matter. As the Community grew in 1980 and again 
in 1986, the voting power of France, Germany, and the UK 
was diluted, so that now their interests can be over­
ridden by the other countries (largely with Mediterranean 
concerns). After the 1986 expansion, it now takes more 
than two of the three large wheat producers to block a 
Council majority decision. Previously two of the count­
ries working together could block a decision.
Weight
Table 7.1 Voting in the Council of Ministers
1958-73 1973-80 1980-86 1986-
France 4 10 10 10
Germany 4 10 10 10
Italy 4 10 10 10
Belgium 2 5 5 5
Netherlands 2 5 5 5
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2
United Kingdom - 10 10 10
Denmark - 3 3 3
Ire land - 3 3 3
Greece - - 5 5
Spain - - - 8
Portugal — — — 5
Total Votes 17 58 63 76
Big 3 as % total 47% 52% 48% 39%
Qualified Majority 12 41 45 54
Blocking Vote 6 18 19 23
Source^, Rangarajan (1985), p. 202,
NEGOTIATIONS AND OUTCOMES (1973-79)
As the Commission used prices to support farm in­
comes and to eliminate the agri-monetary system, national 
interests came to the fore and "issue linkage and package 
broking rather than majority voting" became the means of
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conducting Council business.7 After 1974 the "growth of
the new three-tier presidential-ministerial-civil service 
decision-making body ha[d] shifted substantially the 
balance of power in the Community."63 The national minis­
ters in Council were able to fashion price packages that 
satisfied most national interests, often in conflict with 
Commission plans.
The Commission, however, remained integrally invol­
ved in the decision process. It courted support for its 
overall price goals formulated with the objective method 
by using its prerogative to propose ad hoc agri-monetary 
changes and differentiated product prices. At times this 
system seemed to work as the Council accepted the need 
for higher prices over much of the period. At other 
times the national governments short-circuited the sys­
tem. They gained a tactical advantage in the negotia­
tions as they alternately used the agri-monetary system 
to give their producers price increases in advance, est­
ablished immutable bottom lines through their domestic 
processes, or forced the debate into higher forums.
A review of the price fixings and related debates 
over the 1973-79 period demonstrates how these various 
strategies and tactics, combined with the underlying 
bargains at the national and Community level, yielded ad 
hoc price packages that generally favoured farmers.
Beginning in 1973, the new Commission, with Finn
Olav Gundelach as the Agricultural Commissioner, attemp­
ted to make the price setting more an administrative
exercise based on the objective method formula and on 
automatic agri-monetary rules. If Council had adopted 
either the objective method or automatic changes in green 
rates, it would effectively have transferred power to the
7- Henig (1980), p. 29.
e- Bieber & Palmer (1975), p. 318.
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Commission, which would have seriously limited the minis­
ters' ability to adjust the price proposals to suit their 
national interests. History demonstrated that the form­
ula was not objective at all; the Commission repeatedly 
revised it to produce price proposals that suited its 
concerns. Furthermore, "any scheme to phase out MCAs 
would clearly remove a bargaining weapon which [the Agri­
cultural Ministers] ... found a very useful addition to 
their armoury."9 Council consequently never completely 
accepted either change. As the objective method comp­
letely failed to sway the Council, the Commission was 
forced to develop a new negotiating strategy.
The Commission then attempted to negotiate with the 
Council on the specifics of the price packages. Helen 
Wallace noted that as early as 1971 the Commission propo­
sals to Council were less detailed than in the first 
years of the CAP; details were left to be completed 
during discussions with the national administrations.10
Table 7.2 Commission Bargaining on Prices
DG VI COM Rev 1 Rev 2 Decision
1975 (cereals) — 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
(German) — 4.0% 9.0% 9.0%
1977 (all) — 3.0% 3.9% 3.9%
1978 (all) — 2.0% 2.25% 2.1%
1979 (all) — .0% 2.0% 1.3%
1981 (all) 5-6.0% 7.8% 9.45% 9.2%
1982 (all) — 8.4% 10.3% 10.4%
1983 (all) 5.5% 4.3% — 4.2%
1985 (cereals) -3.1% -3.6% -2.0% -1.8% vetoed
Sources: Financial Times, The Times, and Agra Europe.
Price bargaining took two main forms. First, the 
Commission offered to negotiate different average price
Fennell (1979) , p. 100.
10- Taylor (1983), p. 82; quotes Ucdlace-.
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increases (Table 7.2). Second, and perhaps more impor­
tantly, the Commission both proposed and encouraged the 
Council to adopt differential pricing for products, so 
that deficit products or farm sectors with poor incomes 
would receive larger price increases. Table 7.3 shows 
that over the entire period of the CAP, but especially 
over the 1973-79 period, the product prices for the key 
temperate-zone products varied widely. Generally, cer­
eals farmers received least while milk, beef, and sugar 
producers received relatively more. It was quite easy to 
bargain for these changes during the 1970s because there 
were few controls or restraints on any of the key pro­
ducts. As well, most farmers still produced a mix of 
products. Therefore, higher milk, beef, or sugar prices 
could be used to compensate small producers for lower 
cereals prices. The Commission also found that it could




Wheat Sugar Milk Beef
1973-74 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 5.0% 10.5%
1974-75A 4.0% 4.0% 5.5% 12.0% 12.0%
1974-75B 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
1975-76 9.0% 9.0% 15 .0% 6,0+4.7% 8.5%
1976-77 -7.9% 4.0% 8.0% 4,5+3.0% 8.0%
1977-78 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
1978-79 1.3% 1.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.5%
1979-80 1.7% 1.5% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5%
1980-81 4.3% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
1981-82 6.0% 10.0% 8.5% 9.0% 7,5+2.5%
1982-83 8.5% 8.5% 9.0% 10.5% 8,5+2.5%
1983-84 3.0% 3.0% 4.0% 2.3% 5.5%
1984-85 -1.0% -1.0% .0% -1.0% .0%
1985-86 -1.8% -1.8% .0% 1.5% .0%
Average Percent Change 1985- 
c( 1968-69 2.3% 3.4%
-86
4.2% 4.8% 5.5%
Prices: basic intervention price for common wheat; ref­
erence price for bread wheat; minimum price for beets; 
milk target price; & beef guide price.
Source: Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984); and ASC, various.
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finesse the price package with offers of differential 
prices for feed and bread wheat because the distribution 
of production of those two products varied by country.
Green rates provided the second major bargaining 
chip in the price review. Although he wanted the end of 
all monetary gaps, the Agriculture Commissioner was quite 
willing to negotiate differential pricing by country 
through ad hoc adjustments in green rates. Table 7.4 
shows the impact of proposed and accepted green rate 
changes for common wheat. Although the general tendency 
was to reduce the monetary gaps, the speed and magnitude 
of change was largely a matter for negotiation. Over the 
1973-79 period, France generally wanted to close its mon­
etary gap faster than proposed by DG-VI (yielding higher 
farm prices) while Germany and the UK wanted to go slower
Table 7.4 Commission Proposals and Counci 1 Decisions
f or Common Wheat Intervention Prices {% ch)
ECU pri ces FF prices DM prices £ prices
Proposa1 Decision P D P D P D
1973 2.8 1.0 — 1.0 .0 1.0 — 1.0
1974A .0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
1974B 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 17.9
1975 9.0 9.0 12.6 10.6 3.1 6.6 - 11 .4
1976 -5.8 -7.9 -5.8 -7.9 -9.3 -10.4 -5.8 -7.9
1977 3.0 3.5 5.7 6.2 .0 1.5 9.5 6.6
1978 1.3 1.3 1.3 5.0 0.1 1.0 4.5 9.5
1979 .0 1.7 5.3 3.2* .0 0.6 5.3 12.7
1980 1.8 4.3 5.5 9.5 0.6 3.1 1.8 4.3
1981 6.0 6.0 3.4 6.0 0.4 2.3 ■-0.2 6.0
1982 6.6 8.5 4.7 8.5 1.6 5.2 2.1 8.5
1983 3.0 3.0 5.9 7.9 -0.1 1.1 0.6 3.0
1984 .0 -1.0 2.9 8.3 -6.3 -1.0 -4.0 2.3
1985 -3.6 -1.8 -1.5 0.1 -4.1 -1.8 ■-3.6 -1.8
1986 .0 .0 1.5 1.4 .0 .0 .0 1.3
1987 .0 .0 4.7 6.4 -2.4 .0 3.1 5.7
1988 .0 .0 .0 1.4 -1.0 -1.0 .0 2.9
* In 1979 'the franc was devalued before pri ces were set,
causing the price rise to appear smaller. 
Source: Appendix.
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(to protect higher farm prices in Germany and to prevent 
higher prices in the UK).
After 1976 the national governments and the Commis­
sion also allowed the diffusion of different represen­
tative rates for different products, so that national 
governments and the Commission together could tailor a 
specific set of agricultural prices to suit their needs. 
Countries tended to devalue green rates for products with 
short product cycles (e.g., milk, pigs, and vegetable
products) more rapidly and further than green rates for
cereals. The Commission and Council used this in a num­
ber of years to facilitate successful bargaining.
Table 7.5 Green Rate Changes Outside the Price Review
Date Special Circumstances Impact Approved
France
22.1.74 Elections: franc floated n . a —
19.3.76 Local elections + 1.4% yes
1.2.78 na + 2.5% yes
4.3.78 Parliamentary election + yes
12.78 na +3.6% no
20.3.79 na +5.118% yes
1.10.79 Dublin Summit +1.035% yes
27.3.80 na +3.5% yes
7.5.80 Presidential election +1.336% yes
8.10.81 na + 1.5% yes
4.5.82 na +1.761% yes
20.10.82 na +2.8% yes
United Kingdom
4.8.75 Renegotiation +5.0% yes
14.10.75 Renegotiation +5 .1% yes
8.1.78 Forced by Parliament +7.5% delayed
20.3.79 UK election +5.0% yes
1.10.79 Dublin Summit +1.099% yes
17.12.79 na +5.0% yes
Sources: Financial Times, The Times. and Agra Europe.
Whenever Commission proposals were inconsistent with 
national interests, the farm ministers used a variety of
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tactics to scuttle them. The agri-monetary system was 
the most popular. France, with a generally weak cur­
rency, had great potential to offset price restraint or 
to upset the price negotiations by devaluing its green 
rates and ensuring its producers got a price rise. Mean­
while, the UK had room during 1973-80 to devalue its 
green rate (during 1973-78 the UK accession agreement 
also allowed it to accelerate or slow the rise of UK 
prices toward European levels). In contrast, Germany had 
a consistently strong currency and was unable to change 
its green rates to provide its producers with national 
currency price changes to offset Commission proposals. 
Table 7.5 demonstrates that both the UK and France fre­
quently used the green rate weapon to advantage over the 
1973-82 period.
Farm ministers also obstructed the Commission with 
appeals to national bargains (Table 7.6). They could 
effectively stop a Commission proposal if they could 
demonstrate there were unyielding interests in the 
nation. Governments therefore set out to make solemn 
promises to the farm lobby (e.g., France in 1975), get 
official Cabinet direction (Germany), or refer to parlia­
mentary votes (UK). Conversely, some member states 
attempted to elevate farm debates to other European 
forums in the hope that farm interests could be overcome. 
The UK, in particular, frequently tried to get the Euro­
pean Council or Council of Finance Ministers to decide 
farm policy. This tactic usually only stalemated the 
process, however, because the other forums lacked the 
expertise and the contacts to fashion compromises. When 
these strategies were used, however, the Commission found 
it extremely difficult to salvage any of its proposals. 
Rather, it usually simply attempted to limit the damage 
from such a package.
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Table 7.6 National Strategies in the Council
Date Situation
France
1974B Aid given to non-wheat farmers and Giscard pro­
mised to seek interim price rise
1975 Giscard offered unspecified aid to offset infla­
tion
1975 Chirac's "solemn undertaking" to get 13.5% rise
1980 Giscard promised farmers aid
1981 National aid announced before prices set
1982 National aid announced before prices set
Germany
1974A Ertl accepted Council decision ad referendum 
(i.e., subject to approval by German Cabinet); 
first time used
1975-76 Government worried about inflationary impact on 
national wage bargaining
1978 Ertl got Cabinet approval for position in debate
1985 Government threatened to veto price cut
United Kingdom
1976-78 Social Compact between government and trade 
unions
1977 Non-confidence vote forced Labour recall of
Euro-MPs; weakened EP reform lobby
1978 National government forced by Parliament to
request 7.5% devaluation in green DM
Sources: Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 91; Financial Times;
The Times; and Agra Europe.
While farmers were still united at the European 
level and maintained dominant bargains with the German 
and French governments, the Commission found it had to 
make major concessions to farm interests to get its 
packages accepted in Council. In 1973, Lardinois pro­
posed to raise wheat prices in line with income needs, to 
revalue the DM, and to devalue the franc, but Germany 
refused to accept a price freeze for cereals. Although 
the Commission offered to use EAGGF funds to pay sub­
sidies to German wheat producers equal to a 2% price in­
crease to compensate for the freeze in German prices.
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Ertl got Cabinet approval to reject the package.11 The 
Council eventually compromised with a small rise in the 
wheat price and left unchanged the German representative 
rates.
Over the next several years, national elections 
focused ministerial attention on farm interests much more 
closely, and thereby diverted the price review from 
Commission plans. In 1974, the Commission crafted "one 
of the least controversial farm price packages" that it 
thought had "something in it for everyone.1,12 The review 
was complicated, however, because France floated the 
franc during the election in January, which gave their 
farmers a price increase. Shortly after, during the UK 
election in February, the UK Minister for Agriculture 
announced wheat prices would rise Q% as part of the tran­
sition to EC levels. German farmers, in contrast, could 
only get a price increase if European prices were raised. 
The Commission, however, had proposed a freeze for wheat 
prices. Ertl, as president of the Council, proposed 
after the UK election that wheat prices rise between 4% 
and 5%, which was accepted at the end of a 30-hour mara­
thon session.
Shortly after prices were set, farmers began to 
lobby their national governments and the Commission for a 
supplementary price rise for 1974. Higher input costs 
threatened to cut sharply into farm incomes that year and 
world prices had risen above EC prices. COPA succeeded 
at least partly because the lobby in France roused Presi­
dent Giscard to promise to ask the EC for a supplementary 
price increase. The Commission offered 4% across the 
board shortly thereafter. France supported the rise and 
the UK was willing to allow a small increase but Germany 
was not satisfied. Ertl sided with the German Economics
X1- Agra Europe, 517, 26-4-73.
1=!- Nevi 1 le-Rolfe (1984), p. 266.
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Ministry and resisted the cereals price increase because 
German farmers neither needed the rise (because they did 
not face the same cost increases as in other countries) 
nor would benefit from it (because an estimated 80% of 
the 1974 crop in Germany had already been sold into the 
market). He tried a number of stalling tactics, includ­
ing referring the 5% compromise solution to the German 
Cabinet, where it was duly rejected. The DBV meanwhile 
lobbied for the price rise because that would raise farm 
prices in the following year. Tension built until Presi­
dent Giscard and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt met quietly in 
October, while the UK was preoccupied with its general 
election, and negotiated a 5% price rise. In exchange 
for the price rise, Germany got the other ministers to 
agree to factor the interim increase into the 1975 price 
review and got the Commission to begin a Stocktaking of 
the CAP.
Council faced a new price review only a few months 
later. The Commission offered 9% for wheat in 1975-76 
and proposed to realign green currencies closer to market 
rates. But German and French ministers in Council upset 
Commission plans when they publicly announced they could 
not accept the package. The German Cabinet, worried 
about the nation-wide pay negotiations, directed Ertl to 
accept no more than an average 6% institutional price 
rise. When Ertl threatened to resign (which might have 
destabilized the SPD/FDP coalition). Cabinet agreed to 
allow him to resist the proposed revaluation of the green 
DM. Then in January, Giscard gave a "solemn undertaking" 
to the leaders of the French farm lobby that price in­
creases in 1975 would exceed the rate of inflation; Prime 
Minister Jacques Chirac said this should be more than 13% 
in francs. The Commission consequently had little room 
to manoeuvre. It only got agreement when it offered a 
smaller revaluation of the green DM and higher prices for 
non-cereal products. The new Labour government in the UK
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consented to the price increases because it was busy with 
its plans to re-negotiate its terms of accession.
The Stocktaking that autumn disappointed many re­
formers because the European Council never discussed or 
resolved any of its differences about reform. In retro­
spect, the Stocktaking appeared to have been simply a 
face-saving way for the German government to accept 
higher prices in 1974.13
The Commission took the election-free period that 
followed to make a sudden shift in the wheat price sys­
tem. In 1976 the Commission pushed to realign production 
toward higher quality wheat and to increase feed-use of 
low grade wheat. It therefore proposed to implement a 
higher 'reference' price for wheat suitable for baking 
and a lower intervention price for feed wheat. After 
adjustments for green rate changes, reference prices for 
bread wheat would rise 2.9% in Germany, 5.4% in France, 
and almost 20% in the UK while intervention prices for 
feed-grade wheats would drop 9% in Germany and 6% in 
France, and rise about 5% in the UK. The bread wheat 
reference price would added another mechanism to differ­
entiate prices, as now wheat producers would get differ­
ent prices for different qualities. Both the UK and Ger­
many attempted to exchange their approval for the new 
system for a cereals price freeze, but France, faced with 
farm riots in the country-side, pushed for higher prices. 
The Council, with Commission assistance, finally crafted 
an agreement. They accepted the Commission's direction 
on the new cereals price regime, but delayed full imple­
mentation until 1977-78. In the interim they set the 
intervention price for wheat equal to the new reference 
price for bread-making wheat and instructed the DG-VI to 
levy a 15 UA reduction for wheat that failed to meet the 
higher quality standards. Although the Commission pre­
13. Nevi1le-Rolfe (1984), p. 350
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ferred a slightly different set of prices (e.g., lower 
milk prices), the final package was acceptable because 
the Council approved the realigned wheat prices and 
agreed to cereal prices somewhat lower than the Commis­
sion had proposed.
President Roy Jenkins announced early in 1977 that 
the new Commission would develop a role as "conciliator 
and bridge-bui lder between member governments.1,1 * In 
conjunction with this, the Commission began to push for 
market-based pricing and for an automatic system of green 
rate adjustments. The next price review began in January 
when UK Agriculture Minister John Silkin unsuccessfully 
petitioned the Farm Council to set guidelines for the 
Commission to follow in the 1977-78 price proposals; he 
sought to avoid any price agreement that might jeopardize 
agreement with British trade unions in the third stage of 
the social contract. The UK already faced large domestic 
price rises as the result of the final stage of the tran­
sition to EC prices. When his appeal failed, Silkin 
promised to use the green pound as a "bargaining counter 
to get price stability" and threatened to veto any green 
pound devaluation.13 Nevertheless, the Commission pro­
posed to complete the new price system and to raise 
cereals prices 3.0%, to revalue the green DM, and to de­
value both the green franc and pound. France generally 
accepted the price package; the UK reaffirmed its opposi­
tion to price increases; and Ertl and the DBV pushed for 
higher DM prices. The DBV was soon silenced, however, 
because a leaked German ministry of agriculture report 
showed that German farm income had risen 21% in the pre­
ceding year. When negotiations began, the UK was iso­
lated as the other members generally coalesced around a 
slightly higher rise than proposed by the Commission. 
The NFU, the EP, and the farm ministers lobbied the UK
The Observer. 16-1-77.
Financial Times, 27-10-76, and The Times, 7-12-76.
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farm minister until he yielded. The Commission, however, 
declined to propose a "compromise" different -fVo«v> its 
earlier p r o p o s a l . T h e  ministers therefore unanimously 
agreed to complete the cereals price realignment begun in 
1976, raised prices 3.5%, implemented modest green rate 
changes (the green pound fell only 2.9% instead of 6.3% 
as proposed), and agreed to subsidize UK butter to hold 
the domestic price steady. This deal, for opposite 
reasons, outraged both the new Budget Commissioner and UK 
farmers and set the stage for a confrontation in 1978. 
Nevertheless, it represented a small moral victory for 
the Commission because it was the first time it had not 
compromised completely with the Council.
The negotiating pendulum oscillated during the 1978 
price review and only swung toward the Commission pro­
posals when it used Article 8 of Reg.(EEC) 2727/75 to 
establish a special intervention for bread wheat. The 
national governments out-manoeuvred the Commission 
initially by using the green rates weapon. In February, 
France requested and got a 2.5% devaluation in advance of 
the elections for the National Assembly. Then the NFU, 
angered by the 1977 price decisions, successfully lobbied 
the Conservative opposition in the UK Parliament to force 
the minority Labour government to request a 7.5% green 
pound devaluation.17 Although Council delayed approval 
for the UK devaluation, there was little doubt that it 
would be allowed. Thus, both the UK and France could 
accept the lower price rises proposed by the Commission. 
The Commission had then only to deal with Germany. In 
April, after the French elections (and a bitter exchange 
over French MCAs during the election week). Council met 
for four successive days without agreement. The pendulum 
then swung towards the Commission agenda. Germany de­
1A- Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 273.
17■ The Labour government wanted only a 5% devaluation 
while the NFU wanted 12%.
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manded an average 3.5% price rise but neither the UK nor 
France was keen; both were concerned about inflation. 
The Commission offered a new package which included a 
smaller DM revaluation, a lower increase in the wheat 
reference price (1% vs 3.1% originally proposed), and a 
new special intervention for bread wheat of only minimum 
quality. The new special intervention for lower quality 
bread wheat would raise market prices between August and 
October which was of particular interest to Germany be­
cause about 80% of the German wheat harvest was usually 
marketed during those months. The new intervention was 
acceptable to the other countries because it would not 
directly raise wheat prices during the rest of the year. 
This bit of legerdemain effectively reconciled German de­
mands for higher prices and French and UK insistence on 
price restraint. Ertl made a last attempt to get a full 
3.5% increase by returning to Bonn for a Cabinet meeting 
in the middle of the Council debate, but he was forced by 
the clock to accept in mid-May the package the Commission 
had offered in April.
The Commission in 1979 tried to build on its success 
by proposing a cereals price freeze and automatic re­
alignment of green rates. But the 1979 price review was 
again upset by the national governments. France first 
delayed implementation of the European Monetary System 
because it wanted a definite timetable for the elimina­
tion of existing MCAs and automatic elimination of new 
MCAs. The Council remained deadlocked until mid-January, 
when the FNSEA and DBV met and agreed that MCAs could be 
phased out provided prices rise by enough to sustain 
German farm revenues.13 (The Commission estimated that 
German producers would potentially lose £1 B if they were 
not compensated by price rises.1*5*) When Ertl and French 
farm minister Pierre Mdhaignerie met with Gundelach, Ertl
Le Monde, 19-1-79. 
Financial Times, 22-1-79.
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unsuccessfully demanded EC compensation for any resulting 
DM price cuts. Agreement finally appeared imminent when 
the two ministers agreed that prices should rise 2% in 
1979 to facilitate the change in the green DM but then 
the UK threatened to veto any price increase for surplus 
products. Threats and counter-threats followed until 
March when eight members of the Agricultural Council (the 
UK did not participate) made a gentlemen's agreement to 
dismantle MCAs "pragmatically," provided that changes did 
not cause "economic difficulties for the member state 
concerned." The hard-currency ministers (e.g., Germany) 
also accepted a new one percentage point franchise (cf. 
1.5% franchise for negative MCAs), which was the equiva­
lent of a 1% revaluation. There was then a short hiatus 
while the UK went to the polls (the UK and France were 
both allowed 5% revaluations in March). When Council re­
convened at the end of June, the new UK farm minister 
withdrew opposition to price increases but Gundelach 
declined to propose a price rise for cereals. The Coun­
cil then rewrote the Commission package and raised prices 
by an average 1.5%, devalued the green pound by 5% and 
the green franc 1.5% (on top of the March devaluations), 
and revalued the green DM 1%.
Gundelach was angered by the Council decision to 
rewrite the 1979 price package.220 A few days later the
Commission concurred and unanimously denounced the farm 
deal. The Council decision in 1979 forced the Commission 
to rethink its tactics. It had failed to get Council to
accept its approach to prices during the late 1970s, at
least partly because its new role as a conciliator in
Council neutralized its own natural supporters. Euro- 
groups were increasingly ineffective because the revised
220- Financial Times, 22-6-79, quoted him as exclaiming 
outside the Council meeting that "I am deeply depressed 
but I have not yet been raped." He said his comments had 
been poorly translated but the sense of frustration 
remained.
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proposals during the negotiations were seldom publicized 
and never re-submitted to advisory groups (i.e., the EP, 
ESC, COPA, and BEUC) . The Commission therefore could 
not call for support from those groups. Meanwhile, COPA, 
when it found it could not work effectively at the Euro­
pean level, had little choice but to encourage its member 
organizations to work more closely with their national 
ministries of agriculture. The Commission recognized 
that unless, it changed its approach, the CAP would slowly 
but surely be renationalized.
THE SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1980-83)
Between 1980 and 1983 the Commission seriously tried 
to implement automatic pricing (via the guarantee thres­
hold system) and an automatic agri-monetary system in 
order to reduce the role for political gamesmanship in 
the price reviews. It offered a combination of differen­
tiated prices, ad hoc green rate adjustments, and in 
1981, 1982, and 1983 "monetary events" to win support for 
its proposals but found that the Council was not recep­
tive. 523 The farm ministers and heads of state seemed 
only interested in their national problems. Economic 
recession, high inflation, rising unemployment, and dis­
gruntled voters encouraged the national governments to 
press for greater farm support.
The 1980 price review was typical of the situation 
the Commission faced. The UK demanded and got a 5% de­
valuation immediately before the review, and then announ­
ced that it wanted both a price freeze and a budget re­
bate. When the newly-elected EP rejected the 1980 budget 
and called for a "stringent" price policy, the Commission 
responded with proposals for restrained prices and a
Philip (1985) , p . 58.
:2S- The Commission in 1974 proposed a "monetary event" 
(devaluation of the lira and revaluation of the Snake 
currencies in the UA) to allow for a 2.76% reduction in 
the German monetary gap, but Ertl vetoed it.
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higher co-responsibility levy for milk. But France and 
Germany both faced general elections soon and wanted 
price rises. They noted that higher world prices and a 
weaker ECU ensured that resources provided by the provi­
sional twelfths rule were sufficient to allow greater 
price increases. The debate ebbed and flowed and the 
farm ministers slowly developed a price package. But 
Farm Minister Peter Walker was directed by the UK Cabinet 
not to accept the price package until the UK got a satis­
factory budget rebate. With a presidential election on 
the horizon, Giscard threatened to pay FF 5 B to French 
farmers as income support if prices were not set by June 
1. The French foreign minister also threatened that the 
other eight members would proceed if the UK blocked the 
developing price package. The farm ministers sent the 
dispute to a Summit in the last week of May without suc­
cess. Finally, on May 30 (one day before the French 
deadline), the General Council agreed on a UK budget re­
bate for 1980 and 1981 and the UK lifted its veto on the 
price package. Consequently, milk co-responsibility was 
increased, wheat prices rose 4.2%, the green DM was re­
valued 1.1%, the franc was devalued 5.1%, and France 
cancelled its proposed farm support.
The May 30 deal also provided that the Commission 
was to review the CAP to find ways to restrain costs and 
control surpluses. The Foreign Ministers of France, Ger­
many, and the UK generally agreed that CAP outlays should 
be restrained and both Germany and the UK thought the 
Commission was going in the right direction when it pro­
posed co-responsibility as the fourth principle of the 
CAP. Gundelach fully intended to pursue this approach 
when he was re-appointed Agricultural Commissioner, but 
he died a few days into his new term.
Before Paul Dalsager, the new Agricultural Commis­
sioner, had a chance to release the price proposals for 
1981, France demanded a 10% price rise for 1981-82 and
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announced it would pay special grants worth FF 4.1 B to
support French farmers. President Giscard was concerned 
both about farm incomes in the face of the 1980 bumper 
wheat crop and about re-election in 1981. Meanwhile, 
Germany and the UK called for the 1% VAT ceiling on Com­
munity outlays to remain, which appeared to rule out any 
price rises.
The Commission, however, pushed ahead and proposed
to introduce a guarantee threshold system for cereals.
World prices then began to rise, so that by early January 
EC prices could rise 5% without breaching the 1% VAT 
limit and by the end of January even higher prices would 
be possible. The Commission therefore proposed to raise 
prices an average 8% (bread wheat by 4%) in an effort to 
buy acceptance of both the guarantee threshold system and 
its proposed significant revaluations for the green DM
and pound.
Germany generally agreed with the Commission pro­
posals because industrial unions in the Federal Republic 
were settling for 5% that year, but the UK was unhappy 
with the price cuts being forced in the cereals sector 
(it did not accept that the UK should be the only country 
to face a price cut) while France wanted even higher farm 
prices. In March the Commission proposed a technical fix 
to the ECU to solve the conflict. When the Community 
introduced the European Currency Unit (ECU) for the CAP 
in 1979, it created the potential to change individual 
monetary gaps by realigning the central EMS rates. In 
practice, only the pound and lira central rates could be 
adjusted to suit agricultural interests (without affect­
ing other sectors) because they were not linked closely 
to the EMS. The Commission therefore offered to have the 
Standing Monetary Committee revalue the notional central 
EMS rate for the recently strong UK pound by 22.74% and 
devalue the perennially weak Italian lira by 6.4%, which 
would effectively revalue the ECU and narrow the German
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monetary gap by 2.5%. This resolved the green rate neg­
otiations because, in addition to the reduction in German 
MCAs, it would eliminate the UK positive monetary gap 
(without affecting UK farm prices) and would provide 
France with a new negative monetary gap (that would allow 
for a 2.8% devaluation immediately before the presiden­
tial election).
The Commission appeared to have Council approval for 
cereals co-responsibility without any compensatory price 
increase when the EP resolved that prices should rise by 
12%. The Commission declared its position had been un­
dercut and promptly gave way. The price package, which 
was set before the French presidential election, provided 
for a generous price rise (10% for bread wheat) but mere­
ly approved co-responsibility in principle (implementa­
tion was delayed until 1982-83). The Council, however, 
did allow the Commission to introduce the first of what 
was to be a series of adjustments to the minimum quality 
standards required for intervention purchases. The 
intervention agencies henceforward would not purchase 
bread wheat that did not have at least 10.5% protein 
content.
In June 1981 the Commission's final report to the 
Council on the Mandate confirmed that it wanted co-res- 
ponsibility for surplus cereals production in addition to 
restrained pricing. At the Luxembourg Summit the Commis­
sion convinced the heads of government to delegate debate 
of the reforms to a special ambassadoria1-1eve 1 committee 
of mostly COREPER members, not the SCA, to keep it away 
from the farm ministers. The committee reviewed the pro­
posals during the following months and reported to the 
1981 London Summit, where for the first time in many 
years agricultural matters were handled by other than
agree on CAP reform and the debate returned to the Agri­
cultural Council.




Negotiations in 1982 opened badly. Mitterand 
announced a FF 5.56 B farm support package for 1982 and 
demanded prices in France rise by about the rate of in­
flation (14%). Prime Minster Pierre Mauroy also refused 
to accept any link between farm prices and the UK budget 
rebate, which was back on the agenda. Meanwhile, Peter 
Carrington, the UK foreign minister, threatened to veto 
the price package until a new budget deal was set. The 
Commission then produced a comprehensive package which 
introduced the guarantee threshold system for cereals and 
revalued both the German and UK green rates. The Commis­
sion again attempted to finesse the green rate changes by 
revaluing the theoretical green central rate for the 
pound by 8.27%. Combined with devaluations of the cent­
ral rates for Belgium and Luxembourg, the net effect was
to revalue the ECU by 0.3%, which reduced the German
monetary gap by a corresponding amount. But Germany 
rejected the remaining green revaluation. Meanwhile,
France continued to press for prices to rise at least 12% 
and threatened to force majority voting in Council to
override any UK veto; the Commission agreed that it would 
support majority voting. The Commission reopened negoti­
ations in April and eventually accepted the Council Pres­
ident's proposals. The final package raised wheat ECU 
prices by 8.5%, implemented a smaller green DM adjust­
ment, and introduced a modified guarantee threshold sys­
tem. At the insistence of France and Ireland, the system 
compared three-year average production levels with the 
threshold level, which was to be adjusted for any imports
of cereal substitutes over 15 M t . The price cuts (in the
succeeding year) would be in steps of 1% for each full 1
Mt of over-production. In May, before a UK budget deal
was agreed, the Council put the package to the vote and 
the UK, supported by Denmark and Greece, refused to par­
ticipate. Nevertheless, the vote passed. The Council 
refused to accept the UK veto because it was simply a 
negotiating measure and not a matter of the content of 
the package. The UK was unable to do much about it be­
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cause it also at that time sought EC support for its em­
bargo against Argentina during the Falkland War. The 
Commission subsequently offset some of the price rise 
when, at the beginning of the marketing year, it raised 
the medium quality standards for bread wheat. To receive 
the full reference price wheat had to have 11.5% protein, 
as well as to pass on all the other quality tests.
The Commission thought it would be able make a sig­
nificant reduction in the EC-world price gap in 1983. 
The newly implemented guarantee threshold system indica­
ted that wheat prices should be cut and CAP outlays for 
1983 looked set to exceed the budget (even without any 
price increases for 1983-84) because of a record harvest 
in 1982. After a difficult internal debate, the Commis­
sion finally offered a 4% increase for wheat, reduced by 
1% because production in 1980-82 exceeded the guarantee 
threshold by 1.4 M t . Prices in Germany and the UK would 
be further reduced by green rate revaluations. Council 
opened the price debate in April, after the FDP lost sup­
port in the German federal election and Ertl had retired 
in favour of Kiechle, and the debate got stuck on green 
rates. In March, the EMS currencies had again been re­
aligned, which created a record 13% positive monetary gap 
for Germany and an even greater negative gap for France. 
Germany rejected the proposed 2.8% revaluation in the 
green rate (because ECU prices were proposed to rise only 
3%). Kiechle as President-in-Office toured the capitals 
and then reconvened the Council to present a slightly 
altered price package. The UK vetoed the package. It 
accepted neither a proposed 2.5% revaluation of the pound 
(added by Kiechle to win Irish support) nor any increase 
in ECU prices. The Commission also refused to modify its 
proposals in line with Kiechle's compromise, which stale­
mated the Council because it could not agree unanimously 
to change the package. In May, with the marketing year 
already started for many products, Germany reconvened the 
Council and recommended the theoretical central rate for
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the pound be revalued as In 1981 and 1982; the UK agreed, 
provided France and Germany would accept the Commission 
package. In the end, the Council presented this proposal 
to the Standing Monetary Committee and the sterling cen­
tral rate was raised to the market rate, which effective­
ly revalued the ECU about 1%. Consequently, the Council 
quickly concluded the price package, with ECU prices un­
changed from the Commission proposals-— the first time 
ever— and national currency prices only slightly higher 
than proposed.
After the Council agreement, the Commission got 
through the management committee two reforms that cut the 
effective support for wheat. The Commission decided to 
limit special intervention purchases of bread wheat to 
750,000 tonnes in each of August and September and 1.5 Mt 
in October and imposed a 5 ECU/t non-refundable security 
deposit to be remitted as part of any intervention offer.
Agriculture was near the top of the EC agenda over 
the last six months of 1983 but little was done. The 
Stuttgart Summit examined farm issues in June 1983, but 
decided nothing. The Commission then prepared a new 
report on CAP reform during July and a special Council of 
Agriculture, Finance, and Foreign Ministers met over the 
next several months to prepare a report for the Athens 
Summit. In November, the special Council meeting con­
cluded that agricultural issues were too technical and 
complex and returned them to the Agricultural Council. 
Subsequently, the Athens Summit failed to resolve any of 
the issues.
Counci 1-Commission relations had reached a turning 
point. The Commission knew that it could not manage the 
price review with only moral suasion or manipulation of 
price offers. The Commission strategy for negotiating 
with the Council was thwarted by changes in the economic 
environment throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. The
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strategy of 'buying' price restraint on some products 
(such as cereals) with offsetting improvements for other 
products was less tenable by the mid-1980s: other pro­
ducts had come under tighter market regimes (sugar was
responsibility levy) and new production technologies were
product-specific, which made it difficult for farmers to 
change their production plans. The Commission also found 
it was unable to manage the system by operating as a 
"conciliator and bridge-builder." In each year that the 
Commission attempted to bargain using only adjusted price 
packages, the Council took everything offered and more. 
The Commission so far had offered what the Council could 
do on its own.
But Council successes during 1980-84 masked signifi­
cant change in the member states. During the early 1980s 
the government-farmer bargains in the UK and France were 
continually changing. The time was ripe for reform.
PRICE REFORM (1984-88)
The Commission finally began to achieve genuine re­
form after 1983. During the 1980-83 period, the Commis­
sion had pushed to make wheat pricing more market direct­
ed, at first through the annual price review and then 
with the operation of the guarantee threshold system. By 
1983 it appeared the system might work, but the 1984 and 
1985 price reviews demonstrated the difficulty with that 
approach. Price bargaining had proved ineffective and 
the "monetary event" was impossible once the pound weak­
ened in 1985. So, beginning in 1986, the Commission took 
the initiative and used its market management powers to 
push through a series of reforms that made pricing much 
more automatic and less open to the influence of individ­
ual member states. The Commission, remembering its 1978 
success, decided to offer changes in market structures 
(called related measures; Table 7.7) and permit national 
income supports to finesse its reforms. The Commission
subject to milk co-
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consequently was able to set the agenda and force real 
reform during 1984-88.
Table 7.7 Related Measures Enacted by the Commission 
under Reg.(EEC) 2727/75 and Impact on Prices
Year Measure Impact Used
Art.7.5: Intervention (Commission sets specific rules)
1981 Minimum protein set at 10.5% for
bread wheat n . a yes
1982 Medium quality for bread wheat
raised to 11.5% protein n . a yes
1983 Delay intervention payments by 4
months for cereals 1 o ae yes
1985 Shorten delay in payments to 3
months for cereals (2 months for
small farmers) + 1.0% yes
1986 Limit intervention to Dec.l-Ap.30 n . a no
1989 Reduce value of transport subsidies
and number of intervention stores n . a no
Art.8: Special Intervention (Commission sets specific
rules)
1978 Begins for minimum quality bread
wheat (continues to 1985) n . a yes
1983 Limited purchases to 0.75 Mt in
Aug-Sept and 1.5 Mt in October
and levied 5 ECU/t security fee n . a yes
1984 Same limitations as in 1984 n . a yes
1985 End of minimum quality bread wheat
intervention n . a delayed
Art.9 : Carry-over Payments & Other (Commission sets
rules)
1986 Proposed cut in carryover payments n . a no
1987 Threatened to change cereals rules
to cut prices n . a . no
Sources: Various Commission price proposals. Financial
Times, Agra Europe, ASC, and H-GCA, Marketing Notes
(various).
The Commission was helped by a fundamental shift in 
some of the key power structures. Highly volatile finan­
cial markets and more diversified production structures 
assisted the Commission. First, higher interest rates 
throughout Europe during the 1980s placed a higher oppor­
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tunity cost on delays in payments for intervention. Most 
farmers in the 1980s also were well integrated into the 
commercial systems and therefore were open to such influ­
ences. The Commission used a rule of thumb that every 
month of delay in payments was equal to a one percent 
price cut. Second, after 1979, EC wheat producers grew 
and marketed more wheat than European consumers or in­
dustry needed. Consequently, the intervention price was 
much more important. During the 1970s, the EC wheat mar­
ket price hovered somewhere between the intervention and 
target prices. Market prices dipped below intervention 
prices only when surpluses increased in the early 1980s. 
Consequently, delays for intervention payments, limits to 
intervention buying, or adjustments to special interven­
tion rules and carry-over payments all had a direct im­
pact on market prices.
In 1984 and 1985, the Commission also used its 
powers over income aids to align the German government 
with EC programs. In 1984, the offer of income aids pro­
vided the means to implement the green ECU system, which 
narrowed monetary gaps and reduced discord in Council. 
Then in 1985, Germany threatened to provide compensation 
when the Commission imposed the 1.8% cereals price cut 
Kiechle had vetoed in Council. The Commission calmed 
Germany, first, with a threat to prosecute if national 
aids were implemented and, second, with an offer to 
shorten the delay in intervention payments. Then in 1986 
cereals co-responsibility was introduced without the same 
degree of animosity as the smaller price cut in 1985 at 
least partly because the Commission expanded the less- 
favoured areas in Germany to 51% from 33% and allowed 
Germany to pay direct income support. Finally, the 1988 
stabilizers package was accepted at least partly because 
the Commission offered to supplement the price system 
with a set-aside program and a coordinated income payment 
scheme. So, although the rise of national aids appears 
to be a return to Council domination, in practice it
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provided for community-based solutions to be finessed 
past particularly difficult national interests in Coun­
cil.
By 1984 the situation was ripe for change. All the 
major countries had completed their elections and for the 
first time the Community faced a real budget constraint. 
The Commission estimated that at current prices the EC 
budget would reach 0.997% of VAT, just a shade lower than 
the 1% limit. Even before the Commission presented its 
proposals, it announced that it would use its authority 
under Reg.(EEC) 2727/75 to delay all cereals intervention 
payments after January 1 by four months (the usual delay 
was one month), which effectively cut the real value of 
support by 3-4%.
The Commission proposed in 1984 to freeze wheat 
prices, to significantly revalue both the green DM and 
the pound, and to allow only a modest franc devaluation. 
Germany balked and threatened to veto the large devalua­
tion. The UK was more concerned with getting a new 
budget agreement than with the actual price level while 
France adopted a conciliatory attitude (as President of 
Council). Mitterand served notice that he would not 
tolerate farmer protests in support of their 4% price 
request and threatened to prosecute any farmers who 
damaged public buildings. Then in Council, France pro­
posed a new price package that would actually cut wheat 
prices by 1% and reduce MCAs by even more. Germany, un­
der pressure from the DBV, proposed instead a green ECU 
to replace the existing ECU-based agri-monetary system. 
The Agricultural Council, assisted by a Commission sug­
gestion that Germany could provide national direct income 
support, eventually agreed in March that the wheat price 
would be cut 1%, the green ECU would be introduced, and 
Germany could introduce after 1 January 1985 a 3% VAT 
refund to compensate farmers for the deflationary effects 
of reducing the DM monetary gap. Existing monetary gaps
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would be dismantled in three stages: at the start of the
1984-85 marketing year, on 1 January 1985 and completely 
by the start of 1987-88. The package was put in jeopardy 
in May, however, when the Commission declined a request 
from Chancellor Kohl to allow his government to pay farm­
ers a 5% VAT refund. Kohl had requested permission to 
begin the payments in July to improve CDU prospects in 
the EP election. Meanwhile, the EP withheld the UK's 
1983 budget refund and caused the UK government to with­
hold formal approval for the package.
The heads of government met at Fontainebleau Summit 
at the end of June and resolved all the outstanding dis­
putes. The Summit agreed to give the UK a rebate worth 1 
B ECU in 1984 and then rebates equal to 66% of its net 
contribution in future years, to give Germany a smaller 
but still significant rebate from the future cost of the 
CAP, and to raise the VAT limit to 1.4%, effective 1986 
(with interim measures until then). The Summit also 
overruled the Commission and approved Germany's request 
to pay a 5% VAT refund effective 1 July 1984. Further­
more, the Summit gave the Finance Council authority to 
veto future price packages if outlays looked to exceed 
the average growth over the past three years.23 Although 
the Commission was forced to concede the size and timing 
of the aid for Germany, it played a critical role in the 
negotiations, because as guardian of the Treaty, it had 
the authority to challenge national aids in the European 
Court of Justice.
The 1984 decisions on the budget and the agri-mone- 
tary system set the stage for further reform. The Fon­
tainebleau agreement ensured that the UK share of addi­
tional spending was to be only 7% (rather than 20%) while 
Germany's share was reduced marginally.22* As such, "the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1985), p. 61. 
Harvey & Thomson (1985), p. 14.
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UK's financial responsibility for additional CAP expendi­
ture is now substantially lessened, thus weakening the 
only consistent ally of the Commission in its efforts to 
bring about budget saving changes in the CAP."23 But, 
the redistribution of the burden made France a major con­
tributor to the budget, which affected the way in which 
it looked at Community policies in the following years. 
Meanwhile, the new green ECU system, which was initially 
resisted by.the Commission, eventually enhanced the pros­
pects for reform. Although it raised guaranteed prices 
in weak currency countries with each EMS realignment, it 
largely removed the pressure for ECU prices to rise to 
accommodate green rate revaluations. The new system also 
firmly established the validity of national income aids 
to support particularly disadvantaged producers or count­
ries. Henceforward, ECU prices could be set based on 
market conditions rather than social concerns.
Hans Andriessen, the new Agricultural Commissioner 
in 1985, was immediately presented with an ideal oppor­
tunity to cut prices. The record cereals crop in 1984 
had pushed the three-year average production more than 5 
Mt over the guarantee threshold and triggered a 5% price 
cut. Then the EP strengthened the Commission position 
when it rejected the 1985 budget and forced the Community 
to operate with provisional twelfths. DG-VI proposed an 
average 2% increase in prices but the Commission instead 
voted 12 to 2 to raise prices only 1.5%. When the 5% 
guarantee threshold penalty was assessed, wheat prices 
would fall 3.6%. In addition, the Commission pushed for 
further revaluation of the green DM, which would force 
German wheat prices down 4.1%. The UK, at one extreme, 
pushed for a flat 5% ECU price cut while, at the other 
extreme, COPA demanded that prices rise 4-5% (even this 
was a concession because the objective method indicated
Harvey & Thomson (1985), p. 14.
M. Butler (1986), p . 86.
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prices should rise 7.8%). Germany rejected the complete 
proposal and instead called for tighter quality controls, 
termination of intervention buying for feed-grade wheats, 
and a freeze of institutional prices r*7 Perhaps the 
greatest surprise was that France sided with the Commis­
sion against Germany. It saw the price cut as a "precon­
dition for the continued expansion of the cereals sector" 
and viewed the German stand as a threat to the long-term 
commercial prospects for French cereals farmers.5263
Kiechle promptly raised the stakes and promised Ger­
man farmers that cereals prices would not be cut in DM 
terms. When the CDU lost some of the vote in state elec­
tions in North-Rhine Westphalia, the German cabinet came 
on side: Kohl appealed to the Commission not to push for
the price cut while Josef Strauss, the Premier of Bavaria 
and a CSU leader, publicly supported a veto. The Agri­
cultural Council reconvened in mid-May and approved by a 
qualified majority the 1985-86 prices for all products 
except cereals and rapeseed. The Commission then offered 
to moderate the cereals price cut to 2% and finally to 
1.8%. But, when the issue was again put to the Council 
in June, Germany formally vetoed the prices. With the 
marketing year fast approaching, the Commission adopted 
the 1.8% price cut as an "interim precautionary measure;" 
it interpreted the failure to take a decision as leaving 
it free to choose how to regulate the market. Kiechle 
then threatened to use national aids but the Commission 
vowed to prosecute. The Commission and Kiechle finally 
reached a compromise in June: Kiechle accepted the price
cut in exchange for a reduction of one month in the EC 
delay in payments for cereals intervention (and approval 
for Germany to provide funds to further reduce the delay 
by one month for small farmers), and for extension of the
svr- The formula, because it was based on a three-year 
moving average, would also trigger 5% price cuts in both 
1986 and 1987, which frightened German farmers even more. 
263- Vasey (1985), p. 659.
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special intervention for 3 Mt of bread wheat. Germany 
was placated as those measures allowed German farm gate 
prices to remain relatively constant but it certainly was
not in favour of further reform.
The Commission remained determined to press ahead. 
It released in July (without support from one German 
Commissioner) a Green Paper, which proposed alternative 
policy options for the cereals sector, including a new 
co-responsibility levy in place of the guaranteed thres­
hold system, set-asides, support for alternative crops 
and export development, and direct income payments. 
France accepted the general outline of the proposals but
the UK preferred direct price cuts while Germany insisted
that price support was essential to maintain farm in­
comes. The consultative bodies examined the report and 
provided opinions but little consensus developed. Before 
the year ended the Commission decided that guaranteed 
prices could not be cut directly because of German 
opposition. Instead, DG-VI prepared a detailed plan to 
rationalize the cereals sector by use of a new co-respon­
sibility levy and a realignment of feed and bread wheat 
prices.
The Commission's 1986 price package proposed to imp­
lement DG-VI's plan. The reference price and special in­
tervention for bread wheat were to be eliminated, feed 
wheat intervention prices were to be cut 5% from the
basic intervention price, a 3% co-responsibility levy was
to be introduced* and intervention was to be closed until 
April 1 following the harvest. Kiechle came under great 
pressure when the CDU lost support in state elections in 
April. If the losses continued in a state election in 
Lower Saxony in June, then the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition in 
the upper house might have been threatened. Kiechle
therefore promised to provide German farmers with up to 
DM 1 B direct income support if the prices were not
adequate.
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The German and French ministers for agriculture 
developed an uneasy alliance to coordinate their approach 
in Council. But immediately after the first meeting, the 
franc was devalued in the EMS, which provided French 
farmers with a price increase. When 50,000 German farm­
ers protested against the price package, Kiechle got 
Cabinet support to formally reject the Commission pack­
age. Meanwhile, the EP and the UK sided with the Com­
mission. When the Council met the next week the Commis­
sion regained control of the negotiations. By the end of 
the meeting the ministers had agreed by a qualified 
majority to implement most of the reforms: feed wheat
prices were cut by up to 5% from the common wheat inter­
vention prices; co-responsibility was introduced; inter­
vention buying was only open October 1 to April 30 (Sept­
ember 1 with an additional month payment delay); the ref­
erence price for bread wheat was replaced with a 3.59 ECU 
premium for wheat with more than 14% protein; quality 
standards for intervention were raised to the old bread 
wheat standards; the monthly increments were cut 4.7% and 
delayed until the shortened buying-in period began in 
October32**; and the green franc and pound were devalued 
1.5%. The Commission overcame German resistance by 
tailoring the co-responsibility system to German needs. 
It was levied only on cereals marketed (Germany uses a 
higher proportion of its cereals on farm as feed) and 
small farmers were to receive aid to offset the levy on 
the first 25 tonnes marketed. As shown in Table 6.3, 
that ensured that only about 18% of German farm holdings 
were affected by the levy. The Commission also approved 
German plans to provide its farmers with DM 500 million 
in direct aid. Andriessen thus successfully introduced 
co-responsibility and tightened the intervention system 
for wheat through a judicious use of technical fixes,
a*?. 'pj-jg cut monthly increments was not opposed by 
Germany because its farmers generally sell their crop 
early in the year, before the increments amount to much.
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national aids, direct EC payments to small farmers, and 
devaluations.
Then drought ravaged the 1986 cereals crop across 
Europe and in August France responded with a FF 1.9 B aid 
package for 1986 and a further FF 2.02 billion for 1987. 
Both packages were approved by the Commission. Later 
that fall the Commission and Council implemented a pack­
age of measures that resolved long-standing problems in 
the milk and beef sectors, leaving only cereals unresol­
ved .
The 1987 price package was first delayed by the Ger­
man federal election in January and then by disagreement 
in the Commission. Finally, in mid-February the Commis­
sion released proposals to freeze bread wheat prices, cut 
feed wheat prices 2.6%, revalue completely the green DM, 
tighten quality standards, limit intervention buying to 
February through May (and then only when prices drop be­
low the intervention price), and discontinue monthly in­
creases until intervention opens. Kiechle retorted that 
the proposals amounted to a "declaration of war."30 The 
Commission in an unprecedented meeting between the 17 
Commissioners and the German cabinet offered to provide 
direct EC income payments in an attempt to persuade Ger­
many to accept the package. But when German farmers pro­
tested in both Bonn and Brussels, the German cabinet 
threatened to veto the price package. A Council meeting 
of Farm and Finance Ministers failed to break the dead­
lock and debate dragged on through June. The Commission 
then threatened to make technical changes within its 
authority to force lower cereals prices.31 Eventually, 
the Council and Commission compromised. The Commission 
withdrew its proposals to cut feed wheat prices, but 
Council cut monthly increments by 18%, imposed a 6% cut
30* International Herald Tribune. 2-3-87.
31 * Financial Times. 19-6-87.
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in intervention payments, and allowed the Commission to 
implement new intervention rules that closed buying ex­
cept when market prices dipped below the official price. 
Germany accepted an expansion in the MCA franchise to 
1.5% (equivalent to a 0.5% revaluation) and agreed that 
the remaining effective DM monetary gap for cereals would 
be eliminated at the beginning of the 1988-89 crop year. 
In exchange, the Commission agreed to standardize the 
payments delays at 110 days and allowed Germany to pay 
its farmers compensation of DM 1.1-1.2 B in January 1989.
The Commission pressed forward during the autumn 
with proposals to remake cereals intervention into a 
safety net and to introduce automatic price cuts in pro­
portion to over-production (either by higher co-responsi­
bility or by shorter intervention). The Commission pro­
posed that every 1.55 Mt (1%) of cereals produced in ex­
cess of a 155 Mt cereals threshold would force prices 
down by 1%, subject to a 5% maximum cut in 1988-89 and a 
7.5% cut in 1989-90. The Commission would automatically 
implement cuts based on production figures, without ref­
erence to the Council. The Commission also proposed a 
voluntary set-aside program to remove up to 20% of land 
from production, in an effort to provide the basis for a 
compromise with Germany. Germany, nevertheless, rejected 
the package. The UK government, bolstered by general NFU 
agreement, supported the stabilizers and set-aside pro­
posals, subject to a satisfactory budget resolution, 
while France wanted the set-aside policy to allow land to 
be planted to fodder crops. The budget meanwhile re­
surfaced as an issue. The EP rejected the 1988 budget 
and forced the Community to operate on provisional twelf­
ths; the expected outlays for 1988 exceeded the resources 
available under the 1.4% VAT ceiling.
The Commission opened the negotiations when it 
offered to raise the threshold to 158 Mt and to exempt 
small producers from the new stabilizer levy on the first
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20 tonnes of cereals marketed, provided they set aside 
30% of their land. Germany countered the Commission 
proposals with proposals to set the threshold at 160 Mt 
and to cut prices by a 3% maximum in 1988 and 2.5% in 
future years. The UK rejected those changes and threat­
ened to veto the budget solution being worked out in the 
Finance Council unless there were price cuts (it wanted a 
155 Mt threshold); Germany responded by threatening to 
cut the UK annual rebate. The Council could have dead­
locked over the issue, but Chancellor Kohl, as President- 
in-Office, wanted to get the CAP issue resolved so the 
Single Europe project could proceed.32 When a special 
Brussels Summit convened in February, both sides backed 
down. With the help of their agricultural ministers, the 
heads of negotiated a compromise on the stabilizersA
package. Germany accepted the new 3% stabilizer levy 
(payable in advance but refundable depending on produc­
tion) on top of the existing 3% co-responsibility levy 
and the UK accepted the 160 Mt threshold in exchange for 
budgetary guidelines which limited growth in CAP outlays 
to less than growth in total outlays. The Summit even 
went further than the Commission proposed. First, the 
ministers adopted cumulative automatic price reductions 
for cereals whenever EC production exceeded the 160 Mt 
threshold; the Commission had only proposed non-cumula- 
tive reductions. Second, they agreed to set a ceiling on 
CAP expenditure growth of 80% of GNP growth (including 
new stock depreciation); the Commission had proposed a 
100% growth rate, provided depreciation of both old and 
new stocks was included. Finally, they empowered the 
Commission to challenge Agricultural Council price deci­
sions and refer them to a special Finance and Agriculture
32- The Globe & Mai 1, 30-12-87, quoted an EC diplomat as 
saying that “if [Germany] fails, this could go down as 
the worst EC presidency in history." Another EC official 
said that being the president probably helps moderate the 
German position because “they now have the opportunity to 
tell their clientele back home afterward that they had no 
other choice but to compromise."
Price Policy: Decisions 297
Council meeting, which would have the power to revise the 
decision. As a result, they were able to conclude a new 
budget system that provided new resources to implement 
the programs to make a success of the Single Market.
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, by February 1988, the Commission and Council 
had reformed the wheat price system. The reforms of 
1984-88 were only possible because the Commission pre­
pared a consensus package and then negotiated bi-later­
al ly with the dissenting members, using a combination of 
threats (of further technical changes to market mechan­
isms, such as reduction in the number of designated 
intervention delivery points and in the subsidy to trans­
port grain to the intervention store) and enticements 
(approval for national aids). As a result, the 1988 and 
1989 price reviews progressed relatively smoothly along 
the path laid out by the Commission in earlier reports 
and by 1989 the price and intervention system had dev­
eloped closer links between producers and the markets.
The European Community, with a new market system for 
wheat in place, was well positioned to take a major role 
in the Uruguay Round Negotiations of the GATT in 1989 and 
1990. The system in 1989 was neither perfect nor comp­
lete, but it was a major step on the way to a having a 
market system in place for the 1990s that can produce ex­
portable quantities of wheat at competitive prices, with­
out prohibitively large budgetary costs.
Chapter 8
TRADE POLICY: DEFENCE IN THE 1970s
The EC agricultural trade policy has generally been 
dictated by the stage of development in the EC farm sec­
tor. Tangermann observed in 1983 that "policy makers in 
the Community have never really taken any interest in 
agricultural trade." Instead, "in CAP thinking, trade is 
a variable that is dependent on domestic policies, but 
not an instrument variable or an objective in itself."1 
This introspective orientation conformed during the 1970s 
with the pressures in the food policy system examined in 
chapters 3 through 7: farmers, the Commission, most of
the European consultative bodies, and the national gov­
ernments believed during the 1970s that the price system 
was the most important tool to protect EC consumers and 
to support incomes of the primarily small farmers.
The cold-war political system, volatile exchange and 
inflation rates, and uncertain world grain markets inc­
lined both consumers and their governments during the 
1960s and 1970s to seek food self-sufficiency to insure 
against food shortages (see chapter 2). Food security 
was deemed essential to assure independence from coercion 
by the exporters.2 The International Wheat Agreement, 
first introduced in 1949, was negotiated by exporters and 
importers to reduce the uncertainty of supply and price. 
When it failed in 1968, the EC was concerned that as the 
largest world food importer it would be vulnerable to 
changes in international markets. Events during the 
1970s justified the EC's concern. First, the 1972 "great 
grain robbery" more than doubled the world wheat price. 
Then in 1973 the US embargoed exports of soya and in 1975 
there was a sugar crisis. In between, the World Food 
Conference in 1974 concluded that because the world 
population would likely continue to outgrow the earth's
Tangermann (1983), p. 50.
ASC 1981, p . 30.
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productive capacity, market instability would increase. 
Then, in 1979, the US embargoed all grain exports to the 
USSR (after the Afghanistan invasion), which appeared to 
confirm that food had become a political weapon. Mean­
while, as discussed in chapter 2, market intelligence was 
so poor that the EC was unable to detect or protect it­
self from food shortages that resulted from political, 
production, or market shifts.
The domestic orientation left little opportunity for 
an active export policy. Support for the domestic wheat 
price forced the Community to exclude low-cost imports 
from North America and Australia. Although the EC pro­
duced some wheat in excess of domestic needs during the 
1960s and 1970s, it did little to take advantage of its 
position. The Commission and Council believed that EC 
wheat production was not commercially viable and that 
excess output posed a problem of 'surplus disposal.' 
Henri Nouyrit, of the French Confederation of Agricul­
tural Co-operatives, noted:
For exports there is no real policy. So called 
'surpluses’ are disposed of as the opportunity 
arises. There is no plan for exports, no med­
ium term policy. Exports have become a sort of
undesirable adjunct to intervention. Financial 
preoccupation over export restitutions has in­
hibited a proper commercial policy involving an 
effort to establish permanent trade flows, to 
seek out new markets, and to develop commercial 
instruments such as credits and long-term con­
tracts .3
Instead the Community pursued the cheapest way to dispose
\v
of surpluses. In particular, it encouraged alternate
uses, donated food as aid, stored surpluses in Community
intervention stocks, or simply concluded one-time export 
sales.
N. Butler (1983), p. 113.
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The CAP's domestic orientation also severely circum­
scribed the EC's approach to the Tokyo Round of the GATT. 
The Community had little alternative but to adopt a de­
fensive stance to protect the mechanisms of the CAP. The 
EC negotiators were therefore unable to pursue interna­
tional agreements that would allow the EC to take advan­
tage of its emerging export interests.
This chapter examines how the price and export poli­
cies interacted and supported each other during the per­
iod and reveals the roots of the new policy orientation 
that developed in the 1980s.
PRICES AND TRADE
The EC wheat trade policy before 1979 was an ad hoc 
response to the surpluses that resulted from the domestic 
orientation of the EC wheat price system. The objective 
method criterion was developed and prices were set based 
entirely on domestic needs; the level of protection had 
to be kept high to protect the intervention system. In 
particular, the Community used the threshold price and 
variable levy systems to eliminate competition from vir­
tually all non-European wheats. Any resulting wheat sur­
pluses were not regarded as a problem. Marsh concludes 
that "symbolically the assurance of an adequate supply of 
cereals, guaranteed by policy, is the token of food 
security, which a generation who knew war and post-war 
shortages of food prized highly.
The Commission's 1960 price proposals” had divorced 
domestic pricing from international market influences for 
two reasons that remained relevant during the 1970s. 
First, European farms were generally smaller than in the 
US, Canada, and Australia, so that EC producers would not 
be able to compete with those producers. Second, and
J. Marsh, "Summary," in Beard (1986), p. 10.
IMF (1988), p. 9.
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more importantly, the EC believed that the world wheat 
market was distorted and therefore could not be relied 
upon to produce either fair competitive conditions or 
adequate supplies at reasonable prices. In the 1950s and 
1960s world trade in wheat had become largely a matter of 
competition between governments so that world market 
prices seldom reflected real market or production condi­
tions. Furthermore, domestic programs in the major pro­
ducing and consuming nations exacerbated the uncertainty 
in world markets (see chapter 2). During the 1970s, for 
example, more than half of the world grain market (in­
cluding the EC) was insulated from international market 
conditions. Table 8.1 shows that, although EC policy 
contributed to price volatility, a significant portion 
was due to agricultural and trade policies in other 
countries.
Table 8.1 Effect of the CAP on Volatility and Level of 
the World Wheat Price
Study & Date Period EC
Share of 
Vo 1 at i1ity
Price 
Leve 1
Koester (1982) 1975-77 9 — -9.6%
Sarris & Freebairn (1983) 1978-80 9 19.8% -9.2%
Mathews (1985) 1978-82 10 — -0.7%
Koester & Valdds (1984) 1980 9 — -4.6%
Anderson & Tyers (1984) 1980 9 50.0% -13.0%
Tyers (1985) 1980 9 44.0% -13.0%
Tyers & Anderson (1987) 1980-82 12 32.8% -6.0%
Sarris (1988) 1981-83 10 8.5% -3.0%
Tyers & Anderson (1987) 1985 10 24.0% -0.7%
Source: IMF (1988), pp. 122-25, Tarditi (1989), p. 187.
Also, in the 1970s, the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates ended and all major world currencies began 
to fluctuate. Because most trades in the world wheat 
market were denominated in US dollars, a fluctuating
( OJT <24<0 i
dollar-ECU exchange rateKforcea changes in offer pricesTV
for exports and imports in EC currency terms even in the
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absence of any change in the world wheat price. During 
the 1970s, the swings between the US dollar and the ECU
Cor dts e*y u I v/A I -ec + )
would have exacerbated the volatility of domestic Euro­
pean prices if the variable levy had not protected the 
domestic market (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 Exchange-Induced Volatility in EC Wheat Prices
Annual * Change in: US $ Prices ECU/US$ Impact
1971 -1.8* +4.7* _
1972 +48.8* +8.4* +
1973 +93.8* +3.2* +
1974 -4.5* +0.4* —
1975 -5.3* -3.3* +
1976 -26.7* -4.0* +
1977 -0.8* +6.6* -
1978 +21.4* +9.7* +
1979 +22.5* +4.6* +
1980 +5.2* -10.3* -
Notes: US $ Prices are for #2 Hard Winter Wheat, FOB
Gulf; in the impact column "+" signifies the exchange 
rate exacerbated the price change while the shows it
partially or totally offset the world price change. 
Sources: IWC, World Wheat Statistics; Eurostat, EC
Economy.
Consequently, the Commission and Council set the 
threshold price and variable import levy so that imported 
wheat would be priced at the target level in the food 
deficit regions. Graph 8.1 shows that the world price 
(represented by the Gulf offer price for US #2 Hard 
Winter Ordinary Wheat converted to ECUs) swung widely 
during the 1970s but the Community price system insulated 
both European consumers and producers from these gyra­
tions. Instead, the Agricultural Council generally 
adjusted domestic prices in line with the objective 
method criterion, which reflected production costs, net 
farm income changes, and economy-wide income growth.
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After 1976, Community protection against imports was 
increased through adjustments in the price system. The 
Council implemented the reference price system for bread 
wheat and cut the common wheat intervention price. As a 
result the gap between the target and intervention prices 
expanded from about 10% in 1975 to more than 30% in 1976. 
Between then and 1985, the gap increased to more than 40% 
as intervention price rises were held below the increases 
for target prices.
The successive expansions in protection served two 
purposes. First, increasingly after 1976 France demanded 
greater Community Preference to ensure that imports did 
not cut into its domestic market, which was shrinking as 
production rose in the other member states. The Council 
found that it needed to increase protection continuously 
over the period to get the French government to accept 
the rest of the price package. Second, greater Community 
preference helped the Commission support the market sys­
tem. As supply grew ahead of demand, the internal wheat 
market price dipped down to the intervention price. 
Rising imports would have forced the Commission either to 
purchase more into intervention or to fund greater ex-
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ports. Greater Community preference, in contrast, both 
dampened import volumes and exacted higher levies from 
those imports that continued.
  F i gure 8.2 -------------------------------------------
WHEAT PROTECTION LEVELS IN CO M M UNITY
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In short, the Commission and Council believed that 
EC wheat production was not commercially viable and 
therefore needed to be protected from international com­
petition. Consequently, the Community viewed any excess 
output as simply a problem of 'surplus disposal' and not 
a commercial opportunity.
MECHANISMS FOR SURPLUS DISPOSAL
The relatively high and assured returns for wheat 
encouraged EC farmers to produce surpluses of common 
wheat throughout the 1970s. But, because EC production 
of the other cereal crops was less than adequate to meet 
domestic demand, the Community was not concerned about 
wheat surpluses. In general, the Community sought to 
dispose of the surpluses in the least costly fashion, 
which included a combination of encouragement of alter­
native uses. Community storage, food aid donations, and 
exports.
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a. Alternative Uses
The Community primarily encouraged farmers to use 
low-quality wheats as animal feed in the place of import­
ed cereal-substitutes or the traditional barley and maize 
feed-grains that were in perpetual shortage in the EC. 
Between 1968 and 1974 the Community denatured surplus 
wheat and subsidized its use as feed and then after 1975 
realigned market prices both to encourage farmers to pro­
duce a different mix of crop and feed merchants to incor­
porate more wheat into their feeds. By 1972 almost 39% 
of the wheat produced in the Community was consumed as 
feed, compared with only about 24% in 1966. But the end 
of the denaturing program and rising prices made common 
wheat less competitive with imported feed, so that by the
late 1970s less than 30% of the wheat produced in EC was
fed to animals.
Common wheat was an expensive nutrient source com­
pared with imported oi1-seed cakes and non-cereal substi­
tutes. In the EC, cereals substitutes cost only about 
1.2 times more than cereals (the ratio was 2.5 in the 
US), which encouraged farmers to substitute non-cereals 
feeds for maize, barley, and feed wheat.* The high price 
regime in Europe was a major reason for the price differ­
ence. But part of the price differential was also be­
lieved to be because cereal substitutes (i.e., corn
gluten, citrus pulp, and manioc) were priced by the ex­
porters at or below cost of production. US corn gluten, 
for example, was readily available because it was a by­
product of isoglucose (corn-sugar) production, which re­
sulted from the trade protection provided to US cane and 
beet sugar producers. Farmers also thought that manioc 
was available to the EC at artificially low prices be­
cause Thailand provided subsidies to tapioca producers.
Duchene, Szczepanik, & Legg (1985), p. 140.
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Competition from cereal-substitutes became acute 
during the 1970s because trade in these products was 
covered by the GATT. The Community had surrendered 
during the Dillon Round of the GATT the prerogative to 
tax oilseed and non-grain feed imports (i.e., bound the 
duty at zero).
Table 8.3 Applicable Duties on Cereal Substitutes
Product Duty Status Major Supplier
Soya 0% GATT duty bound United States
Manioc 6% GATT duty bound Thai land
Corn Gluten 0% GATT duty bound United States
Source: ASC 1980, p p . 103-04.
The Community responded to surpluses in the late 
1960s with a subsidy to denature surplus wheat (i.e., 
contaminate it with fish oil so that it could not be used 
for human consumption); that grain was then offered at 
lower prices to the EC livestock industry. This policy 
lasted until 1974, when the world price soared; there­
after it became the high-cost option for surplus dis­
posal. At the same time, rising concern about world food 
scarcity radically changed taxpayers' and politicians' 
views of the morality of diverting food from its best 
use. Consequently the denaturing program was terminated.
The French government and wheat producers associa­
tion (AGPB), however, continued to advocate the use of 
domestic wheat as an animal feed.-7 After the denaturing 
program ended, they pushed the Community to reduce im­
ports into the domestic feed market. In particular, they 
pressed the Commission and Council to raise the target 
price faster than the intervention price and to renego-
v . Financial Times, 24-6-77.
Trade Policy: Defence in the 1970s 307
tiate the GATT-bound duties. France also supplemented 
this with its own programs. The Office National Inter- 
professionel des Cereales (ONIC) collected a levy on all 
cereals marketed in France and used the funds to build 
feed lots to use French feed wheats. Generally the other 
producing countries were less concerned about feed mar­
kets because they did not have any surplus wheat.
The Community responded in 1975 to French demands 
and market pressures with a series of measures to make 
low quality wheats competitive as feed. In 1975-76, the 
Commission began to align barley and maize prices and 
moved the maize marketing year into line with the other 
cereals. Then in 1976 the Commission proposed and the 
Council accepted, with general support from the relevant 
lobbies and consultative agencies, a single intervention 
price for common wheat, barley, and maize and a new ref­
erence price for wheat of bread-making quality (a premium 
compensated farmers for lower yields). After two transi­
tional years prices were finally in the 'silo' formation 
(with all feed grains priced equally and bread wheat 
supported at a higher level), but the inexorable growth 
of surpluses of low-quality feed wheat continued. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the cereal grading system was 
unable to differentiate properly between feed and bread 
quality wheats, so that much of the low-quality wheat 
that could not command a premium on commercial markets 
ended in EC intervention. Thus, throughout the 1970s, 
the Community was unable to manage the domestic circu­
lation of cereals to halt the growth in surpluses re­
quiring disposal.
b. Storage
Storage in public or private intervention was also 
used. Even though the budget did not fully count the 
depreciation costs of intervention storage, public pur­
chase and storage of surpluses was generally regarded as 
the most expensive option. With a guaranteed buying sys­
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tem and little on-farm storage, stockpiles usually ended 
up in intervention stores in the surplus countries, where 
they incurred finance, technical storage, and wastage 
costs.
The focus of the stock policy during the 1970s was 
undoubtedly security of supply rather than disposal. 
Wild gyrations in prices and supplies on international 
markets, which began in 1972 and continued through 1976, 
spurred the Community to hold the average ratio of stocks 
to domestic use at about 21% (i.e., close to the 20% 
ratio that usually accompanies stable prices). In con­
trast, the major exporting countries (especially the US 
and Canada) held greater stocks to reduce wasteful compe­
tition on generally slack world markets.
Table 8.4 EC9 Stock-Domestic Use Ratios for Wheat (ooot)
Final Domestic Stocks Domestic Net
Stocks Use to Use Surplus Exports
1973 7003 35594 19 .7% 2360 2400
1974 9529 35798 26 .6% 5747 1620
1975 6698 33260 20.1% 222 1582
1976 7226 33629 21.5% 1690 1042
1977 6577 35309 18.6% 560 221
1978 9232 36706 25.2% 6870 448
1979 7708 37587 20.5% 5037 3169
1980 7573 38024 19 .9% 8934 7356
1973-80 7693 35738 21 .2% 3928 2330
Sources: Eurostat Supply Balance Sheets; Nimexe.
The Community was careful to hold the stock-to-use 
ratio in manageable bounds. It never moved outside the 
rather narrow range of 18.6% to 26.6%. In contrast, the 
world-wide stock to use ratio dropped well below the low­
est EC level in both 1972-73 and 1973-74, which caused 
world wheat prices to almost triple. As world-wide pro­
duction rebounded, the world stock-to-use ratio soared,
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reaching almost 32% in 1976-77. As a result, US offer 
prices fell more than 25% in 1976. The Community avoided 
these sharp swings in prices as it maintained steady 
stocks and used external markets as a swing destination 
for, or source of, residual quantities of wheat.
In the Stocktaking in 1974-75, the Commission pro­
posed an "active storage policy for cereals" to absorb 
cyclical fluctuations in production, ensure domestic 
supplies, and fulfill international obligations,63 but the 
Council never accepted this approach. An active storage 
policy is a necessary adjunct to the development of a 
commercial policy for wheat. To ensure customers are 
satisfied, the Community would have to hold precautionary 
supplies which would raise the stock-to-use ratio above 
the average 21% recorded in the 1970s. As exports were 
generally one-off shipments, the Commission was able to 
live without an active storage system.
c . Food Aid
After decolonization in Africa and Asia in the 
1960s, war and revolution became commonplace. Although 
EC member states were no longer responsible for these 
countries, instability in those regions endangered Euro­
pean economic trade and investment. France and the UK, 
through La Francophonie and the Commonwealth, and the EC 
through the Yaounde and Lomd Conventions, attempted to 
calm political conflicts in the former colonies in Af­
rica, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. But endemic and 
episodic famine increased tension and conflict and 
threatened to involve the former colonial masters again 
in those areas.
Food aid was one solution. Community aid formally 
began on 1 July 1968 with the Food Aid (Cereals) Conven­
tion, negotiated at the International Wheat Council meet­
Newsletter on the CAP #3, March 1975, p. 45.
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ings during the Kennedy Round of the GATT. Before that 
time, all food aid was disbursed by the member states. 
The EC initially agreed to contribute 1.035 Mt annually, 
to be supplied by either the Community or by individual 
member countries. In 1968-69, only 29% of the cereals 
aid was given by the Community; that figure rose steadily 
until 1985-86 when the Community gave about 70% of the 
1.67 Mt committed.
Table 8.5 EC Cereal Food Aid Allocated and Shipped
Cereals Aid Cereals Shipped Wheat Shipped
A 1 located Shipped com po. re cl Surplus as % of
(OOOt) (OOOt) A 1 located (OOOt) Surplus
1969 301 286 -5% 3,480 8%
1970 337 327 -3% 443 74%
1971 353 244 -31% -631 100%
1972 414 232 -44% 3,396 7%
1973 464 479 3% -1,284 100%
1974 580 736 27% 1,120 66%
1975 643 717 12% 4,987 14%
1976 708 264 -63% 248 100%
1977 721 937 30% 1,098 85%
1978 721 886 23% -1,089 100%
Average 524 511 -3% 1,177 43%
Notes: The aid figures include all cereals but wheat was
the most important commodity; the wheat surplus figure 
includes common and hard wheats.
Source: Green Europe #216, Annex Table 1; Eurostat, Sup-
ply Balance Sheets.
Food aid allocations are set by the Council on ad­
vice of the Commission, subject to the commitments in the 
Food Aid (Cereals) Convention. Shipments are administer­
ed both by the member states and the Commission with the 
costs allocated partly to Title 6 of the EAGGF budget 
(the refund portion of the aid) and partly to the devel­
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opment budget (the remainder of the cost of the aid) 
Aid planning is managed by the Development and Coopera­
tion Directorate of the Commission (DG-VIII). The 
Cereals Management Committee, consequently, had only 
indirect influence on shipments (e.g., determining when 
shipments can move) and as such was never able to make 
direct use of the shipments to develop commercial mar­
kets .
The evidence suggests that during the 1970s the EC 
generally regarded food aid as a means of disposing of 
surplus cereals rather than as a means to develop mar­
kets.10 Although the Community between 1968 and 1978 
supplied virtually all of the grain that it had committed 
under the 1968 Food Aid Convention, it shipped the grain 
at times and under conditions that best suited the Com­
munity. The aid certainly was not tailored to the reci­
pient's needs. Table 8.5 shows that during that decade 
the Community exceeded its annual commitment whenever it 
had supplies surplus to its domestic needs (i.e., in 
1974-75 and 1977) and cut back on shipments during or 
following any year when the EC cereals crop was poor 
(i.e., 1971-72 and 1976). World demand for food aid ex­
ceeded supply throughout the period, so the EC's volatile 
pattern of shipments did not help it develop an image as 
a reliable source.
In 1974 the Commission proposed changes in the Com­
munity food aid policy. Supplies of wheat and other 
cereals had expanded faster than domestic demand and the 
Commission wanted to dispose of more of the surpluses as 
aid. The FAO World Food Conference in 1974 supported the 
Commission's position and asked developed countries to
<9m Before 1975, the entire cost of food aid was allo­
cated to Title 6 of the EAGGF budget. The 1975 Budget 
estimated that prior to 1975 about 193 M ua was allocated 
to the EAGGF budget to purchase cereals to ship as aid.
10- Bard (1972), p. 43.
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expand their annual cereals aid commitments to 10 Mt in 
order to meet larger food deficits throughout the Third 
World. The Commission accepted this approach and pro­
posed to more than double the amount of aid disbursed by
the Community (rather than by member states) and to dis­
tribute more to LDCs via the World Food Program and the
International Red Cross.11 Although the EP and the ESC
supported the Commission's proposal, neither farmers nor 
the Ministries of Agriculture were enthusiastic because 
the additional costs (for restitutions and, until 1975, 
purchases) would be borne by the EAGGF and could squeeze 
other farm priorities. When drought hit in 1976, the 
Commission withdrew the plan because the member states 
rejected any increase in commitments when domestic sup­
plies were short. Reform of the food aid system then 
waited until the 1980s.
d. Export
When the Community found it had wheat that could not 
be disposed as feed, stored, or given as aid, it opted to 
move its surpluses onto external markets. The export 
market was viewed as a cheap storage system because 
short-term exports could be cut off with impunity while 
physical stockpiling required finance, storage, and dep­
reciation costs.12 The export system, therefore, remain­
ed undeveloped at the Community level; the Commission 
failed to develop more than a custodial or bookkeeping 
role during the 1960s and 1970s.
Refunds (or restitutions) were the only EC-control­
led instrument to support exports. 'Common law' or 
standing refunds, granted for cereals exported as grain 
(and, after 1981, for processed cereals and cereals by­
products), were generally confined to sales to countries 
bordering the EC with known, verifiable requirements. In
Bulletin of the ECs, 3/74, pp. 30-34.
Donelan, p. 17.
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contrast, 'awarded' refunds were paid for unprocessed 
cereals exported to all destinations. The Commission, on 
the advice of the Management Committee for Cereals made 
weekly awards which fixed a maximum figure for export 
refunds, on the basis of offers submitted by Community 
operators. The fixed refund offers (which included the 
MCA refund) were limited to set periods, markets, and 
volumes.13 During the 1970s, DG-VI and the Management 
Committee for Cereals— comprised of members of national 
agricultural ministries— generally set tenders whenever 
domestic stocks looked set to exceed the desired stock- 
to-use ratio. The tenders were short term and more often 
than not open to all takers. Consequently, the export 
system did not develop long-term customers but rather 
simply disposed of surpluses at the lowest cost.
The export system was most strongly supported by 
France. Events during the 1960s and 1970s had amply de­
monstrated that food was useful both as a weapon and dip­
lomatic tool. France therefore insisted that the Commun­
ity continue to have an export presence to counter the 
dominant power of the US.1"*
France also had commercial export interests. It had 
been a significant wheat exporter since shortly after the 
Second World War and believed it had an export "voca­
tion." Furthermore, France wanted wheat exports to off­
set its large balance of payments deficits. As wheat 
production rose in France and the world market expanded, 
France saw that the commercial potential of wheat exports 
could become even more important in the 1970s. As a 
result, France pushed the Community to develop an active 
export policy.
OECD (1987c), p. 84. 
Financial Times, 11-11-75.
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Neither Germany nor the UK w^s particularly in­
terested in export policy because they were both large 
food importers. Instead, both governments during the 
1970s were preoccupied with ensuring adequate quantities 
of food imports at reasonable prices, which often put 
them at odds with France.
Figure 8.3
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The Commission, prodded by the French government, 
proposed in 1975 that the EC enter fixed-term supply con­
tracts to provide greater continuity for export shipments 
and perhaps cut the cost of exports.1® It recommended 
that the Community enter a 12-month contract with Egypt 
to supply in 1975-76 a minimum of 1 Mt of wheat and wheat 
flour. The Commission also proposed that the EC arrange 
with Egypt a three-year sugar agreement, a two-year dairy 
deal, and a one-year beef package. Israel and Algeria 
were targeted for similar c o n t r a c t s . T h e  EP supported 
the proposal17 but the ESC withheld support because it 
believed the Community should not implement any agreement
Duchene, Szczepanik, & Legg (1985), p. 205. 
Financial Times, 1-8-75.
Newsletter on the CAP, Jan. 1976, p. 8.
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before the IWA discussions were complete.163 Meanwhile, 
divisions between the member states developed. France 
pushed for the contracts while the MAFF, with NFU sup­
port, expressed concern that long-term agreements would 
institutionalize existing surpluses or create new ones. 
The UK farmers and government instead preferred a renewed 
IWA to provide both security of supply and price stabil­
ity.1'9 Germany and the Netherlands also rejected the 
proposal.20 The 1976 drought scuttled this proposal, 
much as it did the food aid proposals. "Divisions of 
opinion in the Commission developed" during the year and 
the Council never acted.21
As a result, France developed and supported its own 
cereals export system outside the EC sphere. French 
cereals farmers, with state assistance, managed a compre­
hensive system to distribute, store, and finance their 
export sales. The cereal cooperatives owned enough capa­
city to store and market about 70% of the French wheat 
crop, and thereby acted as agents for about 40-45% of the 
French cereals exported.22 As the market became more 
competitive in the 1970s, the French co-ops also develop­
ed close links with the multinational grain traders to 
ensure they maximized their commercial prospects.23 To 
support the system, French farmers paid a para-fiscal 
levy on all cereals marketed in France. ONIC and Uni­
grains then used some of the funds to provide credit 
guarantees on cereal exports.2"1 The French government 
also used the Compagnie Frangais d'Assurances pour le 
Commerce Extdrieur (COFACE) to provide credit guarantees 
for cereals exports (generally six month guarantees on 
95% of the credit at market rates of interest). Conse­
Newsletter on the CAP, Jan. 1976, p. 12. 
House of Lords (1981a.), pp. 71 & 156.
Nevi1le-RoIfe (1984), p. 25.
House of Lords (1981a), p. 70.
Foxall (1982), p. 16.
Morgan (1979), p. 310.
OECD (1987b), p. 201.
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quently, French cereals producers greatly expanded their 
exports through the 1970s, earning the admiration and 
support of President Giscard.
The Community, meanwhile, directed its attention to 
negotiations through the GATT. The assortment of domes­
tic policies operating in the EC in 1976 when the GATT 
Round began, however, provided little scope for the Com­
munity to develop its commercial interests.
THE EC IN THE GATT
The Community approach to GATT negotiations was 
largely determined by domestic concerns until 1979. At 
first, the Community needed to complete the CAP, so the 
Commission and France used the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds 
to force recalcitrant member states to come into line. 
The Community also started out to use the Tokyo Round to 
defend what it had built. Near the end of the talks, 
however, it shifted emphasis and tried to enhance its 
commercial prospects.
Domestically, the Commission and the national gov­
ernments dominated the GATT trade negotiations. Although 
domestic policy actors were consulted at the beginning of 
each of the negotiations, they were then excluded from 
the debate: the negotiating system deprived them of any
real access. The Commission negotiated for the EC, 
guided both by the Council's approved strategy (embodied 
in a directive) and a committee of national officials 
(the '113 Committee' per the Treaty of Rome). The 113 
Committee followed the Commission negotiators to Geneva 
and regularly met to refine the EC position. The Com­
mission with 113 Committee support was regarded as "a 
powerful negotiating team" because it exploited the fact 
that it could only move from its mandate with the consent
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of a qualified majority in the 113 Committee.52=5 The sec­
recy and remoteness of the talks and the negotiating pro­
cess all helped to isolate farmers (who anyway were not 
overly concerned with the trade discussions, providing 
the Community system of pricing and preferences prevail­
ed) . The EP and ESC were also isolated because the 
Treaty of Rome does not require Council to consult either 
of them on commercial agreements under Article 113. 
Thus, neither agency had any real access or influence onA
the process.
a . GATT Negotiations Before 1973
Prior to 1973 the Commission and Council used the 
GATT strategically to build the Community policy system. 
The Dillon Round was used to get GATT approval for the 
European customs union and the general parameters of the 
common policies while the Commission and France worked 
together in the Kennedy Round to finesse the introduction 
of the wheat price regime. Then, in 1966, with the CAP 
largely complete, the Commission focused for the first 
time on carving a protected position for Europe in the 
world wheat market.
Although the CAP was first discussed at GATT commit­
tee meetings in 1958, the farm policy was not fully scru­
tinized until the closing stages of the Dillon Round be­
cause the market mechanisms had not been approved by the 
Council. After they were enacted in 1962, Article XXIV 
of the GATT required the EC negotiate with the countries 
that would be affected by the new customs union. The 
negotiations, especially with the United States, conclud­
ed when the EC agreed to compensate the affected agricul­
tural exporters for their lost markets by allowing an
unlimited quantity of oilseeds, seedcake, and cereal sub­
stitutes to enter the Community duty-free. The EC be­
lieves it thereby fully "paid for" the variable levy sys-
M. Butler (1986), p . 144.
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tem because that decision opened the EC to world market 
influences and raised the cost of the CAP price support 
schemes.26 In exchange, the EC believed the CAP was 
accepted by all GATT signatory states. Although US farm­
ers were not pleased, the US government accepted the pro­
tectionist orientation in both European and world agri­
culture as necessary to help Europe recover from the war 
and to encourage the former combatants to unite against 
the new common enemy: the USSR.227
The Commission then used the agricultural talks in 
the Kennedy Round (1962-67) to force member states to
complete the CAP. War ley concludes that DG-VI had a
"single-minded preoccupation with creating and protecting
( s i c )
the CAP" and used the Kennedy Round "not to alternate^the 
CAP'S external effects but to secure its completion."23 
This defensive posture, which fit well with the existing
/V
power structures, was championed at the negotiations by 
both the Commission and France and strongly supported
within Europe by the farm lobby. The Commission "dec­
lared its complete agreement with the USA on their [farm 
issues] inclusion in the negotiations, but, before com­
mitting itself on the international plane it needed to 
complete its own agricultural policy and in particular 
fix the level of common agricultural prices."2** France
— worried that US imports would ruin French farmers' 
opportunity to become Germany's primary supplier— demand­
ed that the CAP price and financial regimes be completed 
before talks begin. COPA unanimously agreed: Deleau,
then president of COPA, argued that "the existence of the 
CAP is an essential prerequisite for negotiations on
2<b- Petersmann (1986), p. 41.
27- Warley (1976), p. 330; Tangermann (1978), p. 205; 
Barkema, Henneberry, & Drabenstott (1989), p. 23.
Warley (1976), p. 342.
2**- Casadio (1973), p. 11.
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agricultural products in GATT, and such policy cannot be 
called into question."30
The German government appeared as if it would have 
been willing to bargain access to EC food markets in ex­
change for freer world trade in manufactures but France 
withheld support for the EC position on industrial 
tariffs until Germany agreed to complete the CAP price 
and financing arrangements.31 To force Germany to com­
plete the Community prices quickly, France pushed the 
Council in February 1964 to propose at the GATT the mon- 
tant de soutien system. Under the proposal, contracting 
countries would bind the maximum level of support for 
agriculture for three years. The formula set the montant 
de soutien equal to the difference between the world and 
domestic prices, adjusted for any direct subsidies to the 
farm sector. The system was expected to push Germany to 
a quick agreement on EC price levels because the montant 
de soutien could not be determined until domestic prices 
had been set.3:i- The EC strategy succeeded and by 1966 
the Community had set most of the important prices for 
the CAP.
After the 'empty chair crisis' was resolved and 
prices set, the Commission and Council collaborated to 
develop provisions to guarantee access to the EC market, 
in response to demands from the traditional world wheat 
exporters. The EC thus offered to bind the Community'§
• W  (oCc
self-sufficiency ratio for grains at 90% (aUaS at 85%)1C
and to either store or export as non-commercial aid any 
EC surpluses. The UK, which was not then a member of the 
Community, offered to bind its ratio at 75% (<jt oocus air
in
66%). European farmers, however, were not pleased.K
Deleau argued that "the protection of European agricul­
Casadio (1973), p. 38.
Casadio (1973), p. 25. 
Casadio (1973), p. 124.
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ture must not be reduced."33 He argued that the level of 
prices could not be discussed within the framework of 
tariff negotiations, nor could quantitative guarantees be 
given to the USA or other countries, as that would deny 
EC farmers any opportunity for technical expansion.
When that GATT Round concluded in 1967 farm traders 
had not reached agreement because the EC was unwilling to 
accept a 10% cut in their montant de soutien and convei—  
sion of the self-sufficiency ratio to a quantitative 
guarantee. Under the authority of Article XX(h) of the 
GATT, the farm traders reconvened the talks at the Inter­
national Wheat Council and eventually concluded an Inter­
national Grains Agreement to begin in 1967. The new 
Wheat Trade Convention (replacing the 1962 agreement 
which had been extended in 1965 to the end of the Kennedy 
negotiations) established new minimum and maximum prices, 
provided that importers would buy agreed percentages of 
their purchases from member countries, and dictated that 
exporters would adopt special measures whenever the price 
bands were breached. A related Food Aid (Cereals) Con­
vention provided for long-term cereals aid commitments. 
The Trade Convention, however, failed in June 1968 when 
bumper crops pushed market prices below the minimum 
prices of $1.73/bu set in the Wheat Trade Convention.
b. GATT Relations (1973-79)
The 1973-79 period saw a dramatic turnaround in the 
Community approach to world food trade and the GATT. 
When the Community entered the trade negotiations in 1973 
its defensive posture was dictated by its status as the 
largest importer in the world and only a relatively small 
exporter of temperate-zone products. But, by 1979, the 
EC changed its external orientation, especially for 
cereals, to match its developing competitive status.
Casadio (1973), p. 38.
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Table 8.6 EC External Trade in Agricultural Products
fill Food Products (B ECU) fill Cereals (Ht) Cosion Wheat (Ht)
EC6
ill (Hi (HI) (X/H) HI HI (X-H> HI HI (X-H)
1968 3.0 8.8 -5.9 331 6.4 17.1 -10.7 n.a n.a n.a
1969 3.1 9.7 -6.6 31X 7.0 14.2 -7.2 n.a n.a n.a
1970 3.6 10.6 -7.0 33X 7.1 17.6 -10.5 n.a n.a n.a
197! 3.9 10.6 -6.8 36/. 4.7 17.4 -12.7 n.a n.a n.a
1972 4.4 11.6 -7.1 38X 7.1 15.3 -28.2 4.8 2.7 +2.1
EC9
1973 6.9 19.8 -12.9 35X 6.8 23.8 -17.0 5.1 2.6 +2.5
1974 8.7 22.6 -13.9 38X 5.4 19.8 -14.4 4.9 3.3 +1.6
1975 8.9 21.8 -20.9 41X 7.1 23.5 -16.4 7.0 5.4 +1.6
1976 10.0 27.4 -17.4 36X 5.2 26.7 -21.6 5.2 4.1 +1.0
1977 12.0 32.6 -20.6 37 X 2.1 26.4 -24.3 3.5 3.3 +0.2
1978 12.8 31.0 -18.3 40X 6.1 20.7 -14.6 4.1 3.7 +0.4
1979 14.5 33.4 -18.8 44X 8.0 18.4 -10.4 6.9 3.7 +3.2
1980 18.4 33.9 -15.5 54 X 12.3 16.4 . -4.1 10.5 3.2 +7.0
ECiO
198! 37.3 25.1 -12.2 67X 16.6 16.2 +0.4 13.9 3.5 +10.4
Sources: Green Europe Vi!17, p.44 h. 46; Nile?: e.
Even before negotiations began in the Tokyo Round of 
the GATT, the EC was forced to defend itself against 
claims resulting from the enlargement of the Community. 
The accession of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973 
affected other traders, and Article XXVI:3 forced the 
Community to negotiate with them and satisfy their 
claims. In August 1974 the talks ended without a con­
clusive result. Australia and the US "agreed to dis­
agree" with the EC on cereals because they considered 
their legal rights were jeopardized by accession of the 
UK and Denmark; they decided instead "to continue discus­
sions with a view to seeking, through international nego­
tiations, agreed solutions to the problems arising in the 
field of international trade in cereals."3  ^ Thus, the
Bulletin of the ECs 7-8/74, p. 19.
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Community was uncertain when it entered the new GATT 
negotiations whether its trading partners accepted that 
the CAP was legitimate.
Meanwhile, the Community faced a number of attacks 
on its policy under the Article XXIII disputes settle­
ments system. Table 8.7 shows that between 1973 when the 
Tokyo Round negotiations opened and the conclusion of the 
talks in 1979, EC policies were challenged at least nine 
times by other agricultural exporters; previously all 
challenges had been directed at the member states. Al­
though none of the challenges forced any appreciable 
change in EC policy for either cereals or other sectors, 
they forced the Commission to review its export policies. 
Until 1973 the EC had never initiated a legal challenge 
at the GATT against any government for any trade issue. 
It then launched its first action (against the US) and 
henceforward lodged counter complaints with the GATT 
whenever its policies were threatened either by retali­
ation or countervailing duties. The Community, however, 
never used the legal route to open other markets; it 
simply used it to defend its position.
The accession negotiations and the legal cases con­
vinced the Community that its farm policy was not secure 
under international law. Farm Commissioner Petrus Lardi- 
nois noted in a speech in the US in 1976 that the US 
could attack the CAP as "protectionist" and "anti-GATT" 
with impunity because it did not have obligations for 
farm products under the GATT. He objected that the 
'grandfather clause' (written into the Treaty via the 
1951 Torquay Protocol) and the 1955 waiver (under Art. 
XXV:5) gave the US complete freedom from GATT discipline 
in the area of farm policy.^3 In the Tokyo Round nego­
tiations the Community set out to rectify that imbalance.
Newsletter on the CAP #7, September 1976, p. 2.
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Table 8.7 GATT 
ings
Article XXIII Dispute Settlement Proceed- 
Against the EC
Date Plaintiff Issue
1974 Canada EC concessions on grains (Art. XXIV:6)
1976 USA EC measures on animal feed proteins; use 
of surplus dairy products in feed
1976 USA EC fruit and vegetable rules; minimum 
import price regime
1976 Australia Ditto
1977 Chile EC malted barley export subsidies
1978 Australia EC sugar export refunds/export subsidies
1978 Brazi1 EC sugar export refunds/export subsidies
1979 Chi le Discriminatory import rules on apples
Sources: Petersmann (1986), pp. 67-70; Hudec (1988), pp.
46-51
Thus, at the beginning the Community saw the agri­
cultural parts of the negotiations in defensive terms.35 
The Commission Communication in April 1973 affirmed that 
the "principles of the CAP" could not be questioned. But 
French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert was displeased be­
cause the Commission was not positive enough in defense 
of the CAP.37 Because of his pressure, the final text 
adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1973 
declared that the "CAP principles and their mechanisms" 
could not be matters for negotiation because of the "fun­
damental and specific characteristics of agriculture." 
The Community then demanded at the GATT that the agricul­
tural talks be separated from the general tariff negotia­
tions. Although the major food exporters were unhappy 
with that approach, the GATT ministers in Tokyo in Sept­
3<b„ genesis for the MTN was also defensive. In 1972
the US imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports in an
effort to reduce its balance of payments deficit. France
and Germany protested. In the end, they agreed to re­
value their exchange rates and to work within the EC to 
initiate a new round of multilateral trade negotiations 
in exchange for the end of the US import surcharge.
3'7- Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita (1984), pp. 24-26.
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ember 1973 acquiesced; Article 3(e) of the declaration 
recognized that agricultural talks must "take account of 
the special characteristics and problems of this sector" 
and therefore separated them from the tariff talks.
The farm trade talks then proceeded in two distinct 
phases. The Commission argued that Europe must seek "the 
expansion of trade in stable world markets," first 
through a negotiated "code of good conduct covering ex­
port practices" and second via international commodity 
agreements (ICAs) for wheat, flour, feed grains, rice, 
sugar, and some milk products.313 Thus, the GATT con­
tinued to examine subsidies and export practices while,
in 1975, the wheat and grain trade issues were moved to
parallel talks at the IWC.
The Community laboured in the main agricultural
forum to defend and strengthen the basic features of the
CAP. Wide ranging proposals to reform GATT Article XVI:3 
(export subsidies) threatened to force the Community to a 
complete overhaul of the CAP; if the Community could no 
longer provide export subsidies (i.e., restitutions or 
refunds), the CAP could quickly become unworkable. The 
Community entered the final stage of the discussions 
firmly convinced that it "should make its agreement sub­
ject to retaining the full text of Art. XVI, particularly 
paragraph 3, which is sufficient as it stands and there­
fore needs no interpretive clauses. "3<5> But the US had 
made a commitment to US farmers that the GATT agreement 
would include some action on international trade in farm 
products. In the end a compromise was reached. The EC 
accepted a new interpretive code when the US Trade Rep­
resentative (USTR) assured Gundelach that the US did not
3  3  - 
3 C? .
Bulletin of the ECs Supplement 2/73, p. 9-10.
COM(78)275, p. 12.
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plan to use the new code to attack EC policies.*0 The US 
had wanted the interpretive code to prohibit or at least 
severely curtail EC export refunds but had little choice 
but to accept the face-saving subsidies code; if it held 
out longer, its negotiating mandate would have expired, 
invalidating all the work in the other areas.
The GATT ministers finally accepted Art. 10 of the 
new code, which declared that signatories "agree not to 
grant directly or indirectly any export subsidy on cer­
tain primary products in a manner which results in the 
signatory granting such subsidy having more than an 
equitable share of world export trade in such product, 
account being taken of the shares of the signatories in 
trade in the product concerned during a previous repre­
sentative period, and any special factors which may have 
affected or may be affecting trade in such a product." 
The code, however, was left deliberately vague, as the 
definitions for both "equitable share" and "representa­
tive period" were caged with enough caveats so that they 
could not really bind. For example, the "equitable mar­
ket share" was adjusted for "developments on world mar­
kets" while the reference period was to include the three 
most recent calendar years in which "normal market condi­
tions" existed.*1 The code did not even attempt to de­
fine "subsidy."
The Community gained significantly more than it 
surrendered in this part of the negotiations. First, 
Article 10 of the code categorically accepted that export 
subsidies were legal. Second, Article 11 of the code 
confirmed that subsidies other than for exports would be 
permitted to promote social and economic policy objec­
tives. The code explicitly allowed subsidies to elimi—
*°- Hudec (1988), p. 40, reported that USTR Robert 
Strauss sent Gundelach a letter to confirm US intentions.
* 1‘ GATT (1988), p. 221.
326 Chapter 8
nate industrial, economic, and social disadvantages of 
specific regions, to restructure industry, to sustain 
employment, to encourage R&D, and to avoid environmental 
problems. As such, these provisions effectively approved 
the complete panoply of price supports, structural pro­
grams, and social policies that underpinned the CAP. The 
Community negotiators had good reason to be pleased with 
their accomplishments.
The outcome of the GATT subsidies negotiations had a 
significant impact on the wheat talks at the IWC. At the 
start, the Community sought to negotiate an International 
Grains Agreement to get stability in wheat and feed grain 
markets and to protect further the CAP market systems. 
The Community hoped to reach a market sharing arrangement 
that would protect both its import needs (as a major food 
importer) and its export interests (largely in Africa). 
In May 1977, the European heads of r called for the
GATT to develop "a mutually acceptable approach to agri­
culture that will achieve increased expansion and stabil­
ization of trade and greater assurance of world food 
supplies." They said: "Such progress should not remove
the right of individual countries under existing inter­
national agreements to avoid significant market disrup­
tion."^® Ertl thought the ideal would be "that Australia 
and New Zealand find markets in their own region— Indone­
sia, Hong Kong and Japan" while "Europe and the US can 
share Africa and South Amer i ca . ,uq-3
In January 1978 a special meeting of the IWC asked 
the Secretary General of the FAO to convene a conference 
to negotiate a new IWA.'+* The EC entered those talks as
Go It (1978), p p . 4-5.
^3- Financial Times, 8-11-78.
Cohn (1979), p. 135, argues that the talks were 
shifted to the IWC and supervised by UNCTAD rather than 
by the GATT to avoid problems that arose in 1967. The 
USSR refused to join the IGA negotiated in the GATT
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spokesman for the group of importing countries (with 314 
votes at the IWC out of the 1,000 votes for importers, 
the EC was the major importer; it also had 102 votes out 
of 1,000 votes for exporters in 1973-74) .**= As the im­
port spokesman, the EC pushed for lower prices and guar­
anteed supplies in the price band.',<b When the opening 
positions had been staked out, the EC and most of the 
LDCs agreed that the floor price should be kept at about 
US$115/t, that the ceiling price should only be a little 
higher, and that stock actions should be triggered when­
ever prices breached firm price bands. The EC also want­
ed the agreement to extend to all cereals rather than 
just wheat; as a major importer of feed cereals, it be­
lieved that an agreement for wheat alone would not be all 
that useful for the EC. The only major disagreement be­
tween Europe and the LDCs was over reserve stocks. The 
LDCs wanted large stocks to ensure adequate supplies in 
poor crop years while the EC wanted relatively small 
stocks, so that they could export or dispose of their 
surpluses rather than hold them in storage.
The US, the major exporter, wanted a wheat-only 
agreement to include a higher floor price (US$145/t), a 
higher ceiling price (US$215-225/t), and stock accumula­
tion triggered by farmer-owned stocks rather than by mar­
ket prices. The US also wanted higher world stocks (25- 
30 Mt) so that EC surpluses would be stored rather than 
sold on the international market; the EC at that time had 
surplus wheat production about equal to the American de­
mands for reserve stocks.
because it was not renegotiable when non-GATT members 
were invited to participate. Non-participation by the 
USSR and other CPEs (especially China) meant that the 
1967 arrangement could not control world prices as sales 
to non-GATT members were excluded.
4=5 - Bulletin of the EC. 6/73. p. 66.
Winham (1986), p. 253.
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At the beginning of 1977 the four traditional ex­
porters-— the US, Canada, Australia, and Argentina— met 
frequently to develop an exporters' position. When nego­
tiations began in earnest at an IWC/UNCTAD conference in 
Geneva in 1978, the traditional exporters included in 
their discussion the EC and Japan but excluded the LDCs 
from the substantive talks on trigger prices and stock 
holding
Table 8.8 Bargaining Positions in the IMG 6rain Talks (1977-79)
stock Floor ceiling
levels price price trigger products
Ht US$/t u st/t aechanisi covered
EEC
Opening 12-15 115 na Fixed prices all grains
Final 20-22 125/140 195 Fixed prices all grains
LDCs
Opening 25-30 115 na Fixed prices na
Final excluding LDCs 125-30 160 nc na
US
Opening 25-30 145 215-25 Farffi stocks wheat
Final 25 125/140 200 prices wheat +
Canada 30 140-55 225 - wheat
Australia <25 140-55 180 - wheat
Argentina <25 140-55 - - wheat
Japan - 100 - - -
Sources: International Herald Tribune, Financial Tises, The Tiies, and The Guardian.
By the time the negotiations were suspended sine 
die, the US and the EC had significantly narrowed the gap 
between their respective positions but a wide gap had 
opened between the LDCs and Europe. The US had accepted 
that the agreement could include other cereals as in the 
International Grains Agreement of 1967 and that reserves 
could be triggered by prices rather than changes in farm­
Cohn (1979), p. 140.
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er-owned stocks. Meanwhile, the Community had accepted 
both a higher floor and ceiling price and had indicated 
that it would share in a larger world reserve stock. At 
the start the EC had agreed with the LDCs that both the 
floor and ceiling prices should be set as low as poss­
ible. At the last meeting in 1978 the US and EC agreed 
that half of the stock obligations would be triggered if 
prices dipped below US$140/t and the remainder if prices 
continued to fall below US$125/t. The EC also indicated 
it would accept a ceiling price of US$195/t and offered 
to hold 2.8 Mt in reserves, which would comprise its 
share of a stockpile of 20-22 M t . As a result, the EC 
moved firmly into the exporter's camp in the talks.
The Commission, satisfied that the subsidies code 
would neither jeopardize EC market mechanisms nor impede 
EC trade expansion, was willing to strike a deal with the 
US and in November 1978 asked the Council for approval to 
complete negotiations along the lines of the package that 
was evolving. France used its standing reserve on the 
GATT talks to force the negotiations to continue because 
it feared that the IWA agreement might limit export ex­
pansion.40 This action completely severed the IWA talks 
from the rest of the GATT negotiations, because the main 
GATT agreements were required to be completed within 
weeks. Otherwise the US negotiating authority would 
lapse and the entire process would be jeopardized.
In reality the talks were doomed when the EC had 
moved from the import to export side of the negotiations 
because the LDCs were left without a spokesman. Although 
the US and EC positions had moved closer, the major im­
porter group of LDCs completely rejected the potential
The Times, 27-11-78; Financial Times, 14-12-79.
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outcome to which the exporters were c o n v e r g i n g T h i s  
deadlock ultimately killed the international wheat agree­
ment and ended the trade talks for the 1970s.130
CONCLUSION
Opinion in the Community built during the late 1970s 
for the Community to develop an active export policy. In 
1977, the ESC looked beyond the GATT negotiations and 
called for the Community to create a "genuine agricultur­
al trade policy" to include commercially-motivated ICAs, 
long-term supply agreements, export contracts, and new 
credit vehicles. Then in 1978 the EP recommended that 
the EC use the GATT disputes settlement system more 
actively to protect and support its commercial interests. 
These pronouncements heralded change. Cereals traders in 
DG-VI, French and UK wheat producers, and the government 
in France were beginning to see Europe as a world com­
petitor .
***• Cohn (1979), p. 137, writes that a key disagreement 
was over stocks. Under all the proposals LDCs would have 
to hold reserve stocks. The LDCs asked for aid to help 
build storage and handling systems to hold those stocks 
in their own countries, but the major exporters refused 
to pay (they were hoping to make profits storing the 
grain for the LDCs). The LDCs therefore refused to con­
sider holding stocks to support the market.
=°- G. Schuh, "The Changing Context of Food and Agricul­
tural Development Policy," in Gittinger, Leslie, & Hois- 
ington (1987), p. 80, argues that the outlook for the IWA 
was uncertain even before the stalemate because the new 
international financial system made commodity agreements 
markedly more complex than in the 1950s and 1960s. Wide 
swings in the US dollar relative to European or ether 
world currencies would trigger stock action without any 
underlying changes in the system. In the fifteen years 
between 1955 and 1969 (when the IWA broke down), the ECU- 
US dollar exchange rate changed less than 4% in any one 
year and only moved about 11% over the entire period. In 
contrast, after the Bretton Woods system of fixed ex­
change rates ended in 1971, the ECU-US dollar exchange 
rate varied by as much as 20% in any single year and by 
about 40% over the entire period.
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The Commission also thought so. It believed the 
outcome of the GATT negotiations in the agriculture sec­
tor— without a new IWA but with official recognition that 
the general and specific instruments of the CAP wheat 
policy were legal— was "satisfactory because it enables 
the Community to consolidate its agricultural policy. 'I5S1 
The EC had successfully ensured that the "the CAP was not 
called into question and the basic principle behind, and 
operation of, its mechanisms, including those most open 
to attack by our partners, such as levies and refunds, 
remain intact."552 In particular. Article XVI :3 continued 
to allow export subsidies for agricultural products and 
Article 10 of the new subsidies code did not really re­
strict Community action. Furthermore, Article 11 of the 
code explicitly authorized subsidies for many social 
objectives that had never previously been sanctioned. 
Thus, the Community found the international rules were 
pliable when it was forced to confront its changed posi­
tion in the 1980s.
Chapter 9
TRADE POLICY: COMPETITION IN THE 1980s
The Community developed a comprehensive commercial 
policy for wheat during the 1980s through a series of 
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral efforts. Al­
though the obvious reason for the new policy was that the 
Community needed to find an outlet for surplus produc­
tion, the development of the trade policy only occurred 
when major changes in the power structures and bargains 
overcame strong resistance within the Community. In 
short, the commercial policy for wheat was built on the 
successes and changes of the 1970s.
By 1979 changes in the structures and bargains in 
the Community forced the Commission and Council to re­
evaluate the wheat policy. As a result, the Community 
shifted focus and came close to striking a new IWA where 
Europe could realize the potential gains from commercial 
exports. Although the wheat talks became stalemated and 
the only new GATT measures were embodied in a subsidies 
code, the Commission, supported by most of the domestic 
agricultural policy actors, welcomed the outcome because 
it presented an opportunity to reappraise the basic sup­
port mechanisms of the CAP. Henceforward, the Community 
sought to use the GATT to support domestic reform and to 
promote its export interests, which represented a funda­
mental shift from the defensive posture in the 1970s.
Beginning in 1979, the Community realized that the 
security imperative had changed. As discussed in chapter 
2, the pre-1979 security concerns began to shift during 
the 1980s, as East-West relations improved and the EC 
recognized the rising economic interdependence of food 
and industrial production. Germany's minister of defence 
in 1980 recognized this and warned that the CAP threaten­
ed the ability of Australia and New Zealand to play an 
effective military role in their region and could lead to 
a full scale trade dispute that would endanger Community
- 332 -
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imports of energy and raw materials.1 Meanwhile, new 
information technologies reduced the possibility of major 
market dislocations caused by 'grain robberies.' Furth­
ermore, because of the changes in the production struc­
tures by 1980, the Commission recognized that EC food 
security could probably be met by the 25% of farmers who 
produce about 75% of farm output and who need neither in­
come nor price support.22
The Community also was pushed to change by the rapid 
growth in production and surpluses. By the early 1980s, 
the EC annually produced about 10 Mt more wheat than it
could use. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2.6, the oper­
ation of the CAP price and structures policies during the 
1970s had dramatically improved the competitiveness of
large wheat producers in Europe. The Community had two
options: it could tighten controls on domestic produc­
tion and consumption through administrative edict (i.e., 
quotas) and opt out of the export market, or it could re­
structure its price and trade policy toward market forces 
to capitalize on its new position as a competitive pro­
ducer. As demonstrated in chapters 3 through 7, the 
Community opted to redirect its domestic wheat policy to 
market conditions. An adjunct of that change was that 
the Community needed to ensure that commercial farmers 
could find outlets for their product; the EC was there­
fore compelled to look to exports. Rising volatility in 
the financial markets, however, had increased the risks 
encountered in export competition so that European farm­
ers needed help to export.
The Community would not have been able to develop an 
active export policy without changes in the underlying 
bargains in the Community. New bargains between the Com­
mission and large wheat farmers replaced the old agri­
Pearce (1981), p. 61
Pearce (1981), p. 99
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cultural policy compact that had developed the defensive, 
inward-looking wheat policy of the 1960s and 1970s. As 
the EC farm sector consolidated and specialized, the 
newly-dominant, world-competitive producers demanded 
greater access to world market opportunities. This split 
between commercial and peasant farmers enabled the Com­
mission and Council to override powerful conservative 
forces in Europe and ultimately to make the reforms to 
the domestic price regime that would allow the Community 
to develop an export policy. Within Germany, for exam­
ple, the Minister of Economics in 1979 suggested that the 
EC should forego an export policy for agriculture because 
it might damage prospects for successful trade negotia­
tions to ensure raw materials imports.3 Meanwhile, the 
UK government was uncertain whether it wanted the EC to 
develop an export policy; instead, in 1980, the UK sug­
gested that each member state should deal with its own 
surpluses.4 The Commission prevailed because it got 
strong support from a number of important quarters. As 
mentioned in chapter 7, France decided in 1985 to support 
the Commission's proposals to realign the price and trade 
policy. As a result, France became the strongest propo­
nent of reform.
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations faces new 
opportunities and constraints because of these changes. 
For the Community, the exercise presents two main oppor­
tunities. First, if international agreement recognizes 
the EC's role as a natural competitor and establishes new 
rules for international food trade, then the crippling 
export subsidy war could end. That would relieve the 
budgetary burden of the CAP and release funds to imple­
ment other programs to support Community development. 
More importantly, perhaps, the GATT could contribute to 
domestic reform. The new market approach outlined in
Financial Times, 9-7-79.
The Times, 21-11-80.
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chapter 3 could still be overturned if conditions in the 
farm sector deteriorate. "For the Commission it would 
certainly be helpful to be imbedded in an international 
agreement which would support its position vis-a-vis 
those member countries which still are against price 
cuts. "= On the other hand, if the GATT fails to recog­
nize the EC as a 'natural' competitor in the wheat area, 
the Uruguay Round, and possibly the entire GATT system, 
could collapse.
THE REVISED PRICE SYSTEM
The domestic price system and international trade 
policy for wheat are inseparably linked. The operation 
of the price system determines where and how much wheat 
is produced, how it is marketed, and the levels of sub­
sidies required for exports. During the 1970s, when the 
price system was devoted to supporting farm incomes 
irrespective of market conditions, there was little room 
for the Community to develop a sustained export presence 
on the world market. The two goals were incompatible be­
cause of both the expense and logistics. But, beginning 
in 1977, rapidly increasing supplies of common wheat and 
negotiations in the Tokyo Round of the GATT caused the 
Commission to re-examine the price system. Henceforward, 
the Commission attempted to frame prices to adapt domes­
tic production to market conditions (both domestic and 
international), rather than to ameliorate domestic prob­
lems .
Although there was no clear agreement within the 
Community in the 1970s that competition was either desir­
able or attainable, the Commission nevertheless tried to 
realign domestic prices to international levels. Accel­
erating inflation and relatively strong farm incomes in 
Europe in 1978 and 1979 allowed the Commission to provide 
limited EC price increases and yet still bring European
Tangermann (1988), p. 35.
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prices more in line with US guaranteed prices. Then, 
after 1980, opinion began to shift as the old-time bar­
gains that defended the income-supporting role for prices 
broke down (discussed in chapters 4 through 7). By the 
mid-1980s the farm policy community which had successful­
ly managed the development of the CAP was gone. In its 
place, new relationships between commercial farmers and 
the Commission arose, which enabled the farm policy com­
munity to reform the CAP to address the new domestic and 
international market pressures of the 1980s.
In 1980 the Commission for the first time suggested 
that Community prices should be aligned with world 
prices. It pursued that line of argument in the Mandate 
of 30 May 1980, concluding that the support (i.e. target) 
price for cereals in the US was a "valid point of refer­
ence" for the world price.* The Commissioners had expli­
citly rejected aligning EC prices with world prices for a 
number of reasons:
It is unlikely that European consumers could be 
supplied for long at low and stable world 
prices if. community supply, because of reduc­
tion in production, would depend to a greater 
extent on imports. World market prices are 
notoriously volatile because the quantities in­
volved in international trade are often margin­
al in relation to total production (e.g. sugar, 
cereals, dairy products) and may reflect short­
term fluctuations in production.... Therefore, 
the Commission is convinced that a generalized 
and systematic alignment to world market prices 
would not be a practical policy guideline."7
They also did not envisage cutting nominal prices; 
rather, they hoped inflation would close the approxi­
mately 20% gap between the two regions.
The Commission generally followed this pricing 
strategy until 1985. By 1982 the guarantee threshold
COM(81)608. p . 24.
COM(81)608, p. 8.
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system was in place and the EC-US price gap had begun to 
narrow. But, in 1985, the weakening US dollar increased 
the price gap and the Commission decided that nominal EC 
prices would need to be cut if the Community was to close 
the gap. When the 1985 price cut was vetoed by Germany 
in the Agricultural Council, the Commission initiated a 
review of the options, which were eventually published in 
the Green Paper. A major rift then developed within the 
Agricultural Directorate-General over the options. Parts 
of DG-VI pushed strongly during the review for the Com­
mission to continue to set prices to support incomes and
to use a variety of soft-options (including land set-
asides and quotas) to dampen growth in surpluses and bud­
get outlays. As shown in chapter 4, the cereals traders 
prevailed and a market focus was adopted by DG-VI.e Even 
then, the market-pricing approach met resistance in the 
full Commission: the German Commissioner voted against
the Green Paper in 1985 because he rejected the central
premise that EC prices should be aligned with world
prices.<5> Nevertheless, the majority prevailed and there­
after the Commission worked to make the price and inter­
vention systems support the export policy, rather than 
the reverse.
The Commission's Green Paper in 1985 set the tone
for the reforms over the next several years:
As for exports, arrangements whereby the pro­
ducers themselves can take over export risks, 
if they were to be systematically introduced, 
could be incorporated into the market organ­
izations ... by restricting to specified quan­
tities the price and disposal guarantees grant­
ed by the Community at levels above world 
prices. Beyond these quantities, disposal 
would be the responsibility of the producers 
themselves, at world market prices.10
Agra Europe, 1140, 5-7-85. 
Financial Times, 16-6-85. 
COM(85)333, p. 41.
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In addition, the Commission suggested that support prices 
should be fixed at a level closer to those of other ex­
porting countries, especially where a significant share 
of Community production was destined for world markets.11
Meanwhile, in preliminary discussions in 1985 lead­
ing to the Punta del Este conference, agricultural trade 
representatives from many of the GATT signatory states 
concluded that "export subsidies could be permitted in 
the GATT system as long as they are financed by producers 
themselves rather than being paid for by the taxpayer."12 
The Commission, realizing this would fit comfortably with 
Community needs, proposed producer co-responsibility 
levies to fund export refunds. In practice, the new levy- 
differed little from the levies already paid by French 
cereals producers to ONIC to finance export marketing 
(those levies had never been challenged as subsidies in 
multilateral forums). Beard says that as a result, "it 
can be argued by the EC authorities in international 
negotiations that EC exports are not being subsidized and 
that they are therefore legitimate competitive sales, be­
cause of the co-responsibility levies contributing to the 
cost of surplus disposal and export subsidies."13
Over the following few years the Commission manipu­
lated the price and intervention systems to achieve the 
changes proposed in the 1985 Green Paper, which were 
consistent with the prevailing trade laws and conven­
tions. In particular, the Commission forced through the 
Council new rules that realigned prices closer to world 
prices and effectively moved much of the financial res­
ponsibility for exports to farmers.
COM(85)333. p. 41.
Zietz & Valdds (1988), p. 52. 
Beard (1986), p. 54.
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  Figure 9 .11'4
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In 1986 the Commission proposed a 3% co-responsibil­
ity levy on common wheat to finance approximately half of 
the cost of exporting surpluses.1S Although the Council 
only adopted the levy on the basis that the funds would 
be used to develop domestic uses, it did accept that the 
funds should be given to DG-VI rather than put into the 
general revenue account. In practice, there was nothing 
to ensure that the levy was not used to finance exports. 
The 1988 budget stabilizers levy worked in the same way. 
Furthermore, the Council set the production threshold for 
cereals (beyond which prices would automatically fall) at 
160 Mt because that represented the net average annual 
consumption of domestic and imported cereals in the Com­
munity. Amounts over that level would need to be export­
ed. Taking all the changes together, in just over two 
years the Commission both set in motion an automatic sys­
tem to close the gap between support prices in the EC and
The data in Figure 9.1 have not been adjusted for US 
land set-asides or EC changes to the related measures. 
If they could be quantified, the gap might disappear for 
1989 because between 1986 and 1989 the US reduced its 
set-aside requirements (which effectively raised the 
value of the US deficiency program) and the EC undercut 
the operation of intervention (which reduced the value of 
EC support prices). 
ira- COM(86)20, p. B3.
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the US and got producers accepting a greater share of the 
cost of exports.
Table 9.1 EAGGF Expenditures on Cereal Exports
Export Co-resp Refunds Net Import Net
Refunds1 Levies on Aid Refunds22 Levies'3 Cost4
1973 567 0 0 567 -25 592
1974 92 0 0 92 54 146
1975 416 0 1 414 192 222
1976 494 0 45 450 331 119
1977 360 0 31 329 298 31
1978 832 0 52 780 317 463
1979 1182 0 30 1152 266 886
1980 1175 0 26 1149 198 951
1981 1206 0 21 1185 219 966
1982 1065 0 24 1041 226 815
1983 1525 0 16 1059 167 892
1984 918 0 15 903 141 762
1985 1077 0 14 1063 203 860
1986 1711 56 60 1595 319 1276
1987 3157 379 86 2692 500 2192
1988F 2805 814 141 1850 350 1500
1989F 2773 1119 133 1521 300 1221
Notes: M UA in 1973-77, M EUA in 1978--80, and M ECU ii
1981— ; C1) includes refunds on aid shipments; before 197!
it also included the purchase cost of cereaIs aid; (s;
refunds net of co-responsibi1ity and refunds on aid; (3;
for common wheat, estimated to equal the difference be­
tween the threshold price and the US #2 HWO FOB Gulf of­
fer price multiplied by the total tonnage of wheat im­
ported; (4 ) equals net refunds less the import levy. 
Sources: EC Budgets, OJ No. L Series, Nimexe for EC
wheat imports, Canadian Wheat Board Annual Reports for US 
wheat prices, ASC for the EC threshold prices, EC Economy 
for the US-EC exchange rates.
Table 9.1 shows the impact of these changes on ex­
port finances. Revenues from co-responsibility in 1989 
were forecast to pay for more than one third of the cost 
of exporting cereals. In addition, when the refunds for 
food aid (which are included in the export cost in the EC 
but are generally excluded in other exporters budgets) 
and the revenues earned from the variable levy on cereals 
imports are removed, the net cost of exporting cereals
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was substantially lower.1<fo Furthermore, imports of 
cereal substitutes under GATT-bound duty rates forced 
domestic production onto world markets, which contributed 
significantly to the cost of export restitutions (as much 
as 800 M ECU in 1982) . If, as some groups in the EC 
argue, the costs of those exports were not assessed to 
the export policy, then the net cost of cereals exports 
approached zero in 1989, which put the EC in a strong 
position to sustain its export effort.
Meanwhile, the Commission reduced the role for 
official prices. Until 1983 the intervention price rep­
resented a solid floor under the market price and, as 
such, was used as the relevant price for comparison with 
other competitors. But after 1983 the Commission used 
its powers under Reg.(EEC) 2727/75 to reform interven­
tion. It was "restored" to its original role as "a safe­
ty net to cushion farmers against short-term production 
fluctuations which are not structural in nature."1-7 
Chapter 3 illustrates that as a result intervention no 
longer operates during and immediately following the har­
vest, when much of the crop is marketed (especially in 
Germany)iea and that, even when intervention operates, the 
effective price paid to producers is cut from the already 
reduced official support price by about 14% (due to the 
94% buying-in rate, the 110-day delay in payments, and 
smaller and fewer monthly increments).
The combination of realigned prices, restricted 
intervention activity, and producer co-responsibility for
1<fa- Food aid is financed under the EAGGF Guarantee Sec­
tion of the budget (as per Reg.(EEC) 2681/74). The ex­
port refund portion of the cost is assigned to titles 1 
and 2 while the world market value of the gift is 
assigned to Title 9.
1-7- ASC 1988, p. 16.
x&. por those producers without on-farm storage, the 
potential intervention prices are therefore moot; they 
are forced to accept whatever prices prevail on the 
market when they harvest the crop.
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exports has strengthened the European wheat sector's 
potential to take advantage of commercial opportunities 
in the world markets. The Commission believes the 
domestic price system is now a "sound basis for export 
growth.
DEVELOPING MARKETING TOOLS
The Community sought throughout the 1980s to build 
upon its domestic reforms in order to assure growing 
opportunities for commercial wheat producers. As before 
1979, the Community still had four key alternative out­
lets for surplus wheat: food aid, feed or industrial
usage, storage, or export. Whereas the Community gener­
ally preferred during the 1970s to store or donate as aid 
its surplus cereals, in the 1980s the EC sought to dev­
elop long-term, commercial outlets for the excess wheat. 
Food aid shipments continued, but aid policy was reshaped 
to focus on assisting economic development in the Third 
World rather than simply on disposing of EC surpluses. 
Domestic storage, which remained significant, also was 
reshaped, so that it operated more as an adjunct to the 
export policy, rather than as an alternative. In place
IV
of those outlets, the Community encouraged alternate, 
commercially-viable domestic uses for wheat (i.e., animal 
feed or industrial feedstock) and created mechanisms to 
develop continuous exports. In short, the Community 
shifted its focus from 'surplus disposal' toward develop­
ment of commercial markets.^-0
a . Food Aid
The European food aid program over the 1980s moved 
away from merely being a mechanism for surplus disposal 
towards a true development-based policy. The EC during 
the 1980s grew "increasingly to accept that its food aid
1Ci>- Bui 1 . EC 3-84, p. 14.
ao. -phe Commission's rhetoric changed about that time. 
It no longer referred to "surpluses" for disposal but to 
"exportable surpluses."
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commitment should be a continuing one no matter what the 
state of its internal supply situation."21
Table 9.2 Cereals Aid Allocated and Shipped from the EC
Cereals Aid Cereals Shipped Wheat Shipped
A1 located Shipped com pexr&d U illK Surplus as % of
(000 T) (000 T) A1located (000 T) Surplus
1969-78 524 511 —3% 1,177 43%
1979 721 656 -9% 6,398 10%
1980 721 625 -13% 5,109 12%
1981 928 969 5% 10,825 9%
1982 1000 852 -15% 9,731 9%
1983 1001 686 -32% 15,079 5%
1984 1128 1340 19% 8,970 15%
1985 1160 1087 -6% 23,819 5%
1979-85 951 888 -7% 11,549 8%
Notes: The aid figures include all cereals but wheat was
the most important commodity; the wheat surplus figure 
includes common and hard wheats.
Source: Green Europe #216. Annex Table 1; Eurostat, Su p -
ply Balance Sheets.
The change in EC food aid policy was precipitated by 
the rapid expansion in exportable surpluses. During the 
1970s the Community was frequently threatened with domes­
tic shortfalls. As food aid was viewed largely as a 
means of surplus disposal (accounting for an average 43% 
of total surpluses in 1969-78), the Community was quite 
willing to cut aid shipments to supply the domestic mar­
ket. During the 1980s, however, the Community found its 
surpluses were large enough so that even when the Commun­
ity faced a major crop failure, it had sufficient produce 
to supply both domestic and foreign aid commitments. 
Consequently, the aid annual shipments during the 1980s 
reflected the needs of receiving countries, rather than 
short-term market problems in the Community.
-j. . Fennell (1987) , p. 105.
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More importantly, perhaps, the mechanisms of food 
aid were revised in the 1980s, so that food aid could not 
easily be used to develop commercial markets. After wild
gyrations in food prices and supplies in the 1972-73
period, the developed countries met with the food-deficit 
countries at the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974 
and agreed to expand the World Food Program. This "rep­
resented a bench mark in thinking" as it shifted concern 
from Asia to Africa.1--’ In 1971-72, less than 9% of 
world-wide cereals food aid went to Africa; by 1976-77 
the proportion had risen to more than 28% and by 1982-83, 
more than 50% of aid was directed to Africa. Meanwhile, 
Africa received about 52% of the EC's aid in 1983-85, up 
from only 19% in 1969-71.123 This shift reduced the
potential for using food aid to develop commercial rela­
tions because Africa slipped further into economic dis­
order after 1970, with per capita GDP falling an average 
2% per annum. Increasingly, the African countries were 
unable to purchase or produce enough food to feed their 
rapidly rising populations. Food production per capita
Gittinger, Leslie, & Hoisington (1987), p. 15-17. 
Green Europe #216, Annex 10-11 bis.
Trade Policy: Competition in the 1980s 345
slipped by an average 0.7% per year between 1973 and 1980 
and then fell by more than 1.8% per annum between 1980 
and 1984. Consequently, exporters like the Community
found little commercial potential in Africa and were 
forced to reformulate their policies to expand the devel­
opment aspects of their aid.
In 1979, the Commission proposed a new Food Aid Reg­
ulation "to transform food aid into an independent policy 
aimed at development objectives."^3 The newly elected EP 
also began to push for the Community to develop a more 
responsible aid policy. In 1982 the Council finally 
approved revised regulations that focused European food 
aid on development goals-— raising the standard of nutri­
tion, helping with emergencies, and contributing to bal­
anced economic and social development in the recipient 
countries— and thereby divorced food aid from disposal of 
European surpluses. Since then the Community has diver­
sified its methods of giving aid so that in some cases 
the food aid provided by the EC does not even originate 
in the Community (i.e, triangular arrangements).
After 1979, the Community also increased the share 
of cereals aid that it shipped multi laterally. Between 
1968 and 1978 the Community shipped less than 15% of its 
aid via multilateral arrangements or agencies. The rest 
was given bilaterally, which created potential to use the 
aid to develop commercial markets. But in the 1980s on 
average about 30% of the aid was shipped multi laterally 
and in 1985 about 539,000 tonnes or almost half of the 
Community aid that year was shipped through multilateral 
arrangements. Consequently, the Community was less able 
to use aid for commercial purposes.
World Bank (1988), p p . 154-56. 
Green Europe. 216, p. 3.
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Partly or Wholly Through
Volume % of Total
Year (000 Hr) Shipments
1969-78
Low volume 1969 8.3 2.7%
Low Share 1969 8.3 2.7%
High Volume 1978 184.7 20.8%
High Share 1972 113.3 48.9%
Average — 84.0 14.5%
1979-85
Low volume 1980 163.4 26 .1%
Low Share 1981 187.4 19 .3%
High Volume 1985 539.4 49.6%
High Share 1985 539 .4 49 .6%
Average — 264.7 29.8%
Source: Green Europe #216, Annex Table 10.
In 1988 McMahon concluded:
Operation of the policy shows that although it 
started as a means of disposing of agricultural 
surpluses, it has moved towards being a tool in 
the process of development. The latest Commis­
sion paper on the food aid policy states that 
food aid is now an integral part of the devel­
opment policy. They point to the 1984 decision 
allowing for the possibility of replacing food 
aid by credit, where there is risk of upsetting 
the recipient’s market, as evidence of the 
transformation of the policy. Proposed re­
forms, such as the encouragement of triangular 
transactions, clearly point the way forward for 
food aid policy as an integral part of develop­
ment .a<fa
■Y
b . Alternate Uses
\
After the Community ended the wheat denaturing 
program in 1973, it was left to find alternate uses for 
the rising surpluses of low grade wheats. The search 
focused on two alternatives. First, the Community sought
McMahon (1988), p. 270.
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to increase the use of low-quality wheat as animal feed, 
initially by "completing the CAP" (i.e., limit imports of 
cereal substitutes) and then by reform of the price sys­
tem. Then, in the late 1980s, it encouraged processors 
to use more wheat as a feed-stock for industrial pro­
ducts .
Table 9.4 EC10 Use of Cereals, Soya, & Cereal Substi­








1974 12.3 61 12.5 2.1 0.7 4.6
1975 9.5 60 11.6 2.2 0.9 5.9
1976 9.9 59 13.4 3.0 1.1 8.0
1977 10.8 59 13.1 3.8 1.5 9.6
1978 11.7 61 16 .6 6.0 1.7 11.9
1979 12.4 61 17.9 5.4 2.0 12.1
1980 13.2 58 18.4 4.9 2.6 13.0
1981 13.6 55 18.6 6.7 2.8 14.8
1982 14.9 54 18.5 8.1 2.8 16.2
1983 20. 1 50 18.3 4.5 3.6 14.1
1984 21 .3 50 16 .4 5.3 3.7 13.6
1985 21 .4 50 18.6 6.3 3.5 14.7
1986 21.7 — 23.8 5.8 4.1 12.2
1987 — — 24.6 7.0 4.7 15 .4
Notes: (1) marketing years beginning on August 1 (July 1
after 1986); (2) calendar years; (3) before 1982 the soya
figure is the total of beans, cake, and meal, not conver­
ted to cake equivalent; in 1978, the cake equivalent fig­
ure was 14.5 Mt,father +W. 16.8 Mt; (4) cereal substitutes
include manioc, corn glutens, citrus pulps, cereal brans, 
and industrial and animal by-products.
Sources: ASC 1980. p. 102; ASC 1985, p. 122; EC Commis­
sion, CAP Working Notes, 1987, p. 56; Eurostat, Su p p ly 
Balance Sheet; H-GCA, Marketing Notes, various.
As discussed in Chapter 8, the price 'silo' was not 
particularly successful in encouraging greater consump­
tion of low-quality wheats as animal feed. When that 
approach failed to solve the problem, the Community 
sought to reduce imports of non-cereal feeds. By 1979 
the derogations of the CAP cereals markets (i.e., zero- 
bound duties under the GATT) caused the Community serious
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headaches. During the 1980s, the Community annually im­
ported about 30 Mt of soya and cerea1-substitutes, which 
was more than double the exportable production for common 
wheat. Without its GATT obligation, the Community would 
likely have reduced imports of these substitutes and fed 
a significantly higher proportion of its common wheat to 
animals. In 1979-80, imports of 8.9 Mt of cereal substi­
tutes were estimated to cost the Community about 400 M 
ECU, or about half of the net cost of cereals exports.27 
In 1981 COPA estimated that imports of all cereal substi­
tutes at zero duty cost the Community 855 M ECIFB and, by 
1982, the cost of importing 9 Mt of manioc and corn-glu- 
ten feeds had risen to 650 M ECU, or about two thirds of 
the net costs of wheat exports.22,7
Pressure to negotiate changes to these bindings 
built up over the late 1970s and into the 1980s. French 
farmers in particular were convinced that imports of 
cereal substitutes cost them dearly. They saw the import 
of low cost substitutes as the primary cause of weak dom­
estic demand for their wheat and a major factor behind 
the fall in EC domestic market prices toward the inter­
vention levels. Especially following the introduction of 
the cereals co-responsibility levy in 1986, FNSEA pressed 
the French government to have the Council tighten Commun- 
ity pref erence.3° But the feed industry, consumer assoc­
iations, and the UK government generally opposed the 
French proposals. At the European level the French farm 
lobby was able to convince the EP (in the late 1970s) to 
support GATT negotiations to limit imports of these com­
peting products. After 1979, however, MEPs on the com­
mittees on external economic relations and consumer 
affairs developed contrary positions. The ESC meanwhile 
generally supported farmer demands to limit cereal sub­
ASC 1980. p . 100.
Agra Europe, 936, 10-7-81. 
COM(81)608. Annex 9. 
Financial Times, 11-2-86.
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stitutes, but not if the result would be a trade war with 
the US.
The Commission decided as early as 1982 to try to 
limit imports of soya and cereal-substitutes. It first 
opened negotiations for a voluntary export restraint 
(VER) agreement with the exporters of manioc, the major 
cereal substitute not produced in the US. GATT Article 
XXVIII allows contracting countries to modify bindings of 
specific products provided they provide compensation.31 
In April 1982 the Commission reached a tentative agree­
ment with Thailand and Indonesia, paving the way for the 
EC to suspend the bound-duties on manioc. In July 1982 
the Council approved a nine-year deal with Thailand, 
which was not a GATT member, that initially limited it to 
5.5 Mt imports and gradually reduced that to 4.5 Mt by 
1986, at a maximum ad valorem levy of 6%. In exchange
Thailand got grants to aid rural development and agricul­
tural diversification in manioc dependent regions. Indo­
nesia and Brazil, both GATT members, were to share (85% 
and 15% respectively) a 0.588 Mt quota in 1982, which 
would rise to 0.97 Mt in 1986, subject to a 6% ad valorem 
duty.33' In 1986, the quotas for Thailand (by then a GATT 
member), Indonesia, and Brazil were extended to 1990 and
new quotas were developed for China and other non-GATT
members for the 1987-89 period.33
US shipments of soya and corn gluten feeds were more 
difficult to control. The Commission first proposed in 
1982 that the Community should negotiate under Article 
XXVIII to limit imports of US soya and corn gluten feeds. 
But that offer appeared to have been simply part of an 
effort to finesse the 1982 price package past the French
31 ■ If satisfactory compensation can not be negotiated, 
then the affected country can retaliate with equivalent 
measures.
3ri-- Bui 1 . EC 7/8-1982. p. 37.
Bull. EC 11-1986. p. 69.
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government in the Council rather than a serious attempt 
to act.34 As pressure grew, however, the Commission had 
to respond. In 1984 Council finally authorized the Com­
mission to open negotiations with exporters of maize 
starch residues (i.e. corn gluten feeds), spent grains 
from brewing and distilling, and maize cake. The Com­
mission began discussions with the US in July 1984 but 
failed to reach any agreement.355 The Commission was 
careful to avoid a full-scale battle over this issue be­
cause of the increasing importance of world markets for 
the Community. Thus, when it became obvious that the US 
would not budge, the Commission decided that it would 
have to use price cuts to improve the competitiveness of 
EC wheats as animal feed.
The set of measures aimed at realigning wheat and 
feed cereals prices, combined with the limitations on 
imports of manioc, had some success in the mid-1980s. 
The feed use of common wheat rose to an average 21.1 Mt 
in 1983-86 from an average 13.5 Mt in the previous four 
years. But exportable surpluses of wheat continued to 
rise .
The Community decided in the late 1980s to again 
implement subsidies for domestic feed merchants to incor­
porate common wheats into feeds. At the end of 1988 the 
Council agreed to pay subsidies to livestock producers to 
use compounds that include at least 20% EC cereals. The 
subsidies rose progressively with the proportion of EC 
cereals used.36 In total, the Commission planned to make
2-3 Mt of surplus cereals available for feed under this 
plan.
Financial Times, 8-4-82.
ASC 1984, p. 27 & 79.
Agra Europe, 1312, 11-11-88.
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Meanwhile, the Commission worked after 1980 to dev­
elop industrial uses for wheat and other surplus cereals. 
Once the Commission had shifted its scrutiny from farmers 
to the larger agro-industrial complex, it saw potential 
to direct some of the rising surpluses into industrial 
processes. After 1983 the Commission pushed biomass and 
ethanol production as a potentially large outlet for low 
quality wheats. Although the Community had some success 
with this approach— industrial usage of common wheat rose 
to 1.3 Mt in 1986-87 from 0.475 Mt in 1980-81 and only 
0.135 Mt in 1972-7337— the expanded usage represented 
only about 2% of total domestic usage.
c . Storage
After 1980, the Commission and the Cereals Manage­
ment Committee directed its stocks policy much more in 
response to export imperatives. During the 1970s, the 
Committee maintained a tight grip on the domestic stock- 
to-use ratio by adjusting exports and aid shipments in 
line with disposable surpluses. Long-term commitments 
were assiduously avoided. After 1980, however, the Com­
mission was faced with significantly larger disposable 
surpluses (an average 13 Mt per year compared with only 4 
Mt during the 1970s) and a more competitive international 
market (much of the wheat moved under long-term con­
tract) . The Community could no longer expect to store 
all the exportable grain, nor did it expect to ship it as 
aid or use it in the livestock industry or for industrial 
processes. The Community found it needed to develop an 
active, long-term export policy, which in turn required 
it to adapt its storage practices. Consequently, the 
stock-to-use ratio was allowed to swing more widely than 
in the 1970s. In both 1981 and 1983, for example, the 
Community increased exports by more than the increase in 
production, which caused the stock-to-use ratio to drop 
below the level that was historically viewed as consis-
Eurostat, Supply Balance Sheet.
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tent with domestic price stability. The EC also main­
tained the stock—to—use ratio at a higher average level 
throughout the period in order to guarantee that it could 
meet its market commitments.
Table 9 .5 EC Stock-Domestic Use Ratios for Wheat (ooo-tT)





1973-80 9 7693 35738 to to ee 3928 2230
1981 10 6999 40003 17.5% 9725 10404
1982 10 10399 40894 25 .4% 14824 9463
1983 10 7856 46527 16.9% 8795 11664
1984 10 14353 47994 29 .9% 22217 11961
1985 10 13911 48468 28.7% 11737 12487
1986 10 13007 48920 26 .6% 11604 9252
1981-86 10 10087 45468 24.2% 13150 10872
Sources : Eurostat Supply Balance Sheets ; Nimexe
Furthermore, the Commission held greater stocks for 
strategic purposes. In 1981 the US challenged the EC 
export subsidies at the GATT. Under the 1979 Subsidies 
Code, export subsidies were allowed, provided the expor­
ter did not thereby gain more than an equitable market 
share. The US argued that EC subsidies for wheat flour 
exports allowed it to gain market share at the expense of 
other exporters. Before the case was adjudicated, the EC 
announced at the 1982 GATT Ministerial that it would 
limit its exports to 14% of the world wheat market; the 
EC had captured about 14% of the world wheat market in 
the 1980-82 period.30 Even though the disputes panel 
failed to conclude whether EC wheat flour exports exceed­
ed the "equitable share" standard of the subsidies code, 
the Community after 1983 was willing to hold larger 
stocks than strictly needed for domestic purposes in an
3°- Petit (1985), p . 59
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effort to placate the EC's major competitors so as to 
lessen international price competition.
d. Export Mechanisms
When the new EP convened after the 1979 election, it 
supported France's call for the Community to develop med­
ium and long-term agreements and to provide a greater 
variety of incentives to exports (e.g., credit).3^ The 
ESC, which as early as 1977 called for a "genuine agri­
cultural trade policy,"*0 meanwhile examined and proposed 
a variety of configurations of contracts, credit, subsi­
dies, and international agreements that would best suit 
EC export interests.
The Commission generally accepted that approach in 
the 1980s. But before asking for greater powers or new 
mechanisms, it used its management powers to improve the 
existing export machinery to enable it to move maximum 
volumes through the export system at the best price. In 
particular, the Commission created advance settings for 
refund payments (thereby ensuring that sales were made 
when buyers were ready, even if the volumes were not 
necessarily available to move at the time of the sale), 
introduced differentiated and special refunds (which 
allowed the Commission to target exports to specific mar­
kets and to practice market price differentiation), and 
developed product balance sheets (which enabled DG-VI to 
plan its export campaigns).** These innovations were 
critical factors in a number of Community sales during 
the 1980s. In 1983, for example, the Commission used a 
"special export refund" to regain the Egypt wheat flour 
market after the US made a subsidized flour sale.'*2 
Then, in 1986, when the US made an Export Enhancement 
Program (EEP) offer to the USSR, the Commission was able
EP Doc 1-37/80. 24-3-80, p. 22. 
OJ No. C 61, 10-3-77, p. 17.
Bui 1. EC 7/8-1981. p. 21.
Bull. EC 10-1983, p. 58.
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to offer a special refund (more than 8 ECU/t) in advance 
of the new marketing year because the product balance 
sheets showed that the Community would have available 
supply in the new year. By doing so, the EC was able to 
beat the US offer and thereby to complete a 1 Mt sale to 
the USSR.'’3 Again, in 1988, the Commission countered US 
EEP offers to China and the USSR with special .
subsidies of 4.5 ECU/t for wheat exports (in addi­
tion to the existing standing refund offer)
The Commission also got Council approval in 1981 to 
provide restitutions on exports of processed cereal pro­
ducts. ** Thus, after 1981, the Commission was able to 
offer export packages of multiple products from numerous 
food groups, which gave it greater marketing power.
The Commission, however, was not content with those 
tools. The Commission felt that the export system lacked 
continuity. The Community was unable to maximize export 
revenues or volumes because it was constrained to single­
year sales and was only allowed to use export refunds to 
regulate volume, price, and destination. The Commission 
argued that, without further mechanisms, it could not 
optimize the timing, volume, or price of export sales; as 
a result, exports were unnecessarily expensive. The Com­
mission also reported that its customers wanted the 
greater security of supply that would flow from long-term 
agreements. The Commission therefore pressed the Council 
in 1980 for permission to develop long-term framework 
agreements (LTFAs or multiannual supply agreements) to 
protect important EC food export m a r k e t s . T h e s e  three 
to five-year agreements— which would only cover part of 
expected total export volumes— would "regularize sales"
'+3- International Herald Tribune. 15-8-86.
Canadian Wheat Board, Weekly News Summary, Week 13, 
Oct 24-28, 1988.
*KS- 29th Review of the Council's Work 1981, p. 184.
COM(81)429. 10-8-81, p. 1-2.
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because they would establish the price conditions, safe­
guard rules, and minimum and maximum annual volumes of a 
variety of products that the Community would agree to 
export. If integrated into development programs of LDCs 
or tied to multi-annual food aid agreements, these con­
tracts would also help stabilize world markets because EC 
customers would be assured secure supplies. In March
1982, the Commission asked Council to allow it to open 
negotiations on LTFAs with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia but the Council did not approve.'*'7
France, in particular, was unhappy with the limited 
number of export mechanisms that the Community could use 
to market wheat. It became increasingly concerned after 
1979 that rising EC production restricted its commercial 
opportunities within the Community. It wanted the EC to 
develop an active export policy so that French farmers 
could replace their lost EC sales with new world mar­
kets. As early as 1975 France pressed the Community to 
make long-term framework agreements with Europe's major 
trading partners but, as mentioned in chapter 8, that 
attempt failed. When the Community did not pursue long­
term exports, France negotiated with China and eventually 
signed in September 1980 an agreement to sell 0.5 Mt to 
0.7 Mt of wheat annually between August 1980 and July
1983. Then, in October 1982 France concluded a three- 
year agreement in principle to boost French food exports 
to the Soviet Union; the deal included commitments for 
between 1 Mt and 3 Mt of wheat each year over the per­
iod. Nevertheless, France continued to press for Com­
munity action. In October 1983 the French ministerfor 
agriculture proposed that the Community create an EC 
Cereals Export Board to act as a central selling agency, 
similar to the Canadian or Australian Wheat Boards, but
COM(82)73, 4-3-82.
Pearce (1981), p. 97.
Agra Europe (1983), p. 46.
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the proposal died because the Commission declined to for­
ward it to the Council.™0
Meanwhile, the Commission attempted to develop 





to act and the 
own programs.
offered to co-ordinate the existing 
agencies (to reduce competition between 
and to develop an EC credit system for 
As with LTFAs, however. Council refused 
member states were left to develop their
Table 9. 6 Export Mechanisms Used by the EC and Other
Major Exporters
80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (including Member States) ;
(Mt)
Cash 11 .0 11 .1 11.3 12.5 13.3 10.5 12.4
Credit 1.7 1.9 2.3 1 .1 2.6 3.0 1.8
Gift .9 1.3 1 . 1 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.1
(% distribution)
Cash 81 78 77 84 76 73 81
Credit 12 13 16 7 15 20 12
Gift 7 9 7 9 9 7 7
TOTAL OF US, CANADA, ARGENTINA AND AUSTRALIA .
(Mt)
Cash 59.0 69 .5 50.4 58.4 58.6 40.9 38.8
EEP - — — - - 2.1 8.4
Credit 13.4 11.4 24. 1 19 .9 15.3 17.7 17.9
Gift 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.2 1.8 2.5
Tota 1 74.1 82.8 76 .4 80.7 78.9 62.5 67.6
{% distribution)
Cash 80 84 66 72 74 65 57
EEP - - — - - 3 12
Credit 18 14 31 25 19 28 27
Gift 2 2 3 3 3 3 4
Source: IWC (1988), Table 27.
Petit, et al. (1987), p. 31
Bull. EC 7/8-1981, p. 21.
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As with the LTFAs, France led in the development of 
credit instruments. After October 1982 the US used a 
blend of zero-interest export credits and credit guaran­
tees to "regain lost market share" in the Mediterranean 
market; by February 1984, after the first full year of 
the three-year EEP program, it had disbursed US$601 M of 
blended credit for wheat sales to Algeria, Egypt, Moroc­
co, and Tunisia.
Table 9.7 EC Wheat Exports with Credit (OOOt)
To: 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87
AFRICA — 250 500 715 1,424 1,320 514
- Algeria - - - - - - 210
- Angola - - - 50 70 41 -
- Ethiopia - - - - 243 75 -
- Morocco — 250 500 400 905 786 -
- Tunisia — — — 265 206 418 304
MIDDLE EAST 800 750 270 1,040 1,640 1,316
- Egypt - 800 750 270 1,000 1,340 700
- Syria - - - - - 200 500
- Turkey — — — — 40 100 116
CPES 1,700 800 875 — — — —
- China 500 500 875 - - - -
- Poland 1, 200 300 — — — — —
LATIN AMERICA- — 165 105 166 — —
- Brazi1 - - 165 - - - -
- Cuba — — — 105 166 — —
Source: IWC (1988), Table 19.
France regarded those countries as traditional 
French markets where it had a strong interest in develop­
ing economic and political relationships.5522 Consequent-
ss:v2- F. Clerc, "French Attitudes," in Tracy & Hodac 
(1979), p. 363, noted that there is an "advantage for the 
Community in having available agricultural produce which 
can be exported to countries of the Mediterranean, the 
Near East, and above all Africa, where the Community is 
seeking to develop its political relationship." J. Lynn
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ly, when the Commission failed to get authority to extend 
either credit or credit guarantees for EC wheat exports, 
France decided to expand its own credit offerings. Table 
9.7 shows that France responded with expanded credits to 
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia to retain their market share. 
The French government granted, both to export companies 
and the importing countries, two- and three-year credit 
packages at market rates of interest, with a COFACE guar­
antee for 95% of the total amount. In the past, COFACE 
extended credit guarantees to exporters only for politi­
cal and commercial risks and for no longer than six 
months.
Although of lesser importance, UK and German exports 
of wheat were on the rise, which encouraged those two 
countries to develop their own set of export mechanisms. 
In the UK, the Home-Grown Cereals Authority provides 
market intelligence, promotes R&D, and acts as the EC 
agent for intervention buying, storage, and disposal of 
surplus cereals and rapeseed, but does not provide any 
export assistance. The Export Credit Guarantee Depart­
ment (ECGD) of the Department of Trade and Industry, 
traditionally only involved with grain exports in a minor 
way, was permitted at the end of 1984 to extend credit 
and credit guarantees for all bulk grain sales to gov­
ernment and public agencies for a maximum two years and, 
in cases where other countries were offering credit, for 
up to three years.'33 The IWC, however, does not think 
the ECGD used this facility often between then and 1988. 
Even without further support, however, UK producers were 
clearly set to capitalize on their new export capacity. 
The UK made large investments in port and grain handling 
facilities during the late 1970s and early 1980s, so that
& A. Jay, Yes, Prime Minister (London, 1986), p. 31, 
present a wonderful satire of European geopolitical 
concerns of the CAP which is uncomfortably close to this 
statement.
=3- IWC (1988), p. 3:10.
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by the mid-1980s the UK could move 750,000 tonnes monthly 
or about 9 Mt annually.25*
In Germany, support for cereals exports comes mainly 
from producer financed agencies. The Marktabsatzfond, a 
marketing fund set up in 1969, was reformed in the 1980s 
so that its export efforts were financed entirely by 
levies on agricultural products sold in Germany (before 
1979-80 it received government funding). It spends a 
significant portion of its budget to promote exports, 
particularly to traditional markets in Eastern Europe.
In 1985, the Commission’s Green Paper signaled a new 
phase in the search for more EC export mechanisms. Once 
the Commission got the new co-responsibility system in 
operation, it proposed to develop related trade policy 
instruments. Commercial farmers, largely in France, 
demanded that they have greater opportunities to sell 
abroad if their domestic support was to be cut. In the 
Green Paper, the Commission first recommended that export 
refunds should be further varied by quality, intended 
use, and destination. Then, it recommended that the Com­
mission should become more active in the credit area. In 
particular, the Commission proposed to harmonize existing 
national credit and insurance practices, to encourage the 
use of ECU-denominated loans (to reduce exchange risks), 
to regulate national loan subsidies to ensure they accord 
with the OECD code for credit for industrial products,2515 
to develop an EC-level export credit program, and to 
negotiate multi-annual supply contracts.256 The Council 
did not respond and national measures continued to proli­
ferate .
F. Rees, "The EEC and the UK’s Cereals Processing 
Industry," in Swinbank & Burns (1984), p. 106.
==5- See OECD (1987a), pp. 231-238. The guidelines in­
clude the maximum proportion of credit allowable per 
trade (85%), the maximum term (10 years), and the minimum 
interest rates (SDR rate less 10 basis points).
COM(85)333, p. 46.
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In 1988, after the outstanding domestic concerns 
were resolved at the special Brussels Summit, the Com­
mission returned to the Council for approval for a Com­
munity-based export system. The Commission again offered 
to co-ordinate national credit agencies (COFACE, ECGD, 
and Marktabsatzfond) in order to harmonize national loans 
on hard commercial food exports (using OECD guidelines) 
and then to develop an EC scheme of reduced-rate loans to 
support exports to the poorest debtor nations in Africa. 
The credit program would provide subsidies of 35% to 100% 
of the loan interest rate for up to three years, while 
the principal of the loans would be guaranteed for the EC 
exporters.5'7 The Canadian Wheat Board estimated that the 
proposal (76 M ECU in 1989) would have been adequate to 
finance approximately 2 Mt of wheat sales during the 
first year of the program (equal to about 10% of the 1989 
EC export campaign) .“'sm The Council had not decided on 
that set of proposals by September 1989.
Although the trade policy was not in full operation 
in 1989, it was possible, nevertheless, to see its scope. 
The Commission would co-ordinate national LTFAs and 
credit arrangements (which are largely financed through 
para-fiscal levies on producers) until the Council 
approves a set of European supply agreements and credit 
measures (similarly financed by producers through co­
responsibility levies). When fully operational, the 
system would rival any now functioning in the major 
competing countries.
THE EC IN THE GATT
Faced with the changed orientation of the CAP and 
strong domestic pressure for export expansion, the Com­
munity adopted an aggressive strategy for the Uruguay
53";'- Agra Europe, 1296, 22-7-88, p. 2.
Canadian Wheat Board, Weekly News Summary, Week 4, 
Aug. 22-26, 1988.
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Round of GATT negotiations which began in 1986. Whereas 
in the Tokyo Round the EC sought to protect and defend 
its domestic farm policy, in the Uruguay Round until 1989 
it sought to consolidate its domestic reforms and expand 
its position in world wheat markets. In particular, the 
EC wants the GATT to confirm that it is a 'natural' com­
petitor and to grant it the privileges that flow from 
such a position, such as the right to defend its market 
share and the opportunity to enter new markets.
The Community entered the negotiations in the run up 
to the Punta del Este conference in a strong position, 
having begun the process to recast its domestic price 
system to support its international goals. The Commis­
sion argued in 1988 that:
In so far as the Community has been able to 
press forward its reforms internally, it has 
also been in a position to make a credible 
contribution to the achievement of a consensus 
at international level (OECD, GATT and the 
economic summits of the Seven in Tokyo, Venice 
and Toronto) on the principle that only consis­
tent adjustments of the agricultural policies 
themselves will enable the world markets to be 
stabilized and trading conditions improved .~r,<9
The domestic reforms between 1983 and 1988 were closely 
linked with the international negotiations. The co-res- 
ponsibility and stabilizer systems (which incorporate 
levies, a maximum guaranteed quantity, and automatic 
price cuts) provided the Community with a solid base for 
export growth because, as indicated above, the levies 
contribute a large and growing share of the export sub­
sidy costs of the CAP. As well, the mechanisms modulate 
prices in line with market conditions.
With its domestic programs in order, the Commission 
sought to develop a matching strong external position. 
As in the 1970s, the Community faced a variety of legal
ASC 1988, p . 25
362 Chapter 9
and political challenges to its export policies (e.g., in 
1981 and 1982 the US launched five separate GATT legal 
challenges to EC agricultural production and trade prac­
tices) . In contrast to the earlier period, however, the 
Commission responded aggressively to those challenges. 
The Community's new response to trade irritations was "a 
quick, sharp, and rather belligerent threat of retalia­
tion, often listing the actual products. "<fa° For example, 
the EC retaliated to the onslaught of US litigation in 
1981 and 1982 with cases against the US subsidized sale 
of wheat flour to Egypt in 1983 and against tobacco and 
wine import restrictions in 1985 .*,t In the 1980s the EC 
also frequently blocked panel decisions and then nego­
tiated bilaterally with the other litigants to resolve 
the disputes. After 1979 the Commission also began to 
use GATT Article XXIII to pry open foreign markets for 
European exports. Furthermore, in 1984 the EC Foreign 
Ministers Council adopted a "New Commercial Policy Inst­
rument," similar to the Section 301 provisions of the US 
Trade Act of 1974, which permits private EC citizens to 
complain about GATT violations of other countries and 
establishes a series of steps by which EC officials could 
be forced to respond with GATT lawsuits against offen­
ders. ^  3
<fj°- Hudec (1988), pp. 30-31.
In 1983 the US administration subsidized a sale of 1 
Mt of wheat flour to Egypt, which France saw as an unfair 
incursion into its traditional market. The US had added 
to the commercial sale a fully subsidized payment-in-kind 
from CCC stocks to bring the average offer price well be­
low the EC bid; a French observer estimated the subsidy 
cost the US budget about US$130 million. The EC chal­
lenged the sale as an abrogation of Art. 10 of the Sub­
sidies Code.
A=a. -phe Community also matched the US in rhetorical ex­
cesses. In 1983, for example, the EC said the US had en­
tered a traditional EC market for the first time in 10 
years when it made a subsidized sale of wheat flour to 
Egypt. In fact, the US had sold an average 2 Mt per year 
over the preceding several years; the difference was that 
US sales were always unprocessed grain rather than flour. 
^  Hudec (1988), p . 35.
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Table 9.8 Key Farm Trade Disputes at the GATT (1980-89)
GATT Article XXIII Dispute Settlement Proceedings:
Date Plaintiff I ssue
1980 Canada EC restrictions on imports of beef
1980 USA UK restraints on poultry imports
1981 Austra1ia EC canned fruit production subsidies
1982 EC Switzerland measures on table grapes
1982 Austra1 ia+ EC sugar export subsidies
1982 USA EC production aids on canned fruit
1982 USA EC tariff on Med. citrus imports
1983 EC USA tobacco policies
1984 EC Chile dairy products policies
1984 Australi a EC beef and veal regime
1985 EC Canadian provincial liquor boards
1986 EC Canadian limits on beef imports
1987 EC Japan label rules & distribution 
systems for bulk wine and beer
1988 USA EC meat hormone ban
1988 Chi le EC import licenses for dessert apples
1988 US EC subsidies to feed processors
1988 US EC restrictions on imports of apples
1988 EC US 1955 waiver
1988 EC US duties on EEC products in response 
to Hormone Directive
Formal Dispute Settlement proceedings under the Framework
of the 1979 Tokyo Round Trade Agreements:
Date Plaintiff I ssue
1981 USA EC export subsidies on wheat flour
1982 USA EC export subsidies on pasta
1982 USA EC export subsidies on poultry
1983 USA EC export subsidies on sugar
1983 EC US wheat flour sale to Egypt
1985 EC US countervailing duty action on wine
+ also Austria, !Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Dominican Rep.,
India, Nicaragua, Peru, & Philippines
Sources: Petersmann (1986), p p . 67-71, 370-76; Hudec
(1988) , p p . 46-51 ; OECD (1988); OECD (1989).
Then the Community brought before the GATT Council 
meeting on 22 September 1988 a complaint against the 1955 
waiver granted for US agricultural laws. The Community 
argued the waiver was the major infringement of the GATT 
in the agricultural area and therefore the main source of
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"disequi1ibria, tensions and weakening of the trading 
system."^4 The EC and US had held consultations under 
Article XXIII:2 during 1987 and 1988, but had failed to 
resolve their differences. The US offered to address the 
waiver in the Uruguay Round negotiations but the EC 
wanted to remove that bargaining chip before the talks 
got to the substantive stage. The EC therefore pressed 
the GATT Council to establish a panel to review US sugar 
policies (exempted under the waiver) and, if no agreement 
could be reached, to vote by a two-thirds majority to 
remove the waiver. The GATT in July 1989 established a 
panel to review the case.
Meanwhile, the momentum behind the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT increased. Compared with past multilateral 
trade negotiations, this round developed a different 
focus. In the Tokyo Round discussion centered on tariff 
levels and the profusion of export subsidies and non­
tariff trade barriers. The Uruguay Round, in contrast,
quickly evolved into an exercise to establish ground 
rules to limit both domestic and international policies 
that distort trade.
In March 1985 the Council set out its objectives for 
the new GATT Round. Both the Commission and Council 
agreed that the Community should seek "more satisfactory 
arrangements for trade in agricultural products which 
would not call into question the fundamental principles 
of the CAP. "*ss The Community would not countenance pro­
hibition of export subsidies or the variable import levy 
because both instruments were fundamental to the domestic 
organization of the markets. Furthermore, Bruno Julian, 
the EC agricultural representative at the GATT, said that 
"the EC believes it is entitled to a fair share of the 
world market and will be aggressive in trying to obtain
GATT, Focus, #57, Sept/Oct 1988, p. 1.
<fa=5“ 33rd Review of the Council's Work 1985, p. 105.
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this share. In support of that goal, the Community 
quietly let lapse its 1982 commitment to hold its share 
of the world wheat market to 14%; during 1984-86 the EC 
market share averaged more than 17% and rose to 20% in 
1988.
The Community then stonewalled at the GATT opening 
meeting until the other countries accepted a significant­
ly less dogmatic ministerial declaration than either the 
US or the Cairns Group desired. The final declaration 
simply stated that the contracting parties "agreed that 
there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and 
predictability to world agricultural trade." The talks 
were not committed, as the US argued, to total liberal­
ization of farm trade, but simply to "increase discip­
line."^'^ Furthermore, export subsidies were not singled 
out as a key issue.
The Commission also seeks to use the GATT talks to 
protect its own reform initiatives from domestic pres­
sures, rather than, as in the past, to defend domestic 
interests from outside forces. Although the Commission 
and European Council want lower domestic support prices 
and a commercially directed export policy for wheat, 
there are still large numbers of farmers and politicians 
who would like to reverse the changes. The Commission 
therefore seeks through the GATT to embed the new CAP 
orientation in an international agreement.60 Whereas the 
EC chose to protect the CAP mechanisms in the Tokyo Round 
by removing agriculture from the agenda (i.e., to the IWC
6j<6- D. Hayes & A. Schmitz, "The Price and Welfare Impli­
cations of Current Conflicts between the Agricultural 
Policies of the US and the EC," in Baldwin, et al. 
(1988), p. 69.
GATT, Press Communique, 1396, 25-9-86, p. 7. 
Tangermann (1988), p. 35.
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and into discussions leading to interpretive codes)^, 
this time it wanted agriculture fully on the GATT agenda. 
The domestic reforms over 1984-88 brought the CAP largely 
in line with the terms of the GATT and the subsidies code 
negotiated at the end of the Tokyo Round. Therefore, the 
Community has little to fear from GATT discipline. In­
stead, it judges that it would gain if agriculture were 
brought fully under the rules and obligations of the GATT 
because it could use the disputes settlement system to 
resolve differences about the subsidies code (without re­
sort to export subsidy wars) and state trading rules.
The Commission decided early in the negotiations 
that it could best serve both its domestic interests and 
international market goals by pushing for adoption of a 
revised form of montant de soutien, similar to that pro­
posed in the Kennedy Round negotiations. In particular, 
the Commission believes such a system would help entrench 
its domestic reforms, permit it to "balance” Community 
Preference so that cerea1-substitutes and oilseed imports 
are treated as any other imported foodstuff, allow it to 
extend export subsidies to processed food products, and, 
perhaps most importantly, help to reduce the predatory 
price competition in international markets. The Commis­
sion accepted that a modified producer subsidy equivalent 
(PSE) system could be used provided it was adjusted to 
take account only of measures with a significant inci­
dence on trade, that it included a method to quantify 
production constraints, and that it accommodated problems 
related to world price and currency f luctuations.v’° The 
OECD, the US, Canada, and the Cairns group also appeared
<£,s>- International commodity agreements, such as the IWA, 
are not governed by the GATT and as such there is no dis­
putes settlement procedure. The subsidies code is also 
not part of the formal GATT treaty, so it is more diffi­
cult to police than other trade rules.
';ro- National Consumer Council (1988), p. 80.
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willing to consider a similar sort of system to measure 
and bind farm support.
The EC in 1987-88 expanded its proposal. It sug­
gested to the GATT Negotiating Group on Agriculture that 
each country bind for a period of five years its total 
support for cereals, rice, sugar, oilseeds, dairy pro­
ducts and beef and veal at the level prevailing in 1984 
(chosen so that the EC would get total credit in the 
negotiations for the significant reforms that it had 
implemented afterwards). The subsidy level would be
measured by comparing domestic support prices (ECUs in 
the EC) with a fixed external reference price (expressed 
in national currency terms in order to remove distortions 
caused by changes in exchange rates). Each country could 
then adjust the specific levels of support by commodity 
without limitation, provided the aggregate level of 
support remained at or below the bound amount. At the 
end of five years the system would be reviewed and the 
Community suggested that it would then accept a long-term 
phased reduction in agricultural support that affected 
international markets ,'7’1 The Community additionally
sought to improve its market prospects by forcing the 
state trading agencies, especially the Canadian and Aust­
ralian Wheat Boards, to operate more openly (i.e., trans­
parently),^'-2 which is essential for the EC to be able to 
set the proper level of refunds and import levies.7"3
GATT, Focus. #50, p. 5; #56, p. 4; & #58, p. 7.
Also see Negotiating Group on Agriculture (GATT), The EC 
Approach on Aggregate Measurement of Support (Paris, 
MTN/GNG/NG5, 10-7-89).
7 22. Tangermann (1988), p . 36. A good example of EC con­
cerns was reported in The Western Producer, 18-5-89. The 
Canadian Wheat Board, which in the past publicized major 
sales, announced that it would no longer comment on 
sales.
Morgan (1979), p. 295.
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As outlined, the policy was sharply at odds with the 
US goal of complete liberalization by the year 2000. 
When the trade ministers met in Montreal in December 
1988, the differences became obvious. The US and the EC 
failed to agree on the wording for either the mid-term 
review or the negotiating mandate for the remainder of 
the talks. The entire GATT Round was then jeopardized 
because the trade ministers refused to proceed with
the other areas until there was progress on agriculture.
In April 1989 the US and EC finally resolved their 
differences. After four months of wrangling over the 
words related to the ultimate goal of the talks, the 
trade ministers agreed that they sought "a fair and mar­
ket-oriented agricultural trading system" which would 
"provide for substantial progressive reductions in agri­
cultural support and protection sustained over an agreed 
period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing 
restrictions and distortions in world agriculture mar­
kets. ",F=S The ministers also agreed that the EC would get 
credit for the positive measures it had adopted since the 
Punta Del Este meeting in September 1986, thereby embed­
ding past reforms in international agreement. Further­
more, for the short-term, the deal specified that support 
prices for producers (in ECUs for the EC) should not be 
raised above the level which prevailed in April 1989. 
Consequently, when the Agricultural Council met later in 
April, it had little alternative but to accept the Com­
mission proposals for the 1989-90 marketing year.
CONCLUSION
During the 1980-89 period, the Community successful­
ly replaced its old, inward-looking trade policy (which 
was designed to protect small family farms) with a fledg-
Financial Times, 15-10-88.
^S5- GATT, Focus: Uruguay Round Special Issue, #61, May
1989, p p . 4-5.
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ling commercial export policy to assist competitive farm­
ers to realize their commercial potential. Although the 
new intervention rules and co-responsibility levies had 
not brought EC prices in line with US prices by 1989, nor 
had the Council approved the full selection of export 
mechanisms offered by the Commission, the shape of the 
Community's trade policy for the 1990s was clearly vis­
ible. As a result, the Uruguay Round of the GATT was 
extremely important for both the Commission and Community 
in the late 1980s, because it "represented a unique op­
portunity to encourage and consolidate the reforms— in- 
dispensible as they are— in agricultural policies in the 
various countries, and to improve, on a lasting basis, 
conditions on world markets. ,r/&
ASC 1988, p. 26.
Chapter 10
CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR POLICY MAKERS
The changes in the CAP wheat policy during the 1980s 
were the result of significant shifts in the power struc­
tures and concomitant changes in some of the critical 
bargains in the system. It follows, therefore, that 
further change can only come as fast as the structures 
shift, which creates both constraints and opportunities 
in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. In short, the GATT 
negotiators must accept that "politics is the art of the 
possible." They may continue to strive for the ideal, 
but in the end they must accept the 'possible' or fail. 
The foregoing analysis, using the international political 
economy approach, illuminated the vital linkages between 
the political and economic spheres to determine the 
'poss ible. '
Trade policy poses a particular problem for analysis 
and policy development because it depends critically on 
the domestic economic and policy systems in the trading 
nations. This thesis provides some hope for the GATT
Round because it shows that the EC has already made some
of the significant reforms that are prerequisites for a 
successful trade negotiation. The foregoing analysis, in 
particular, shows that the domestic reforms in the EC 
entail more than mere tinkering with mechanisms; they 
represent fundamental changes in attitudes and outlook. 
Many observers and participants both within and outside 
the Community believe the CAP price policy has been re­
formed solely because of budgetary pressures. If that 
were so, the policy could easily be sustained with just a 
simple fix at the margins (because the budgetary situa­
tion is largely within the authority of the EC political
system); if that were possible, there would be little
potential for agreement at the GATT. In reality, as 
chapters 2 through 9 demonstrate, the CAP wheat policy 
has been reformed because the inexorably shifting power
- 370 -
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structures realigned the fundamental bargains that both 
support and drive the policy system. As a consequence, 
the entire outlook of the farm policy community in the EC 
has changed. Avery notes that during the 1970s reform of 
the CAP caused apprehension in political circles and for 
many "the very term 'reform of agricultural policy' was 
taboo."1 During the 1980s, however, virtually all actors 
in the policy community came to accept that reform was 
necessary and most believed that it was even desirable.
International trade negotiators must recognize the 
basis for these reforms and understand their implica­
tions. The challenge for the Uruguay Round GATT negoti­
ators is to recognize the changes within the Community 
(i.e., that Europe is a natural wheat trader) and to 
develop a new trading environment that will both secure, 
and build upon, the domestic reforms in the European 
Community.
The New Power Structures
Since 1970, the shifting structures, more than any­
thing else, caused greater diversity in both the economic 
and political systems, thereby making it much more diffi­
cult to control either farm policy options or outcomes. 
The changes in structures, however, are not complete. 
They are only part of long-term movements that are occur­
ring world-wide. Consequently, neither the policy com­
munity nor the resulting economic systems are stable—  
they will continue to face pressure to change.
The security structure is perhaps the least certain 
of all the power structures. The thaw in East-West rela­
tions in the 1980s and the major economic and political 
reform efforts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are 
far from secure. There are many road-blocks and pit­
falls that could stall or reverse the reforms. Neverthe­
X « Avery (1987), p. 161-2.
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less, the world security structures have changed enough 
that one can confidently say that the CAP wheat system of 
the 1970s would be inconsistent with any new one that 
could evolve over the coming years. International con­
flicts, in particular, are highly unlikely to follow the 
conventional patterns (i.e., lengthy battles and block­
ades) . Meanwhile, the failure of the US embargo in the 
early 1980s demonstrated countries had little to fear 
from disruption of supply. Self-sufficiency therefore 
should diminish as a strategic concern. As discussed in 
chapter 2, food self-sufficiency also is now neither 
physically possible nor politically desirable. World­
wide integration of production has virtually eliminated 
the potential for any country to be truly self-sufficient 
in any product. Instead, an open and fair trading system 
is more critical than any national policy of self-suffi­
ciency. The CAP as it operated in the 1970s represented 
a major irritant in the trade system, and thereby threat­
ened the basis of the transformed western security sys­
tem .
In contrast, production changes are both more cer­
tain and inexorable. The gap between commercial and 
peasant farms continues to widen annually: small farmers
have neither motivation nor opportunities to become more 
competitive while large efficient farmers (now producing 
about 80% of EC cereals) continuously apply new technolo­
gies and capital to increase productivity. Furthermore, 
in spite of the reforms of the price system. Community 
wheat and cereals output could rise sharply during the 
next decade. Spain, which in 1988 had more land seeded 
to wheat than any other member state except France, had 
wheat yields of only 40% of the average in France, Ger­
many, and the UK. If yields increase in response to the 
higher prices now offered to Spanish producers, Spain 
conceivably could produce another 5 Mt of wheat and per­
haps an additional 10 Mt of other cereals.
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Although significant increases in productivity have 
made large European farmers competitive with other major 
exporters, they will face stiff competition in the coming 
years. The IWC estimates that the USSR, currently the 
largest single importer of wheat and feed grains, could 
become self sufficient in cereals by 1993 if the new farm 
program introduced during 1985-89 improves the efficiency 
of grain use, reduces post-harvest losses, and raises 
yields.3 As world wheat stocks are rebuilt in the 1990s 
and production rebounds in North America, lower Soviet 
imports should intensify competition among Europe, Can­
ada, Australia, and the US for the slowly growing markets 
in the developing world.3
Rapidly changing financial systems will also con­
tinue to press on farmers. The introduction of financial
capital into the European farm sector allowed farmers to
expand, consolidate, and specialize but also opened the 
sector to more volatility. In 1989 there was little 
prospect that financial conditions would return to the 
stability that characterized the 1960s. Nevertheless, 
the financial system rapidly innovates and may yet fill 
one of the missing elements in the developing EC market- 
based price system. Strange has noted that European 
farmers do not have ready access to and consequently do 
not use futures markets to insure themselves against poor 
prices.^ Instead, the CAP market regimes have protected 
farmers both from international competition and volatile
prices. As the security afforded farmers under the CAP
is steadily eroded by reforms, the financial system will 
be pressed to develop a futures market for wheat and 
other cereals. The financial community, spurred by de­
regulation and competition flowing, from the Single Mar-
The Western Producer. 22-12-88. 
The Western Producer, 4-5-89. 
Strange (1986), p. 113.
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ket, might rapidly fill this gap in the system, further 
reducing the need for regulated prices.
Finally, the knowledge base for farming and food 
production is booming, with scientific knowledge doubling 
about every 10 years. So far, recombinant DNA techniques 
have not been directed fully to cereals; when they are, 
the potential for growth will be large. The US Office of 
Technical Assessment forecast in 1982 that wheat yields 
world-wide could rise 1.3% per annum until the turn of 
the century because of new technologies and seeds.3
Overall, the power structures examined in Chapter 2 
represent only a stage in the continually changing envi­
ronment for the European and world wheat industry. There 
certainly will be more changes, many of which will push 
the system along the way it has been going since 1980 
while others will force re-evaluation and redirection of 
po1i cy.
The Evolving Policy Community
The biggest change since 1970 is the striking rever­
sal in the influence of farmers on the system. The 
rapidly evolving structures forced the policy community 
to transform itself. In the 1970s, the CAP wheat policy
represented a archetypical case of "sacred cows herded by 
special interests."*’ Since then the policy community has 
become both more diverse and more balanced, with the cows 
(the CAP mechanisms) less sacred and the special inter­
ests (farmers) less able to herd. Farmers still have in­
fluence, but more in line with their economic signific­
ance, while non-farm groups, especially consumers and en­
vironmentalists, now have a greater say in future direc-
55■ M.J. Phillips, "Enhancing Competitiveness," in Feder­
al Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1985), p. 31.
*’■ BBC Broadcast, 30-10-87.
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tions. Overall, however, markets are the strongest force 
driving the system.
The farm lobbies in the three major cereals produc­
ing countries have all lost power and influence and 
appear to have little chance of regaining their lost 
position. The farm lobby in Germany is increasingly 
losing the unique position it maintained in the political 
and economic systems. The security imperative to have 
farmers in the regions bordering on East Germany has 
lessened with the thaw in East-West relations while the 
massive shift from full to part-time farming has sharply 
reduced the number of small and inefficient farmers who 
depend solely on their farm labours. At the same time, 
non-farm groups in most of the member states want to 
ensure that the new Single Market is completed and that 
the world trading system allows European firms to compete 
abroad and they are willing to offer the CAP to those 
goals. Consequently, support for farmers now comes less 
assuredly from Bonn. French farmers also appear to have 
passed a key political threshold, as they were unable to 
elect their favoured presidential candidate in either 
1981 or 1989. Farmers are highly unlikely, even if a 
Gaullist president is elected, to rebuild the privileged 
corporatist relationship which sustained them during the 
1960s and 1970s. Meanwhile, UK farmers have decided that 
their government is not receptive to their needs and now 
look for support from Brussels. In the UK a survey of 
producers in 1988 showed that 75% of them believe that 
the EC is a better farm policy maker than the UK govern­
ment and, as such, they are fully committed to the CAP.-7
The Brussels farm policy community is also only a 
shadow of its former self. COPA and the strong farm 
lobbies in the European Parliament and the ESC have
Centre for Agri Food marketing study results reported 
in Financial Times, 25-11-88.
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little chance of regaining their earlier power. DG-VI 
has also lost influence since 1980 because of a variety 
of administrative and political reforms. In particular, 
the shift to market pricing allows non-farm interests to 
become more involved in agricultural policy formulation 
because market-based pricing requires fewer contacts and 
less expertise to finesse through the councils. Conse­
quently, the agricultural policy community is increasing­
ly unable to keep budget, foreign, and trade ministers 
out of the farm policy debates. To compensate, the farm 
policy community in Brussels has expanded its brief, 
along the lines of the 1986 revision of the UK Agricul­
tural Act, to include all rural issues. In 1989, the 
Commissioner appointed to DG-VI was called the Commis­
sioner for Agriculture and Rural Development and promptly 
began to review and expand the directorates responsible 
for rural issues. On balance, the policy community has 
been irreparably changed.
The Changed Orientation for Price Policy
The CAP has changed fundamentally. In brief, it no 
longer represents a "licence to farmers to over pro­
duce;"3 instead, the domestic market now largely deter­
mines the prices and marketing conditions. The reform of 
the CAP has come so slowly and in such fits and starts 
that many observers refuse to accept that it has really 
occurred. But, a comparison of the system in the early 
1970s with the system operating in 1989 clearly demon­
strates the extent of the reforms (chapter 3).
Although prices have been cut and intervention sys­
tems have been increasingly tightened since 1985, EC mar­
ket prices have not fully responded. The tight world 
wheat situation has offset much of the impact of the 
lower support in Europe and masks the changes in the 
policy. First the depreciating dollar and then drought
Philip (1989), p. 6.
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in North America in 1988 and 1989 supported the world 
wheat price in ECU terms, so that the Community has been 
able to sell abroad with lower net subsidies. Domestic 
growing conditions in 1985-88 also were not as favorable 
as in 1984, so that the volumes of grain were not oner­
ous. Consequently, the Commission until 1989 was able to 
sustain domestic prices above the reduced support levels 
without exceeding the budgetary limits. The farm lob­
bies, in particular, recognize that whenever yields stab­
ilize in both North America and Europe, the domestic 
wheat price in the EC should drop in line with the reduc­
ed price and intervention support. Even though that has 
not happened, the reforms that enable it to occur are 
rea 1 .
The EC's competitors commonly complain that Europe 
has not adopted complete free market pricing in one step. 
That expectation plainly fits in the category of the 
ideal rather than the 'possible.' To give due credit, 
the Commission attempted to make the price system the 
sole market regulator in the mid-1980s but the cuts 
needed to restore market balance were too great for 
national governments to accept. Koester estimated in
1981 that real EC wheat prices would have to be cut by 4- 
6% annually merely to halt the growth in surpluses. In 
West Germany, that would have led to annual nominal cuts 
of as much as 2 The Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (BAE) in 1985 demonstrated by using regression 
analysis that production would have increased over the 
1973-82 period even if the Commission had been able to 
cut real prices an average 4% per annum. They concluded 
that the investment stimulus to yield was so great that 
total agricultural production in the EC would still have 
risen by more than 10% under such a price regime.10 The 
BAE proceeded to demonstrate that output will rise fur­
Koester (1981a), p. 10.
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1985), p. 318.
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ther between 1987 and 1995 even with 4% per annum real 
price cuts.11 More recently, a Canadian study of the 
international wheat markets concluded that even if the EC 
paid farmers at only about US$80/t, the EC would still 
produce about 70 Mt of wheat.122 The Council rejected 
such large price cuts and the Commission was forced to 
seek other methods to stabilize production and costs.
The financial dependence of farming also clearly 
limits the opportunities for overall policy reform. 
Cereals farmers in France, Germany, and the UK have high 
debt levels and, in most cases, land represents a large 
proportion of cereal farm investment. Because land 
prices generally reflect the expected returns from pro­
duction (and there are few alternative uses for cropped 
land), even small changes in the level of domestic sup­
port for cereals translates into significant changes in 
land prices. Consequently, heavily indebted cereals
farmers (who are usually the most efficient producers13) 
are particularly vulnerable to land price fluctuations. 
Major changes in the pricing structure, therefore, could 
eliminate a significant portion of cereal farming's net 
worth. The Kiel Institute of World Economics estimates 
that complete liberalization of the CAP would cause farm 
land prices in Germany to drop by 17%:'^  while other 
studies suggest the relative shadow prices for farm land 
would decline by two-thirds to three-quarters, which 
could translate into price cuts of u p  to 50%.1K5<^  In 
addition to endangering a large number of farms, such 
declines in land prices would also threaten many farm-
11- Ibid., p. 320.
12‘ Furtan, et al. (1988), p. 129.
13_ ASC 1988, p. 61, shows that in 1985-86, the largest
14% of farms had 40% of the capital in agriculture and 
the lowest net worth as a percentage of liabilities. 
i'v- Centre for International Economics (1988), p. 28.
1=s- Ibid. , p .i8.|>,rVa\ P. Pierani & K. Frohberg, "Impact of
CAP Trade Liberalization on Agricultural Supply," in
Tarditi, et al . (1989), p. 136.
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based financial institutions and agricultural supp- 
1iers.a ^
In spite of these constraints, the Community achiev­
ed significant reform. But the reforms are and likely 
will remain less than total liberalization for a number 
of reasons. First, cereals are different from many com­
modities. Compared with mineral products and even live­
stock production, the cereals production cycle is quite 
long, with little opportunity to adjust production deci­
sions once the process has started (i.e., the price elas­
ticity of supply is very low in the short term). Adjust­
ing prices after the crop is sown has little or no effect 
on final production levels. Hence, the Community and 
most farmers are unenthusiastic about freely floating 
prices during the marketing year.
Second, because the opportunity cost for much of the 
agriculture sector's land, labour, and capital is low in 
the short to medium term, governments will always provide 
some support to keep people on the farm. Especially for 
the peasant farmer, the farm land, the specialized build­
ings and farm machinery, and the skills acquired in the 
operation of the small holding have little value outside 
the farm sector.
Perhaps most important of all, governments have both 
a significant investment to protect in rural areas and 
limited resources to replicate those services in urban 
areas if the population were to move. Governments have 
generally made large per capita public investment in 
rural roads, schools, hospitals, and public utilities and 
therefore have a strong economic reason to support the 
rural economy, which has been overwhelmingly farm-based.
K. Thomson, "Budgetary and Economic Effects of CAP 
Trade Liberalization," in Tarditi, et al. (1989), p. 117,
estimates that the farm supply industry would suffer 
losses of nearly 60 B ECU if the CAP were liberalized.
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In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Community supported 
farmers largely through higher prices. But, with the 
reform of the price system in the 1980s, the Commission 
decided to use a wider variety of programs to put rural 
development "in the forefront of the European Community's 
obj ectives . 1,17
Domestic economic and political changes will con­
tinue to expand concern for rural affairs, to the detri­
ment of farmer-directed and dominated policies. As 
discussed in chapters 8 and 9, section 11 of the 1979 
GATT subsidies code provided a blueprint for reform of 
the policy in the 1980s. The current round of multila­
teral trade negotiations under the aegis of the GATT 
certainly has a vital role to play in directing, guiding, 
and, ultimately, sustaining this reformulation of the 
European wheat policy.
Constraints and Opportunities for GATT Negotiators
The reform of the EC wheat price policy, and the 
emergence of the Community as a 'natural' competitor in 
world markets, both constrains the scope of possible 
outcomes and presents opportunities for progress. The 
direction chosen will depend on how the international 
community responds to the EC.
The farm talks in the Uruguay Round negotiations are 
vitally important because failure could jeopardize the 
entire GATT process. The opening of the new round of 
negotiations was delayed in 1986 because of disagreements 
over farm trade issues and at the start of 1989 progress 
in the non-farm areas was stalled for four months because 
negotiators were unable to agree on a mid-term report for 
the agricultural negotiations. Ultimate failure to re­
solve the outstanding farm trade issues could also endan­
ger existing GATT agreements because governments in the
1 V . Avery (1989)
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US and the Cairns Group countries, in particular, have so 
strongly sold the prospects for farm policy reform that 
farmers might force new retaliatory farm trade actions if 
the promised reforms do not occur. The negotiators in 
the Uruguay Round must ensure that they do not destroy 
the benefits of past agreements in the quest for a new, 
more comprehensive package. Although many regarded the 
1979 Tokyo Round agreements as relatively unimportant for 
farm trade, they have proved to be significant. The sub­
sidies code, in particular, provided the Community with a 
blueprint for reforming its domestic policies after 1985, 
by specifying the acceptable types of, and targets for, 
government support.
Traditionally, the GATT is based on the view that 
"the world is not rich enough to despise efficiency."1® 
Although that motivation possibly dominates other coun­
tries or other commodities, it is not the key concern of 
Community negotiators in the area of agricultural trade. 
Instead, the Community both seeks acceptance of its dev­
eloping export orientation and support for its domestic 
approach. Avery believes that the GATT should "harness 
the external pressures to help, rather than hinder, the 
process of reform" in the EC.19 Therefore, the GATT must 
develop a workable way to reduce support and bolster the 
rules governing farm trade.
At a minimum, the trade negotiations must accept 
that no agreement will be able to dictate specific 
changes to domestic policies. The GATT must allow the 
national governments to design domestic policy in their 
own way. A major stumbling block in the negotiations up 
to autumn 1989 was the desire of the US negotiators to 
dictate which domestic policies the EC could use and 
which would have to be changed. The US proposal to con-
Warley (1976), p. 364.
Avery (1987), p. 163.
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vert all levies to tariffs, in particular, is "unrealis­
tic, for it would involve radical changes in domestic
mechanisms and administration of agricultural policy."20 
The GATT should coordinate reductions in farm support, 
but leave the methods to the individual governments.
The EC and the traditional exporters have already 
agreed in principle that they would be willing to bind 
and gradually reduce agricultural support, using some 
type of aggregate measurement, such as the producer sub­
sidy equivalent (PSE) measure proposed by the FAO and 
OECD or the trade distorting equivalent (TDE) measure
proposed by Canada.^1 Provided it is not cluttered by 
demands that limit mechanisms that may be used, this 
approach would allow the EC to negotiate internally to 
get agreement on tighter market control (i.e., lower 
producer support prices and more co-responsibility). 
Although total support would be bound, it should be poss­
ible to allow the EC to realign its external protection 
(i.e., higher duties on cereal substitutes) and to pro­
vide for some ameliorating measures to offset price move­
ments caused by largely monetary-induced exchange rate
fluctuations.
Unlike in the past, the GATT cannot ignore the Com-
(R* lc>.‘) __
munity's export interests^. At the very least, GATT mem­
bers will need to recognize the EC as a legitimate com­
petitor. Even in 1989, the prevailing opinion among the 
traditional wheat traders (i.e., the US, Canada, Aust­
ralia, and Argentina) is that the EC should not export. 
But the Community cannot easily be denied a position in 
world markets. Farmers, governments, and the Commission 
fully support the EC's changed focus on commercial wheat 
exports. A 1987 opinion survey showed an overwhelming
=°- Avery (1987), p. 164.
21 - GATT, News of the Uruguay Round: #007, 14-7-87, p.
4; #011, 12-11-87, p p . 2-3; and #017, 30-6-88.
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majority of respondents believed the EC should maintain 
its role as the second largest food exporter.22 The tra­
ditional exporters should instead press for the Community 
to proceed to realign its domestic policy and encourage 
the EC to develop a system of producer-financed export 
subsidies to replace the current EC budget-based system 
of export restitutions. As shown in Chapter 9, the Com­
munity is already moving in that direction. Now, most of 
all, it needs support through the GATT to sustain the 
ref orms.
  Figure 10.1
EC SHARE OF WORLD WHEAT MARKET
* c  e x p o r t *  a s  *  o f  t o t a l  w o u l d  e x p o r t s
The GATT will also need to accommodate Community and 
developing world concerns over the impact of macroeconom­
ic policy on trade. For both LDCs and the EC, the link 
between protection and exchange rate misalignments has 
become a major issue.23 Resolution of the US current 
account and budgetary deficits, in particular, poses the
National Consumers Council (1988), p p . 190, 196, &
198. About 67.1% of Germans, 83.8% of the French, and 
72.3% in the UK agreed that "the EC should maintain its 
role as the second largest exporter of agricultural pro­
ducts by improving competitiveness" For the Community as 
a whole, 70.7% responded yes and only 8% disagreed.
22::s- Valdes (1987), p. 575.
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most difficult y. Cline estimates that if the US current 
account deficit is reduced to a sustainable level, ex­
change rates will have to change massively. In the EC, 
that would require a swingeing realignment in the EMS, 
including a 17% revaluation of the DM against the French 
franc,32 * which would wreak havoc with the agri-monetary 
system and the whole CAP wheat price regime. Although at 
first glance this threatens to make the negotiations more 
complex, exchange rate adjustments may provide a critical 
opening for reform in the EC. The Commission has announ­
ced that it wants to end the agri-monetary system by the 
beginning of 1992 so that intra-EC trade in food products 
will compete on the same basis as non-agricultural pro­
ducts in the newly completed Single Market. By then re­
valuations of the DM may have opened the gap between the 
green and real ECU (already about 13.7%) to such a degree 
that all producers would suffer a price cut if the green 
ECU were set equal to the real ECU. If by that time the 
GATT has negotiated firm commitments to hold the line on 
domestic price support, for farmers, the Community might 
be persuaded to allow effective ECU prices to drop by the 
amount of the correcting factor, provided both income 
support and direct cash payments could be made. The GATT 
therefore should seek an agreement that will establish a 
framework to guide Community reforms.
The GATT negotiators, however, must get beyond the 
confusion and disagreement emanating from the different 
national negotiating mandates and strategies. One cri­
tical difference between the EC and US is that the US 
Trade Representative's (USTR) mandate is set once and for 
all by the Congress in the Trade Act, while the Commis­
sion's mandate is continuously revised. As a result, the 
USTR can offer to negotiate almost anything (such as com­
plete liberalization of farm trade) without causing major 
protests from the national constituencies, because any-
The Economist, 6-5-89, p. 95
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thing outside the negotiating mandate must be ratified by 
Congress. In this round, the 1988 US Trade Act only 
authorizes the President to negotiate rules for agricul­
tural trade and to reduce farm subsidies in a manner 
"consistent with the US policy of agricultural stabiliza­
tion. Even if lower world-wide farm supports are
approved in the GATT, the concomitant changes in US dom­
estic farm programs are not covered by the fast-track 
system of approval for the rest of the GATT. Congress 
therefore has the opportunity to fully debate and amend 
any changes proposed for the US Farm B i l l . I n  con­
trast, anything the Commission offers as a negotiating 
position, because of the constant supervision by the 113 
Committee, would be viewed as official policy and there­
fore could incite great opposition and concern in the EC. 
The GATT participants therefore must not assume that the 
EC is unnecessarily obstructionist when it hesitates to 
make ambitious proposals; it simply has a different 
negotiating style imposed on it by its mandate.
Contrary to popular opinion in North America and 
Australia, the Community is serious about the GATT farm 
talks and is willing to pay a price to get agreement. 
During the mid-1980s the Community voluntarily limited 
its wheat exports to a maximum 14% of the world market in 
order to reduce the level of animosity in the trade for­
ums. Since then, the Commission has used its powers a 
number of times to manage EC exports to support its posi­
tion in the multilateral trade talks. In March 1989, for 
example, the Commission suspended all free market wheat 
export tenders until April 5 because of the sensitivity 
of negotiations leading up to the April 5 GATT negotiat­
ing meeting in Geneva.27
2 55 ■ Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
P.L.100, 23-8-88, S.1101(7.B). 
a*. ibid., S.1102(b).
1-'7- The Western Producer, 16-3-89.
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Perhaps most important, the balance of power in the 
European Commission now favours reform. In January 1989, 
when the Commission was reappointed, Frans Andriessen, 
the agricultural commissioner and the architect of CAP 
reform during 1984-88, was moved to become the Commis­
sioner for DG-I (external affairs) and assumed responsi­
bility for the GATT negotiations. Consequently, the EC 
trade negotiators for the first time may have both the 
political influence and the technical knowledge to sway 
debate and offset the influence of defensive elements in 
DG-VI. Support also extends into the national gov­
ernments and to the farmers themselves. France, Germany, 
and the UK all support the GATT negotiations and each is 
willing to make further changes in the CAP in exchange 
for concessions in other areas. Meanwhile, commercial
farmers in Europe generally support farm reform, provided 
it comes gradually. Daniel Green argues that farmers are 
"not rejecting change; for in no other industry have men 
kept abreast of a rapidly changing technology quite so 
successfully." Rather they want change to come at an 
"evolutionary rather than a revolutionary pace."2® 
Better than most, farmers know that they must survive the 
short-term to take advantage of the long-run benefits of 
reform.
Finally, the GATT negotiators must look closely at 
the calendar. The scheduled final year for the Uruguay 
Round negotiations roughly coincides with two major dom­
estic events. First, the 1985 US Farm Security Act must 
be renewed in or shortly after 1990. Second, the EC bud­
getary, production, and price targets set in 1988 are 
only established until the end of the 1991-92 marketing 
year; after then, the Community must either extend or 
replace the system. Although farmers likely could not 
force the EC to return to using prices to support farm 
incomes, the Community could reverse its support for a
Green (1975), p. 126
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market-based price and marketing system and introduce 
stronger administrative controls over the market (e.g., 
through quotas and market guarantees), which would vir­
tually eliminate any chance for fair competition in the 
international market. Therefore, the GATT negotiators 
and their political masters must decide whether to accept 
the possible or risk failing in pursuit of the ideal.
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EC: WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (ECU/TONNE; HARKETINS YEARS)
Inter­ Refer­
Target vention ence
Price 7. CH Price * CH Price * CH
1972-
73 Year-end Prices 137.58 -- 126.64 -- — —
1973- Coiftission Proposal 141.37 2.8/1 130,13 2.8* — —
74 Council Decision 138.96 1.0* 127,91 1.0* — —
Year-end Prices 138.96 1.0* 127.91 1.0* -- —
1974- C'ommi ssion Proposal A 141.73 2.0* 127.91 0.0* — - -
75 Council Decision A 147.30 6.0* 133.02 4.0* — —
CoMission Proposal B 153.19 10.2* 138.34 8.2* — —
Council Decision B 154.66 11,3* 139.67 9.2* — —
Year-end Prices 154.66 11.3* 139.67 9.2* — - -
1975- Coffifflission Proposal 170.12 10.0* 152.24 9.0* — - -
76 Council Decision 168.58 9.0* 152.24 9.0 * — —
Year-end Prices 168.58 9.0* 152.24 9,0* — - -
1976- Cosiffii ssi on Proposal 184.33 9.4* 143.45 -5.8* 162.73 6.9*
77 Council Decision 183.76 9.0* 140.24 -7.9* 158.37 4.0*
Year-end Prices 183.76 9.0* 140.24 -7.9* 158.37 4.0*
1977- Goodssion Proposal 189,20 3.0 * 144.47 3.0* 163.21 3.1*
78 Council Decision 191.11 4.0* 145.15 3.5* 163.92 7  C«.: * J  /•
Year-end Prices 191.11 4.0* 145.15 3.5* 163.92 3.5*
1978- CoM'ission PropoE-al 196.32 2.7* 146.97 1.3* 169.01 3.1*
79 Council Decision 196.32 2.7* 146.97 1,3* 165.58 1.0*
Year-end Prices 196.32 2,7* 146.97 1.3* 165.58 1.0*
1979- Consolssior. Proposal 196,32 0.0* 146,97 0.0* 165.58 0.0*
BO Council Decision 201.42 2.6* 149,47 1.7* 168.06 1.5*
Year-end Prices 201.42 2.6* 149,47 1.7* 168.06 1.5*
1980- Commi ssion Proposal 208.97 3.7* 152.15 1.8* 171.00 1.7*
SI Council Decision 214.01 6.3* 155.88 4.3* 175.20 4.2 *
Year-end Prices 214.01 6.3 * 155.88 4.3* 175.20 4.2*
1981- Commission Proposal 231.13 8.0* 165.23 6.0* 182.21 4.0*
82 Council Decision 230,55 7.7* 165.23 6.0* 192.72 10.0*
Year-end Prices 230.55 7.7* 165.23 6.0* 192.72 10.0*
1982- Coiiission Proposal 246.81 7.1* 176,10 6.6* 205.40 6,6*
H.j Council Decision 250.61 8.7* 179,27 8.5* 209.10 8.5*
Year-end Prices 250.61 8.7* 179.27 8.5* 209.10 8.5*
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EC: WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (ECU/TONNE; MARKETING YEARS) (con’ t)
Inter­ Refer­
Target vention ence
Price 7 CH Price 7 CH Price 7 CH
1983-• Coiiission Proposal 261.41 4.37. 186.44 4.07 217.46 4.07
84 - Less Co-Respons. 261.41 4.37. 184.58 3.07. 215.29 3.07
Council Decision 261.41 4.371 184.58 3.07 215.2.9 3.07
Year-end Prices 261.41 4.37. 184.58 3.07. 215.29 3.07.
1984-■ Coiiission Proposal 261.41 0.071 184.58 0.071 215.29 0.07.
85 Council Decision 259.08 -0.971 182.73 -1.07. 213.14 -1.07
Year-end Prices 259.08 -0.97 132.73 -1.07 213.14 -1.07
1985- Coiiission Proposal 262.97 1.57. 185.47 1.57. 216.34 1.57
86 - Less Co-Respons. 249.82 -3.671 176.20 -3.671 205.52 -3.67
Interiis Prices 254.98 -1.67 179.44 -1.87 209.30 -1.87.
Year-end Prices 254.98 -1.67. 179.44 -1.87. 209.30 -1.87
HARKST SYSTEMS REVISED IN 1986-87: BREAD WHEAT REFERENCE PRICE REPLACED KITH 27.
PREMIUM; FEED WHEAT PRICES CUT BY UP TO 57; 371 CO-RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSED; AND
INTERVENTION RULES HODIFIED
1986- Coiiission Proposal 256.16 0.57. 179.44 0.07 - - - -
87 Council Decision 256.16 0.571 179.44 0.07 — —
Year-end Prices 256.16 0.57 179.44 0.07 -- --
1987- Cos Proposal (wdrn) 251.63 -1.87 175.85 -2.07. - - - -
80 Co* Proposal (rev’ d) 256.10 0.071 179.44 0.07. — —
Council Decision 256.10 0.07. 179.44 0.07 — —
Year-end Prices 256.10 0.071 179.44 0.07 -- --
1938- Coiiission Proposal 250.30 -2.37 179.44 0.07 - - —
89 Council Decision 250.30 -2.371 179.44 0.07. — —
Year-end Prices 250.30 -2.371 179.44 0.07 — —
ADDITIONAL 37. (REFUNDABLE) BUDGET STABILIZER LEVY ASSESSED AND INTERVENTION FURTHER
TIGHTENED
1989-■ Coiiission Proposal 247.78 -1.07. 174.06 -3.07. — —
90 Council Decision 247.78 -1.07. 174.06 -3.07. —
Notes: Prices before 1979 converted at 1 ECU = 1.208953 t UA; the percentage d iffe r­
ence in the reference price in 1976-77 is the change from the intervention price for 
1975-76.
Sources: CotMission Proposals, ASC (various).
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FRANCE: MEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (FF/TONNE; MARKETING YEARS)
Conversion Franc Inter­ Refer­
Factor for Green Target vention ence
Green ECU Rate Pries 7 CH Price 7. CH Price 7. CH
1972-
73 Year-end Prices - - 4.58422 632.1 — 581.8 - - — - -
1973- Coiiission Proposal — NA NA NA NA NA — —
74 Council Decision — 4.59422 638.4 1.0/i 587.6 1.07. - - —
Year-end Prices — 4.59422 638.4 1.0% 587.6 1.07. — - -
1974- Commission Proposal A 4.59422 651.1 2.07. 587.6 0.07. — - -
75 Council Decision B - - 4.58422 676.7 6.07. 611.1 4.07 — —
Coiiission Proposal A 4.58422 703.8 10.27, 635.6 8.27 - - -
Council Decision B — 4.59422 710.5 11.3% 641.7 9.27 — -
Year-end Prices - - 4.59422 710.5 11.37. 641.7 C7 a Li* - - —
1975- Coiiission Proposal - - 4.74658 807.5 13.67. 722.6 12.67. — - -
76 Council Decision — 4.65955 785.5 10.57. 709.4 10.67 - - —
Year-end Prices - - 4.65955 785.5 10.57 709.4 10.67. — - -
1976- Coiiission Proposal - - 4.65955 859.1 9.4% 668.4 -5.87 758.2 6.97
77 Council Decision — 4.65955 856.2 9.07 653.4 -7.97 737.9 4.07
Year-end Prices — 4.65955 856.2 9.07 653.4 -7.97. 737.9 4.07
1977- Coiiission Proposal - - 4.78294 904.9 5.77 691.0 5.77 780.6 5.87
78 Council Decision — 4.79142 913.8 6.77 694.0 6.27 783.8 6.27
Year-end Prices - - 4.96381 948.6 10.87. 720.5 10.37 813.7 10.37
1978- Coiiission Proposal - - 4.86381 974.5 2.77 729.5 1.37 838.9 3.17
78 Council Decision — 5.14920 1010.9 6.67. 756.8 5.07 852.6 4.87.
Year-end Prices — 5.42697 1065.4 12.37 797. 6 10.77 898.6 10.47
1979- Coiiission Proposal -- 5.42021 1064.1 -0.17 796.6 -0.17 097.5 -0.17
BO Council Decision — 5.50961 1109.7 4.27 823.5 3.27 925.9 3.07
Year-end Prices -- 5.56725 1121.4 5.27. 832.1 4.37. 935.6 4.17
1980- Coiiission Proposal -- 5.76891 1205.5 7.57 877.7 5.57 986.5 5.47
81 Council Decision — 5.84700 1251.3 11.67. 911.4 9.57. 1024.4 9.57.
Year-end Prices - - 5.99526 1283.0 14.47 934.5 12.37 1050.4 12.37
1981- Coiiission Proposal -- 5.84700 1351.4 5.37 966.1 3.47 1065.4 1.47
02 Council Decision — 5.99526 1382.2 7.77 990.6 6.07 1155.4 10.07
Year-end Prices -- 6.19564 1428.4 11.37. 1023.7 9.57 1194.0 13.77
1982- Coiiission Proposal - - 6.08656 1502.2 5.27 1071.8 4.77 1250.2 4.77
83 Council Decision - - 6.19564 1552.7 8.77. 1110.7 8.57 1295.5 0.57.
Year-end Prices — 6.19564 1552.7 8.77 1110.7 8.57 1295.5 8.57.
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FRANCE: WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (FF/TONNE; MARKETINS YEARS) (con’ t)
Conversion Franc Inter­ Refer­
Factor for Green Target vention ence
Green ECU Rate Price 7 CH Price 7 CH Price 7 CH
1983- Commission Proposal — 6.37174 1665.6 7.37. 1187.9 7.07 1385.6 7.07
84 - Less Co-Respons. - - 6.37174 1665.6 7.37. 1176.1 5.97 1371.8 5.97
Council Decision — 6.49211 1697.1 9.37 1198.3 7.97 1397.7 7.97
Year-end Prices — 6.49211 1697.1 9.37 1198.3 7.97 1397.7 7.97
GREEN ECU SYSTEM INTRODUCED IN 1984-85; CORRECTINGi FACTOR ADDS TO PRICES IN FRANCE
1904- Commission Proposal - - 6.67790 1745.7 2.97. 1232.6 2.97 1437.7 2.97
85 Council Decision 1.033651 6.86866 1839.4 8.411 1297.3 8.37 1513.3 8.37
Year-end Prices 1.033651 6.36866 1839.4 8.47 1297.3 8.37 1513.3 8.37
1985- Commission Proposal 1.033651 7.01590 1907.0 3.77 1345.0 3.77 1568.9 3.77
86 - Less Co-Respons. 1.033651 7.01590 1811.7 -1.57. 1277.8 -1.57 1490.4 -1.57
Interim Prices 1.033651 7.00089 1845.2 0.37 1298.5 0.17 1514.6 0.17
Year-end Prices 1.083682 7.00089 1934.5 5.27 1361.4 4.97 1587.9 4.97
MARKET SYSTEMS REVISED IN 1986-89; BREAD NhEAT REFERENCE PRICE REPLACED WITH 27. PREMIUM; FEED WHEAT
PRICES CUT BY UP TO 57; 37 CO-RESPONSIBILITY LEVY ASSESSED; AND INTERVENTION RULES MODIFIED
1986- Commissi on proposal 1.083682 7.10590 1972.6 2.07 1381.B 1.57 — - -
87 Council Decision 1.003682 7.09967 1970.8 1.97. 1380.6 1.47 — —
Year-end Prices 1.125696 7.09967 2047.2 5.37 1434.1 5.37 — —
1987- Com Proposal (wdrn) 1.125696 7.43388 2105.7 2.97 1471.6 2.67 — —
88 Com proposal (rev’ d) 1.125696 7.43388 2143.1 4.77 1501.6 4.77 — —
Council Decision 1.137282 7.47587 2177.4 6.47 1525.6 6.47 — —
Year-end Prices 1.137282 7.47587 2177.4 6.47 1525.6 6.47 — —
1988- Commission Proposal 1.137282 7.47587 2128.1 -2.37. 1525.6 0.07 — —
89 Council Decision 1.137282 7.58418 2158.9 -0.87. 1547.7 1.47 — —
Year-end Prices 1.137282 7.58418 2158.9 -0.87 1547.7 1.47 — —
ADDITIONAL 37 (REFUNDABLE) BUDGET STABILIZER LEVY ASSESSED AND INTERVENTION RULES FURTHER TIGHTENED
1989- Commission Proposal 1.137202 7.47587 2106.7 -2.47 1479.9 -4.47 — —
90 Council Decision 1.137282 7.69787 2169.2 0.57 1523.8 -1.57 -- --
Notes: The prices before 1979 were converted at 1 ECU = 1. 208953 UA; in 1978 the Franc Green Rate was
changed after the Commission proposal, so the existing rate has been entered rather than the proposed
rate; the percentage difference in the reference price in 1976-71■ is  the change from the intervention
price for 1975-76; because France continually devalued the franc. there are times the year-■end prices
would be higher than the Commission’ s proposed prices (e.g., 1979-80); in those cases i t is best to
compare the proposed prices with the Council decision.
Sources; Commission Proposals; ABC (various): and Commission (1988), Taux de Conversion.
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6ERHANY: WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (DH/TQNNE; MARKETING YEARS)
DH Inter­ Refer­
Breen Target vention ence
Rate Price 7 Cti Price 7 CH Price 7 CH
1972-
73 Year-end Prices 3.C2741 416.51 — 383.39 -- — —
1973- Coiiission Proposal 2.943S5 416.17 -0.17 383.09 -0.17. — —
74 Council Decision 3.02741 420.69 1.07. 387.24 1.07 — —
Year-end Prices 3.02741 420.69 1.0% 387.24 1.07 — —
1974- Coiiission Proposal A 3.02741 429.07 2.07 307.24 0.07 -- —
75 Council Decision A 3.02741 445.94 6.07. 402.71 4.07 -- —
Coiiission Proposal 8 3.02741 • 463.77 10.2% 418.81 8.27 — —
Council Decision B 3.02741 468.22 11.3% 422.84 9.27 — —
Year-end Prices 3.02741 466.22 11.37. 422.84 9.27 -- —
2975- Coiiission Proposal 2.86467 487.35 4.17. 436.13 3.17 -- —
76 Council Decision 2.96018 499.02 6.67 450.67 6.67 — —
Year-end Prices 2.96018 499.02 6.67 450.67 6.67 -- --
1976- Coiiission Proposal 2.84843 525.19 5.27 408.62 -9.37. 463.51 2.87
77 Council Decision 2.87922 529.09 6.07 403.78 -10.47 455.99 1.27
Year-end Prices 2.87922 529.09 6.07 403.78 -10.47 455.99 1.27
1977- Coiiission Proposal 2.79407 528.64 -0.17 403.66 0.07 456.02 0.07
76 Council Decision 2.82276 539.46 2.07 409.71 1.57 462,71 1.57
Year-end Prices 2.82276 539.46 2.07 409.71 1.57 462.71 1.57
1978- Coiiission Proposal 2.79049 547.83 1.67 410.12 0.17. 471.63 1.97
79 Council Decision 2.81432 ccr: c *:JJL,Ji 2.47 413.63 1.07. 465.99 0.77
Year-end Prices 2.81432 552.51 2.47 413.63 1.07 465.99 0.77
1979- Coiiission Proposal 2.81432 552.51 0.07 413.63 0.07 465.99 0.07
BO Council Decision 2.78341 560.64 1,57 416.04 0.67 467.78 0.47
Year-end Prices 2.78341 560.63 1.57 416.04 0.67 467.78 0.47
1980- Coiiission Proposal 2.75175 575.03 2.67 418.60 0.67 470.55 0.67.
81 Council Decision 2.75175 508.90 5,07 428.94 3.17 482,11 3,17
Year-end Prices 2.75175 588.90 5.07 428.94 3.17 482.11 3.17.
1981- Coiiission Proposal 2.60723 602.61 2.37 430.79 0.47 475.06 -1.57
82 Council Decision 2.65660 612.48 4.07. 438.95 2.37 511.98 6.27
Year-end Prices 2.65660 612.48 4.07 438.95 2.37 511.98 6.27
i 7 -JL Coiiission Proposal 2.53140 624.77 2.07 445,78 1.67 519.95 1.67
Q • j Council Decision 2.57524 643.32 5.47 461.66 5.27 538.48 5.27
Year-end Prices *? trI7ti” 4 645.30 5.47. 461.66 5.27 538.43 5.27
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BERNANY: WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (DN/TONNE; HARKETIN6 YEARS) (con’t)
DN Inter­ Refer­
Green Target vention ence
Rate Price 7 CH Price 7. CH Price 7 CH
1983- Coiaission Proposal 2.49870 653.19 1.27 465.86 0.97 543.37 0.97
84 - Less Co-Respons. 2.49870 653.19 1.27 461.21 -0.17 537.95 -0.17
Council Decision 2.52875 661.04 2.47. 466.76 1.17 544.41 1.17
Year-end Prices 2.52875 661.04 2.47. 466.76 1.17. 544.41 1.17
GREEN ECU SYSTEM INTRODUCED DURING THE 1984-85 MARKETING YEAR
1984- Coiiission Proposal 2.37039 619.64 -6.37. 437.53 -6.37. 510.32 -6.37
85 Council Decision 2.52875 655.15 -0.97. 462.08 -1.07 538.98 -1.07
Year-end Prices 2.39792 621.25 -6.07 438.17 -6.17 511.09 -6.17
1955- Coaaission Proposal 2.38516 627.22 1.07. 442.38 1.07 516.00 1.07
86 - Less Co-Respons. 2.38516 595.86 -4.17 420.27 -4.17 490.20 -4.17
Interisri Prices 2.39792 611.42 -1.67 430.28 -1.87 501.88 -1.87
Year-end Prices 2.39792 611.42 -1.67. 430.28 -1.37 501.88 -1.87
HARKET SYSTEMS REVISED IN 1986-87; BREAD WHEAT REFERENCE PRICE REPLACED WITH 27 PREMIUM; FEED WHEA‘
PRICES CUT BY UP TO 52; 37. CO-RESPONSIBILITY LEVY ASSESSED; AND INTERVENTION RULES MODIFIED
1986- Coaaission Proposal 2.39792 614.25 0.57 430.28 0.07 — --
87 Council Decision 2.39792 614.25 0.57 430.28 0.07 — --
Year-end Prices 2.39792 614.25 0.57 430.28 0.07 — —
1987- Coa Proposal (wdrn) 2.39792 603.39 -1.87 421.67 -2.07. — --
88 Coi Proposal irev’ d) 2.34069 599.45 -2.47 420.01 -2.47 — —
Council Decision 2.39792 614.11 0.07 430.28 0.07 — —
Year-end Prices 2.39792 614.11 0.07. 430.28 0.07 -- —
1988- Coaaission Proposal 2.37360 607.88 -1.07 425.92 -1.07 — —
89 Council Decision 2.37360 594.11 -3.37 425.92 -1.07 — —
Year-end Prices 2.37360 594.11 -3.37 425.92 -1.07 — —
ADDITIONAL 37. (REFUNDABLE) BUDGET STABILIZER LEVY ASSESSED AND INTERVENTION RULES FURTHER TIGHTENED
1989- CoMis5ion Proposal 2.37360 583.13 -l.OZ 413.14 -3.07.
90 Council Decision 2.37360 588.13 -1.02 413.14 -3.02
Notes: Prices before 1979 converted at 1 ECU = 1.208953 I Ufi; the percentage difference in the refer­
ence price in 1976-77 is the change fro® the intervention price for 1975-76.
Sources: Coaaission Proposals; ASC (various); and Coaaission (1988), Taux de Conversion.
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UNITED KIN6DQH: HHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (POUNDS/TONNE; MARKETINS YEARS)
Conversion Pound Inter­ Refer­
Factor for Green Target vention ence
Green ECU Rate Price 7 CH Price 7 CH Price 7 CH
1972-
73 Year-end Prices — 0.382168 52.58 — 48.40 — — —
1973- Coaaission Proposal — NA NA NA NA NA — —
74 Council Decision — 0.382168 53.11 1.0X 48.83 1.07 — —
Yea!--end Prices — 0.382168 53.11 1 .OX 48.88 1.07 — —
1974- Coaaission Proposal A 0.332168 54.16 2.0/1 48.88 0.07 — --
75 Council Decision A — 0.382168 56.29 6.07. 50.84 4.07 — —
Coaaission Proposal B 0.382168 58.54 10.27. 52.87 8.27 — —
Council Decision B — 0.412489 63.80 20. n 57.61 17.97 — —
Year-end Prices — 0.412489 63.80 20.17. 57.61 17.97 -- --
1975- Coaaission Proposal — NA NA NA NA NA — --
76 Council Decision — 0.421638 71.08 11.47 64.19 11.47 — --
Year-end Prices — 0.471156 79.43 24.57. 71.73 24.57 -- --
1976- Coaaission Proposal — 0.471156 86.87 9.47 67.59 -5.87 76.67 6.97
77 Council Decision — 0.471156 86.58 9.07 66.07 -7.97 74.62 4.07
Year-end prices — 0.471156 86.58 9.07 66.07 -7.97 74.62 4.07
1977- Coatission Proposal — 0.500910 94.77 9.57 72.37 9.57 81.75 9.67
78 Council Decision — 0.485244 92.74 7.17 70.43 6.67 79.54 6.67
V'ear-enc Prices — 0.485244 92.74 7.17 70.43 6.67 79.54 6.67
1978- Coaaission Proposal — 0.500995 98.36 6.17 73.63 4.57 84.67 6.57
79 Council Decision — 0.524589 102.99 11.17 77.10 9.57 86.86 9.27
Year-end Prices -- 0.524589 102.99 11.17 77.10 9.57 86.86 9.27
1979- Coffisii ssion Proposal — 0.552200 108.41 C TVJ » -j it 81.16 5.37 91.43 5.37
BO Council Decision — 0.581264 117.08 13.77 86.88 12.77 97.69 12.57
Year-end Prices — 0.618655 124.61 21.07 92.47 19.97 103.97 19.77
1980- Coaaission Proposal — 0.618655 129.28 3.77 94.13 1.87 105.79 1.77
Si Council Decision — 0.618655 132.40 6.37 96.44 4.37 108.39 4.27
Year-end Prices -- 0.618655 132.40 6.37 96.44 4.37 108.39 4.27
1981- Coaaission Proposal — 0.582603 134.66 1.77 96.26 -0.27 106.16 -2.17
82 Council Decision — 0.618655 142.63 7.77 102.22 6.07 119.23 10.07
Year-end Prices -- 0.618655 142.63 7.77 102.22 6.07 119.23 10.07
1982- Coasission Proposal — 0.592604 146.26 2.57 104.36 2.17 121.72 2.17
83 Council Decision — 0.618655 155.04 8.77 110.91 8.57 129.36 8.57
Year-end Prices -- 0.618655 155.04 8.77 110.91 8.57 129.36 8.57
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UNITED KINGDOM: WHEAT PRICE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS (POUNDS/TONNE ; MARKETING YEARS) (con’t)
Conversion Pound Inter­ Refer­
Factor for Green Target vention ence
Green ECU Rate Price 7. CH Price 2 CH Price 7. CH
1983- Commission Proposal - - 0.604167 157.94 1.97. 112.64 1.62 131.38 1.62
84 - Less Co-Respons. — 0.604167 157.94 1.97. 111.52 0.62 130.07 0.52
Council Decision -- 0.618655 161.72 4.32 114.19 3.07. 133.19 3.02
Year-end Prices -- 0.618655 161.72 4.37. 114.19 3.02 133.19 3.02
GREEN ECU SYSTEM INTRODUCED IN 1984-85; CORRECTING FACTOR ADDS TO PRICES IN THE UK
1984- Coifflission Proposal - - 0.593946 155.26 -4.07. 109.63 ■-4.02 127.87 -•4.02
85 Council Decision 1.033651 0.618655 165.67 2.47. 116.85 2.32 136.30 2.32
Year-end Prices 1.033651 0.618655 165.67 2.4% 116.85 2.37. 136.30 2.37.
1985- Commission Proposal 1.033651 0.61B655 168.16 1.5% 118.60 1.52 138.34 1.52
86 - Less Co-Respons. 1.033651 0.618655 159.75 -3.67. 112.68 ■-3.62 131.42 -■3.67.
Interim Prices 1.033651 0.618655 163.05 -1.62 114.75 ■-1.87. 133.84 •-1.82
Year-end Prices 1.033682 0.618655 170.95 3.22 120.30 3.02 140.32 3.07.
MARKET SYSTEMS REVISED IN 1986-87: BREAD WHEAT REFERENCE PRICE REPLACED WITH 27. PREMIUM; FEED NHEA'
PRICES CUT BY UP TO 57,; 37 CO-RESPONSIBILITY LEVY ASSESSED; AND INTERVENTION RULES MODIFIED
1986- Commissi on Proposal 1.083682 0.618655 171.74 0.52 120.30 0.02 — —
87 Council Decision 1.083682 0.626994 174.05 1.82 121.92 1.32 — —
Year-end Prices 1.125696 0.626994 180.80 5.87. 126.65 5.32 -- —
198’- Cos Proposal (worn) 1.125696 0.646618 183.16 1.37. 128.00 1.12 — --
86 Cos Proposal ire rd ) 1.125696 0.646618 186.41 3.17. 130.61 3.12 -- —
Council Decision 1.137282 0,656148 191.11 5.77. 133.90 5.72 — —
Year-end Prices 1.137282 0.656148 191.11 5.72 133.90 5.72 -- --
1988- Cossission Proposal 1.137282 0.656148 186.78 -2.32 133.90 0.07. — —
89 Council Decision 1.137282 0.675071 192.17 0.67. 137.76 2.92 — —
Year-end Prices 1.137282 0.675071 192.17 0.67. 137.76 2.92 — --
ADDITIONAL 37 (REFUNDABLE) BUDGET STABILIZER LEVY ASSESSED AND INTERVENTION RULES TIGHTENED
1989- Cossission Proposal 1.137282 0.675071 190.23 -1.07. 133.63 •-3.02 — --
90 Council Decision 1.137282 0.701383 197.65 2.92 138.84 0.82 — —
Notes: Prices before 1979 converted at 1 ECU = 1.208953 t UA; the percentage difference in the refer­
ence price in 1976-77 is the change from the intervention price for 1975-76.
Sources: Cosmission Proposals; ASC (various); and Cossission (1988), Taus de Conversion.
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1979-80 C O M (79)10, 5-2-79 OJ No. C 171, 9-7-79 Doc 675/78, 12-3-79 0J No. C 93. 9-1-79 21-6-79
1980-81 C O M (80)10, 7-2-80 OJ No. C 182, 21-7-80 Doc 1-37/80, 2*1-3-80 0J No. C 97, 21-1-80 30-5-80
1981-82 C O M (81)50, 20-2-81 OJ No. C 159, 29-6-81 Doc 1-50/81, 19-3-81 0J No. C 90. 21-1-81 2-1-81
1982-83 C O M (82)10, 27-1-82 OJ No. C 1 H . 6-5-82 Doc 1-30/82/A, 19-3-82 0J No. C 10*1, 11-1-82 18-5-82
1983-8*1 C O M (82)650, 21-12-82 OJ No. C 12-1. 9-5-83 Doc 1-1325/82/A, 28-2-83 OJ No. C 96, 11-1-83 17-5-83
198*1-85 COM (8*1) 20, 21-1-8*1 OJ No. C 103, 16-*1-8*1 Doc 1-1508/83, 2-3-8*! OJ No. C 10*1, 16-1-81 31-3-81
1985-86 C O M (85)50, 30-1-85 No opinion Doc 2-1770/8*1, *1-3-85 OJ No. C 9*1, 15-1-85 **
1986-87 C O M (86)20, 13-2-86 OJ No. C 181, 20-5-86 Doc A2-8/86/A/B/C, OJ No. C 120, 20-5-86 25-1-86
1987-88 COM (87)1, 2*1-2-87* OJ No. C 150, 9-6-87 Doc A2— 10/87, 29-*1-87 OJ No. C 156, 15-6-87 30-6-87
1988-89 C O M (88)120, 25-3-88 OJ No. C 175, *1-7-88 Doc A 2 - 108/88 OJ No. C 187, 18-7-88 11-7-88
Notes:
- 1971-75A and 1971-75B were both acted upon.
* Revised 16-3-87
** Council never approved the cereals price decisions; the Connission inplenented an interin set.
*** The best sources for infornation are the Bulletin of the ECs, OJ L Series, Green Europe NeMsflash, and the 
Hone-GroMn Cereals Authority Marketing Reports.
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